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ABSTRACT
Following exposure to consistent stimulus–stop mappings, response inhibition can become 
automatised with practice. What is learned is less clear, even though this has important theoretical and 
practical implications. The main contribution of this thesis is to investigate how stimulus-stop 
associations are acquired and the conditions under which they influence behaviour. To this end, this 
thesis addressed several outstanding issues concerning the associative architecture of stop learning, 
the role of expectancies, and the specificity of learning in inhibition tasks. Experiments 1-4 provide 
evidence that participants can acquire direct associations between specific stimuli and the stop goal 
without mediation via a single representation of the stop signal. However, these experiments also 
suggest that the influence of stimulus-stop associations on behaviour depends on top-down attentional 
settings: if participants begin to ignore the stop-associated stimuli, the effects of stop learning are 
diminished or eliminated entirely. Across eight experiments, this thesis provides evidence that 
participants generate expectancies during stop learning that are consistent with the stimulus-stop 
contingencies in play. However, Experiments 5-6 indicate that there may be some differences in the 
relationships between stimulus-stop expectancies and task performance under instructed and 
uninstructed conditions; stimulus-stop associations that are acquired via task instructions or via task 
practice have similar effects on behaviour, but seem to differ in how they trigger response slowing for 
the stop-associated items. Experiments 7-8 investigated the role of signal detection processes during 
the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations. To distinguish between stimulus-stop learning and 
stimulus-signal learning, the contingencies between specific stimuli and the stop goal and the 
contingencies between specific stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal were independently 
manipulated. Although these experiments showed evidence of stop/go (goal) learning, there was no 
evidence that participants acquired the stimulus-signal associations. Across four experiments, this 
thesis investigated the specificity of stop learning. Experiments 9-10 compared the effects of training 
on behavioural performance in inhibition (go/no-go) and non-inhibition (two-choice) tasks. The 
results of these experiments revealed that learning in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks could arise 
through similar associative mechanisms, but suggest that the effects of training in these tasks could 
also depend on top-down response settings and general non-associative processes. Experiments 11-12 
investigated the neural specificity of stop learning. These experiments also revealed similar effects of 
training across the go/no-go and two-choice tasks adding weight to the claim that training in 
inhibition tasks primarily influences task-general processes. Combined, the overall conclusion of this 
thesis is that bottom-up control can influence response inhibition but what is learned depends on top-
down factors. It is therefore important to consider bottom-up factors and top-down factors as 
dependent, rather than independent, influences on response inhibition. 
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Modern day life is awash with a multitude of choices, options, and competing courses of action. As 
such, the ability to behave flexibly in response to a rapidly changing environment is one of the most 
powerful commodities available to us. In cognitive psychology, flexible and goal-driven behaviour is 
often attributed to an ‘executive’ or ‘cognitive’ control system (e.g. Logan & Gordon, 2001; Miller & 
Cohen, 2001; Monsell & Driver, 2000; Norman & Shallice, 1986). The term ‘executive control’ is 
typically used to refer to ‘the functions of the cognitive system that allow people to regulate their 
behaviour according to higher-order goals or plans’ (Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014, p. 
497). On a daily basis, we rely on executive control to rapidly configure actions when required, resist 
temptations, and overcome habits (e.g. Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Indeed, impaired 
executive control is linked to a variety of psychopathological and impulse-control disorders, such as 
attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, substance abuse, pathological 
gambling, and eating disorders (Bechara, Noël & Crone, 2006; Crews & Boettiger, 2009; de Wit, 
2009; Fernie, Peeters, et al., 2013; Garavan & Stout, 2005; Nigg, 2001; Noël, Brevers & Bechara, 
2013). Taken together, it would not be an overstatement to say that we would be ‘doomed’ without 
executive control. 
The ‘Homunculus Problem’
Although executive control has been the subject of extensive research over the past century, many 
theories still attribute executive control to an ill-defined set of ‘executive’ control functions1 or, even 
worse, an intelligent agent (a ‘homunculus’) without explaining how control is achieved (Verbruggen, 
McLaren, et al., 2014). This is problematic because the outcomes of cognitive control (e.g. to inhibit a 
prepotent response) are too readily confused with the mechanisms through which control is achieved 
(e.g. ‘response inhibition’). To address the ‘homunculus problem’, Verbruggen and colleagues 
recently suggested that one of the first steps in ‘banishing the control homunculus’ from theories of 
executive control is to consider how control is achieved across different time-scales. 
When researchers describe the time-scale of executive control processes, they commonly 
draw a contrast with ‘automatic’ processes (e.g. Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 
1977). Research has often characterised control processes as dichotomous to ‘automatic’ processes 
1. Correlational research has shown that there are at least three executive control functions: switching between 
tasks (‘shifting’); updating representations stored in working memory (‘updating’); and suppressing irrelevant 
information and stopping irrelevant or inappropriate actions ('inhibition'; Miyake, Friedman, et al., 2000).
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(e.g. Miller & Cohen, 2001; Norman & Shallice, 1986). ‘Executive’ processes are considered to be 
slow, effortful, rule-based, intentional, and ‘top-down’ whereas ‘automatic’ processes are considered 
to be fast, associative, effortless, and ‘bottom-up’2. Even beyond the action control literature, the 
characterisation of controlled and automatic processes as discrete influences on behaviour is 
common3. However, in recent years, it has been suggested that executive and automatic processes may 
be better characterised as a continuum in which executive control begins as ‘top-down’, deliberate, 
intentional, and goal-driven but becomes more ‘bottom-up’ with training (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008a; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Indeed, Verbruggen and colleagues argue that by not 
acknowledging the bottom-up factors that influence control processes ‘we generate an inherently 
limited perspective on the cognitive mechanisms behind action control’ (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 
2014, p. 498). 
To this end, the research presented in this thesis contributes to the action control literature by 
considering the interplay between top-down and bottom-up influences on control. In particular, this 
thesis considers the bottom-up influences on a function of the control system that is often considered 
to a hallmark of ‘top-down’ executive control; ‘response inhibition’ (e.g. Miyake, Friedman, et al., 
2000).
What is ‘Response Inhibition’? 
The term ‘inhibition’ has been linked to a variety of phenomena across several research domains (for 
an overview, see Aron, 2007; Bari & Robbins, 2013). The concept of ‘inhibition’ is commonly used in 
psychology to describe suppression of memories, actions, and attention. However, the exact role of 
inhibition in several paradigms is debated (see e.g. MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). 
The main reason for this debate is that inhibition at the behavioural level mostly cannot be clearly 
operationalised or observed (Aron, 2007). Nevertheless, there is one exception; most researchers 
accept that some kind of inhibition at the behavioural level is required to stop a motor response (see 
MacLeod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson, & Bibi, 2003). In this case, ‘response inhibition’ refers to the ability 
to quickly stop and replace responses that are no longer relevant or that are inappropriate in the 
current task environment (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b). Note, that although the term ‘inhibition’ 
is frequently used in the neuroscience domain, there is no clear relationship between ‘inhibition’ at the 
cellular level and the kind of behavioural inhibition that is the subject of research presented in this 
2. Throughout this thesis, ‘top-down control’ refers to control processes that are ‘guided by internal states or 
intentions’ (Miller & Cohen, 2001, p. 168) whereas ‘bottom-up control’ refers to control processes that are 
guided by lower-level processes in the absence of goals and/or intentions.
3. For example, several behaviour change interventions are based on the idea that automatic and controlled 
(intentional) processes reflect discrete or dichotomous influences on behaviour (for an overview, see Webb & 
Sheeran, 2006).
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thesis (see, e.g. Aron, 2007; Bari & Robbins, 2013)4. 
Response inhibition can occur ‘reactively’ following the detection of an external ‘stop signal’ 
and ‘proactively’ in advance of stop-signal detection. The majority of research has focussed on the 
mechanisms of reactive inhibition, but more recently it has been shown that when people expect a 
stop signal in the near future, they preemptively adjust attentional settings, increase response 
thresholds, or proactively suppress all motor output to enhance detection of the stop signal and to 
prevent premature go responses (e.g. Aron, 2011; Elchlepp, Lavric, Chambers, & Verbruggen, 2016; 
Jahfari, Stinear, Claffey, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen, 
Stevens, & Chambers, 2014; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, Neggers, Kahn, & Vink, 2012). Both reactive 
and proactive response inhibition play a key role in enabling optimal and goal-directed behaviour; 
without the ability to stop habitual or no-longer relevant actions, we would very rapidly find ourselves 
responding to any stimulus that presented itself in our environment. 
Response Inhibition in the Laboratory
Popular paradigms used to study response inhibition in healthy and clinical populations are the go/no-
go task (Donders, 1868/1969) and the stop-signal task (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008b). Figure 1.1 presents typical trial structures for these tasks. 
In the go/no-go paradigm, participants are presented with a series of stimuli and are instructed 
to respond when a ‘go’ stimulus is presented and to withhold their response when a ‘no-go’ stimulus is 
presented (e.g. non-living words = go; living words = no-go; Figure 1.1). The primary index of 
inhibitory control in the go/no-go task is the probability of responding on no-go trials (i.e. 
commission errors) which becomes lower as no-go performance improves. 
In the stop-signal paradigm, participants are required to perform a speeded choice reaction 
time task (e.g. living words = left keypress; non-living words = right keypress; Figure 1.1). On a 
random selection of trials, a stop signal is presented (e.g. an additional visual stimulus or an auditory 
tone) after a variable delay (stop-signal delay; SSD) instructing participants to stop their go response. 
The stop-signal delay is usually varied using an adaptive tracking procedure based on the participants’ 
individual levels of stop performance. Although inhibitory control in the stop-signal task can be 
indexed via the probability of responding on stop trials, manipulating the SSD allows researchers to 
estimate the covert latency of the inhibitory control process in the stop-signal task5 (i.e. the stop-signal 
reaction time; SSRT; Logan, 1981; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen, & 
4. Indeed, inhibition at the cellular (neural) level is even involved in response execution (for an overview, see 
Aron, 2007).   
5. Note that for reasons that will be discussed in Chapter 2, I do not use the SSRT as a measure of inhibitory 
control in the experiments presented in this thesis. This approach is consistent with similar experiments in the 
stop learning literature (e.g. Bowditch, Verbruggen, & McLaren, 2016; Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016; Verbruggen, 
Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014). 
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Wagenmakers, 2014; but see Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013 for a cautionary note about 
estimation methods). 
Figure 1.1. Trial structure in the (a) go/no-go task and (b) stop-signal task. In the go/no-go task, participants are 
required to respond to one class of stimuli (e.g. non-living words = go) and to withhold their response to another 
class of stimuli (e.g. living words = no-go). In the stop-signal task, participants perform a choice reaction time 
task (e.g. non-living words = right keypress; living words = left keypress). On a selection of trials, an additional 
stimulus is presented (in this example, the line beneath the word becoming thicker) after a variable SSD to 
instruct participants to stop their go response. Participants are instructed to respond as quickly and as accurately 
as possible on no-signal (i.e. go) trials, but to stop their response if a stop signal is presented. On no-signal and 
stop-signal trials, the stimulus remains on the screen until the maximum reaction time (MAXRT) has elapsed.
Modelling Performance in Response Inhibition Tasks
Independent Horse-Race Model
Performance in the go/no-go and stop-signal tasks can be modelled as a ‘race’ between a ‘go’ process 
triggered by the presentation of the go stimulus (i.e. a ‘go goal’) and a ‘stop’ process triggered by the 
presentation of the no-go stimulus or the stop signal (i.e. a ‘stop goal’; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 
Van Zandt, et al., 2014; for a review, see Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b).
According to the independent race model, response inhibition depends on the relative 
finishing times of the go and stop processes [Logan & Cowan, 1984; Figure 1.2(a)]. When the stop 
process finishes before the go process [i.e. go RT > (SSRT + SSD)] response inhibition is successful 
and the go response is withheld (i.e. signal-inhibit). On successful stop trials, the inhibition of the go 
response typically occurs within 200-300 ms of stop-signal presentation (Logan & Cowan, 1984). 
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When the go process finishes before the stop process [i.e. go RT < (SSRT + SSD)], response 
inhibition is unsuccessful and the go response is executed (i.e. signal-respond)6. The independent race 
model assumes that the SSD will influence the relative finishing time of the stop process; when the 
SSD is increased the stop process will start later and will be more likely to finish after the go process 
(i.e. stopping is unsuccessful); when the SSD is decreased the stop process will start earlier and will 
be more likely to finish before the go process [i.e. stopping is successful; for a visual depiction of this 
idea, see Figure 1.2(b)]. 
Variants of the Independent Horse-Race Model
Although the independent race model can account for performance in most response inhibition tasks, 
there are some situations where it cannot. Therefore, some variants of the independent race model 
have been proposed to address its shortcomings. In this section, I briefly focus discuss two of these 
variants, the interactive race model and the blocked-input model, that are relevant to the research 
presented in this thesis. 
A central assumption of Logan and Cowan’s (1984) model is that the go and stop processes 
race independently against each other. Most research supports the independence assumption but some 
behavioural studies have shown that the independence assumption is often not met when the SSD is 
short (e.g. Logan & Buskell, 1986; Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015; Logan, Van Zandt, et 
al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2015). Furthermore, the independence assumption is inconsistent 
with some neuroimaging research (Aron, Durston, et al., 2007; Hanes, Patterson, & Schall, 1998). 
Thus, an ‘interactive race model’ (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007) was devised to account 
for the dependence between the go and stop processes. The ‘interactive race model’ assumes that the 
go and stop processes are independent during an initial afferent delay period following the 
presentation of the stop signal, but that they briefly interact when the stop unit becomes active. On no-
signal (go) trials, activation in a go unit (i.e. the go ‘goal’) begins to accumulate following the 
presentation of the go stimulus and the go response is executed when an activation threshold is 
reached. On stop-signal trials, activation of the go unit begins to accumulate in much the same way as 
on no-signal trials; the initiation of the stop process begins following the presentation of the stop 
signal and activation of the stop unit (i.e. the stop ‘goal’) begins after this initial delay. When response 
inhibition is successful, the stop unit is activated before activation in the go unit reaches threshold; 
when response inhibition is unsuccessful, activation in the go unit reaches threshold before the stop 
unit is activated. Thus, according to the ‘interactive race model’ the go and stop processes remain 
6. In support of the race idea, it is often the case that RTs on unsuccessful stop trials are faster than RTs on no-
signal trials because only the fastest go responses can escape inhibition [e.g. Logan & Cowan, 1984; see also 
Bissett & Logan, 2011; see also Figure 1.2(b)]. 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
24
independent for the majority of their latencies, before they interact towards the end (for reviews, see 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2009b). 
Another shortcoming of the independent race model is that whilst it provides a good 
explanation of whether and when a response is inhibited, it does not address how the go response is 
inhibited. In other words, the independent race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984) describes well the race 
between the go and stop processes, but does not describe what happens after the stop process has won 
the race. Boucher and colleagues’ interactive race model addressed this shortcoming with the 
suggestion that the activation of the stop unit slows the accumulation of activation in the go unit (i.e. 
the go response; Boucher, Palmeri, et al., 1998). Recently, however, an alternative model was 
proposed which assumes that response inhibition is achieved by blocking input to the go unit instead 
of inhibiting the accumulation of activation in the go unit (Logan, Yamaguchi, et al., 2015). In sum, 
the blocked-input model assumes that go responding can be inhibited by disabling the link between 
the perceptual system and the motor system (Logan, 1983) or by deleting the goals that allow for the 
go response (Logan & Cowan, 1984).
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Figure 1.2. (a) Visual depiction of the independent race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). When response 
inhibition is successful, the stop process finishes before the go process (i.e. signal-inhibit); when the response 
inhibition is unsuccessful, the go process finishes before the stop process (i.e. signal-respond) (b) Inhibition 
function based on the independent race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984). The area under the curve to the left of 
the red dashed line is the probability of a signal-respond trial; the area to the right of the red dashed line is the 
probability of a signal-inhibit trial. This figure also shows the mean signal-respond RT and the mean go RT. 
This shows why signal-respond RTs are faster than mean go RTs: signal-respond RTs are calculated on the basis 
of the fastest RTs that escaped inhibition (i.e. the RTs to the left of the red dashed line) whereas go RTs are 
calculated based on the whole RT distribution. This figure also illustrates that the probability of responding on 
stop trials depends on three factors: the SSD, the SSRT, and the go RT distribution. SSD = stop-signal delay; 
SSRT = stop-signal reaction time.
The Neural Mechanisms of Response Inhibition
An extensive body research has been conducted into the neural mechanisms of response inhibition. To 
avoid repetition with forthcoming sections of this thesis, I primarily focus on neuroimaging and brain 
CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION
26
stimulation (transcranial magnetic stimulation; TMS7) studies here. A comprehensive review of 
electrophysiology research on response inhibition can be found in Chapter 6. 
Response inhibition depends on a ‘stopping’ network of cortical and subcortical regions 
comprising the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; ventrolateral prefrontal cortex), the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA), and the basal ganglia (e.g. Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Rubia, 
Taylor, et al., 2001; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010; for reviews, see e.g. Aron, 2007; Chambers, Garavan, & 
Bellgrove, 2009). In particular, research has especially highlighted the critical role of the right IFG for 
successful response inhibition. For example, the use of TMS has provided causal evidence for the 
involvement of the right IFG in successful response inhibition (Chambers, Bellgrove, et al., 2006, 
2007). Furthermore, neuroimaging research has shown that when response inhibition is successful, 
activation in the right IFG negatively correlates with the latency of the stop process (i.e. the SSRT; 
Aron & Poldrack, 2006; Chevrier, Noseworthy, & Schachar, 2007). The most common interpretation 
is that the right IFG is an ‘inhibitory hub’ specialised for response inhibition (e.g. Aron, Robbins, & 
Poldrack 2004; van Boxtel, van der Molen, Jennings, & Brunia, 2001). However, alternative accounts 
have suggested that the right IFG is involved in more general processes, such as stop signal detection 
and/or action updating (i.e. replacing the action plan to ‘go’ with the action plan to ‘stop’; Dodds, 
Morein-Zamir, & Robbins, 2011; Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan, & Owen, 2010; Mars, 
Piekema, Coles, Hulstijn, & Toni, 2007). In support of the latter interpretation, the use repetitive TMS 
has shown that the right IFG can be functionally segregated into a dorsal region responsible for the 
detection of visual changes in the environment, and a ventral region responsible for action updating 
(Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010; see also, Chikazoe, Jimura, et al., 2009; Levy & 
Wagner, 2011)8.
Alongside, the right IFG, research has also focussed on discerning the relative contributions 
of the pre-SMA and the basal ganglia regions. Common interpretations are that the pre-SMA is 
involved in updating current action plans and monitoring for response conflict (e.g. Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004) and the basal ganglia is involved in the selection of 
response alternatives, (e.g. to go or to stop) based on prior experiences (Aron & Poldrack, 2006; 
Chambers, Garavan, et al., 2009; Cohen & Frank, 2009; Graybiel, 2005). 
Current research suggests that there are three pathways through which these regions could 
interact in order to suppress motor output; the direct pathway (also involved in going), the indirect 
pathway, and the hyperdirect pathway (Aron, Durston, et al., 2007; Nambu, Tokuno, & Takada, 2002; 
7. TMS generates a transient electrical current in the brain, meaning that neural activity can be disrupted in a 
given region. The advantage of TMS over neuroimaging techniques is that it allows researchers to establish the 
causal contribution of a given brain region to the cognitive process of interest (e.g. O’Shea & Walsh, 2007). 
8. Note, however, that recent research suggests that there could be something ‘special’ about response inhibition 
after all, but it remains unclear exactly ‘what’ is special about response inhibition (see, e.g. Maizey, unpublished 
PhD thesis). 
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Wiecki & Frank, 2013). An in-depth overview of these pathways is beyond the scope of this 
introduction (but for an overview, see Jahanshani, Obeso, Rothwell, & Obeso, 2015). However, for 
the purposes of this thesis, it is important to highlight that these different pathways could support both 
global and specific forms of response inhibition. For example, it has been suggested that the indirect 
pathway could support a relatively slow but selective inhibition of specific responses (e.g. inhibit left 
keypress; Aron, 2011; Aron & Verbruggen, 2008) whereas the hyperdirect pathway could support a 
fast, but global inhibition of the motor system (e.g. inhibit all responses; see Wiecki & Frank, 2013). I 
will return to this distinction later in this chapter (see Does Stimulus-Stop Learning Have a Global or 
Specific Effect on Responding?). 
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Forms of Response Inhibition
Most research in the action control literature attributes response inhibition to ‘top-down’ control. 
However, in the past decade, growing evidence has suggested that response inhibition is less 
‘executive’ than originally thought. In this section, I review two lines of research in support of this 
idea showing that response inhibition can become ‘a prepared reflex’ readily triggered by information 
in the environment or a ‘learned reflex’ triggered by the retrieval of previously acquired associations 
between stimulus and stopping (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). 
Response Inhibition as a ‘Prepared Reflex’
Many cognitive control theories attribute successful response inhibition to the intentional activation 
of a stopping process (e.g. Logan & Gordon, 2001; Miller & Cohen, 2001). However, recent research 
suggests that when processes involved in action control are prepared in advance, the actual initiation 
of action control may not require much ‘control’ at all (Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 2016; Verbruggen, 
McLaren, et al., 2014). In other words, top-down control could become a ‘prepared reflex’. The term 
‘prepared reflex’ here refers to idea that ‘stimuli can reflexively trigger the corresponding action 
based on instructed or planned stimulus–response (S–R) information, even without any prior 
practice’ (Cohen-Kdoshay & Meiran, 2009, p. 128). More generally, the idea that response inhibition 
can become a ‘prepared reflex’ is consistent with the ‘implementation intentions’9 idea that preparing 
controlled behaviours in advance means that the actual execution of top-down control can be rapid 
and unintentional (Gollwitzer, 1999; for a discussion, see Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014).
In support of the ‘prepared reflex’ idea, several studies have demonstrated that response 
inhibition can be triggered by the presentation of primes in go/no-go and stop-signal tasks. For 
example, in a series of experiments, van Gaal and colleagues demonstrated that responding on go 
trials was slower when the go stimulus was preceded by the presentation of a low-visibility (masked) 
9. ‘Implementation intentions’ refer to the formation of ‘if-then’ plans that specify goal-directed behaviours in 
response to situations cues (e.g. ‘if placed in situation X, I will execute behaviour Y’; Gollwitzer, 1999).
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no-go stimulus or stop signal than when the go stimulus was not preceded by a no-go stimulus or stop 
signal (van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van 
den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009; van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010; van Gaal, 
Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2011)10. In addition to these behavioural results, van Gaal and 
colleagues demonstrated that the presentation of a low-visibility no-go stimulus or stop signal 
activated regions in the ‘inhibitory control network’ (the inferior frontal gyrus and the pre-SMA; van 
Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010) and elicited event-related potential components 
thought to reflect processes involved in successful response inhibition (the N2 and P3 components; 
van Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort, & Ridderinkhof, 2010; for similar findings, see Hughes, Velmans, & 
De Fockert, 2009), even though a go response was required. Importantly, the degree of activation in 
the inhibitory control network and the amplitude of the event-related potential components correlated 
with the magnitude of the observed slowing for the go responses on low-visibility prime trials. Thus, 
these neuroimaging and electrophysiology findings support the conclusion that the slowing to the go 
stimuli observed on prime trials was due, at least in part, to the initiation of stopping by the masked 
no-go and stop-signal stimuli. Taken together, van Gaal and colleagues’ findings provide evidence for 
the ‘prepared reflex’ idea because they show that the stop goal can be triggered by the presentation of 
low-visibility primes even when the explicitly instructed task goal is to respond.
In the van Gaal experiments, the primes were task-relevant as they instructed whether 
participants should stop on high-visibility stop-signal or no-go trials. However, research has also 
demonstrated that the activation of a stop goal can be primed by task-irrelevant, high-visibility cues 
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). In a series of experiments, Verbruggen and Logan (2009c) presented 
the primes ‘GO’, ‘###’, and ‘STOP’ inside shapes (circles or squares). In a first experiment, 
participants were required to respond to the shape (e.g. circle = left keypress; square = right keypress, 
or vice versa) but were required to stop this response if an additional auditory tone (the stop signal) 
was presented. Participants were instructed to ignore the primes presented in the centre of the shapes 
(i.e. the primes were always task-irrelevant). In support of the ‘prepared reflex’ idea, responding on 
go trials in which the ‘STOP’ prime was presented was slower than on go trials in which the ‘###’ 
prime or the ‘GO’ prime was presented. Verbruggen and Logan (2009c) replicated these findings in a 
subsequent experiment where the same primes were used but as stop signals. Similar findings have 
also been demonstrated in a go/no-go task where the go stimulus was flanked by other stimuli that 
were irrelevant to the task; the results showed that when the flankers were presented in the same 
colour as the no-go stimulus they suppressed motor responding (Anderson & Folk, 2012, 2014). 
10. van Gaal and colleagues interpreted these priming effects as reflecting the ‘unconscious’ activation of 
stopping. However, these claims about (un)consciousness should be interpreted caution. Although a body of 
research supports the idea of ‘unconscious’ or automatic priming (for an overview, see Papies & Aarts, 2016), 
Newell and Shanks (2014) argued that the detection tasks used by van Gaal, et al. are not sensitive enough to 
accurately assess awareness.
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A key feature of these priming effects is that they appear to depend on top-down control. In 
the Verbruggen and Logan (2009c) experiments, the ‘STOP’ prime only activated the stop goal in 
tasks where stopping was relevant to task performance (e.g. in stop-signal or go/no-go tasks) but not 
in a task where stopping was irrelevant to task performance (e.g. participants were always required to 
go). Furthermore, Chiu and Aron (2014) showed that the van Gaal priming effects (i.e. RT slowing 
following the presentation of a masked low-visibility no-go stimulus) only influenced responding in a 
go/no-go task (i.e. in the original van Gaal task) but not on a go-only task condition (that was not 
included in the original van Gaal experiments)11. This is entirely consistent with the ‘prepared reflex’ 
idea; when top-down control is prepared in advance, the actual initiation of control can operate in a 
‘reflex’ like manner following the presentation of ‘trigger’ stimuli in the environment (i.e. you need 
some ‘control’ before you can observe the reflex).
Combined, these priming findings show that response inhibition can be triggered by 
‘unconscious’ or task-irrelevant cues in the environment. Another feature of a ‘prepared reflex’ is that 
a behaviour can be triggered by stimuli based on instructed (S-R) contingencies that have not received 
any prior practice (Cohen-Kdoshay & Meiran, 2009). Recent research suggests that similar effects to 
those observed for stimulus-response instructed contingencies can also be obtained for instructed but 
not overtly practiced stimulus-stop contingencies (Liefooghe, Degryse, & Theeuwes, 2016). In the 
Liefooghe, Degryse, et al. task, participants were provided with explicit go/no-go task instructions 
(e.g. “if Q, press left”, “if E, do not press”). However, prior to performing the go/no-go task 
participants performed a number of trials of a two-choice task in which they had to respond to the 
orientation of a series of letters (e.g. upright = left keypress; italic = right keypress). The main finding 
was that responding was slower in the two-choice task to stimuli that were assigned to the no-go 
mapping in the go/no-go task instruction (e.g. “E”) than for stimuli assigned to the go mapping in the 
go/no-go task instructions (e.g. “Q”), even though response inhibition was not required in the two-
choice task. Note that the key feature of this experiment is that the go/no-go task instructions were not 
overtly practiced prior to performance of the two-choice task. Thus, when response inhibition is 
prepared on the basis of task instructions, these findings suggest that response inhibition can be 
triggered even when the instructed contingencies were irrelevant to the task and were not previously 
practiced. 
Response Inhibition as a ‘Learned Reflex’
The ‘prepared reflex’ idea suggests that response inhibition can depend on an interplay between top-
down and bottom-up factors. However, it is possible that after some practice, top-down control may 
11. Note, however, that some concerns have been raised about the priming manipulation used by Chiu and Aron 
(2014); Lin and Murray (2015) showed that differences in the priming effect between the go/no-go and the go 
only conditions reported by Chiu and Aron (2014) could arise from differences in awareness of the primes rather 
than differences in the executive setting (as originally proposed).
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not be required at all. When there is a consistent mapping between specific stimuli and the stop goal 
or response, stimulus-stop associations or ‘bindings’ could form. With sufficient training, the retrieval 
of these associations could activate the stop goal12 in a bottom-up manner, eliminating the need for 
top-down control entirely (e.g. Logan, 1988; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
In this section, I will review evidence that response inhibition can become a ‘learned reflex’ triggered 
by the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations from memory. 
Sequential after-effects. Research using modified versions of the go/no-go and stop-signal 
tasks has demonstrated that there are both short-term and long-term after-effects of stopping (e.g. 
Bissett & Logan, 2011; Enticott, Bradshaw, Bellgrove, Upton, & Ogloff, 2009; Rieger & Gauggel, 
1999; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe, & Vandierendonck, 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). The 
typical finding is that responding to a stimulus is slowed following a stop-signal trial, especially if the 
go stimulus presented on the preceding stop trial is repeated (Bissett & Logan, 2011; Verbruggen, 
Logan, et al., 2008). A compelling hypothesis proposed for the observed slowing is that the stimulus 
presented on a stop-signal trial becomes associated with the stop goal (e.g. see Bissett & Logan, 
2011). When the stop goal is ‘bound’ or associated to the stimulus on trial n-1 and this stimulus is 
repeated on trial n, the stop goal is retrieved and this slows responding (Rieger & Gauggel, 1999; 
Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). The stimulus-stop association idea in 
the sequential after-effects literature overlaps with the ‘do-not-respond’ tag account of negative 
priming13. According to the ‘do-not-respond’ tag account, a ‘do-not-respond’ or ‘ignore-it’ tag 
becomes associated with the old distractor stimulus; repeating the distractor as a target stimulus on a 
subsequent trial retrieves this tag which slows go responding (Neill, Valdes, Terry & Gorfein, 1992; 
Neill & Valdes, 1992). However, it is perhaps no surprise that there are similarities between the ‘do-
not-respond’ tag idea and the stimulus-stop association idea as both accounts are based on the 
principles of memory-retrieval theories (e.g. Instance theory; Logan, 1988; for details, see What is 
‘Automaticity’?). 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the sequential after-effects demonstrated in the 
aforementioned studies are assumed to reflect the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations rather than 
the inhibition of an acquired stimulus-go association. For example, it might be possible to argue that 
12. The use of the term ‘stop goal’ is consistent with the original work on ‘automatic inhibition’ conducted by 
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a). However, it is important to note that in the context of the research presented in 
this thesis, there is no functional difference between ‘stop goal’ and ‘stop response’. Nevertheless, I use ‘stop 
goal’ throughout primarily to denote that there is no overt response executed on stop trials (for a similar 
rationale, see Giesen & Rothermund, 2014). Furthermore, the term ‘stop goal’ is consistent with research 
suggesting that the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations has a global effect on all go responding rather than a 
selective effect in stopping a specific go response (for a discussion, see Does Stimulus-Stop Learning Have a 
Global or Specific Effect on Responding?). Other broadly synonymous terms used in the literature are ‘stop 
unit’, ‘stop tag’, ‘stop centre’, and ‘stop representation’. 
13. The negative priming effect refers to the finding that performance is generally impaired for target stimuli 
that previously appeared as a distractor in previous trials (e.g. Tipper, 1985). 
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successful response inhibition on the preceding trial(s) might weaken the association between the 
target stimulus and the corresponding go response. However, whilst the inhibition of a stimulus-go 
association explanation may initially seem parsimonious, it cannot explain sequential effects where 
the stimulus associated with stopping is task-irrelevant. In a series of experiments, Giesen and 
Rothermund (2014) used a sequential priming paradigm in which there was a ‘prime’ trial and a 
‘probe’ trial that occurred in succession. On each prime and probe trial, a word was presented and 
participants were required to press the spacebar as soon as the word appeared. On a selection of prime 
and probe trials, an additional auditory tone (i.e. the stop signal) was presented to instruct participants 
to stop their response. The meaning of the word was always task-irrelevant. Crucially, the word could 
either be repeated between the prime and probe trials or replaced with a new word. The results 
showed that if participants were required to stop their response on a prime trial, responding was 
slower on the subsequent probe trial if the word identity was repeated. This argues against the 
‘inhibition of a stimulus-go association’ idea because it shows that the retrieval of an stimulus-stop 
association can influence go responding even when the stimulus identity associated with stopping was 
not associated with any go response (i.e. there was no stimulus-response association to be inhibited or 
weakened). Thus, this experiment suggests that the irrelevant stimulus identity (word meaning) 
became associated with the stop goal which was retrieved when the stimulus identity was repeated. 
Response Inhibition as an ‘Automatic Act of Control’. The sequential after-effects 
research suggests the presentation of a stop signal can affect performance up to 20 trials following 
stop-signal presentation (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). Thus, the relatively long-lasting nature of 
stimulus-stop associations reported in the sequential after-effects literature suggests that an automatic 
form of response inhibition could develop if the stimulus-stop associations were reinforced within a 
training phase. After all, as will be reviewed in more detail below (see ‘What is ‘Automaticity’?), the 
formation of associations between specific stimuli and responding may be the first step towards 
automaticity (Logan, 1989, 1990, 1992).
In a series of experiments, Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) examined the idea that inhibitory 
control in go/no-go and stop-signal tasks can be triggered automatically via the retrieval of stimulus-
stop associations from memory. In one experiment, participants performed a go/no-go task in which a 
word category determined if a participant should respond or not (e.g. living word referents = go; non-
living word referents = no-go; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 1). After a training phase, the 
go/no-go mapping was reversed in a test phase. It was found that responding to the old stop stimuli 
was slower than responding to new stimuli that were not previously presented during training 
(consequently, these new stimuli were not associated with going or stopping). Similar differences 
were also found in a go/no-go task in which the judgments changed between the training and test 
phases; participants made living/non-living judgments in the training phase and small/large judgments 
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in the test phase (or vice versa; Experiment 2). Responding was slower for the inconsistent items (i.e. 
no-go in the training phase task but go in the test phase task) than for the consistent items (i.e. go in 
both the training and test phases). 
Based on these findings, Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) proposed the ‘automatic inhibition 
hypothesis’; following training, ‘automatic inhibition’ occurs when old no-go items retrieve the stop 
goal, even when go responding is required. In its traditional form, the stop-signal task does not allow 
for the formation of stimulus-stop associations because there is no consistent mapping between 
specific stimuli and stopping (Figure 1.1). However, in a final experiment Verbruggen and Logan 
(2008a) demonstrated that similar effects to those observed in the go/no-go task could occur in the 
stop-signal task when the mappings between specific stimuli and stop signal presentation are 
manipulated (Experiment 5). In this experiment, there was a training phase in which there was a 
subset of stimuli that was consistently presented on stop-signal trials, a subset of stimuli that was 
consistently presented on no-signal trials, and another subset that was presented on both stop-signal 
and no-signal trials (i.e. these stimuli were not consistently associated with either stopping or going). 
In a test phase, the mappings were reversed such that the stop-associated stimuli were consistently 
presented on no-signal trials. Consistent with the go/no-go experiments, responding was slowed for 
the stimuli that were consistently presented on stop-signal trials during the training phase. The finding 
that responding is slowed for stop-associated stimuli has been subsequently replicated using similar 
paradigms in healthy (e.g. Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan, & 
Poldrack, 2011) and clinical populations (Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016; Woolard, Kose, et al. 2010). 
Combined, these findings suggest that response inhibition may not always require top-down 
‘executive’ control and can become a ‘learned reflex’ when the mappings between specific stimuli are 
consistent throughout task practice. 
Before proceeding, it is important to note that the slowing observed for the old stop-
associated stimuli cannot be accounted for by non-specific sequential effects. For example, due to the 
stimulus-stop manipulation and the fixed overall probability of stop signals, an old stop item (which 
was always ‘go’ in test) would more likely to follow a stop trial than the control items (which were 
‘go’ or ‘stop’) in the test phase. In a recent experiment, participants performed a stop learning task in 
which there was a training (acquisition) phase followed by a test (reversal) phase (Verbruggen, Best, 
et al., 2014, Experiment 1). In an experimental condition, a subset of stimuli were consistently 
presented on stop-signal trials during training, but were presented no-signal trials in the test phase 
(‘stop-then-go’ items) and another subset were presented on stop-signal and no-signal trials with equal 
probability during training (50%) but the trial order was otherwise random. The test trial for these 
items was also always a no-signal trial ('stop/go-then-go'). The trials in the control group followed the 
same sequence as participants in the experimental group but there were no consistent mappings 
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between specific stimuli and stopping. Consistent with the ‘automatic inhibition’ account, the results 
showed that responding in the test phase was slower to ‘stop-then-go’ items than to the ‘stop/go-then-
go’ items in the experimental condition. Importantly, there was no reliable difference between these 
stimulus-types in the control condition. This difference was supported by a reliable condition by 
stimulus-type interaction. The absence of a difference between the stimulus-types in the control group 
indicates that the slowing observed for the stop-then-go items in the experimental group was unlikely 
to be due to general (non-stimulus specific) sequential after-effects of stopping (e.g. goal priorities, 
proactive adjustments; Bissett & Logan, 2011). 
In summary, responding to items that are associated with stopping is slowed compared with 
responding to items that are inconsistently associated with stopping. This slowing has been attributed 
to the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations from memory; when there is a consistent mapping 
between specific stimuli and stopping, associations can form between the stimulus and the stop goal 
over practice. This could allow automatic processing to develop (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).
What is ‘Automaticity’?
The formation of stimulus-stop bindings may be to the first step towards automaticity (Logan, 1990). 
Memory-retrieval accounts of automatisation assume that every time people respond to a stimulus, 
processing episodes are stored as ‘instances’ (Logan, 1988) or ‘event files’ (Hommel, 1998, 2004) in 
memory. These instances or event files may contain information about the stimulus (e.g. the word), 
the interpretation given to the stimulus (e.g. ‘non-living’), the task goal (e.g. ‘go’) and the response 
(e.g. ‘left key press’). These episodes are retrieved when a stimulus is repeated, and will influence 
responding. Logan’s (1988) Instance theory postulates that action selection can be construed as a race 
between an algorithmic response-selection process and a memory-retrieval process; the process that 
finishes first determines which action is selected. The Instance theory assumes that when people begin 
to perform a novel task they rely on general algorithms (i.e. rules) that are sufficient to perform the 
task, but as they get more experienced they begin retrieve the instances stored in memory. When the 
memory-retrieval process wins the race, the decision is said to be automatic; when the algorithmic 
process wins the race, the decision is said to be deliberate or intentional (Logan, 1988, 1990, 1992). 
When the stimulus-response or stimulus-stop mapping is the same throughout practice, 
multiple instances are formed and automatic processing can develop (Logan, 1988, 1990, 1992; 
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Behaviour is considered to be fully automatised when there is ‘single-
step direct access’ of past solutions from memory (Logan, 1988). At this point, the algorithm can be 
abandoned as there are enough instances in memory to respond on the basis of the retrieved instances 
on every trial. In effect, the algorithm races against the fastest instance that can be retrieved from 
memory; as training progresses, the algorithm is more likely to lose the race because the finishing 
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time of the algorithmic process remains the same whereas the finishing time of the memory-retrieval 
process becomes faster. Thus the shift to the memory-retrieval process will either be based on the 
statistical properties of the race between these processes or based on a strategic decision to abandon 
the algorithmic process entirely (Logan, 1988). Either way, during training, the Instance theory 
predicts that reaction times will decrease as a power function of the number of instances stored in 
memory (Logan, 1992; for an example in response inhibition tasks, see Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008a)14. Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) showed that the effects of stop learning emerged after just 
four stimulus presentations.
In summary, memory-retrieval accounts suggest that, with sufficient training, response 
inhibition can become automatised, such that the requirement for top-down control could theoretically 
be eliminated entirely. 
How do Stimulus-Stop Associations Influence Responding?
Theoretical Explanations
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) suggested that the activation of the stop goal following the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations from memory can be best explained by the interactive race model 
(Boucher, Palmeri, et al., 2007; see Modelling performance in response inhibition tasks); following 
training, the go goal can be activated via the retrieval of an association between the go stimulus and 
going and the stop association can be activation via the retrieval of an association between the go 
stimulus and stopping. When a stop-associated stimuli is presented, activation in the stop unit slows 
the rate of accumulation in the go unit. Thus, go RTs are slowed for the stop-associated stimuli 
relative to the control stimuli that were not particularly associated with stopping or going. Verbruggen 
and Logan (2008a) assumed that the activation of the stop unit is weaker when it is incorrectly 
activated on go trials than when it is correctly activated on no-go or stop-signal trials, which explains 
why go responding is slowed following the retrieval of a stimulus-stop association but is only 
occasionally completely inhibited. 
Does Stimulus-Stop Learning Have a Global or Specific Effect on Responding?
In two experiments, Giesen and Rothermund (2014) investigated whether the retrieval of the stop goal 
had a specific effect on responding (e.g. stop left keypress) or a global effect on responding (e.g. stop 
all responses). In these experiments, words were presented in either green or red and participants were 
required to make a left keypress response if the word was presented in green and a right keypress 
response if the word was presented in red. On a selection of trials, an auditory stop signal was 
14. Note that the Instance theory makes no assumptions about the numbers of trials required to reach 
automaticity. Consequently, it is possible that performance on some trials is automatic whereas performance on 
others is (more) algorithmic (Logan, 1988). 
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presented to instruct participants to stop their planned response. Consistent with their previous 
research (see Sequential after-effects, Chapter 1), when the word was repeated on the probe trial 
responding was delayed if the word was presented with a stop signal on the preceding prime trial, 
regardless of the word colour. Importantly, the response slowing on the probe trial was not influenced 
by the response that was stopped on the prime trial and the correct response on the probe trial. 
Although speculative, the global effect on responding observed by Giesen and Rothermund could 
indicate that stimulus-stop associations operate through the hyperdirect neural pathway (see The 
Neural Mechanisms of Response Inhibition, Chapter 1; for similar conclusions, see The Neural 
Mechanisms of Stimulus-Stop Learning, Chapter 1).
The Neural Mechanisms of Stimulus-Stop Learning
To date, a small number of studies have investigated the neural mechanisms of stimulus-stop learning. 
Recent neuroimaging research indicates that the presentation of an old stop-associated stimulus on a 
go trial may activate regions in the inhibitory control network (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al., 2011). 
In a study conducted by Lenartowicz and colleagues, there were two experimental sessions: on day 1, 
participants performed a stop-signal task in which some face stimuli were paired with a stop signal 
more often than other face stimuli; on day 2, participants performed the stop learning task in the MRI 
scanner. The first two blocks in the scanner were training blocks to ensure that participants had not 
forgotten the mappings, then the mappings were reversed in a test phase, such that the old stop-
associated faces were always presented on go trials. Consistent with the predictions of the ‘automatic 
inhibition’ hypothesis, the behavioural data showed that stopping performance improved during the 
training phase for the faces that were consistently paired with stopping compared with the faces that 
were not particularly associated with either stopping or going (these faces presented on stop trials on 
50% of presentations). Following the reversal of the mappings in the test phase, go performance was 
slower for the old stop-associated faces. Importantly, it was found that the right IFG was activated in 
the test phase following the presentation of the old stop-associated faces (even though a go response 
was required). As discussed above (see The Neural Mechanisms of Response Inhibition, Chapter 1), 
several studies have suggested that the right IFG plays a key role in successful stopping (e.g. Aron, 
Robbins, et al., 2004, 2014; Chambers, Garavan, et al., 2009). This suggests that in addition to being 
activated by explicit stop signals, key regions of the inhibitory control network could be activated 
following the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations associations (cf. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, 
& Lamme, 2010). This is consistent with the idea that the presentation of old stop-associated items 
can activate the stop goal, even when go responding is required. However, although the stimulus-stop 
explanation for these results is plausible, it is important to highlight that the right IFG has been linked 
with a variety of other functions, such as attentional orienting and action selection (e.g. Dodds, 
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Morein-Zamir, et al., 2011; Hampshire, Chamberlain, et al., 2010) meaning that the activation 
observed by Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al. cannot be conclusively attributed to the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations15. Nevertheless, on the face of it, these initial findings suggest that there is 
an overlap between the mechanisms of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ forms of response inhibition. 
Consistent with the idea that the presentation of old no-go or stop-associated stimuli suppress 
the accumulation of activation in the ‘go unit’, a TMS study has demonstrated that presentation of old 
no-go stimuli influenced the excitability of the motor cortex (Chiu, Verbruggen, & Aron, 2012). 
Following a training phase, TMS was applied in that study to the cortralateral motor cortex of the go 
response hand and motor-evoked potentials16 were measured after word presentation. Chiu, 
Verbruggen, et al. (2012) showed that motor excitability was suppressed within 100 ms following the 
presentation of old no-go words. The rapid timing of this effect suggests that, at the very least, 
‘automatic inhibition’ reflects a fast, efficient form of inhibition17. The rapid timing of the motor 
suppression is consistent with event-related potential research which showed that following 
performance of an auditory go/no-go task, the topographies of auditory-evoked potentials were 
modulated within ~100 ms of presenting stimuli previously consistently associated with stopping (see 
also Manuel, Grivel, Bernasconi, Murray, & Spierer, 2010). Interestingly, however, there was no 
reduction of corticospinal excitability for no-go stimuli in a consistent condition where the go/no-go 
mappings were not reversed in the test phase. Chiu, Verbruggen, et al. suggested that the effects of go/
no-go learning on the motor cortex could be context dependent. According to this idea, the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations can suppress motor output but these effects appear to be dependent on an 
top-down ‘executive setting’ (a similar conclusion was reached about the response inhibition priming 
work, see Response Inhibition as a ‘Prepared Reflex’, Chapter 1). 
However, it is important to highlight that in addition to the ‘automatic inhibition’ account, 
there is an alternative explanation that could explain why motor excitability is suppressed following 
the reversal of the go/no-go mappings. It was recently suggested that the decreased motor excitability 
for the old no-go items in the inconsistent condition could have been driven, at least in part, by 
conflict between the trained goal or response representation (i.e. no-go) and the required response (i.e. 
‘go’; see Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). Research has suggested that when conflict between 
responses is detected, a global braking mechanism is triggered that prevents premature responding 
15. For example, the stimulus-stop mappings were reversed only when participants entered the scanner. This is 
potentially problematic as participants could have re-learnt the new mappings in the scanner, reducing the 
influence of the previously learnt mappings, and introducing the possibility that the observed right IFG 
activation reflects re-learning, not the effect of retrieving old stimulus-stop associations from memory (e.g. 
Passingham, & Toni, 2001; Wallis, Dias, Robbins, & Roberts, 2001).
16. Motor-evoked potentials provide a measure of corticospinal excitability; reduced corticomotor excitability 
corresponds to inhibition of the motor cortex (e.g. Valls-Solé, Pascual-Leone, Wassermann, & Hallett, 1992).
17. The rapid timing of this effect could correspond to the fast hyperdirect pathway detailed above (for a similar 
claim, see Does Stimulus-Stop Learning Have a Global or Specific Effect on Responding?, Chapter 1; for an 
overview of the hyperdirect pathway, see The Neural Mechanisms of Response Inhibition, Chapter 1).
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(Frank, 2006; Wiecki & Frank, 2013). Thus, although the automatic inhibition and the conflict 
detection accounts both predict slowing for the old no-go items, they propose different mechanisms 
through which the suppression arose. According to the ‘automatic inhibition’ account, it is the direct 
activation of the stop response; according to the the conflict detection account, it is the conflict 
between the indirect activation of the braking mechanism (i.e. after conflict has been detected). In 
their paper, Chiu, Verbruggen, et al. cast doubts on the conflict account because the observed effects 
on motor excitability occurred very rapidly (within 100 ms of stimulus presentation), leaving very 
little time for conflict to be detected. However, some support for the conflict account is provided by a 
recent event-related potential experiment showing that sequential after-effects of stopping do not 
always result from the ‘automatic’ retrieval of the stop goal but rather interference between stop and 
go goals (Oldenburg, Roger, Assecondi, Verbruggen, & Fias, 2012).
Can ‘Top-down’ Forms of Response Inhibition be Trained?
Before proceeding, it is important to highlight that some training effects have been reported in 
response inhibition tasks where there is no consistent stimulus-stop mapping (Berkman, Kahn, & 
Merchant, 2014; Chavan, Mouthon, Draganski, van der Zwaag, & Spierer, 2015; Ditye, Jacobson, 
Walsh, & Lavidor, 2012; Hartmann, Sallard & Spierer, 2015; Logan & Burkell, 1986; Manuel, 
Bernasconi, & Spierer, 2013; but see Cohen & Poldrack, 2008). However, unlike the aforementioned 
stimulus-stop training effects, the absence of consistent stimulus-stop associations in these tasks mean 
that training-effects in these studies are unlikely to reflect the transition from top-down control to 
bottom-up control. Instead, it is seems likely that training-effects in ‘top-down’ response inhibition 
tasks reflect the transition from top-down reactive control to top-down proactive control (for an 
overview of reactive and proactive control, see What is ‘Response Inhibition’?, Chapter 1). In support 
of this suggestion, a recent neuroimaging study suggests that stop-signal training could induce 
strategic (deliberate) changes in performance (Berkman, Kahn, et al., 2014). In Berkman, Kahn, et 
al.’s study, participants performed a stop-signal task across 10 sessions in a three-week period. Neural 
activation was measured at the beginning and at the end training. The neuroimaging results indicated 
that after training, activity in right IFG following stop-signal presentation decreased whereas activity 
prior to stop-signal presentation increased (relative to a control group who competed the task but 
without any stop signals). The observed shift in the timing of activation suggests that training 
encouraged a proactive response strategy, as participants started ‘controlling’ their responses before 
the presentation of the stop signal (for similar claims about the involvement of proactive control in 
top-down training-effects see Verbruggen, Adams, & Chambers, 2012; Verbruggen, Adams, et al., 
2013). Thus, top-down control can be trained, but this seems to reflect in strategic changes to task 
performance rather than the development of automatic forms of inhibition.
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Practical Applications 
Over the past few years, a growing body of research has investigated whether stop learning can be 
used as a behaviour change intervention. Recent studies suggest that training on item-specific 
response inhibition tasks could be an effective way to reduce engagement in impulsive behaviors, 
such as excessive food (Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison, 
Adams, & Chambers, 2015; Lawrence, O’Sullivan, et al., 2015a; van Koningsbruggen, Veling, 
Stroebe, & Aarts, 2014; Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013a, 2013b; 
Veling, van Konningsbruggen, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2014) and alcohol (Bowley, Faricy, et al., 2013; 
Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers, & Jansen, 2011; 
Jones & Field, 2013) consumption in healthy and clinical populations (for meta-analyses see Allom, 
Mullan, & Hagger, 2015; Jones, Di Lemma, et al., 2016). The majority of these studies used 
paradigms in which no-go or stop signals were superimposed over, or presented around, images of 
unhealthy foods or alcohol. The effects of training in these have been assessed in terms of intake 
following task completion (e.g. Houben, 2011; Houben & Jansen, 2011) and outside of the lab for up 
to 6 months following food inhibition training (Allom & Mullan, 2015, Study 1; Lawrence, 
Verbruggen, et al., 2015b) or up to one week following alcohol inhibition training (e.g. Bowley, 
Faricy, et al., 2012; Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012; Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers, 
& Jansen, 2011; Jones & Field, 2013). The effects of training on unhealthy food consumption were 
strongest in individuals who are particularly prone to overeating (‘restrained eaters’; Houben & 
Jansen, 2011; Lawrence, Verbruggen, et al., 2015; Veling, Aarts, & Papies, 2011), in individuals with 
a high appetite, and in individuals who regularly consume the unhealthy food items used in the 
training task (Veling, Aarts, & Stroebe, 2013a, 2013b) suggesting that these training tasks could be 
effective in ‘boosting’ inhibitory control in individuals with low top-down inhibitory control.
Training-effects on consumption appear to be strongest in tasks where there is a consistent 
mapping between the food- and alcohol-related images and stopping (Allom, Mullan, et al., 2015); 
evidence for general training effects in top-down response tasks (i.e. where the stimulus-stop 
mappings are inconsistent) are weak (e.g. Guerrieri, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012). This suggests that 
the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations could play a role in the observed effects on food and 
alcohol consumption. The challenge in this applied research is to develop inhibitory control training 
tasks that have a long-term effect on behaviour. In order to develop effective training protocols, it is 
important to understand the mechanisms through which stimulus-stop associations are acquired and 
the factors that influence the effect of stimulus-stop learning on behaviour. Therefore, alongside being 
of theoretical interest, the research presented in this thesis could also be of interest to researchers in 
the applied inhibitory control training domain. 
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Main Outstanding Issues
In light of the research discussed in this chapter, I propose that there are three main outstanding issues 
that need to be addressed in order to understand how and when response inhibition can become 
automatised: (1) what is learned?; (2) the role of expectancies; and (3) the specificity of stop learning. 
The research presented in this thesis addressed each of these outstanding issues. Therefore, I give a 
brief overview of each issue below. In light of the research discussed in this chapter, I propose that 
there are three main outstanding issues that need to be addressed in order to understand how and when 
response inhibition can become automatised: (1) what is learned?; (2) the role of expectancies; and (3) 
the specificity of stop learning. The research presented in this thesis addressed each of these 
outstanding issues. Therefore, I give a brief overview of each issue below. 
What is Learned?
In a recent review article, it was proposed that there are at least two pathways through which learning 
in response inhibition tasks could influence behaviour (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; for a simplified 
version of this associative architecture, see Figure 1.3). First, there is the direct pathway in which a 
link between a stimulus and the ‘stop goal’ or stop representation is formed. The direct pathway18 was 
assumed in Verbruggen and Logan’s (2008a) original ‘automatic inhibition’ hypothesis; it is via the 
direct pathway that the repeated presentations of stop-associated stimuli can begin to automatically 
activate the stop goal and slow responding on go trials when the mappings are reversed. Second, there 
is the indirect pathway in which a link is formed between a stimulus and a representation of whatever 
stop signal or no-go category was used in the given response inhibition task. The indirect pathway 
exploits the consistent association between the stimulus and the stop signal in response inhibition 
tasks. Verbruggen and colleagues suggested that the acquisition of stimulus-signal associations would 
have important consequences for our understanding of what is learned in response inhibition tasks; 
importantly, under these circumstances the presentation of a stop-associated stimulus could just 
activate the representation of the stop signal rather than the stop goal. This would result in the absence 
of (or severely weakened) stop learning relative to circumstances where participants acquired 
stimulus-stop associations. In support of this these pathways, recent research has shown that the 
slowing observed for old stop-associated stimuli was more pronounced in a condition where the the 
stop-associated stimuli were paired with multiple coloured stop signals than when the stop-associated 
stimuli were paired with a single coloured stop signal (Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016). This 
could indicate that participants in the ‘multiple signal’ group acquired more direct associations 
between the stop items and the stop goal compared with participants in the ‘single signal’ group. 
Thus, there currently exists some (indirect) evidence suggesting that the effects of stop learning are 
18. Note that there is no direct mapping between this direct learning pathway and the direct neural pathway 
outlined earlier (see The Neural Mechanisms of Response Inhibition, Chapter 1). 
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weaker when stimuli are paired with a single representation of the stop signal than when stimuli are 
paired with multiple representations of the stop signal (Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016). However, 
it remains unclear whether participants can acquire direct associations between stimuli and the stop 
goal that are not mediated via a representation of the stop signal or indirect stimulus-signal 
associations when the contingencies between specific stimuli and features of the stop signal are 
manipulated. 
Figure 1.3. Overview of the architecture of the associative stop system (for a more detailed overview, see 
Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). There are two associative routes to activating the stop-goal; a direct pathway 
between the stimulus and the go/stop goal (solid lines), or an indirect pathway between the stimulus or cue and 
the go/stop goal that is mediated via a representation of the go/stop signal (dashed lines).
The Role of Expectancies 
Previous studies in the stop learning literature can be placed into two groups: those in which the 
stimulus-specific stop associations are acquired (in modified stop-signal tasks; e.g. Lenartowicz, 
Verbruggen, et al., 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 5) and those in which a stimulus-
category rule is explicitly instructed (e.g. in the go/no-go task; Chiu, Aron, et al., 2012; Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008a, Experiments 1-4). This raises the issue of whether the influence of stop learning under 
instructed and uninstructed conditions on behaviour operate through similar mechanisms. Research in 
the associative learning literature indicates that people often generate expectancies about the 
characteristics of upcoming trials, even under conditions of uncertainty (McAndrew, Yeates, 
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Verbruggen, & McLaren, 2013; Perruchet, Cleeremans, & Destrebecqz, 2006). However, expectancies 
have not been examined in stop learning studies. Yet, evidence of expectancies could have important 
implications for our understanding of what is learned in response inhibition tasks as it could indicate 
that training induces strategic (deliberate) changes in performance, as participants could learn to 
control their responses before a stop signal is presented (i.e. proactive control), rather than after the 
occurrence of the stop signal (i.e. reactive control). Thus, it is important to investigate the role of 
expectancies during stop learning as evidence for expectancies could undermine the idea that item-
specific stop training causes a shift from top-down control to bottom-up control (i.e. the ‘automatic 
inhibition hypothesis’; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Instead, it would indicate that after practice, 
there is a shift from top-down reactive control to top-down proactive control as seems to be the case 
in top-down response inhibition training (see Can ‘Top-down’ Forms of Response Inhibition be 
Trained?, Chapter 1). 
The Specificity of Stop Learning 
It has been suggested that response inhibition may be similar to response execution in many ways 
(e.g. McLaren & Verbruggen, 2014; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014; see also Mostofsky & 
Simmonds, 2008). Indeed, it has recently been suggested that various forms of action control depend 
on three basic cognitive processes: signal detection, action selection, and action execution 
(Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). These basic cognitive processes can account for performance in 
inhibition and non-inhibition tasks (e.g. Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Ratcliff 
& Smith, 2004; Schall, 2001; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). In the action control literature, however, 
Verbruggen and colleagues suggest that researchers often attribute control to an ill-defined set of 
‘black-box homunculi’ that are assumed to perform control functions, such as ‘response inhibition’, 
rather than considering how control is achieved (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
Consistent with this suggestion, many researchers in stop learning studies explain the effects 
of training in terms of strengthening or improving ‘inhibitory control’ (see, e.g. Spierer, Chavan, & 
Manuel, 2013). This could give the impression that the processes influenced by training are specific to 
response inhibition tasks. However, this seems unlikely. After all, the idea that specific stimuli can 
become associated with stopping shares many similarities with stimulus-response bindings observed 
in other cognitive control paradigms, such as in the task-switching paradigm. A typical finding in the 
task-switching paradigm is that performance is impaired (responding is slower and accuracy is lower) 
when the task changes compared with when it stays the same; a ‘switch cost’ (e.g. Monsell. 2003). 
Allport and colleagues have suggested that the switch cost can be explained in terms of the longer-
term effects of interference via the retrieval of previous stimulus-task associations. In other words, 
they suggest that prior task performance results in the formation of ‘bindings’ between stimulus 
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attributes and the related task-set that hinders performance on switch trials (e.g. Koch & Allport, 
2006; Waszak, Hommel & Allport, 2003, 2004, 2005). Furthermore, similar effects of training to 
those reported by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) have also been shown in non-inhibition tasks (i.e. go 
only tasks; see Horner & Henson, 2009). However, the effects of training in inhibition and non-
inhibition tasks have not yet been compared in the same experimental design. Thus, claims about the 
specificity of stop learning are currently based on indirect cross-experiment comparisons. Therefore, 
it remains an outstanding issue whether the effects of learning are specific to inhibition tasks or 
whether they represent task-general (non-inhibition) effects.
Thesis Outline
The goal of this thesis is to increase understanding of how stimulus-stop associations are acquired and 
to investigate the conditions under which stop learning influences behaviour.
In Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-4), I focus on two of the main outstanding issues highlighted 
above (see Main Outstanding Issues, Chapter 1): (1) can participants acquire stimulus-stop 
associations that are not mediated via a single representation of the stop signal (i.e. is there support for 
the direct pathway?; see above); and (2) what is the role of expectancies during stimulus-stop 
learning? To this end, participants performed a task that combined features of the go/no-go and stop-
signal tasks in which the stop-signal rule changed at the beginning of each block. Furthermore, 
expectancies were measured following task completion (Experiments 1-3) or measured within the 
task (Experiment 4). 
In Chapter 3 (Experiments 5-6), I take a closer look at the role of expectancies during the 
acquisition of item-specific stop learning. To investigate whether stimulus-stop learning could induce 
strategic (deliberate) changes in performance, I adapted a paradigm that was specifically developed to 
examine the effects of proactive control in the stop-signal task. Furthermore, to examine the 
contributions of explicit expectancies and learning, I introduced a between-subjects expectancy 
manipulation in which one group of participants were explicitly informed about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies and another group did not receive any information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies. 
In Chapter 4 (Experiments 7-8), I directly investigate whether participants can acquire 
stimulus-signal associations when the representation of the signal remains the same throughout 
training (i.e. the indirect pathway; Figure 1.3). Participants performed a go/stop learning task in which 
the contingencies between specific stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal were 
manipulated, in addition to the contingencies between specific stimuli and the stop goal. 
In Chapter 5 (Experiments 9-10), I concentrate on another of the outstanding issues 
highlighted above: the specificity of learning in response inhibition tasks. Currently, very little is 
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known about whether training in response inhibition tasks influences specific inhibition processes or 
more general processes involved in the performance of inhibition and non-inhibition tasks. I aimed to 
advance on this position by comparing the effects of learning on behaviour in the go/no-go task with 
the two-choice task.
In Chapter 6 (Experiments 11-12), I investigate the neural mechanisms of stop learning. 
Previous electrophysiology studies have suggested that the N2 and P3 event-related potential 
components are sensitive to training in the go/no-go task. However, no study has investigated the 
specificity of these effects. Therefore, I followed-up on the behavioural findings reported in Chapter 5 
by comparing the effects of training (within-subjects) on the latencies and amplitudes of the N2 and 
P3 components in inhibition (go/no-go) and non-inhibition (two-choice) tasks. 
In Chapter 7, I summarise the main findings of the research presented in this thesis. 
Furthermore, I discuss the contribution of this thesis to our understanding of action control, highlight 
the limitations of the experiments presented, and provide some suggestions for future research.
44
CHAPTER 2: ASSOCIATIONS AND EXPECTANCIES
45
CHAPTER 2
ASSOCIATIONS AND EXPECTANCIES IN RESPONSE INHIBITION TASKS
Current research in the stop-learning literature appears to provide strong support for the ‘automatic 
inhibition’ account that postulates that stimuli can become associated with the act of stopping. 
However, as outlined in Chapter 1, it is still unclear exactly what is learned in these tasks and how 
learning influences performance. The present chapter was designed to address two of the main 
outstanding issues that were highlighted in Chapter 1 (similar issues were also recently raised in the 
context of S-R bindings; Henson, Eckstein, Waszak, Frings & Horner, 2014): (1) are associations 
between stimuli and stopping direct, and (2) to what extent does expectancy play a role?
Are Associations Between Stimuli and Stopping Direct?
The automatic inhibition account assumes that people learn direct associations between a stimulus and 
the act of stopping in go/no-go tasks and modified versions of the stop-signal task. However, the 
results of a recent experiment are inconsistent with this account (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). In 
that experiment, participants made speeded semantic categorisations (living/non-living) of a series of 
words. On some trials (stop-signal trials) an additional visual signal was presented below the word, 
instructing participants to withhold their planned response. Certain words were consistently presented 
on stop-signal trials, whereas other words were presented on go and stop-signal trials with equal 
probability. Verbruggen, Best, et al. found that the probability of responding on stop-signal trials was 
lower for the consistent words than for the inconsistent words in the training phase, indicating that 
learning had occurred. However, there was no evidence of a go RT difference between the old stop 
words and the inconsistent words when the stimulus-stop mapping was subsequently reversed in the 
test phase. In other words, learning influenced stop performance on signal trials in the training phase, 
but it did not influence go performance on no-signal trials in the test phase. Verbruggen, Best, et al. 
proposed that this pattern of results indicates that participants learned stimulus-signal associations 
rather than stimulus-stop associations. Such associations between the stop words and the stop signal 
(i.e. the line turning bold) will prime the representation of the stop signal rather than the stop goal. 
Signal detection plays a critical role in successful stopping (e.g. Verbruggen, Stevens & Chambers, 
2014), and computational work suggests that a considerable proportion of the stopping latency is 
occupied by perceptual or afferent processes (Boucher, Palmeri, et al., 2007; Logan, Van Zandt, et al., 
2014; Logan, Yamaguchi, et al., 2015; Salinas & Stanford, 2013). Thus, by priming the representation 
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of the stop signal, learning could lead to improvements in stopping performance on stop-signal trials 
without influencing responding on go trials in the test phase.
The idea that participants could learn stimulus-signal associations is also consistent with a 
range of research on learning and conditioning in humans and other animals indicating that stimulus 
detection can itself become conditioned (McLaren, Wills, & Graham, 2010) and, of course, that links 
between perceptual stimuli can be established. As an illustrative (and rather basic) example, in a 
classic autoshaping paradigm with pigeons, the presentation of a conditioned stimulus (e.g. a 
keylight) and an unconditioned stimulus (e.g. the delivery of food) usually co-occur. With practice, 
the presentation of the conditioned stimulus alone can come to elicit the conditioned response (e.g. 
pecking at this key). The conditioned stimulus can activate this response via two routes; either 
indirectly via the CS-US link, or more directly, via a CS-R link (Hall, 2002). Thus, it seems plausible 
that learning can also influence perception of the no-go or stop signal in response-inhibition 
paradigms. 
The potential for stimulus-signal associations has important implications for the interpretation 
of previously reported behavioural effects in the stop-learning literature. Previous studies that have 
used no-go or stop signals to manipulate stimulus-stop learning cannot distinguish between stimulus-
goal and stimulus-signal learning. It is therefore possible that previously observed RT effects and 
neural activations (Lenartowicz , Verbruggen, et al., 2011; Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010) could be 
mediated by a link between the stimulus, the stop signal, and stopping (see Figure 1.3, Chapter 1). 
Similarly, in go/no-go experiments in which the go/no-go rules are explicit (e.g. living = go, non-
living is no-go), the stimulus-stop association could be mediated via the go/no-go category (e.g. ‘desk 
= non-living -> non-living = no-go’, instead of ‘desk = no-go’)19. 
In addition to being of theoretical interest, the idea of stimulus-stop associations also has 
implications for applied stop-training research as stimulus-signal learning could reduce or even 
eliminate the effect of stop training on behaviour (for an overview of the applied inhibition training 
literature, see Practical Applications, Chapter 1). For example, if participants acquired stimulus-
signal associations the effects of inhibitory control training on food- or alcohol-consumption (if any) 
would only occur when in the presence of the stop signal. Thus, it is important to establish whether 
there is any evidence for the original idea (i.e. as suggested by Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) that 
direct associations can be acquired between a stimulus and the stop goal, without mediation via a 
representation of the stop signal (or no-go category). To discourage the formation of stimulus-signal 
associations, the stop signal and the task rules changed at the beginning of each block. As previous 
studies in the stop learning literature have all used a constant signal representation, the demonstration 
of response slowing for consistent stop items in the present study would provide the strongest 
19. Mediation via a category representation may actually have an adaptive advantage because it would reduce 
the memory-load of saving all individual instances in memory (for a similar idea, see Arrington & Logan, 2004). 
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evidence to date that, at least in some situations, participants can acquire direct stimulus-stop 
associations. 
What is the Role of Expectancy in Stimulus-Stop Learning?
In the associative-learning literature, there is an on-going debate surrounding the involvement of 
explicit and implicit processes in the acquisition of stimulus-action associations (Mitchell, De 
Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009). To make a broad distinction, ‘explicit’ processes are assumed to be 
controlled, intentional, effortful and rule-based; by contrast, ‘implicit’ processes are assumed to be 
automatic, effortless, and associative (e.g. McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994; for a recent 
discussion of the distinction between associative and propositional processes, see McLaren, Forrest, et 
al., 2014)20. Expectancy ratings have been used to dissociate between the two processes (e.g. 
McLaren, Forrest, et al., 2014; Newell & Shanks, 2014). In the context of stop-learning, this 
dissociation between rule-based processes and associative (S-S or S-R) processes has important 
theoretical implications. After all, expectancy of a stop signal for old stop items could indicate that the 
response slowing observed for old stop items is due to proactive inhibitory control, rather than 
‘automatic inhibition’. When a cue indicates that a stop signal is likely to occur on the following 
trial(s), participants proactively increase response thresholds or suppress motor activation (e.g. 
Jahfari, Verbruggen, et al., 2012; Ramautar, Kok, & Ridderinkhof, 2004; Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009a; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, et al., 2013). Stimuli associated with stopping could act as such cues 
(e.g. ‘if stimulus X then p(stop) is high’), and participants would adjust their response strategies 
accordingly. In other words, slowing for old stop items could be due to proactive control (which may 
be conceived as another ‘algorithmic’ process; cf. Logan, 1988), rather than to the direct activation of 
the stop response via memory retrieval. The role of expectancy-driven processes is also relevant for 
the applied stop-training research. Indeed, the extent to which training effects like these reflect 
implicit or associative effects has been called into question. For example, Boot and colleagues (2013) 
argued that many ‘control’ training effects could be due to changes in expectations and demand 
characteristics. The involvement of expectancies would have implications for the longevity of these 
inhibitory control training effects and the variability of training efficacy across individuals (cf. Boot, 
Simons, Stothart, & Stutts, 2013). 
In the present chapter the role of expectancy in stimulus-stop learning was investigated via 
the inclusion of an additional dependent variable that was sensitive enough (Newell & Shanks, 2014) 
20. Note that the 'consciousness’ is also often referred to in this distinction. However, the unconscious/conscious 
characteristics of explicit/implicit processes are subject to intense debate (see, e.g. Shanks & St John, 1994). 
This is primarily because it very difficult to assess whether a given process was performed unconsciously. 
However, for the purposes for the present chapter, it is important to highlight that conscious awareness of a 
stimulus-stop association does not necessarily indicate that stop learning was not automatic (for a discussion, 
see Is ‘automatic inhibition’ truly automatic?, Chapter 1). 
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to detect stimulus-stop learning following task completion (Experiments 1-3) or within the task 
(Experiment 4).
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, features of a go/no-go task and a stop-signal task were combined. The go/stop task 
used was based on those used in studies examining the effects of no-go training effects on food and 
alcohol consumption (see Practical Applications, Chapter 1). Similar to picture-word Stroop tasks 
(see e.g. MacLeod, 1991), go and stop signals were superimposed over forty neutral images. There 
was no delay between the presentation of the images and the signals (i.e. zero ms). A subset of the 
images was consistently associated with stop signals (75% stop), another subset was consistently 
associated with go signals (100% go), and the remaining images were control images (25% stop). 
After twelve training blocks (80 trials per block), the mappings were reversed, and participants had to 
respond to the stop-associated images. Participants were not informed about the mappings, but they 
were told at the beginning of each block what the go and stop signals were. To discourage the 
formation of stimulus-signal or stimulus-category associations, the representation of the go and stop 
signals was varied at the beginning of each block. It was predicted that this change manipulation 
would encourage the formation of image-stop associations (cf. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) instead 
of image-signal associations (i.e. S-R rather than S-S learning). Learning during task performance 
was indexed via two measures. The first index was the probability of responding on the stop trials, 
p(respond|stop), which was predicted to be lower for stop-associated images than for the control 
images. The second index was RT on go trials, which was predicted to be longer for the stop-
associated images than for the control images. To examine the role of expectancy in stop learning, 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they expected to withhold their response for each 
of the images presented in the task at the end of the experiment.
Method 
Participants. Participants. Thirty-one students from the University of Exeter participated 
for monetary compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 19.43 years, SD = 1.70 years, 17 
females, 27 right-handed). Two participants were excluded because they incorrectly executed a 
response on ≥ 30% of the stop-signal trials (there was no delay between the presentation of the image 
and the stop signal; consequently, p(respond|stop) was expected to be low). The target sample and 
exclusion criteria were determined before data collection.
Apparatus and stimuli. The experiment was run on an Apple iMac using Psychtoolbox 
(Brainard, 1997). The stimuli were presented on a 20-in monitor (screen size: 1680 × 1050 pixels). 
The experimental paradigm consisted of a go/stop task in which the go/stop rule changed at the 
beginning of each block. The go and stop signals (a full list of the signals used is presented in 
Appendix A) were superimposed over forty task-irrelevant neutral images (size: 250 × 250 pixels), 
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which were presented in the centre of the screen on a white background. Each image was presented 
twice per block. In each block, two go signals (e.g. the vowels 'a' or 'e') and two stop signals were 
used (e.g. the consonants 't' or 'n'). Participants responded on go trials by pressing the spacebar on a 
keyboard with their right index finger; they were instructed to withhold their response on stop trials. 
The signals and the go/stop mapping were shown on the screen at the beginning of each block for a 
minimum of 5 seconds and participants had to press a key to start the first trial. The order of the task 
rules was randomised across the blocks and the response-rule category was counterbalanced across 
participants (e.g. ‘go = vowels, stop = consonants’ vs. ‘go = consonants, stop = vowels’). 
Procedure. Unbeknown to the participants, there were two phases in the experimental 
paradigm that determined the image-stop/go mappings; the first 12 blocks of 80 trials comprised the 
‘training phase’ and the final two blocks of 80 trials comprised the ‘test phase’. Participants were 
verbally instructed to read the task rule screen carefully before starting each block. There was a 15 
second break between each block.
There were three image types (Table 2.1). First, stop-associated images were paired with a 
stop signal on 75% of presentations in the training phase; in the test phase, they were always paired 
with a go signal. Second, go-associated images were always paired (100%) with a go signal in the 
training phase, but they could occur on stop trials in the test phase (eight old go-associated images 
were paired with a stop signal on 75% of presentations; eight old go-associated images were never 
paired with a stop signal). Third, control images were paired with a stop signal on 25% of 
presentations in the training and test phases. The control images were mostly paired with a go signal 
during training to ensure that the overall probability of a stop trial [p(stop) = 0.25] was the same in the 
training and the test phases (stopping performance is sensitive to minor variations in signal 
probability, e.g. see Bissett, & Logan, 2011). 
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Table 2.1. Proportion of stop-signal trials as a function of experiment, image type, and phase. The 
overall p(stop) both across experiments and within the experimental phases was 0.25.
All trials began with the concurrent presentation of the image and a go/stop signal (Figure 
2.1), instructing participants to execute (go) or withhold (stop) the spacebar response. After 750 ms 
(regardless RT), the images and go/stop signal were replaced by a feedback message (‘correct’, 
‘incorrect’, or ‘too slow’ in case the participant did not respond before the end of the trial) which 
remained on the screen for 500 ms. The feedback message was presented to encourage fast and 
accurate responding. Following the feedback message, there was a blank screen for 250 ms, after 
which the next trial started. 
Following completion of the experimental task, each image was again presented on the 
screen. The order of the images was randomised anew for each participant. Participants were asked to 
rate ‘how much do you expect to withhold your response when this image is presented?’ on a scale 
between 1 ('I definitely do not think this image indicates that I have to withhold my response') and 9 
('I definitely think this image indicates that I have to withhold my response'). As a manipulation 
check, I also asked participants to rate how much they expected to respond (i.e. go) to each of the 
images (the order of the respond/withhold ratings was counterbalanced across participants). These go 
ratings were consistent with the stop expectancy ratings so are not reported further. 
Experiment 1
stop-associated
go-associated
control
Experiment 2
stop-associated
go-associated
Experiment 3 & Experiment 4
stop-associated
go-associated
control
# images
8
16
16
10
30
8
16
16
% stop-signal trials 
Training phase
75%
0%
25%
100%
0%
75%
0%
25%
Test phase 
0%
8 images: 75%; 8 images: 0%
25%
0%
20 images: 0%; 10 images: 100%
0%
4 images: 0%; 12 images: 50%
8 images: 0%; 8 images: 50%
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Figure 2.1. Example go/stop trial sequence. The task rule changed at the beginning of each block (e.g. Block n: 
vowel = stop; consonant = go, Block n + 1: > 5 = stop; < 5 = go). In Experiments 1-3, the go/stop signals were 
superimposed on top of the image (as shown). In Experiment 4, the signals were presented in one of the four 
corners of the image (top-left, bottom-left, top-right, bottom-right). 
Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). The training and test phase trials were analysed separately using Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVA) with image type and block as within-subjects factors. Performance was assessed in terms 
of average RT for correct go responses, the probability of a missed go response [p(miss)] and the 
probability of responding on a stop trial [p(respond|stop)]21. RTs < 1 ms were removed prior to 
analyses. I did not analyse p(miss) further as values were very low (Table 2.2). Table 2.3 provides an 
overview of the ANOVAs. For pairwise comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure 
(Lakens, 2013). All data files and R scripts used for the analyses are deposited on the Open Research 
Exeter data repository (http://hdl.handle.net/10871/17735).
21. The design was optimised to examine stimulus-stop learning for the stop-associated items but this design 
made it suboptimal for the estimation of SSRTs; therefore, SSRT were not estimated or analysed. However, I 
analysed p(respond|signal) to determine if learning influenced stopping performance (see also e.g. Bowditch, 
Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016). It was predicted that the p(respond|signal) would become 
lower for the stop-associated images than for the other image types during the training phase. 
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Results
Training phase. The main effect of image type on go RTs was reliable (p < 0.001); planned 
comparisons revealed that responding to the stop-associated images (on the relevant 25% of trials) 
was slower (414 ms) than to the go-associated images (403 ms), t(28) = -4.93, p < 0.001, gav = 0.44, 
and to the control images (406 ms), t(28) = -3.26, p = 0.002, gav = 0.33. There was a marginally 
reliable difference between the go and the control images, t(28) = -1.99, p = 0.055, gav = 0.11 (Figure 
2.2; Table 2.3). In line with my predictions, the p(respond|stop) was lower for the stop-associated 
images (0.13) than for the control images (0.15), p = 0.019 (Figure 2.2). Thus, performance on go and 
stop trials suggests that participants acquired the image-stop associations. The effect of block and the 
interaction between block and image type did not reach significance suggesting that the effect of 
image type was present in most blocks (Table 2.3). This is consistent with previous work which 
indicates that the effect of stop learning emerges after a single trial presentation and that it then 
quickly asymptotes (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2008c). The absence of an overall practice effect is 
most likely due to the introduction of a novel go/stop rule at the beginning of each block; consistent 
with this idea, a post-hoc test confirmed that participants responded faster in the second half of a 
block than in the first half, t(28) = 3.99, p < 0.001, gav = 0.32. 
Table 2.2. Probability of a missed go response [p(miss)] as a function of experiment, image type and 
experimental phase. P(miss) is the ratio of the number of omitted responses to the total number of no-stop-
signal trials: p(miss) = missed/ (correct + missed). M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
Experiment 1
stop-associated
go-associated
control
Experiment 2
stop-associated
go-associated
Experiment 3
stop-associated
go-associated
control
Experiment 4
stop-associated
go-associated
control
Training phase
M
0.020
0.015
0.016
-
0.016
0.028
0.023
0.018
0.028
0.020
0.021
SD
0.071
0.024
0.028
-
0.025
0.083
0.034
0.031
0.088
0.032
0.032
Test phase 
M
0.013
0.014
0.017
0.024
0.013
0.038
0.037
0.036
0.018
0.007
0.025
SD
0.033
0.024
0.036
0.043
0.031
0.060
0.062
0.052
0.033
0.018
0.036
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Figure 2.2. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel) and p(respond|stop) data (lower panel) for the 
three image types (stop; go; control) as a function of the block (blocks 1-12 = training phase; blocks 13-14= test 
phase) in Experiment 1. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Test phase. In the test phase, the stop-associated images were always paired with a go signal, 
the control images were paired with a stop signal on 25% of the trials (i.e. the control images 
remained the same in the training and test phases), and the go-associated images were mostly paired 
with a stop signal (8 images: 75% stop; 8 images: 0% stop; Table 2.1). Based on the automatic 
inhibition hypothesis, I predicted that responding on go trials would be slower for the stop-associated 
images than for the go-associated images and for the control images. Furthermore, p(respond|stop) 
should be higher for the go-associated images than for the control images. However, image type did 
not influence RT nor the p(respond|stop) in the test phase (p’ ≥ 0.557; Table 2.4). It is possible that the 
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absence of the test phase effect is due to differences in the overall RT (as RTs were faster in the test 
phase than in the training phase). To investigate this possibility, I plotted RT percentiles for the 
training and test phases. This revealed that the overall test phase RT cannot account for the absence of 
the predicted image-stop learning effects (see Appendix B). 
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Table 2.3. Overview of repeated Analyses of Variance performed to compare go and stop training phase 
performance. Image type (Experiments 1, 3, & 4: stop-associated, go-associated, control) and block 
(Experiments 1 & 2: 1-12; Experiments 3 & 4: 1-6) are the within-subjects factors. I did not analyse p(miss) 
because values were low. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Expectancy ratings. Due to technical reasons, one participant in Experiment 1 did not 
complete the expectancy ratings task (note that this participant was included in the training and test 
phase analyses). The results of the test phase raise some doubts about whether participants learned 
long-term image-stop associations. However, the analysis of the expectancy ratings obtained 
Experiment 1
Go Reaction Time
image type
block
image type by block
p(respond|stop)
image type
block
image type by block
Experiment 2 
Go Reaction Time
block
p(respond|stop)
block
Experiment 3
Go Reaction Time
image type
block
image type by block
p(respond|stop)
image type
block
image type by block
Experiment 4
Go Reaction Time
image type
block
image type by block
p(respond|stop)
image type
block
image type by block
df 1
2
11
22
1
11
11
11
11
2
5
10
1
5
5
2
5
10
1
5
5
df 2
56
308
616
28
308
308
319
319
60
150
300
30
150
150
54
135
270
27
135
135
Sum of 
squares 
effect
21980
43427
17475
0.071
0.547
0.154
27502
0.199
5589
64257
16048
0.010
0.053
0.055
6816
75823
13700
0.087
0.109
0.180
Sum of 
squares 
error
41878
1438376
431981
0.323
7.616
3.384
405062
3.846
47836
437275
162531
0.200
2.688
1.780
87254
192102
203293
0.317
1.857
2.363
F
14.70
0.85
1.13
6.17
2.01
1.28
1.97
1.50
3.51
4.41
2.96
1.48
0.60
0.93
2.11
10.66
1.82
7.45
1.58
2.05
p 
< 0.001
0.575
0.331
0.019
0.043
0.238
0.039
0.136
0.058
< 0.001
0.005
0.232
0.703
0.461
0.153
< 0.001
0.094
0.011
0.173
0.077
gen. η2
0.009
0.017
0.007
0.005
0.040
0.011
0.037
0.037
0.006
0.061
0.016
0.002
0.009
0.009
0.009
0.092
0.018
0.015
0.019
0.031
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following task completion revealed a main effect of image type, F(2, 54) = 10.06, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 
0.075. Consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies during training, participants expected to 
withhold their response more when the stop-associated images were presented (4.83) than when the 
go-associated images (3.91) and the control images (4.26) were presented; t(27) = -3.46, p = 0.001, gav 
= 0.65, and t(27) = -2.74, p = 0.010, gav = 0.40, respectively. The difference between the control and 
the go-associated images was also reliable, t(27) = -2.89, p = 0.007, gav = 0.27. Thus, participants 
could distinguish between the images on the basis of their association with the stop and go goals. The 
‘stop minus control image’ expectancy difference correlated with the corresponding RT difference in 
the test phase, r(26) = 0.437, p = 0.019: participants who expected to withhold their response more 
during the presentation of the old stop-associated images slowed more when they had to respond to 
these images in the test phase (see Figure C.1, Appendix C). This suggests that expectancies 
generated on the basis of the acquired image-stop mappings may contribute to the manifestation of an 
‘automatic’ inhibition effect in the test phase. However, there was no reliable correlation between the 
‘stop minus control’ expectancy difference and the corresponding RT in the training phase, r(26) = 
0.010, p = 0.961. There was also no reliable correlation between the RT and expectancy differences 
for the stop- and the go-associated images in the training phase, r(26) = - 0.040, p = 0.841, or the test 
phase, r(26) = 0.272, p = 0.161 (note that uncorrected ps are reported). 
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Table 2.4. Overview of repeated Analyses of Variance performed to compare go and stop test phase 
performance. Image type (Experiments 1, 3, & 4: stop-associated, go-associated, control; Experiment 2: stop-
associated, go-associated) and block (Experiments 1 & 2: 13-14; Experiments 3 & 4: 7) are the within-subjects 
factors. I did not analyse p(miss) because values were low. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Interim Discussion
In Experiment 1, I investigated two questions highlighted in Chapter 1: (1) can participants learn 
direct associations between stimuli and stopping; and (2) what is the role of expectancy in stimulus-
stop learning? The results provide some answers to both questions. Task performance during the 
training phase showed that participants could acquire direct stimulus-stop associations when the rules 
(and consequently, signals) constantly changed throughout the task. This indicates that the learning 
effects were not mediated via signal representations (as each image was only presented twice per 
block and there were only two stop signals and two go signals per block). Furthermore, the 
Experiment 1
Go Reaction Time
image type
block
image type by block
p(respond|stop)
image type
block
image type by block
Experiment 2 
Go Reaction Time
image type
block
image type by block
p(respond|stop)
block
Experiment 3
Go Reaction Time
image type
p(respond|stop)
image type
Experiment 4
Go Reaction Time
image type
p(respond|stop)
image type
df 1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
df 2
56
28
56
28
28
28
29
29
29
29
60
30
54
27
Sum of 
squares 
effect
471
2318
771
0.001
0.058
0.007
160
390
60
0.020
711
0.51
7329
0.050
Sum of 
squares 
error
22425
53598
13040
0.268
0.380
0.316
10621
47352
7087
0.337
28880
0.416
28228
0.473
F
0.59
1.21
1.66
0.16
4.24
0.64
0.44
0.24
0.25
1.73
0.74
3.73
7.01
2.83
p 
0.557
0.281
0.200
0.695
0.048
0.429
0.513
0.629
0.624
0.198
0.479
0.062
0.004
0.104
gen. η2
0.002
0.010
0.003
< 0.001
0.028
0.004
< 0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.019
0.005
0.043
0.064
0.034
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expectancy data obtained following task completion showed that participants generated expectancies 
that were consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies acquired during training. 
However, the results of Experiment 1 raised a new question: why did stimulus-stop 
associations not influence performance in the test phase? I found an associative effect on behaviour 
that appeared early in training but then disappeared again in the later training blocks and in the test 
phase (Figure 2.3; for similar results in another action control paradigm, see Gaschler & Nattkemper, 
2012), even though the expectancy data measured at the end of the experiment indicated that the 
associations were not forgotten. I attribute this to an interaction between attention and learning. The 
role of attention in stimulus-stop learning has not yet been considered. In previous studies 
demonstrating stimulus-stop learning (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a), the go/stop items were task-
relevant as they determined the required response; consequently, optimal task performance in these 
studies depended on participants attending to the stop items (as opposed to the signals). In the present 
chapter, I adapted a paradigm frequently used in applied research (e.g. Houben & Jansen, 2011) 
whereby go/stop signals were superimposed on a series of images. This was advantageous as it 
allowed me to vary the representation of the go/stop signals throughout the task whilst independently 
manipulating the image-stop contingencies. However, a consequence of this procedure is that optimal 
task performance does not depend on attending to the stop-associated images. Initially, the task-
irrelevant images may have captured attention because they were novel, allowing the effects of 
learning to emerge. But habituation to the images and reduced salience may have reduced attentional 
capture, and consequently, weakened or even eliminated the effects of stop-learning on behaviour in 
later blocks.
The hypothesised role of attention in the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations is 
consistent with the associative learning literature. For example, a review by Kruschke (2003) 
indicates that attention is crucial in explaining associative learning phenomena. Following the 
principles first enunciated by Mackintosh (1975), he argued that attending to informative cues whilst 
ignoring irrelevant cues will accelerate learning. Furthermore, the amount of attention that is paid to 
the cues will determine the influence of acquired associations on behaviour. In a similar vein, the 
Instance theory assumes that attention determines what is learned and what is retrieved (Logan & 
Etherton, 1994; Logan, 1988). But attention can also be influenced by learning. For example, the 
learned predictability of the outcome relative to other concurrently presented cues may influence the 
extent to which cues are considered informative or salient, and consequently, the extent to which 
participants attend to them (see Mackintosh, 1975). Consistent with this suggestion, Livesey & 
McLaren (2007) demonstrated that stimuli that were better predictors of an outcome became 
relatively more salient than stimuli that were worse predictors of the outcome over practice (see also 
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Le Pelley & McLaren,2003)22. In other words, previous research indicates that attention and 
associative learning go hand in hand.
In Experiment 1, the stop-associated images could be considered relatively worse predictors 
of the stop goal when presented with a stop signal. After all, the stop-associated images were 
associated with the stop goal (i.e. the outcome in this case) on 75% of the trials, whereas any given 
stop signal (e.g. the consonants 't' or 'n') was associated with the stop goal on 100% of presentations. 
Similarly, control images could occur on both go and stop trials. Therefore, attentional accounts of 
associative learning predict that the images would decrease in salience with exposure; consequently, 
their contribution to performance would also diminish with increased image exposure (see Le Pelley, 
Suret & Beesley, 2009). The suggestion that the relative salience of the images diminished during 
training is also consistent with conflict monitoring accounts (e.g. Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter & 
Cohen, 2001). These accounts predict decreased attention to the images due to response conflict 
triggered by the inconsistency in the predictability of these images. For instance, Egner & Hirsch 
(2005) have demonstrated that when response conflict is detected, task-relevant information is 
amplified. Hence, conflict detection accounts predict that participants should increase their attention 
to the go/stop signals relative to the task-irrelevant images. Thus, in this regard, the main difference 
between the associative learning and conflict monitoring accounts is the detailed mechanism by which 
the cognitive system adjusts attentional settings. The conflict account requires conflict to drive this 
change in attention whereas the associability account does not. All the latter requires is that one 
stimulus (in this case the stop signal itself) has a greater associative strength to the outcome 
(stopping) than the other stimulus present (the image). 
In sum, the findings of Experiment 1 show that participants can acquire direct associations 
between specific stimuli and the stop goal. However, despite reliable learning effects in the training 
phase and in expectancy ratings obtained following task completion, I found no evidence of learning 
in the test phase when the stimulus-stop mappings were reversed. I hypothesise that attention plays a 
role in determining the influence of stimulus-stop learning on behaviour. This idea could put 
important constraints on current theories of the automaticity of control processes. Therefore, I 
conducted three more experiments to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1, and to 
explore the role of attention in the influence of stimulus-stop associations on behaviour. 
22. There is some evidence suggesting that inconsistent reinforcement can increase attention to, and the 
motivation salience of, conditioned stimuli. For example, the Pearce-Hall (1980) model suggests that 
associability is maintained for stimuli that are followed by unpredictable outcomes. However, despite animal 
data in support of this effect (e.g. Anselme, Robinson & Berridge, 2013), there is relatively little data showing 
this effect in humans (see Hogarth, Dickinson, Austin, Brown & Duka, 2008). The weight of evidence using 
humans participants is in favour of the Mackintosh (1975) model outlined above (but for a combination of both 
algorithms in one model, see Pearce & Mackintosh, 2010).
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Experiment 2
In Experiment 1, I hypothesised that habituation and the predictability of the signal-stop contingency 
relative to the image-stop contingency decreased the amount of attention that was paid to the stop-
associated images over practice. To investigate the predictability hypothesis, in Experiment 2, I 
manipulated the contingency between the images and stopping, to ensure that the stop-associated 
images were paired with a stop signal and were predictive of the stop goal on 100% of presentations 
during training (cf. 75% of presentations in Experiment 1). This should prevent conflict driving down 
attention, but it would not abolish any associability effects as the stop signal would still tend to be the 
stimulus with the strongest connection to stopping. All that an associability theory requires for the 
images to lose attention is that they are worse predictors of the outcome relative to the stop signal(s). 
This will occur when the stop signal(s) always predicts the outcome whereas the images only predict 
the stop goal on the trials on which they occur. As a result, image associability will be driven down in 
a block, and will not have time to recover when the stop signal changes at the beginning of each 
block.
Method 
Participants. Thirty students from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 19.97 years, SD = 2.81, 23 females, 27 right-handed). 
No participants were excluded. 
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were 
identical to those of Experiment 1, except for the following changes: the stop-associated images (10 
images) were paired with a stop signal on 100% of trials during the training phase, and were never 
paired with a stop signal in the test phase; the go-associated images (30 images) were never paired 
with a stop signal in the training phase, but some of these images were paired with a stop signal in the 
test phase (20 old go-associated images were never paired with a stop signal; 10 old go-associated 
images were paired with a stop signal on 100% of the trials). The analyses were identical to those of 
Experiment 1, except that the contingencies meant that, for obvious reasons, I could not examine the 
effect of image type on go RTs or p(respond|stop) in the training phase of this experiment (see Table 
2.1).
Results
Training phase. In the training phase, the RT for the go-associated images reliably decreased 
as a function of block (p = 0.038). This suggests that participants acquired the stimulus-go 
associations during the training. The p(respond|stop) for the stop-associated images did not reliably 
decrease as a function of practice (Figure 2.3, Table 2.3), which could be due to a floor effect. 
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Test phase. Contrary to the predictions of the automatic inhibition hypothesis, go RT was not 
influenced by image type in the test phase when the image-stop mappings were reversed (Table 2.4). 
As in Experiment 1, the absence of an effect in the test phase cannot be accounted for by the overall 
speeding of RTs (for RT distributions, see Appendix B). 
Expectancy ratings. Despite the absence of an effect of image-stop learning in the test phase, 
expectancy ratings obtained following task completion revealed a main effect of image type: 
participants expected to withhold their response more for the stop-associated images (5.99) than for 
the go-associated images (3.86), t(29) = -5.17, p < 0.001, gav = 1.44. This suggests that participants 
had learned the image-stop contingencies during training, even though these contingencies did not 
significantly influence performance in the test phase. The ‘stop minus go’ image expectancy 
difference did not significantly correlate with the RT difference in the test phase, r(28) = 0.262, p = 
0.162 (see Figure C.2, Appendix C). Note that the ‘stop minus go’ expectancy difference was larger in 
Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1 (in which stop items could occur on 25% of go trials in the 
training phase), t(49) = -2.47, p = 0.017, Cohen’s d = 0.64. In other words, this between-experiment 
comparison indicates that the image-stop contingency (100% in Experiment 2 relative to 75% in 
Experiment 1) influenced expectancy ratings but it did not influence performance during the test 
phase. 
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Figure 2.3. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel) and p(respond|stop) data (lower panel) for the 
two image types (stop; go) as a function of the block (blocks 1-12 = training phase; blocks 13- 14 = test phase) 
in Experiment 2. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Interim Discussion
In Experiment 2, I investigated whether the relative predictability of the stop-associated images 
influenced the extent to which the acquired stimulus-stop associations influenced task performance 
when these mappings were reversed. Therefore, the stop-associated images were paired with stopping 
on 100% of presentations during training (cf. 75% of presentations in Experiment 1). 
Consistent with Experiment 1, the decrease in go RT for the go-associated images shows that 
participants acquired the stimulus associations during training (i.e. they associated the go-associated 
images with responding), and the expectancy ratings obtained following task completion show that 
participants expected to stop their responses more for the stop-associated images than for the go-
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associated images. Furthermore, these expectancy ratings were sensitive to the increased 
predictability of the stop-associated images as the expectancy difference between stop-associated and 
go-associated images was larger in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. However, as in Experiment 1, 
RTs were comparable for the old stop-associated images and the old go-associated images in the test 
phase, which indicates that the acquired associations did not influence performance in the test phase 
when the image-stop mappings reversed. On the face of it, these results do not support the conflict 
account of attentional modulation (e.g. Botvinick, Braver, et al., 2001). However, it is possible that 
participants quickly learned to ignore the images in the test phase when the mapping had reversed. 
Consistent with this idea, participants were slower to respond to the stop-associated images (382 ms) 
than to the go-associated images (376 ms) in the first half of block 13, but this was in the opposite 
direction in the second half of block 13 (stop-associated images: 374 ms, go-associated images: 380 
ms; this reversal could be due to an increased error signal in the first half of the test phase). This 
suggests that participants may have quickly re-learnt the new mappings in the test phase23. Note that I 
did not conduct any inferential statistics on this difference due to low numbers of trials (≤ 20 trials per 
cell). An alternative possibility is that participants habituated to the images and stopped paying 
attention to them because the images were less novel. I tested the habituation hypothesis in 
Experiment 3. 
Experiment 3
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate whether the relative predictiveness of the stop-associated 
images influenced the extent to which the stimulus-stop mappings acquired during training influenced 
task performance in the test phase. However, even though participants acquired the stimulus-stop 
mappings, these mappings did not modulate performance in the test phase. It is possible that this 
manipulation did not prevent participants ‘tuning-out’ attention to these images over practice because 
the images still became less novel. Therefore, in Experiment 3 I investigated whether stimulus 
exposure influenced the extent to which participants attended to the stop-associated images. To this 
end, I halved the number of stimulus presentations in the training phase, such that there were 12 
presentations prior to the test phase (cf. 24 presentations in Experiments 1 & 2). 
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 19.19 years, SD = 1.49, 26 females, 29 right-handed). 
One participant was excluded because they incorrectly executed a response on ≥ 30% of stop trials.
23. More generally, the idea that participants could rapidly re-learn the new mappings is also consistent with the 
categorisation literature; when people are learning a rule-based category structure and the stimulus-response 
mappings are switched, participants can use rules to reset the mappings with minimal impairment (see, e.g. 
Ashby, Ell, & Waldron, 2003).
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Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were 
identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2, except for the following changes: each image was presented 
once per block (i.e. 14 presentations in total). To ensure that the overall p(stop) was the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, the reduced number of image presentations meant that the stimulus-stop 
contingencies for the go and the control images in the test phase had to be altered (for the specific 
contingencies, see Table 2.1). As in Experiment 1, the stop-associated images were paired with a stop 
signal on 75% of presentations during the training phase to provide an index of image-stop learning 
during training. For comparison with Experiments 1 and 2, in the analyses the blocks were collapsed 
to ensure that the number of observations per cell was comparable. 
Results
Training phase. In the training phase, the main effect of image type on go RTs was 
marginally significant (p = 0.058); planned comparisons revealed marginally significant differences 
between the stop-associated images (428 ms) and the go-associated images (422 ms), t(30) = -1.99, p 
= 0.055, gav = 0.23, and between the stop-associated images and the control images (422 ms), t(30) = 
-1.92, p = 0.064, gav = 0.24. There was no reliable difference between the control and the go-
associated images, t(30) = 0.28, p = 0.777, gav = 0.02. However, Figure 2.4 shows that RTs were 
longer for the stop-associated images than for the control and the go-associated images in blocks 1-3, 
but this difference disappeared from block 4 onwards. This conclusion was supported by a reliable 
interaction between image type and block (p = 0.005). The overall main effect of block was reliable, 
suggesting that participants improved as a function of task practice (p < 0.001). There were no 
reliable differences in p(respond|stop). 
Test phase. As in Experiments 1 and 2, there was no main effect of image type on go RT in 
the test phase (p = 0.479; Table 2.4). However, the difference in p(respond|stop) between the go-
associated images (0.18) and the control images (0.13) was marginally significant, p = 0.062, 
suggesting that the image-go associations did influence test phase performance to some extent (Table 
2.4).
Expectancy ratings. Consistent with the previous experiments, image type influenced 
expectancy ratings, F(2, 60) = 11.44, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.136. Expectancy ratings were greater for 
the stop-associated images (5.54) than for the go-associated images (4.57), t(30) = -3.50, p = 0.001, 
gav = 0.85, and the control images (4.76), t(30) = -3.44, p = 0.001, gav = 0.69. There was no reliable 
difference between the control images and the go-associated images, t(30) = -1.84, p = 0.075, gav = 
0.20. However, the expectancy differences did not correlate with the corresponding RT differences (rs 
≤ 0.136, ps ≥ 0.464; see Figure C.3, Appendix C). 
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Figure 2.4. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel) and p(respond|stop) data (lower panel) for the 
three image types (stop; go; control) as a function of the block (blocks 1-6 = training phase; block 7 = test 
phase) in Experiment 3. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.Figure 2.4. Reaction times for the correct go 
trials (upper panel) and p(respond|stop) data (lower panel) for the three image types (stop; go; control) as a 
function of the block (blocks 1-6 = training phase; block 7 = test phase) in Experiment 3. Error bars are 95% 
confidence intervals.
Interim Discussion
In Experiment 3, I investigated whether the amount of exposure to the stop-associated images 
influenced the extent to which the stimulus-stop mappings acquired during training affected task 
performance in the test phase (when the stimulus-stop mappings were reversed). 
Consistent with Experiment 1-2, the results of Experiment 3 indicate that participants 
acquired the stimulus-stop mappings during training; participants were slower to respond to the stop-
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associated images than to the go images and the control images. However, this effect appeared and 
then disappeared again throughout practice; this conclusion was supported by a significant interaction 
between block and image type. This is consistent with the (numerically) diminished learning effect 
observed at the end of the training phase in Experiment 1. Furthermore, participants were not slower 
to respond to the stop-associated images than to the go-associated images and to the control images in 
the test phase (although I observed a marginally significant difference between go and control 
images). This suggests that the amount of habituation to the images cannot entirely account for the 
absence of the test phase effect. This leaves an associability mechanism controlling attention to the 
stimuli as the most plausible explanation for the results of the experiments so far. 
As in Experiments 1-2, I find clear evidence that participants acquired the stimulus-stop 
contingencies in the expectancy ratings obtained following task completion; participants expected to 
stop their response more for the stop-associated images than for the go-associated images and the 
control images. This suggests that participants did not forget the stimulus-stop contingencies, despite 
the disappearance of the learning effect on task performance towards the end of the training phase and 
during the test phase. 
Experiment 4
In the final experiment of this chapter, I presented the image before the go and stop signals, and asked 
participants to rate whether they expected to stop or not. Furthermore, I presented the go and stop 
signals around the image, at one of four possible locations (one of four corners of the image; for a 
similar procedure see Houben & Jansen, 2011). These manipulations served two purposes. First, the 
results of Experiments 1-3 suggested that participants stopped paying attention to the task-irrelevant 
images. I tried to increase attention to the images by making them perfect predictors of the outcome 
(Experiment 2) or by decreasing image habituation (Experiment 3). These manipulations were only 
moderately effective: some behavioural indices indicate that the manipulation influenced learning, but 
the effect of learning on test performance still disappeared over training. By presenting the images 
before the go and stop signals, and asking participants to rate their stop expectancy, participants were 
less likely to ignore the images in Experiment 4 (however, subjects were not explicitly informed to 
attend to the images so as to keep the image-stop mappings uninstructed as in Experiments 1-3). 
Furthermore, the images initially did not have the stop signal present as a competitor driving their 
associability down. If the proposed attentional account is correct, I should observe the effects of stop 
training in the later blocks of the training phase and in the test phase. Second, in Experiments 1-3, I 
found that participants generated expectancies based on the image-stop associations acquired during 
training. In Experiment 1, expectancy correlated with some aspects of performance in the test phase, 
but I could not replicate this finding in Experiments 2-3. It is possible that obtaining the expectancy 
ratings following task performance meant that these expectancies were contaminated by the re-
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learning of the new (inconsistent) mappings in the test phase. Therefore, in Experiment 4, I further 
investigated the role of expectancy in stimulus-stop learning by obtaining expectancy ratings during 
task performance (for a similar procedure, see e.g. McAndrew, Jones, McLaren, & McLaren, 2012; 
Perruchet, Cleeremans, et al., 2006). 
Method
Participants. Thirty-two students from the University of Exeter participated for partial 
course credit (M = 18.47 years, SD = 0.62 years, 27 females, 31 right-handed). Four participants were 
excluded because they incorrectly executed a response on ≥ 30% of stop trials.
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. The apparatus, stimuli and procedure were 
identical to those of Experiment 3, except for the following changes: All trials began with the 
presentation of the image in the centre of the screen. The word ‘RATING’ was presented above and 
below the image to instruct participants to rate ‘how much do you expect to withhold your response?’. 
Participants inputted their ratings on a scale between 1 ('I definitely do not think that I will have to 
withhold my response') and 9 ('I definitely think that I will have to withhold my response') using the 
number keys of the keyboard with their right index finger (latency rating response: M = 969 ms; SD = 
681 ms). After participants made their expectancy rating, a go/stop signal appeared at one of four 
locations on the screen (top-left, bottom-left, top-right, or bottom-right corner of the image). The 
delay between the expectancy response and the presentation of the go/stop signals varied randomly 
between 500 and 1250 ms. Participants responded on go trials by pressing the spacebar on a keyboard 
with their left index finger. To allow for the presentation of the signals at each location on the screen, 
task rules used in Experiments 1-3 that were based on signal location (e.g. ‘X on the left/right of the 
image’) or signal shape (e.g. ‘shape bigger/smaller than a fifty pence piece’) were excluded and, of 
the remaining rules, seven rules were selected on the basis of response latencies in Experiments 1-3 
using a non-parametric box and whisker method (Tukey, 1977). A full list of the signals used appears 
in Appendix A. The expectancy ratings data in the training and test phase trials were analysed 
separately using ANOVAs with image type and block as within-subjects factors.
Results 
Training phase. In the training phase, responding became numerically slower for the stop-
associated images than for the go-associated images and the control images in the second half of the 
training phase (see Figure 2.5). However, the interaction between image type and block did not reach 
significance (p = 0.094) and there was also no reliable main effect of image type (p = 0.153). 
Nevertheless, analyses of the RT percentiles in the training phase showed that responding was slower 
for the stop-associated images than for the go-associated and control images in the fastest RTs 
(Appendix B). This was supported by a reliable two-way interaction between image type and 
CHAPTER 2: ASSOCIATIONS AND EXPECTANCIES
68
percentile in the training phase (p < 0.001; Appendix B). Furthermore, the overall main effect of block 
was reliable suggesting that performance improved throughout the training phase (p < 0.001). 
Analyses of performance on stop trials showed that the p(respond|stop) was reliably lower for the 
stop-associated images (0.15) than for the control images (0.19) (p = 0.011). The interaction between 
image type and block in the p(respond|stop) was not reliable. However, visual inspection of Figure 2.5 
shows that this difference began 
The analysis of the online expectancy ratings also revealed a reliable image type by block 
interaction (p = 0.005), reflecting higher stopping expectancies for the stop-associated images in the 
second half of the training phase (blocks 4-6; see Figure 2.5). There was also a reliable main effect of 
block on the expectancy ratings (p = 0.012): overall mean expectancy ratings decreased with task 
practice, which is consistent with the overall p(stop) of 0.25 (note, the increase in expectancy ratings 
across block for the stop-associated images was not reliable, p = 0.261). Combined, these findings 
indicate that participants were generating appropriate expectancies during the acquisition of the 
stimulus-stop mappings. Importantly, the overall ‘stop minus go’ expectancy ratings difference 
reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference in the training phase, r(26) = 0.575, p = 
0.001; the overall ‘stop minus control’ expectancy ratings difference also correlated with the 
corresponding RT difference, r(26) = 0.498, p = 0.006. Taken together, these findings provide some 
support for the idea that participants acquired the stimulus-stop associations in the training phase. 
CHAPTER 2: ASSOCIATIONS AND EXPECTANCIES
69
Figure 2.5. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel), p(respond|stop) data (middle panel), and 
expectancy ratings (lower panel) for the three image types (stop; go; control) as a function of the block (blocks 
1-6 = training phase; block 7 = test phase) in Experiment 4. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Test phase. Unlike in Experiments 1-3, I found a main effect of image type on go RTs in the 
test phase (p = 0.004). Planned comparisons revealed that responding to the old stop-associated 
images was slower (443 ms) than to the go-associated images (422 ms), t(27) = -2.84, p = 0.008, gav = 
0.52, and to the control images (424 ms), t(27) = -2.87, p = 0.007, gav = 0.54. There was no reliable 
difference between the go and control images, t(27) = -0.31, p = 0.756, gav = 0.04, (Figure 2.5; Table 
2.3). Image type did not reliably influence p(respond|stop) in the test phase (however, the means were 
in the predicted direction, see Figure 2.5; Table 2.4).
There was also a reliable main effect of image type on test phase expectancies (p = 0.002); 
planned comparisons revealed that participants expected to stop more for the old stop-associated 
images (4.80) than for the go-associated images (3.86), t(27) = -2.65, p = 0.013, gav = 0.81, and the 
control images (4.01), t(27) = -2.83, p = 0.008, gav = 0.72. There was no reliable difference between 
the go-associated and the control images, t(27) = -1.37, p = 0.181, gav = 0.14. As in the training phase, 
I found that the ‘stop minus go’ expectancy ratings difference reliably correlated with the 
corresponding RT difference, r(26) = 0.624, p < 0.001; the ‘stop minus control’ expectancy ratings 
difference also correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(26) = 0.653, p < 0.001 (see Figure 
C.4, Appendix C). Hence, participants who had a stronger expectancy to stop their response when the 
stop-associated images were presented displayed greater response slowing for these images than for 
the go-associated images and for the control images upon signal presentation. 
To further investigate to what extent the expectancy to stop determined response slowing for 
the stop-associated images, I conducted an exploratory median-split analysis on the expectancy 
ratings of the test phase (I could not perform a similar analysis in the training phase because there 
were not enough trials in each block). I calculated the median for each image type and participant 
separately. Ratings greater than the median were classified as a ‘stop’ expectancy whereas ratings less 
than or equal to the median were classified as a ‘go’ expectancy. Four participants were excluded 
from these analyses as they always entered the same expectancy rating for one or more of the image 
types (consequently, I could not perform a median split). I analysed the data with a 2 (expectancy: 
stop vs. go) by 3 (image type) ANOVA. Consistent with previous work on proactive control (see e.g. 
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a), responding was slower for trials on which participants expected a stop 
signal (445 ms) compared with trials on which participants expected a go signal (420 ms), F(1, 23) = 
13.96, p = 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.088. As discussed above, image type also had a reliable main effect on 
performance. Importantly, the effects of stimulus-stop learning and expectancy were additive; i.e. the 
two-way interaction between expectancy and image type was not reliable, F(2, 46) = 0.08, p = 0.915, 
gen. η2 < 0.001 (for descriptive statistics, see Table 2.5). Thus, the slowing for the stop-associated 
images is unlikely to reflect an entirely strategic, expectancy-driven effect.
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Table 2.5. Go reaction times (in ms) in the test phase as a function of expectancy (go, stop) and image type 
(stop-associated, go-associated, control) in Experiment 4. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
Interim Discussion
Consistent with the results of Experiments 1-3, I find evidence that participants acquired the stimulus-
stop associations. In the training phase, responding became slower for the stop-associated images than 
for the go-associated images and the control images with task practice, and the p(respond|stop) was 
lower for the stop-associated images than for the control images. In addition, the expectancy ratings 
showed that participants generated expectancies that were consistent with the trained stimulus-stop 
contingencies in the second half of the training phase. These expectancies correlated with task 
performance in the training phase: participants who expected to withhold their response more to the 
stop-associated images responded more slowly to these images than to the go-associated images and 
to the control images during training. Unlike in Experiments 1-3, I also find that learning influenced 
performance in the test phase: participants were slower to respond to the stop-associated images than 
to the go-associated images and the control images during the test phase. 
These results suggest that presenting the images before the go/stop signals and asking 
participants to rate their expectancy on each trial increased the extent to which participants attended to 
these images. In order to ensure that attention to the task-irrelevant images was maximised, I 
combined these manipulations in the same procedure. Consequently, it was not possible to determine 
the relative contributions of these manipulations to the observed slowing for the stop-associated 
images in the test phase. One could speculate that the observed slowing reflects an entirely strategic, 
expectancy-driven effect, rather than the implicit retrieval of the acquired stimulus-stop associations 
(as predicted by the automatic inhibition account). I argue that an entirely explicit explanation is 
unlikely for several reasons. First, previous studies have demonstrated stop-learning effects using 
procedures in which the stop-associated stimuli are presented prior to stop-signal onset but, unlike the 
present experiment, without expectancy ratings on each trial. For example, in a recent study the stop-
associated stimuli were presented as ‘warning cues’ for a variable duration prior to the presentation of 
the stop signal, and observed stop learning effects during the training and test phases (Bowditch, 
Verbruggen, et al., 2015). Similarly, Veling and colleagues have conducted two experiments using go/
no-go designs in which food images were presented 100 ms (Veling, van Koningsbruggen, et al., 
2014) or 500 ms (Veling, Aarts, et al., 2013a) prior to the onset of the go/no-go signal. They found 
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Control
Stop expectancy
M
453
437
440
SD
56
43
40
Go expectancy 
M
429
411
411
SD
51
36
33
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that when the food images were consistently presented on no-go trials, subsequent choice of the food 
items was reduced (Veling, Aarts & Stroebe, 2013a) and weight loss was facilitated (Veling, van 
Koningsbruggen, Aarts & Stroebe, 2014). 
Second, the median split analysis on expectancy ratings in the test phase shows that the 
slowing for the stop-associated images occurred even when stop signal expectancy was relatively low. 
This result suggests that expectancy ratings cannot account for the whole data pattern. However, it is 
important to note that whilst the median split analyses provided some insight into the present data, 
median split analyses can have limitation (e.g. a loss of statistical power and a reduction in effect 
sizes; Moreau, Kirk, & Waldie, 2016). Furthermore, it might be possible to argue that the very act of 
asking participants to provide an expectancy ratings on each trial could have had extraneous effects 
on how they approached the task. Therefore, in Chapter 3 I followed-up on these findings by 
investigating the role of expectancies using a methodology that did not rely on median split analyses 
or trial-by-trial expectancy ratings (the results of Chapter 3 are consistent with the results reported 
here). 
Finally, research in the wider action control literature is consistent with the pattern of findings 
in the present chapter. For example, Frings and Moeller (2012) found that associations between old 
distractor stimuli and the previously required target response only interfered with responding when 
the distractors were presented prior to the target stimuli. When combined with the findings of these 
studies, the present findings strongly suggest that presenting the task-irrelevant image before the go or 
no-go signal increases attention to the images, and consequently, the probability that the image-stop 
association are retrieved.
To conclude, the presence of a learning effect in the test phase is consistent with the proposed 
hypothesis that attention to the images determines whether acquired stimulus-stop associations 
influence behaviour in the test phase. Now that the images are more task-relevant and associability is 
no longer driven down for the images by virtue of their competition for attention with the stop signal, 
there is a strong effect on test phase go RTs. Furthermore, the test-phase expectancy ratings show that 
participants continued to generate expectancies consistent with the image-stop mappings acquired 
during training, despite the reversal of these mappings. As in the training phase, these expectancies 
reliably correlated with task performance: participants who expected to withhold their response more 
for the stop-associated images responded more slowly to these images than to the go-associated 
images and to the control images in the test phase. However, the median split also suggested a 
contribution of implicit (non-expectancy related) processes. 
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Chapter Discussion
In the present chapter, I investigated three outstanding issues relating to the mechanisms of stimulus-
stop learning. The first two issues were highlighted in Chapter 1: (1) are associations between stimuli 
and stopping direct, and (2) what is the role of expectancy in stimulus-stop learning? Based on the 
results of Experiment 1, Experiments 2-4 also investigated a third issue: (3) does attention to the stop 
items affect the extent to which stimulus-stop learning influences behaviour? Based on the present 
findings, I can answer each of these questions.
Are Associations Between Stimuli and Stopping Direct? 
Across four experiments where the specific stop signals and rules were always changing, I provide 
strong evidence for the idea that participants can learn direct stimulus-stop associations (Verbruggen 
& Logan, 2008a). During training, I found that responding was reliably slower (Experiments 1, 3, and 
numerically slower in Experiment 4; in Experiment 2, I could not compare stop and go-associated 
images in the training phase) and the p(respond|stop) was lower (Experiment 1 & Experiment 4) for 
images that were consistently associated with stopping than for images associated with going and for 
control images that were not particularly associated with stopping or going.
In recent experiments, it was observed that learning can influence the p(respond|stop) but not 
response latencies on go trials (see e.g. Experiment 2 in Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). Based on 
previous findings in the conditioning literature (for a review, see Hall, 2002), Verbruggen, Best, et al. 
(2014) hypothesised that participants in these experiments learned an association between an item and 
a representation of a no-go or stop signal. Hence, when the item was repeated, it primed the signal so 
that it was detected sooner on stop-signal trials, resulting in improved response inhibition and, 
consequently, a lower p(respond|stop). The signal priming idea explains why it can be that learning 
influences the probability of stopping on signal trials without influencing response latencies on go 
trials. In the present chapter, both RTs and p(respond|stop) were influenced even though the go/stop 
signals and task rules constantly changed (and there were two go signals and two stop signals in each 
block). This indicates that learning was not (solely) mediated via image-signal associations. The most 
parsimonious account is that the effects in the present chapter reflect the direct association of the stop-
associated images with a stop goal, rather than the association of the stop-associated images with the 
representation of a single stop signal. Therefore, the present chapter provides strong support for the 
original hypothesis outlined by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) that participants can acquire direct 
(i.e. un-mediated) associations between specific stimuli and the stop goal. In situations where the task 
rules do not constantly change, it is likely that individuals will acquire both stimulus-goal and 
stimulus-signal associations (indeed, research in the conditioning literature suggests that the 
acquisition of multiple associations is the norm; Hall, 2002). It is possible that experimental factors, 
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such as the perceptual properties of the stop signal, will influence which association dominates 
behaviour. In Chapter 4, I investigate the role of signal detection during stop learning. 
It is important to note that the learning effects demonstrated in the present chapter are 
assumed to reflect the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations rather than the absence of stimulus-go 
learning on stop trials. Whilst the ‘absence of go learning’ explanation may initially seem 
parsimonious, it cannot account for several findings previously reported in the stop-learning literature. 
First, Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) have previously demonstrated that responding to old stop items 
is slowed compared with novel items that were not presented during training (hence, these items were 
not associated with going or stopping; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 1). Second, 
neuroimaging work has shown that the presentation of old stop items activates the neural inhibitory 
control network (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al., 2011; but see What is the Role of Expectancy in 
Stimulus-Stop Learning? below). Third, brain stimulation studies have shown that even when the 
probability of go and no-go signals is equal (i.e. 50/50), motor-evoked potentials are below baseline 
200-300 ms following no-go stimulus presentation (indicating that responding is suppressed; Leocani, 
Cohen & Wassermann, 2000). In other words, successful performance on a no-go trial requires the 
activation of a no-go or stop response, and not just the absence of a go response. Fourth, short-term 
after-effects of stopping further support the idea that participants can learn stimulus-stop associations 
that can have a (global) inhibitory effect on responding (Giesen & Rothermund, 2014; for an extended 
discussion of this experiment, see Sequential after-effects, Chapter 1). Finally, in the present chapter, 
response latencies decrease for go and control images but I observe an initial increase in response 
latencies for stop-associated images over practice (Experiment 1). In Experiments 3, this conclusion is 
further supported by a reliable interaction between image type and block. Finally, the comparison of 
expectancy ratings in Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that expectancy ratings were altered when the 
image-stop consistencies had changed (even though the image-go contingencies did not change). 
Therefore, previous results and the findings reported in the present chapter are consistent with the 
idea that participants can learn go associations on go trials and stop associations on stop trials (which 
interfere with responding).
What is the Role of Expectancy in Stimulus-Stop Learning? 
In the present chapter, I show that participants generated expectancies that were consistent with the 
stimulus-stop mappings acquired during training: participants expected to withhold their responses 
more when stop-associated images were presented than when go and control images were presented. 
Furthermore, these expectancy ratings were sensitive to the specific contingencies in play: 
participants expected to withhold their responses more for the stop-associated images that were 
reinforced on 100% of presentations (Experiment 2) than for the stop-associated images that were 
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reinforced on 75% of presentations (Experiment 1). Finally, I found that these expectancies correlated 
with task performance both during the acquisition of the stimulus-stop mappings in the training phase 
(Experiment 4) and following the reversal of these mappings in the test phase (Experiment 1 & 
Experiment 4). 
The role of expectancies in stimulus-stop learning has not been previously investigated. 
Therefore, the present chapter provides initial evidence that stimulus-stop learning could be partly 
mediated via explicit knowledge of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. Although the median split 
analysis and the absence of significant correlations in some of the experiments indicate that implicit 
processes could play a role as well. However, it is not possible to conclusively attribute a role of 
implicit processes as the absence of reliable correlations could be due to issues of sensitivity because I 
assessed expectancies at the end of task performance in those experiments. If expectancies did play a 
role, this could indicate that the response slowing observed for the stop-associated images is caused 
by top-down control processes. First, the slowing could be partly due to proactive control. According 
to this proactive control account of stimulus-stop learning, stop items could become predictive cues 
(e.g. if image X then p(stop) is high) that indicate that participants should adjust their response 
strategies accordingly. If this were the case, this would suggest that earlier findings that have 
demonstrated response slowing and neural activation of the inhibitory control network by old stop 
items (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al., 2011) could be due to proactive control (i.e. another 
algorithmic process), rather than the direct activation of the stop response via memory-retrieval (i.e. 
picture X = stop). Therefore, whilst the retrieval of the stimulus-stop association may still be 
automatic, the subsequent slowing observed following the reversal of the stimulus-stop mapping 
would be due to a top-down control process (rather than a bottom-up process as is currently assumed). 
The role of proactive control during stop learning is investigated in Chapter 3. Second, stop items 
could effectively become a new stop signal (the direct stopping account). In other words, the only 
difference between the stop items and an external stop signal is that the association with stopping is 
acquired via learning in the case of the stop items, whereas it is acquired via instructions in the case of 
the stop signal. Thus, in both cases, response inhibition is a deliberate act of control. But the 
advantage of the former form of control is that the go and stop processes in stop-signal tasks could be 
initiated simultaneously and, therefore, start the race at the same time (Logan & Cowan, 1984); 
consequently, response inhibition is more likely to succeed. 
It is important to note, however, that the proactive control route and the direct stopping route 
are both compatible with the idea that associative learning plays a key role in response inhibition 
paradigms; indeed, both accounts still assume that stimulus-specific learning influences stop 
performance. Learning offers participants another route to control their behaviour. The key difference 
between these two top-down accounts and the ‘automatic’ inhibition account is the nature of the 
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process that occurs following the retrieval of the stimulus-stop association; either this association 
directly activates the stop goal via an stimulus-response based link (in the automatic stopping 
account) or this association indirectly activates the stop goal via a top-down (algorithmic and 
deliberate) control process. In Chapter 3, I directly compare the proactive control and automatic 
inhibition accounts. 
Does Attention to the Stop Items Affect the Extent to Which Stimulus-Stop Learning Influences 
Behaviour? 
In Experiments 1-3, the acquired stimulus-stop associations did not influence performance in the test 
phase, despite effects of learning on task performance in the training phase and on expectancies 
following task completion (suggesting that participants had not forgotten the stimulus-stop 
associations). 
A potential explanation for this finding is that the images used in the present chapter were 
task-irrelevant so participants may have begun to ignore the images as they became less novel and as 
they learned that they were less predictive. In Experiments 1-3, task performance did not require 
participants to attend to the stop-associated stimuli (unlike in previous work; see e.g. Verbruggen & 
Logan, 2008a), so participants may have started ignoring all the images over time. In line with this 
possibility, the effect of image type reliably interacted with block (in Experiment 3) and visual 
inspection of the data shows that the influence of image-stop learning on performance began to 
disappear at the end of the training phase (Experiment 1). Since there were no differences between the 
image types in the final block of the training phase, this may explain why I did not find any effect of 
image-stop learning in the test phase 24. Several associative learning accounts suggest that the reduced 
predictiveness of the images relative to the go/stop signals (in Experiments 1 & 3) may have 
decreased the extent to which they were considered informative or salient and, consequently, the 
extent to which participants attended to them and the extent to which they can influence performance 
(Mackintosh, 1975). Effects that point to this conclusion have been previously observed in animals 
(see e.g. Sutherland & Mackintosh, 1971 for a review of this literature) and, importantly, also in 
humans (Le Pelley & McLaren, 2003; Livesey & McLaren, 2007; Suret & McLaren, 2005). For 
example, Le Pelley and McLaren (2003) showed that foods that were worse predictors of an outcome 
than other foods present on a trial in an allergy discrimination task became less salient, resulting in 
slower learning of a new association to these stimuli in a later training phase (cf. learned irrelevance; 
Mackintosh, 1975). Note that the majority of the results in Experiments 1-3 are also consistent with 
conflict monitoring accounts (e.g. Botvinick, Braver, et al., 2001), which predict that participants will 
24. Note that I can rule out the possibility that the absence of a test phase effect in Experiments 1-3 is due to the 
use of images or the frequent rule switching; in a word version of the go/stop task with a single rule, it was 
similarly found that reversing the word-go/stop mapping in the test phase did not influence performance either 
(For experimental details see Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren, & Verbruggen, 2016, Appendix B). 
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ignore task-irrelevant information that produces response conflict or choice errors. However, unlike 
the associative learning accounts, these conflict monitoring accounts do not easily explain the absence 
of a learning effect in the test phase found in Experiment 2 when conflict should have been minimised 
by the use of 100% contingencies.
Importantly, I found a clear effect of stimulus-stop learning on test phase performance when 
attention to the images was increased in Experiment 4 (as a result of presenting them before the go/
stop signals and the requirement to make an online expectancy rating on each trial). This finding is 
consistent with the Instance theory (Logan, 1988; Logan & Etherton, 1994) and other theories of 
associative learning. For example, Instance theory suggests that processing episodes will only be 
stored and retrieved from memory when participants attend to each stimulus presentation (Logan, 
1988; Logan & Etherton, 1994). Thus, by encouraging subjects to attend to the image in Experiment 
4, the image-stop associations were more likely to be retrieved, and performance was influenced in 
the test phase. Therefore, the present chapter strongly indicates that the influence of image-stop 
learning on behaviour is likely to be determined by the interplay of both attentional control and 
associative learning systems (see also Logan, 1988; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). 
Conclusion
In sum, the present chapter indicates that participants can learn direct associations between stimuli 
and a stop goal when the go/stop rule changes at the beginning of each block. Exposure to the image-
stop associations influenced task performance during training, and expectancies following task 
completion. However these results also suggest that attention to stimulus attributes is key for retrieval 
of processing episodes; if participants do not attend to the stop stimulus then the previously acquired 
stimulus-stop associations will not influence behaviour. The results presented in this chapter are 
consistent with the Instance theory and other attentional accounts of associative learning.
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Appendix A 
A full list of the rules and the stimuli used in Experiments 1-4
In Experiments 1-3 I used fourteen go/stop rules. In Experiment 4, I used rules 1-7 only. The signals 
used in rules 1-11 were presented in Arial (font size = 50). The sizes of the signals used in rules 12-14 
are provided in pixels below (screen resolution: 1680 × 1050).
1. Vowels ('a' or 'e') vs. consonants ('t' or 'n'). 
2. Symbols that are the same ('@@' or '&&') vs. symbols that are different ('@&' or '&@').
3. Uppercase letters ('H' or 'R') vs. lowercase letters ('h' or 'r').
4. Long symbol strings ('£%£%' or '%£%£') vs. short symbol strings ('£%' or '%£').
5. Curved letters ('S' or 'C') vs. angled letters ('K' or 'W').
6. Digits smaller than 5 ('2' or '4') vs. digits bigger than 5 ('6' or '8').
7. Curly brackets ('{' or '}') vs. square brackets ('[' or ']').
8. Words that refer to animals ('horse' or 'sheep') vs. words that refer to fruit ('lemon' or 'apple').
9. Symmetric letter strings ('UYYU' or 'YUUY') vs. asymmetric letter strings ('YYUU' or 
'UUYY').
10. Crosses on the left of image vs. crosses on the right of the image relative to the centre 
(crosses appeared at the top and bottom of the image). 
11. Asterisks on the top of the image vs. asterisks on the bottom of the image relative to the 
centre (asterisks appeared on the left and right of the image).
12. Horizontal lines (lines appeared across the top or bottom of the image relative to the centre) 
[width: 240 pixels] vs. vertical lines (lines appeared along the left or right of the image 
relative to the centre) [height: 240 pixels].
13. Shapes bigger than a fifty pence piece (square or circle) [100 × 100 pixels] vs. shapes smaller 
than a fifty pence piece (square or circle) [40 × 40 pixels].
14. Lines thicker than a matchstick vs. lines thinner than a matchstick (lines appeared 
horizontally [width = 240 pixels] or vertically [height = 240 pixels] about the centre of the 
image). 
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Appendix B
RT Percentiles 
To investigate the possibility that the absence of an effect of image type in the test phase of 
Experiments 1-3 is due to response latencies (responding was faster in the test phase than in the 
training phase) I plotted RT percentiles for the training and test phases. These RT percentiles revealed 
that the overall response latency cannot account for the absence of a learning effect in the test phase. 
Furthermore, in Experiments 1-3, visual inspection of the percentile plots suggests that the 
slowing for the stop-associated images emerges in the slow end of the RT distribution. This 
conclusion is supported by a reliable two-way interaction between image type (stop; go; control) and 
percentile in the training phase of Experiment 1, F(16, 448) = 23.12, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.030. 
However, in Experiment 4, the slowing for the stop-associated images emerges in the fast end of the 
RT distribution. This conclusion is also supported by a reliable two-way interaction between image 
type and percentile in the training phase, F(16, 432) = 56.50, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.09725.
In Experiments 1-3, processing the image could slow overall RT; but for stop-associated 
items, processing the image would also lead to retrieval of the stop associations, and consequently, 
automatic inhibition of the response. Alternatively, only on slower trials, the stimulus-stop 
associations could be retrieved in time and affect performance. In Experiment 4, attention to the 
images prior to signal presentation meant that there was more time for the acquired stimulus-stop 
associations to be retrieved and thus influence performance. 
25. Note that for consistency with the percentile analyses reported later in this thesis (see Appendix M), the 
‘percentile’ factor comprised the 10th-90th percentiles (as shown in Figures B.1-B.4). However, to reduce the 
number of levels in the percentile factor, this analysis was previously presented in Best, Lawrence, et al. (2016) 
with only the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles included. However, it is important to note that there were no 
meaningful differences between the percentile findings presented here and those presented by Best, Lawrence, 
et al. (2016).
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Figure B.1. Go RTs (in ms) in the training phase (blocks 1-12; upper panel) and the test phase (blocks 13-14; 
lower panel) for the three image types (stop-associated; go-associated; control) as a function of percentile in 
Experiment 1. 
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Figure B.2. Go RTs (in ms) in the test phase (blocks 13-14) for the two image types (stop-associated; go-
associated) as a function of percentile in Experiment 2. Due to the stimulus-stop contingencies used, I could not 
plot RT percentiles for the training phase data.
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Figure B.3. Go RTs (in ms) in the training phase (blocks 1-6; upper panel) and the test phase (block 7; lower 
panel) for the three image types (stop-associated; go-associated; control) as a function of percentile in 
Experiment 3. 
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Figure B.4. Go RTs (in ms) in the training phase (blocks 1-6; upper panel) and the test phase (block 7; lower 
panel) for the three image types (stop-associated; go-associated; control) as a function of percentile in 
Experiment 4. 
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Appendix C
Expectancy/RT correlation plots
Figure C.1. Expectancy/RT correlations in the training phase (blocks 1-12; upper panels) and the test phase (blocks 13-14; lower panels) in Experiment 1. Note, ‘stop-
associated minus control image’ expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference in the test phase, r(26) = 0.437, p = 0.019. All other 
correlations were not reliable (rs ≤ 0.272, ps ≥ 0.161).
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Figure C.2. Expectancy/RT correlations in the test phase (blocks 13-14; lower panel) in Experiment 2. Due to the stimulus-stop contingencies used, I could not run these 
correlations on the training phase data. Note, the stop-associated minus go-associated correlation was not reliable (r(28) = 0.262, p = 0.162).
CHAPTER 2: APPENDIX C
86
Figure C.3. Expectancy/RT correlations in the training phase (blocks 1-6; upper panels) and the test phase (block 7; lower panels) in Experiment 3. Note, all correlations 
were not reliable (rs ≤ 0.136, ps ≥ 0.464).
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Figure C.4. Expectancy/RT correlations in the training phase (blocks 1-6; upper panels) and the test phase (block 7; lower panels) in Experiment 4. Note, all correlations 
were reliable (rs ≥ 0.498, ps ≤ 0.006).
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF INSTRUCTED AND ACQUIRED CONTINGENCIES IN 
RESPONSE INHIBITION TASKS
The ‘automatic inhibition’ account states that after stimulus-specific stop training, the need for top-
down executive control is reduced and may eventually disappear altogether as control is triggered in  
a bottom-up manner following stimulus presentation (see also Chein & Schneider, 2012). Consistent 
with this account, previous work has demonstrated that the effects of automatic inhibition can occur 
very rapidly (within ~100 ms) following the presentation of old no-go stimuli (Chiu, Aron, et al., 
2012; Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010), suggesting that, at the very least, a fast, efficient form of control is 
trained. However, in some situations, slowing for old stop items could also be caused by anticipatory 
control processes. One of the main functions of the executive control system is biasing competition 
between stimulus or response options on the basis of expectancy or task rules. For example, when the 
control system predicts a certain action, it will pre-activate the motor network, biasing action selection 
and reducing the latency of the anticipated action (e.g. Bestmann, 2012; Meyer & Kieras, 1997; but 
see Verbruggen, McAndrew, Weidemann, Stevens, & McLaren, 2016).
In Chapter 2, I found that item-specific stop learning may have been mediated via 
expectancies of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. Participants had to rate the extent to which 
they expected to withhold their response for each of the stimuli presented in the task at the end of 
each experiment. I found correlations between expectancy ratings and the ‘automatic inhibition’ effect 
in Experiment 1 and Experiment 4. This suggests that expectancies generated on the basis of the 
acquired stimulus-stop mappings may contribute to the manifestation of an ‘automatic’ inhibition 
effect: when participants expect a no-go or stop signal in the near future, they proactively adjust 
attentional settings, increase response thresholds, or proactively suppress all motor output to enhance 
detection of no-go or stop signals and to prevent premature go responses (e.g. Aron, 2011; Elchlepp, 
Lavric, et al., 2016; Jahfari, Stinear, et al., 2010; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen, Stevens, et 
al., 2014; Zandbelt, Bloemendaal, et al., 2012). For example, previous work found that participants 
slowed their responses when an instructional cue, such as ‘p(stop-signal) = 0.75’, at the beginning of 
the trial indicated that a stop signal was likely to occur on the following trial(s) (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2009a). In other words, participants became more cautious when stop-signal presentation was likely. 
The expectancy results in Chapter 2 suggest that stop-associated stimuli could become such cues (for 
example ‘if stimulus X then p(stop) is high’). In other words, the slowing observed for old stop items 
could reflect deliberate ‘proactive’ inhibition, another algorithmic process, rather than the direct 
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activation of the stop response via memory-retrieval (e.g. stimulus X = stop) as assumed by the 
automatic inhibition account. 
Although evidence for proactive control has been found in traditional ‘top-down’ stop-signal 
tasks, the role of proactive control adjustments during stop learning has not been previously 
examined. Yet, evidence for the involvement of anticipatory control adjustments in stop-training tasks 
would have two important implications. First, it would contradict the idea that inhibitory control was 
fully automatised in stop-training tasks where participants made anticipatory control adjustments. 
Second, it would have important practical implications for work in the applied inhibition-training as it 
could indicate that the effects of inhibition training are more ‘top-down’ than initially thought (for an 
overview of the applied inhibition-training work, see Practical Applications, Chapter 1). 
The automatic inhibition and expectancy accounts both predict increased RTs for old stop 
items. One way to assess whether participants proactively adjust response strategies for old stop items 
is to question them at the end of the experiment (as in Chapter 2). However, measuring knowledge of 
rules, expectancies, or strategies at the end of the experiment has limitations (Newell & Shanks, 2014; 
Shanks, 2010). For example, Newell and Shanks (2014) proposed four criteria for the assessment of 
awareness: (1) reliability (the assessment should not be affected by factors that did not affect 
behavioural performance); (2) relevance (assessments should only target information relevant to the 
behaviour in question); (3) sensitivity (assessments should be made under optimal conditions, such as 
using the same cues as in the task); and (4) immediacy (the assessment should be made during 
behaviour or immediately afterwards). Whilst the assessment of expectancies at the end of task 
performance meets the first three criteria, it is sub-optimal that expectancies were obtained after 
learning had taken place. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, asking participants to provide an 
expectancy rating on each trial (as in Experiment 4) could change the nature of the task. For example, 
if participants are performing a task more associatively and are then asked to provide expectancy 
ratings, this may ‘push’ participants towards a more deliberative process. Therefore, I used a 
complementary approach in the present chapter that did not require participants to provide a trial-by-
trial expectancy rating; in addition to measuring expectancy ratings at the end of the experiment, I 
introduced a between-subjects condition in which participants were informed about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies at the beginning of the experiment. By contrasting performance in the instructed 
(explicit) condition with performance in an ‘uninstructed’ condition in which participants were not 
told about the stimulus-stop contingencies, I could further explore how expectancies and learning 
influenced performance in a stop-signal task.
The Present Chapter
In the present chapter, I used a learning variant of the stop-signal paradigm developed by Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al. (2014). The paradigm used by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) was designed to 
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investigate the effects of expectancies on proactive control. In the Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) 
study, participants responded to centrally presented words on go trials. In some blocks, a stop signal 
was presented on a random 33% of the trials. There were three types of blocks: central-signal blocks 
(in which a visual stop signal could occur in the centre of the screen), non-central signal blocks (in 
which a visual stop signal could occur in the periphery), and no-signal blocks (in which no stop 
signals could occur). On a random 50% of the go and stop-signal trials, visual distractors were 
presented (see Figure 3.1 for an example of a distractor trial). I predicted a trade-off between stop-
signal detection and interference control in non-central blocks. On the one hand, participants try to 
widen their attentional focus to detect stop signals in the periphery; on the other hand, they try to 
narrow their focus to avoid processing distractors. These opposing demands were expected to result in 
a larger distractor effect26 on no-signal trials in non-central signal blocks than in the two other block 
types without the opposing attentional demands. Their results supported this prediction. In other 
words, when participants knew that a stop signal could appear in the periphery, they proactively 
widened their attentional focus to detect the signal, but this resulted in an increased distractor effect 
on no-signal trials (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014).
Thus, by introducing a perceptual distractor manipulation, I could examine whether 
participants adjusted attentional settings (reflected by an increased distractor effect when participants 
expected a stop signal in the periphery), response settings (reflected by a general RT increase when 
participants expected a stop signal in the periphery), or both, when they expected a stop signal. In the 
present chapter, on each trial, a large square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of the 
screen (Figure 3.1). After a delay, a single word appeared in the centre of the square. Participants had 
to decide whether the word referred to a natural or human-made object. On stop-signal trials, the lines 
of the surrounding square became thicker, instructing the participants to withhold their response. 
There were three word types in this experiment: 80%-stop words (on 80% of the trials, a stop signal 
was presented); 20%-stop words (on 20% of the trials, a stop signal was presented); and 0%-stop 
words (these words could only occur on no-signal trials). To distinguish between the effects of 
explicit, instructed stimulus-stop contingencies and the effects of practice-induced, uninstructed 
stimulus-stop contingencies I directly manipulated contingency knowledge via task instructions 
(between-subjects). In the instructed condition, participants were presented with a list of the 80%-stop 
words at the beginning of each block; in the uninstructed condition, participants received no 
information about the stimulus-stop contingencies. Note that participants in the instructed condition 
received no information about the 20%-stop words or the 0%-stop words. The 80%-stop words 
remained the same throughout the whole experiment. On 50% of no-signal and stop-signal trials, 2-
letter distractor strings appeared. Participants were instructed to ignore them; however, based on the 
26. Performance on distractor trials minus performance on no-distractor trials.
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previous work by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., I expected that these distractors would interfere with 
performance on no-signal trials. If item-specific expectancy effects induce attentional shifts (cf. 
Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014), the distractor effect on no-signal trials should be larger for the 
80%-stop words than for the two other word types: if participants expected a stop signal after having 
identified an 80%-stop word they would monitor the periphery for the stop signal to occur (as 
observed by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014), making them more vulnerable to the distractors. The 
findings presented in Chapter 2 introduced the possibility that stop-associated stimuli could become 
such explicit cues after stimulus-stop learning. The idea that the stop-associated items could become 
explicit cues is contrary to the idea of automatic inhibition which supposes that the stop-associated 
items become (implicitly) associated with the stop goal following training. Although it was predicted 
that the overall effect of the stimulus-stop contingencies would be greater in the instructed condition 
than in the uninstructed condition, the effect of the distractor stimulus allowed me to discern whether 
the stop-associated stimuli became explicit cues in the uninstructed condition. If this were the case, 
there should be a larger distractor effect of the 80%-stop words than for the other item-types and, 
critically, this distractor effect should be qualitatively, and possibly quantitatively, similar across the 
item-types in the instructed and uninstructed conditions. 
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Figure 3.1. The distractor stop task. A word was presented in the middle of a square. Participants had to judge 
whether the word referred to a human-made or a natural object. On half of the trials (distractor trials), random 
two-letter strings appeared at random locations every 100 ms. On some trials (stop-signal trials), the square 
turned bold after a variable delay from the onset of the word, instructing the participants to withhold their 
response. For display purposes, foreground and background colours are switched in this figure. However, in 
Experiment 5-6, white stimuli appeared against a black background. 
Experiments 
There were two experiments. In Experiment 5, I encouraged fast responding using a strict response 
deadline (1250 ms). Furthermore, I obtained eye movement data as an additional exploratory 
dependent variable to detect within-trials shifts of attentional focus. However, the probability of 
missed no-signal responses (M = 0.050, SD = 0.066) in Experiment 5 was slightly higher than in the 
previous study by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., including for words that were not associated with 
stopping. Therefore, I ran another experiment in which I extended the response deadline (2000 ms) to 
reduce the probability of missed responses. In Experiment 5, the eye-tracker was calibrated at the 
beginning of each block and lasted approximately 2 minutes per calibration; to ensure that the overall 
task duration was comparable across experiments, I therefore did not obtain eye movement data in 
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Experiment 6. After all, the eye movement data of Experiment 5 did not substantially add to the 
overall pattern of behavioural data (see Appendix F; note that the eye-movement data similarly did 
not add much to the pattern of data reported by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). 
Initial analyses revealed that whilst the probability of missed no-signal responses was reduced 
in Experiment 6 (and the no-signal RTs were numerically increased) the overall pattern of results (i.e. 
differences between word types, distractor types, and instruction conditions) was consistent across 
both experiments. This was revealed by analyses of no-signal RTs, go accuracy and the probability of 
responding on stop-signal trials. Separate analyses for Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 can be found 
in Appendix D. These separate analyses produced similar results; in both experiments, there is reliable 
evidence of stimulus-stop learning on go and stop performance, and a reliable distractor effect on go 
and stop performance in both experiments. Furthermore, there was reliable evidence in both 
experiments that the differences between the word types were larger in the instructed condition than in 
the uninstructed condition. Thus, both experiments find (statistically) clear evidence that the stimulus-
stop contingencies influenced performance, and that the effects of these contingencies were sensitive 
to the instructional manipulation. Therefore, I analysed the data of both experiments together (total N 
= 120), and consequently will report this study as a single experiment. Although the individual studies 
were sufficiently powered to detect small to medium-sized within-between interactions they were not 
sufficiently powered to detect direct medium-sized between-subjects comparisons. This combined 
approach was beneficial as it increased the power to detect medium-sized effects in the between-
subjects comparisons and allowed me to run sufficiently powered correlational analyses on the 
expectancy and task performance data.
Method
Participants. 120 volunteers (48 in Experiment 5 and 72 in Experiment 6) from the 
University of Exeter participated for monetary compensation (£8) or partial course credit (M = 19.88 
years, SD = 3.05, 98 females, 109 right-handed). Five participants were replaced: two participants 
were replaced because the percentage of correct go trials was below 70%27 (one in Experiment 5 and 
one in Experiment 6; this exclusion criterion was based on an earlier pilot study presented in 
Appendix G) and three further participants in Experiment 5 were replaced due to poor calibration of 
the eye-tracker. 
All experiments in the present chapter were approved by the local research ethics committee 
at the School of Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the 
nature and possible consequences of the studies were explained. The target sample size and exclusion 
criteria for each experiment were decided in advance of data collection. Participants were randomly 
assigned to between-subjects groups. 
27. This exclusion criteria was set on the basis of the pilot study presented in Appendix G. 
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Apparatus and stimuli. The experiments were run using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The 
stimuli were presented on a 17-in CRT monitor (screen size: 1024 × 768 pixels) in Experiment 5 and a 
21-in iMac (screen size: 1920 × 1080) in Experiment 6. In Experiment 5, an EyeLink 1000 Desktop 
Mount camera system (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada), calibrated before each block, tracked the gaze 
position of the right eye during the whole block.
The stimuli consisted of a large square (12 cm diameter: 350 × 350 pixels) and a word in 
white lowercase font (Courier 16 point) on a black background (Figure 3.1). The stimuli were 
presented in the centre of the screen. I created a list of 50 four-letter words (Appendix E). The word 
could refer to a natural or a human-made object. The experiment consisted of three parts, with 5 
blocks per part. Each word was presented twice per block (1x with and 1x without distractors). There 
were 3 different word types: 80%-stop words (10 words; on 80% of the trials, a stop signal was 
presented); 20%-stop words (30 words; on 20% of the trials, a stop signal was presented); and 0%-
stop words (10 words; these words could only occur on no-signal trials). There were more 20%-stop 
words than 80%-stop words to keep the overall probability of stop-signal trials low (0.28). There is no 
reason to assume that this would influence the acquisition of stimulus-stop or stimulus-go associations 
as each word was presented an equal number of times per block. Words were counterbalanced over 
conditions between participants. 
Procedure. On each trial, the square and a fixation signal were presented in the middle of the 
screen. After 250 ms, the word appeared in the centre of the square (replacing the fixation signal). 
Participants had to decide whether the word referred to a natural or a human-made object. Half of the 
participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) when the word referred to a natural 
object, and the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) when the word referred to a human-made object. 
This mapping was reversed for the other participants. On 50% of the trials twenty 2-letter randomly 
generated uppercase strings were displayed as distractors (distractor trials; Figure 3.1). They appeared 
in random locations within the square. To avoid overlap between the distractors and words, the centre 
of the distractors was outside a smaller central region (100 × 50 pixels). New distractors were 
presented in different locations every 100ms throughout the duration of the trial. Participants were 
instructed to ignore the distractors. 
On stop-signal trials, the outer square turned bold (1 to 3 pixels) after a variable SSD, 
instructing participants to withhold their response. The stop signal occurred equally often on distractor 
and on non-distractor trials. The SSD for 20%-stop words was initially set at 500 ms and was 
continuously adjusted to a tracking procedure to obtain a probability of successful stopping of 0.50: 
the SSD decreased by 50 ms following an unsuccessful stop trial, but increased by 50 ms following a 
successful stop. I used two separate one-up/one-down tracking procedures to set the SSD for the 20%-
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stop words (one for distractor trials and one for no-distractor trials). The SSD for the 80%-stop words 
was yoked to the SSD for the corresponding 20%-stop words. 
After the response deadline elapsed (1250 ms in Experiment 5; 2000 ms in Experiment 6) I 
presented feedback (on no-signal trials: ‘correct’, ‘incorrect’, or ‘not quick enough’ in case the 
participant did not respond before the end of the trial; on stop-signal trials: ‘correct stop’ or ‘failed 
stop’), which remained on the screen for 500 ms. The feedback was presented to encourage fast and 
accurate responding. The next trial started immediately after the feedback. 
Stimulus-stop contingency knowledge was manipulated between-subjects. Participants in the 
instructed condition were presented with a list of the 80%-stop words on the screen at the beginning 
of each block and were instructed ‘For certain words, the lines of the surrounding square will become 
thicker (indicating that you have to withhold your response) more often than for other words. These 
words are listed below’. The stimulus-stop contingencies remained the same throughout the whole 
experiment so the same list was presented at the beginning of each block. No information about the 
20%-stop words or and 0%-stop words was provided. Participants were instructed to remember as 
many of the words as possible. Once participants had done so, participants were required to press the 
‘s’ key to move on to the next screen. There was no deadline on the word list screens. Participants in 
the uninstructed condition were not provided with any information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies. All participants were required to press the ‘s’ key to start the first trial. At the end of 
each block, I presented as feedback to the participant their mean RT on no-signal trials, the number of 
no-signal errors and the number of missed no-signal responses, and the percentage of failed stops.
Following completion of the experimental task, each word was again presented on the screen. 
The order of the words was randomised anew for each participant. Participants were asked to rate 
‘how much do you expect to withhold your response when this word is presented?’ on a scale between 
1 ('I definitely do not think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response') and 9 ('I 
definitely think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response'). There was no response 
deadline for the expectancy ratings. 
Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). All data files and R scripts are deposited in Dropbox (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/
obhjddhyqmth6ng/AABW3NcPOhM9Xms1Cxxc1zKVa?dl=0).
Proactive strategy adjustments could result in a higher percentage of missed responses in 
addition to higher no-signal accuracy (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a) so I distinguished between the 
proportion of correct no-signal trials and the proportion of missed no-signal trials. To determine if 
learning influenced stopping performance, I analysed the p(respond|signal); see also Chapter 2; 
Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Noël, Brevers, et al., 2016). 
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ANOVAs were performed on the correct no-signal RTs, the probability of missed responses 
on no-signal trials, the probability of correct no-signal trials, and on the probability of responding on 
stop-signal trials. Performance was analysed as a function of ‘part’ (there were 5 blocks per part: 1 = 
blocks 1-5; 2 = blocks 6-10; 3 = blocks 11-15), word type (80%-stop words, 20%-stop words, and 
0%-stop words), distractor type (distractor vs. no distractor), and instruction condition (instructed vs. 
uninstructed). Where appropriate, I applied the Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity. 
For pairwise comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). 
For the RT analyses, I also calculated Bayes factors for all main effects and interaction 
contrasts in the ANOVA design (Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012). I calculated these 
with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior (0.707; Morey, Rouder, et al., 2015). As I 
had four factors (word type, distractor type, part, and condition), I used a top-down approach to 
reduce the number of model comparisons. Top-down model comparisons investigate the effect of 
removing each fixed factor and interaction from the overall model, such that the removal of 
meaningful factors or interactions will have a deleterious effect on the model fit whereas the removal 
of non-meaningful factors or interactions will not. 
Tables 3.1 and 3.6 presents an overview of the descriptive statistics and Tables 3.2 and 3.3 
present an overview of the inferential statistics (separate analyses for the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions are presented in Tables 3.4-3.5). I present exploratory analyses of the eye-tracking data of 
Experiment 5 in Appendix F.
Results 
No-signal analyses. 
No-signal RTs. Figure 3.2 (upper panel) shows correct no-signal RTs for each condition 
(instructed or uninstructed), word type (80%-, 20%-, 0%-stop), and distractor type (distractor or no-
distractor). I found a main effect of word type (p < 0.001; Table 3.2), and an interaction between 
condition and word type (p < 0.001; Table 3.2): Consistent with the stimulus-stop expectancy 
manipulation, the word type effect was more pronounced in the instructed condition than in the 
uninstructed condition (Figure 3.2). Follow-up tests (Tables 3.4 & 3.5) revealed that the main effect of 
word type on no-signal RTs was significant in the instructed condition (p < 0.001) and in the 
uninstructed condition (p < 0.001; Table 3.4). In the instructed condition, additional planned 
comparisons revealed that no-signal RTs were longer for the 80%-stop words (933 ms) than for the 
0%-stop words (863 ms), t(59) = 10.17, p < 0.001, gav = 0.34 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.00128), 
and for the 20%-stop words (874 ms), t(59) = 9.34, p < 0.001, gav = 0.29 (one-tailed directional t-test: 
28. The ‘automatic inhibition’ account makes strong predictions about the direction of this effect. No differences 
between word types or differences in the opposite direction (i.e. shorter RTs or lower p(miss) for 80% words 
than for 0% and 20% words) would argue against stimulus-stop associations. Therefore, I report both the two-
tailed p-values and the p-values of one-directional t-tests. 
CHAPTER 3: INSTRUCTED AND ACQUIRED CONTINGENCIES
98
p < 0.001)29. The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was also reliable, 
t(59) = -5.10, p < 0.001, gav = -0.05 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001). In the uninstructed 
condition, planned comparisons revealed that no-signal RTs were longer for the 80%-stop words (921 
ms) than for the 0%-stop words (900 ms), t(59) = 4.87, p < 0.001, gav = 0.10 (one-tailed directional t-
test: p < 0.001), and for the 20%-stop words (902 ms), t(59) = 4.71, p < 0.001, gav = 0.09 (one-tailed 
directional t-test: p < 0.001). The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was 
not reliable, t(59) = - 1.14, p = 0.261, gav = -0.01 (one-tailed directional t-test: p = 0.130).
29. To explore the difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words I repeated the main analysis 
excluding the 80%-stop words. This showed that the two-way interaction between condition and word type was 
reliable, F(1, 118) = 7.12, p = 0.009, gen. η2 < 0.001, reflecting the larger RT differences between the 0%-stop 
words and the 20%-stop words in the instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition. Furthermore, the 
three way interaction between condition, word type and part was also reliable, F(2, 236) = 3.07, p = 0.047, gen. 
η2 < 0.001: the numerical difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words became larger as a 
function of part in the instructed condition but became smaller as a function of part in the uninstructed 
condition. 
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Table 3.1. Overview of the no-signal data. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)], probability of a 
missed go response [p(miss)] and average no-signal reaction time (RT) as a function of condition, word type, 
distractor type, and part. Accuracy is the ratio of correct no-signal trials to the number of correct and incorrect 
no-signal trials (missed trials are excluded). P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total number of no-
signal trials. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
 I found a main effect of distractor type (p < 0.001; Table 3.2), but there was no reliable 
difference in the size of the distractor effect between conditions (p = 0.270; Table 3.2). Follow-up 
tests showed that the presentation of distractors slowed no-signal RTs in the instructed condition (no-
distractor: 867 ms, distractor: 912 ms; p < 0.001; Table 3.4) and in the uninstructed condition (no-
distractor: 881 ms, distractor: 934 ms; p < 0.001; Table 3.5). Crucially, there was no reliable two-way 
interaction between word type and distractor type (p = 0.349; Table 3.2). Furthermore, the three-way 
interaction between condition, word type, and distractor type was not reliable (p = 0.447; Table 3.2), 
and follow-up tests showed that there was no reliable two-way interaction between word type and 
distractor type in the instructed condition (p = 0.665; Table 3.4) nor in the uninstructed condition (p = 
0.195; Table 3.5). As discussed above, in the previous study by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014) it 
was found that proactive adjustments in non-central stop-signal blocks led to an increased distractor 
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effect on no-signal RTs. Therefore, the absence of an interaction between word type and distractor 
type in the present chapter indicates that item-based expectancy effects differ from the kind of 
proactive adjustments of attentional settings observed in block-based designs. Instead, the absence of 
an interaction between word type and distractor supports the idea that the stop-associated words 
primed stopping. However, the presence of a reliable two-way interaction between condition and 
word type suggests that this priming effect must have been greater in the instructed condition than in 
the uninstructed condition. I will return to this issue in the Chapter Discussion. 
 I found an interaction between part and word type in the main analysis (Table 3.2) and in the 
analysis of the instructed condition (p = 0.005; Table 3.4). However, the interaction between word 
type and part did not reach significance in the uninstructed condition (p = 0.323; Table 3.5), 
suggesting that the effect of word type was present in all parts (see Table 3.1). This is consistent with 
previous work which indicates that the effect of stop learning emerges after a single trial presentation, 
and that it then quickly asymptotes (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 2008c).
Table 3.3 shows the outcome of the Bayesian analyses. As can be seen, the results are largely 
consistent with the ANOVAs reported in Tables 3.2. Table 3.3 shows that dropping word type, 
distractor type, part, and the two-way interaction between condition and word type had a deleterious 
effect on the model. All other factors or interactions could be dropped (Table 3.3 also shows the 
separate models for the instructed and uninstructed conditions). These analyses provide further 
support for the conclusion that the distractor effect was similar for the different word types. 
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Figure 3.2. Reaction times for the correct no-signal trials (upper panel), the probability of missed no-signal 
responses (middle panel), and the probability of correct no-signal responses (lower panel) for the instructed 
condition (left panels) and for the uninstructed condition (right panels) as a function of word type (0%-stop, 
20%-stop or 80%-stop words) and distractor type (distractor, no-distractor). Error bars reflect 95% confidence 
intervals. 
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Table 3.2. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal data. Condition is included as 
a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. In the no-signal RT analysis, incorrect, and 
missed no-signal trials were removed. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
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Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
Df2
118
236
236
118
236
236
118
472
236
236
472
236
236
472
472
118
236
236
118
236
236
118
472
236
236
472
236
236
472
472
118
236
236
118
236
236
118
472
236
236
472
236
236
472
472
Sum of 
squares 
effect
171051.50
1783555.0
904922.00
1309571.0
64644.43
246795.90
9326.65
41534.56
7617.38
3299.20
28190.83
812.94
2398.44
7405.20
3603.93
0.07
0.10
0.23
0.04
0.01
0.10
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.04
0.03
0.00
0.02
0.10
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
94794587.10
13010265.90
966318.40
896684.60
13010265.90
966318.40
896684.60
1219546.70
664742.90
387996.50
1219546.70
664742.90
387996.50
1006301.70
1006301.70
8.00
1.13
1.38
0.40
1.13
1.38
0.40
1.43
0.70
0.64
1.43
0.70
0.64
1.24
1.24
2.56
1.09
0.66
0.23
1.09
0.66
0.23
1.07
0.28
0.37
1.07
0.28
0.37
0.55
0.55
F
0.21
16.18
110.50
172.33
0.59
30.14
1.23
4.02
1.35
1.00
2.73
0.14
0.73
0.87
0.42
0.99
9.95
19.83
10.57
0.69
8.39
0.34
1.55
1.35
7.35
0.94
6.33
1.35
3.56
3.18
0.13
2.38
18.03
16.71
2.02
11.92
0.03
1.89
1.22
0.14
0.83
3.34
6.54
0.59
1.37
p
0.645
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.492
< 0.001
0.270
0.011
0.261
0.349
0.052
0.857
0.447
0.443
0.705
0.321
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.499
0.002
0.562
0.204
0.260
0.003
0.417
0.002
0.257
0.019
0.030
0.724
0.098
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.138
< 0.001
0.869
0.146
0.296
0.760
0.453
0.039
0.007
0.585
0.254
gen. η2
0.002
0.016
0.008
0.011
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.004
0.006
0.015
0.002
< 0.001
0.007
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.003
< 0.001
0.002
0.002
< 0.001
0.003
0.015
0.005
0.003
0.010
< 0.001
0.003
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
< 0.001
0.001
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Probability of a missed go response [p(miss)]. Figure 3.2 (middle panel) shows the 
probability of a missed go response for each condition (instructed or uninstructed), word type (80%-
stop, 20%-stop, 0%-stop), and distractor type (no-distractor or distractor). I found a main effect of 
word type (p < 0.001; Table 3.2) and a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type 
(p < 0.001; Table 3.2). The main effect of word type on the probability of missed responses was 
reliable in the instructed condition (p < 0.001; Table 3.4) but not in the uninstructed condition (p = 
0.224; Table 3.5). Follow-up comparisons revealed that the p(miss) in the instructed condition was 
higher for the 80%-stop words (0.051) than for the 0%-stop words (0.026), t(59) = 4.43, p < 0.001, gav 
= 0.58 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001), and for the 20%-stop words (0.025), t(59) = 4.43, p < 
0.001, gav = 0.61 (one-tailed directional t-test: p < 0.001). There was no reliable difference between the 
0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words, t(59) = 0.675, p = 0.502, gav = 0.04 (one-tailed directional t-
test: p = 0.749). 
The p(miss) was higher on distractor trials than on no-distractor trials in both the instructed 
and uninstructed conditions (ps ≤ 0.012; Tables 3.4-3.5; main effect of distractor: p < 0.001; Table 
3.2). The three-way interaction between condition, word type, and distractor type was reliable (p = 
0.007; Table 3.2). Follow-up tests showed that the two-way interaction between word type and 
distractor type was reliable in the instructed condition (p = 0.047; Table 3.4): the distractor effect was 
numerically larger for the 80%-stop words than the other word types (Table 3.1). The two-way 
interaction between word type and distractor type was not reliable in the uninstructed condition (p = 
0.091; Table 3.5). 
Combined, these results suggest that the instructed stimulus-stop associations increased 
outright stopping following the presentation of stop-associated words (even when a go response was 
required). The two-way interaction between word type and distractor type in the instructed condition 
could indicate that participants relied more on the instructed stimulus-stop contingency when 
monitoring for the stop signal was difficult (on distractor trials); when monitoring was easier (on no-
distractor trials), the decision to stop (or not) was primarily influenced by the actual presentation of 
the stop signal (and hence, there were fewer missed responses following the presentation of 80%-stop 
words). This conclusion is supported by the eye movement data; as can be seen in Appendix F, 
participants made very few eye-movements in this task. Nevertheless, there were some small 
differences in the number of eye movements between the word types. Importantly, however, I found 
no evidence that the distractors influenced eye-movements and little evidence to support the view that 
participants moved their eyes to enable stop-signal detection following the presentation of the 80%-
stop words compared with the other word types. I discuss the implications of these findings for the 
involvement of anticipatory control adjustments in the Chapter Discussion.
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Table 3.3. No-signal RT Bayesian analysis. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of the factor or 
interaction had a deleterious effect on the model, whereas Bayes factors > 1 indicate that the factor or 
interaction could be removed without impairing the fit much. Note that ‘participant’ was included as a factor for 
all models, but this factor is not added to the model descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. Note: 
distract = distractor type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type.
Probability of a correct go response. Figure 3.2 (lower panel) shows the probability of a 
correct go response for each condition (instructed or uninstructed), word type (80%-stop, 20%-stop, 
0%-stop), and distractor type (no-distractor or distractor). I found a reliable main effect of word type 
(p < 0.001; Table 3.2) and a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001; 
Table 3.2). Follow-up analyses revealed that the main effect of word type on no-signal accuracy was 
reliable in the instructed condition (p < 0.001; Table 3.4) but not in the uninstructed condition (p = 
0.204; Table 3.5). Accuracy was lower in the instructed condition for the 80%-stop words (0.89) than 
for the 0%-stop words (0.93), t(59) = 4.73, p < 0.001, gav = 0.53, and for the 20%-stop words (0.93), 
Main analysis
Instructed condition only 
Uninstructed condition only 
Omitted factor(s)
Part
Distract
Type
Condition by type
Condition
Condition by part
Condition by distract by part by type
Condition by distract by type
Condition by distract
Distract by part by type
Part by type
Distract by type
Condition by part by type
Distract by part
Condition by distract by part
Type
Part
Distract
Part by type
Distract by part
Distract by type
Distract by part by type
Part
Distract
Type
Distract by part
Distract by type
Distract by part by type
Part by type
Bayes Factor
< 0.00
< 0.00
< 0.00
0.01
6.76
68.63
268.60
387.73
702.78
796.09
878.80
901.37
4387.12
4814.11
88222.89
< 0.00
< 0.00
< 0.00
28.38
66.71
87.66
178.86
< 0.00
< 0.00
0.15
12.84
23.79
43.38
67.32
Confidence interval
±104.9%
±66.33%
±89.32%
±98.86%
±65.95%
±103.7%
±57.32%
±91.84%
±108.94%
±63.71%
±88.37%
±88.94%
±79.46%
±97.42%
±108.29%
±44.47%
±55.46%
±44.69%
±43.48%
±47.56%
±53.96%
±57.8%
±51.14%
±52.73%
±48.48%
±52.35%
±50.26%
±44.85%
±45.79%
CHAPTER 3: INSTRUCTED AND ACQUIRED CONTINGENCIES
105
t(59) = 4.88, p < 0.001, gav = 0.51. There was no reliable difference between the 0%-stop words and 
the 20%-stop words, t(59) = -0.44, p = 0.661, gav = -0.03. 
There was a small but statistically significant difference between the no-distractor trials and 
the distractor trials (p = 0.001; Table 3.2). This difference was significant in both conditions (ps ≤ 
0.029). It is plausible that the decreased accuracy on the no-distractor trials reflects a speed-accuracy 
trade-off due to the faster responding on no-distractor trials than on distractor trials. I also found a 
reliable two-way interaction between word type and distractor type in the instructed condition (p = 
0.008); the difference between the no-distractor and distractor trials was numerically larger for the 
80%-stop words than for the other word types. I discuss the implications of these results in the 
Chapter Discussion.
Table 3.4. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal data in the instructed condition 
only with part, word type, and distract included as within-participants factors. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold. 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
Df2
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
Sum of 
squares 
effect
752724.90
1048297.00
548932.50
60508.50
1735.85
1253.55
10025.40
0.06
0.32
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.16
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
5564658.50
667567.70
536161.00
751780.30
334462.00
233353.70
556483.70
0.62
0.87
0.26
0.84
0.37
0.37
0.69
0.75
0.50
0.13
0.63
0.14
0.20
0.28
F
7.98
92.65
60.41
4.75
0.31
0.32
1.06
5.54
21.34
5.69
2.01
6.37
6.43
4.10
3.15
19.17
6.80
2.07
4.10
3.80
1.54
p
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.005
0.732
0.665
0.360
0.005
< 0.001
0.020
0.123
0.002
0.008
0.012
0.047
< 0.001
0.012
0.132
0.019
0.047
0.217
gen. η2
0.014
0.020
0.010
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.007
0.039
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.005
0.006
0.010
0.040
0.004
0.006
0.003
0.003
0.002
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Table 3.5. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal data in the uninstructed 
condition only with part, word type, and distract included as within-subjects factors. Note: distract = distractor 
type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Signal analyses. Tables 3.6-3.7 present an overview of the descriptive and inferential 
statistics. Separate analyses for the instructed and uninstructed conditions are also presented in Table 
3.7. Analyses of probability of responding on stop-signal trials revealed a main effect of word type 
(20% vs. 80% words), p < 0.001 (Table 3.7). Consistent with the stimulus-stop instructional 
manipulation, there was a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p < 0.001) 
reflecting the larger difference between the 80%-stop words and the 20%-stop words in the instructed 
condition than in the uninstructed condition. Follow-up tests revealed that the probability of 
responding was lower for the 80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words in the instructed condition 
(80%-stop words: 0.36, 20%-stop words: 0.47; p < 0.001) and in the uninstructed condition (80%-stop 
words: 0.43, 20%-stop words: 0.46; p = 0.001). Note that the observed difference in the probability of 
responding between the 80%-stop words and the 20%-stop words is presumably due to response 
speed (i.e. participants are slower to respond to the 80%-stop words than to the 20%-stop words) but, 
importantly, response speed was influenced by the stimulus-stop associations. Thus, the probability of 
responding on stop trials benefited from the stimulus-stop associations in the instructed and 
uninstructed conditions. Furthermore, as shown in Table 3.6, the SSD values were similar for the 
Go trials: go RT
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Go trials: p(correct) 
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Go trials: p(miss)
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
Df2
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
118
118
59
236
118
118
236
Sum of 
squares 
effect
1095475.00
103420.60
769965.60
9216.89
6694.47
4444.09
983.74
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
7445607.40
298750.70
360523.60
467766.40
330280.90
154642.80
449817.90
0.51
0.51
0.14
0.58
0.33
0.27
0.55
0.34
0.16
0.10
0.45
0.14
0.16
0.27
F
8.68
20.42
126.01
1.16
1.20
1.70
0.13
5.04
1.65
5.02
0.14
0.99
1.45
2.44
0.12
1.53
10.41
0.37
0.36
2.76
0.41
p
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.323
0.300
0.195
0.925
0.009
0.204
0.029
0.943
0.372
0.239
0.072
0.873
0.224
0.002
0.716
0.690
0.091
0.711
gen. η2
0.018
0.002
0.013
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.006
0.002
0.002
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.003
< 0.001
0.001
0.006
0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.001
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80%-stop and 20%-stop words (due to the yoked tracking procedure; for details see Procedure), 
showing that the difference in the probability of responding was not due to differences in the SSD. 
Table 3.6. Overview of the relevant stop-signal data. Probability of responding on a stop trial [p(respond|
signal)] and average SSD as a function of condition, word type, distractor type, and part. M = mean; SD = 
standard deviation.
The probability of responding was lower on no-distractor trials than on distractor trials (p < 
0.001). Follow-up tests showed that the presence of distractors increased the probability of responding 
in the instructed condition (no-distractor: 0.40, distractor: 0.43; p = 0.001) and in the uninstructed 
condition (no-distractor: 0.43, distractor: 0.46; p = 0.001). However, there was no reliable two-way 
interaction between word type and distractor type (interaction effect: p = 0.947; instructed condition: 
p = 0.571; uninstructed condition: p = 0.633). 
Instructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
Uninstructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(respond)
Distractors
M
0.47
0.37
0.50
0.36
0.50
0.37
0.42
0.44
0.49
0.44
0.51
0.46
SD
0.11
0.17
0.11
0.16
0.07
0.15
0.09
0.15
0.07
0.11
0.08
0.12
No distractors
M
0.40
0.32
0.48
0.36
0.50
0.35
0.38
0.35
0.48
0.45
0.49
0.46
SD
0.11
0.16
0.05
0.13
0.05
0.16
0.10
0.11
0.05
0.13
0.06
0.12
SSD
Distractors
M
486
490
463
466
448
452
439
440
511
515
487
491
SD
297
300
166
169
188
188
252
254
187
189
222
224
No distractors
M
438
441
435
436
493
494
439
441
435
435
455
457
SD
167
169
196
199
269
270
166
168
207
210
229
230
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Table 3.7. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the stop-signal data. Condition is included 
as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
Expectancy analyses. Analyses of the expectancy data revealed a main effect of word type (p 
< 0.001). There was also a reliable interaction between word type and condition (p < 0.001), 
indicating that the differences between the word types were larger in the instructed condition (F(2, 
118) = 138.81, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.58) than in the uninstructed condition (F(2, 118) = 13.28, p < 
0.001, gen. η2 = 0.05). Consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies, planned comparisons revealed 
that in the instructed condition participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words (6.66) than 
for the 0%-stop words (3.70), t(59) = -12.98, p < 0.001, gav = 2.62, and for the 20%-stop words (4.22), 
t(59) = -11.27, p < 0.001, gav = 2.35. The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop 
Main analysis
Instructed condition only
Uninstructed condition only
Condition
Part
Type (20%-stop, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by 
distract
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
118
236
118
118
236
118
118
236
236
118
236
236
118
236
236
118
59
59
118
118
59
118
118
59
59
118
118
59
118
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.36
1.04
1.95
0.21
0.09
0.68
0.00
0.12
0.22
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.04
0.26
2.47
0.11
0.07
0.10
0.00
0.01
0.86
0.17
0.09
0.05
0.12
0.00
0.05
Sum of 
squares 
error
5.35
4.51
2.27
0.99
4.51
2.27
0.99
1.85
1.60
0.73
1.85
1.60
0.73
1.36
1.36
2.08
1.50
0.55
1.01
0.92
0.37
0.61
2.43
0.77
0.44
0.84
0.68
0.36
0.76
F
7.94
27.13
101.58
24.50
2.31
35.21
0.07
7.59
16.03
0.00
0.20
0.17
0.55
2.26
3.15
7.46
97.20
12.20
3.99
6.31
0.33
1.13
20.94
12.61
12.39
3.77
10.53
0.23
3.97
p
0.006
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.109
< 0.001
0.792
0.001
< 0.001
0.947
0.834
0.840
0.459
0.106
0.045
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.023
0.004
0.571
0.326
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.026
< 0.001
0.633
0.021
gen. η2
0.019
0.053
0.095
0.011
0.005
0.035
< 0.001
0.006
0.012
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.002
0.023
0.183
0.010
0.006
0.009
< 0.001
0.001
0.102
0.021
0.012
0.007
0.016
< 0.001
0.007
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words in the uninstructed condition was also reliable, t(59) = -5.47, p < 0.001, gav = -0.46. Similarly, in 
the uninstructed condition participants expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words (5.22) than for 
the 0%-stop words (4.65), t(59) = -4.26, p < 0.001, gav = 0.50, and for the 20%-stop words (4.75), 
t(59) = -4.01, p < 0.001, gav = 0.44. The difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop 
words in the uninstructed condition was not reliable, t(59) = -1.03, p = 0.307, gav = -0.09. Thus, 
participants in both the instructed condition and the uninstructed condition could distinguish between 
the 80%-stop words and the other word-types on the basis of their association with stopping.
To investigate the relationship between the expectancy ratings and task performance, I also 
investigated whether the expectancy ratings correlated with task performance (see Figure 3.3). In the 
instructed condition, I found that the 80%-stop minus 0%-stop expectancy difference reliably 
correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.465, p < 0.001; similarly, the 80%-stop 
minus 20%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) 
= 0.494, p < 0.001. In the uninstructed condition, all correlations were not significant (ps ≥ 0.501; 
note that uncorrected ps are reported). 
To investigate whether the differences between the correlations in the instructed and 
uninstructed conditions were different, I compared the correlation coefficients in the instructed and 
uninstructed conditions using the Fisher's r-to-z transformation. This confirmed that the difference 
between the instructed and uninstructed conditions was reliable for the 80%-stop minus 0%-stop 
correlations (Z = 3.59, p < 0.001) and for the 80%-stop minus 20%-stop correlations (Z = 3.58, p < 
0.001). Furthermore, Bayesian regression analyses supported the null hypothesis that the expectancy 
ratings did not correlate with the RT slowing in the uninstructed condition (Bayes factor 80%-stop 
words minus 0%-stop words: 0.28; Bayes factor 80%-stop words minus 20%-stop words: 0.32). 
Consistent with the ANOVAs, the Bayesian analyses for the instructed condition supported the 
alternative hypothesis (Bayes factor 80%-stop words minus 0%-stop words: 2701.52; Bayes factor 
80%-stop words minus 20%-stop words: 1023.85). Note that inspection of Figure 3.3 shows that the 
difference between these correlations is unlikely to be entirely due to differences the range of the RT 
and/or expectancy values between the instructed and uninstructed conditions. Furthermore, this 
difference cannot be easily explained by the differences in the acquisition rates of the stimulus-stop 
contingencies between the instructed and uninstructed conditions; RT/expectancy correlations 
performed on only part 3 (i.e. the final part of training) showed a similar pattern as the 
aforementioned correlations with all parts of training included. In the instructed condition, I found 
that the 80%-stop minus 0%-stop expectancy difference reliably correlated with the corresponding RT 
difference, r(58) = 0.419, p < 0.001; similarly, the 80%-stop minus 20%-stop expectancy difference 
reliably correlated with the corresponding RT difference, r(58) = 0.341, p = 0.008. In the uninstructed 
condition, all correlations were not significant (ps ≥ 0.223). Thus, it seems that although the 
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behavioural effects are the same (i.e. response slowing for stop-associated words), the underlying 
mechanisms are somewhat different between the instructed and uninstructed conditions.
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Figure 3.3. Expectancy/RT correlations for the 80%-stop and 0%-stop words (upper panels) and the 80%-stop and 20%-stop words (lower panels) for the instructed condition (left panels) and 
for the uninstructed condition (right panels). The correlations in the instructed condition were reliable (ps ≤ 0.001) but the correlations in the uninstructed condition were not reliable (ps ≥ 
0.501).
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Chapter Discussion
The findings reported in Chapter 2 show that slowing for old stop words was mediated by 
expectancies of the stimulus-stop contingencies acquired during training. Previous work has 
demonstrated that when an instructional cue [e.g. ‘p(stop-signal) = 0.75’] indicates that a stop signal is 
likely to occur on the following trial(s), participants slow down by proactively adjusting their 
processing strategies (e.g. Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Therefore, if 
participants used the stop-associated words as similar cues, slowing for old stop words could reflect 
anticipatory control adjustments driven by expectancies of the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. 
The primary purpose of the present chapter was to investigate how expectancies influence 
performance in an word-specific stop learning task. In addition to measuring expectancy ratings 
following task completion (as in Chapter 2), I also introduced a between-subjects expectancy 
manipulation whereby one group of participants were informed about the stimulus-stop contingencies 
(instructed condition) and another group of participants were not told about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies (uninstructed condition). If expectancies play a role in item-specific stop learning, 
performance in the uninstructed condition should be qualitatively similar to performance in the 
instructed condition. 
The results show that the stimulus-stop contingencies influenced task performance in both the 
instructed and the uninstructed conditions. As predicted, RTs on no-signal trials were higher and the 
probability of responding on stop-signal trials was lower for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop 
words and for the 20%-stop words. As expected, the effects of word type on task performance were 
greater in the instructed condition compared with the uninstructed condition. Furthermore, 
participants in both conditions generated expectancies that were consistent with the stimulus-stop 
contingencies in play: participants expected to stop their responses more when 80%-stop words were 
presented than when 0%-stop words or 20%-stop words were presented. But, as seen in the task 
performance data, the differences between word types on the expectancy ratings were greater in the 
instructed condition than in the uninstructed condition (as predicted). It is important to highlight that I 
also found a reliable difference in expectancies between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words 
in the instructed condition even though I did not tell participants which words were the 0%-stop 
words or the 20%-stop words. Similarly, there was a reliable difference between the 0%-stop words 
and the 20%-stop words in the task performance data. In other words, extra learning occurred in the 
instructed condition. However, these differences may not necessarily reflect implicit learning; in the 
uninstructed condition, the difference between 0% and 20% was not significant (and the difference in 
the instructed condition was significantly greater than the difference in the uninstructed condition). It 
is possible that informing participants in the instructed condition about the 80%-stop words 
encouraged them to look for further stimulus-stop contingencies and identify that the probability of 
stopping was greater for the 20%-stop words than for the 0%-stop words. Combined, these results 
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suggest that stimulus-stop associations acquired through explicit instructions and stimulus-stop 
associations acquired through task practice have qualitatively similar effects on stop-signal task 
performance (i.e. both induce slowing on no-signal trials and reduce the probability of responding on 
stop-signal trials). However, as predicted, the effects are much stronger when the stop contingencies 
are instructed.
It is important to highlight that I also found some differences between the instructed and 
uninstructed conditions. In the instructed condition, I found that the expectancy ratings correlated 
with task performance: participants who expected to withhold their response more for the 80%-stop 
words responded more slowly to these words than to the 0%-stop words and to the 20%-stop words. 
In contrast, the expectancy ratings in the uninstructed condition did not reliably correlate with task 
performance. This conclusion was further supported by Bayesian regression analyses. In other words, 
participants did generate some expectancies but they did not use these expectancies to influence task 
performance. In Chapter 2, I also found that the stop-associated words slowed responses, even when 
participants did not expect a stop signal for those words. I suggested that when the stimulus-stop 
contingencies are uninstructed, stimulus-stop learning is mediated via an interplay of explicit and 
implicit processes. The findings reported in the present chapter provide additional support for this 
conclusion: it seems that, unlike in the instructed condition, the response slowing observed in the 
uninstructed condition reflects at least some contribution of bottom-up (i.e. implicit) processes 
independent of top-down expectancies. Indeed, the absence of a correlation in the uninstructed 
condition satisfies the zero correlation criterion which states that under situations of unconscious (i.e. 
implicit) learning there should be no relationship between confidence judgments (i.e. expectancies) 
and task performance (Dienes, Altmann, Kwan & Goode, 1995; Dienes, 2007). The idea that response 
inhibition can become automatised independent of top-down expectancy is consistent with the 
Instance theory which construes automaticity as the single-step direct retrieval of past solutions from 
memory (Logan, 1988). Furthermore, research in the associative learning literature has shown that 
performance on various implicit and explicit measures are separable, and not strongly correlated 
(Gebauer & Mackintosh, 2007; Yang & Li, 2012; see also McLaren, Forrest, et al., 2014). Therefore, 
it is possible that performance in the uninstructed condition is primarily influenced by (implicit) 
associations, but that the induction of expectancies is explicit and hence expectancies not correlated 
with performance. 
However, it is important to highlight that in Experiment 1 (Chapter 2) I found some evidence 
that expectancies obtained following task completion correlated with the magnitude of the response 
slowing following the reversal of the acquired stimulus-stop mappings in a test phase following 
training (Experiment 1). Thus, it is possible that although expectancies do not drive the acquisition of 
slowing, they constitute a measure of the strength of stimulus-stop learning on performance. As such, 
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they could reliably predict the magnitude of slowing for the old stop-associated items in the test 
phase. Furthermore, in Experiment 4 (Chapter 2) when expectancies were obtained on each trial, the 
expectancies ratings correlated with task performance during the training and test phases. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, it could be that asking participants to rate their expectancies on each trial 
provided a more sensitive measure of the acquisition of the stimulus-stop expectancies. Alternatively, 
it could be that asking participants to rate their expectancies on each trial changed the nature of the 
task and encouraged a more deliberate form of processing. Note, however, that the latter explanation 
cannot account for all of the stop learning effects observed in that experiment (for a discussion, see 
Chapter 2).
In the Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. study, expectancy was manipulated in a block-based fashion 
(i.e. participants were informed at the beginning of a block if signals could occur in the periphery or 
in the centre of the screen), and proactive control adjustments increased the distractor effect in no-
signal RTs. In the present chapter, word-specific stop learning did not interact with the distractor 
effect in no-signal RTs. I observed this pattern of results in both the instructed and uninstructed 
conditions (even though I observed greater stop learning effects in the instructed condition).  Note that 
I also replicated the pattern of results observed in the uninstructed condition in an earlier pilot 
experiment (the results of this pilot experiment are reported in Appendix G). There appear to be three 
plausible explanations for the absence of an interaction between expectancy and the distractor 
manipulation in no-signal RTs. First, it is possible that participants simply cannot adjust their 
attentional settings on a trial-by-trial basis (see Strayer & Kramer, 1994, for a similar idea). Recently, 
I tested this idea in a different (unpublished) experiment where there were ‘pure’ blocks in which the 
location of the signal stayed the same (non-central signal blocks, central signal blocks, and no-signal 
blocks as in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. 2014) and ‘mixed’ blocks in which the location of the signal 
changed on a trial-by-trial basis. In both block types, the location of the upcoming signal was 
instructed by way of a cue presented at the beginning of each trial. I did not find any differences in the 
size of the distractor effect across the signal locations in the pure blocks or in the mixed blocks. It is 
possible that the presentation of the cue on each trial encouraged participants to attend to the centre of 
the screen in that experiment. Alternatively, it could be that signal detection processes during stopping 
play less of a role in the current task than originally thought. If it turns out that participants cannot 
make attentional adjustments on a trial-by-trial basis in this task, these findings would conflict with 
previous research that has demonstrated that participants can make trial-by-trial control adjustments in 
other control paradigms. For example, evidence in the task-switching literature has demonstrated that 
participants can reconfigure their attentional settings when a cue indicates that a task switch is 
required (see, e.g. Longman, Lavric, & Monsell, 2013; Longman, Lavric, Munteanu & Monsell, 2014; 
Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002). 
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Second, it is possible that in the previous study by Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), the 
presence of distractors primarily interfered with the detection or analysis of the go words rather than 
response selection. This could explain the difference between block-based and word-based 
expectancy manipulations because unlike block-based expectancies, word-based expectancies can 
only influence processing after the word has been identified (assuming a serial architecture e.g. 
stimulus X -> stop word -> stop). Hence, the distractor manipulation and the word manipulation 
should have additive effects. 
Third, it is possible that participants formed direct associations between the stop-associated 
words and stop response (without a mediating role for the stop signal). If this were the case, stop-
associated words would not induce attentional shifts and no increased distractor effect is expected. 
However, it is not possible to distinguish between these explanations in the present chapter.
The RT analysis showed that that word type did not influence the distractor effect. However, I 
did find that the distractor effect was larger for the 80%-stop words than the other words types in the 
probability of missed responses in the instructed condition. However, this is unlikely to reflect 
proactive adjustments of attentional settings. First, the absence of an interaction between word type 
and distractor type in no-signal RTs argues against the explanation that participants allocated attention 
to the stop signal and consequently got timed out, especially in Experiment 6 where I extended the 
response deadline to 2000 ms (considerably longer than overall mean RTs). Second, the eye-
movement data (Appendix F) suggests that participants made fewer eye movements following the 
presentation of 80%-stop words on distractor trials than on no-distractor trials. These data support the 
idea that participants used the instructed stimulus-stop contingency more on distractor trials (when it 
was difficult to monitor for the stop signal) than on no-distractor trials (when it was easier to monitor 
for the stop signal). Hence, on no-distractor trials the decision to stop or not was primarily influenced 
by the actual presentation of the stop signal rather than the stimulus-stop contingencies. Finally, the 
probability of missed responses was low suggesting that, even if we assume that these differences 
reflect anticipatory adjustments, this happened on only a small minority of no-signal trials.
The absence an interaction between the distractor manipulation and the word type 
manipulation also sheds further light on what is learned in stop-signal tasks. In Chapters 1 and 2, I 
discussed the idea that in stop-learning tasks that use a single representation of the stop signal (e.g. the 
lines of the surrounding square becoming thicker) participants could acquire associations between the 
stop-associated words and the stop signal; retrieval of these associations will prime the representation 
of the stop signal rather than the stop goal or stop response (i.e. the ‘indirect’ pathway; see also 
Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). This signal priming account 
predicts that stop learning will influence the probability of stopping in training without influencing 
responding on no-signal trials. In the paradigm used in the present chapter, the signal-detection 
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component may be more important than in other variants of the stop-signal paradigm. Nevertheless, I 
found that both go (no-signal) and stop performance were influenced by word-specific learning. 
Furthermore, if participants learned a stimulus-signal association, the distractors effect should be 
larger for 80%-stop words than for the 20%-stop words due to the increased priming of stop-signal 
detection for the stop-associated words. As can be seen in Tables 3.3-3.6, distractors and word type 
had additive effects on p(respond|signal). This is inconsistent with the stop-signal priming idea. 
Finally, the analyses of task performance on no-signal trials revealed an unexpected finding. 
In addition to the predicted stop learning effect on no-signal RTs, I found that learning influenced 
accuracy in the instructed condition: accuracy was lower for the 80%-stop words than for the 0%-stop 
words and the 20%-stop words. Note, missed trials were excluded from the analyses of accuracy rates 
so these findings cannot be accounted for by the observed differences in the probability of missed 
responses on go trials. I did not find any evidence of this accuracy effect in the uninstructed condition. 
This accuracy effect cannot be accounted for by a speed-accuracy tradeoff as no-signal RTs were 
reliably slower for the stop-associated words than for the other word types in both conditions. Instead, 
these accuracy effects may be explained by the blocked-input model of response inhibition (Logan, 
Yamaguchi, et al., 2015). According to this model, response inhibition can be achieved by blocking 
input to go units. It is possible that the retrieval of strong stimulus-stop associations in the instructed 
condition had a similar effect. This could explain why accuracy was lower for stop-associated words 
in the instructed condition: when input to the relevant go unit is reduced (as specified by the word 
itself), the probability of an incorrect response (and indeed the probability of a missed response) may 
increase. However, future research is required to test this blocked-input idea (for an extended 
discussion of the implications of this blocked-input idea, see How do Stimulus-Stop Associations 
Influence Behaviour?, Chapter 7) . 
Conclusion
In conclusion, these results suggest that slowing for stimuli than are consistently associated with 
stopping can arise from explicit, top-down expectancies or from learning through experience during 
task practice. Given that I found effects of the stimulus-stop contingencies on expectancies in the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions, it is tempting to argue that expectancies are required for word-
specific stop learning. However, Bayesian analyses showed that expectancies correlated with response 
slowing on no-signal trials in the instructed condition but not in the uninstructed condition. In other 
words, the slowing for the 80%-stop words observed in the instructed condition can be accounted for 
primarily by the instructed expectancies; on the other hand, the slowing for the 80%-stop words 
observed in the uninstructed condition can be accounted for primarily by implicit learning processes 
(the expectancies observed were neither necessary nor sufficient to elicit the response slowing and can 
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be considered a by-product of learning). Thus, stimulus-stop learning may well be mediated via both 
explicit and implicit processes.
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Appendix D
Separate Analyses of Experiment 5 and Experiment 6
In Appendix D, the separate analyses for Experiment 5 and Experiment 6 are presented. There were 
three differences between these experiments: (1) sample sizes (N = 48 in Experiment 5, N = 72 in 
Experiment 6), (2) response deadlines (1250 ms in Experiment 5, 2000 ms in Experiment 6), and (3) 
dependent measures obtained (with eye-tracking in Experiment 5, without eye-tracking in Experiment 
6). 
Experiment 5. Descriptive statistics for the task performance data are presented in Tables D.1 
and D.2, inferential statistics are presented in Table D.3 and D.5 (separate analyses for the instructed 
and uninstructed conditions are presented in Tables D.6 and D.7).
Task performance. I found a reliable main effect of word type on no-signal RTs (p < 0.001), 
on the probability of correct responses (p = 0.001), the probability of missed responses (p < 0.001), 
and the probability of responding on stop-signal trials (p < 0.001). The main effect of distractor type 
(distractor, no-distractor) was also reliable in each of the aforementioned measures (ps ≤ 0.001). The 
interactions between condition (instructed, uninstructed) and word type were reliable (ps ≤ 0.006) 
reflecting the greater differences between the word types in the instructed condition than in the 
uninstructed condition. The word type by distractor interactions were not reliable in go RTs, the 
probability of missed responses, and the probability of responding on stop-signal trials (ps ≥ 0.418) 
but was reliable in the probability of correct responses (p < 0.001). The p(correct) interaction was also 
reliable in the combined analysis; for possible explanations, see the Chapter Discussion. Table D.4 
shows the outcome of the Bayesian analysis. As can be seen, the results are largely consistent with the 
ANOVA reported in Tables D.3.
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Table D.1. Overview of the no-signal data in Experiment 5. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)], 
probability of a missed go response [p(miss)], and average go reaction time (RT) as a function of condition, 
word type, distractor type, and part. Accuracy is the ratio of correct no-signal trials to the number of correct and 
incorrect no-signal trials (missed trials are excluded). P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total 
number of no-signal trials. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(correct)
Distractors
M
0.92
0.92
0.89
0.92
0.93
0.90
0.93
0.92
0.92
0.90
0.89
0.90
0.91
0.91
0.94
0.89
0.90
0.89
SD
0.06
0.06
0.14
0.06
0.05
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.11
0.08
0.09
0.11
0.08
0.07
0.12
0.10
0.08
0.15
No distractors
M
0.90
0.91
0.86
0.94
0.93
0.87
0.92
0.92
0.83
0.89
0.88
0.88
0.91
0.91
0.89
0.90
0.91
0.89
SD
0.06
0.05
0.15
0.05
0.05
0.11
0.06
0.06
0.14
0.09
0.09
0.11
0.09
0.07
0.10
0.07
0.06
0.14
p(miss)
Distractors
M
0.05
0.06
0.14
0.03
0.02
0.07
0.04
0.05
0.11
0.06
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.04
SD
0.04
0.04
0.13
0.03
0.02
0.09
0.04
0.06
0.13
0.05
0.04
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.08
0.06
0.07
0.07
No distractors
M
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
SD
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.03
0.02
0.05
0.05
0.04
0.10
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.06
go RT
Distractors
M
781
786
831
754
767
825
767
779
835
815
819
829
809
807
823
810
812
823
SD
69
66
99
83
83
108
94
107
139
90
86
92
138
129
140
128
130
137
No distractors
M
726
730
756
705
717
770
710
725
773
757
758
757
754
753
785
752
748
756
SD
64
66
79
89
94
120
105
101
145
80
81
99
131
137
133
134
132
143
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Table D.2. Overview of the relevant stop-signal data in Experiment 5. Probability of responding on a stop trial 
[p(respond|signal)] and average SSD as a function of condition, word type, distractor type, and part. M = mean; 
SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80
Uninstructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(respond)
Distractors
M
0.48
0.39
0.52
0.38
0.50
0.37
0.46
0.48
0.51
0.44
0.52
0.48
SD
0.08
0.16
0.07
0.16
0.06
0.12
0.08
0.18
0.08
0.11
0.08
0.10
No distractors
M
0.41
0.29
0.48
0.39
0.51
0.35
0.43
0.41
0.49
0.46
0.49
0.44
SD
0.06
0.14
0.04
0.13
0.04
0.12
0.09
0.10
0.05
0.14
0.04
0.11
SSD
Distractors
M
366
369
373
376
351
354
375
377
366
371
347
349
SD
130
128
166
166
174
177
145
144
156
153
161
164
No distractors
M
360
357
333
333
393
393
329
330
286
287
416
417
SD
114
114
113
112
111
111
85
87
136
137
131
131
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Table D.3. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal data in Experiment 5. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. In the no-signal RT 
analysis, incorrect and missed no-signal trials were removed. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20, 80)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (0, 20, 80)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (0, 20, 80)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
Df2
46
92
92
46
92
92
46
184
92
92
184
92
92
184
184
46
92
92
46
92
92
46
184
92
92
184
92
92
184
184
46
92
92
46
92
92
46
184
92
92
184
92
92
184
184
Sum of 
squares 
effect
123926.20
6022.55
208930.80
720715.70
7831.28
79512.53
141.16
13498.73
6570.54
1324.51
3870.41
654.58
1174.59
3844.43
1284.19
0.01
0.04
0.13
0.05
0.00
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.06
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.07
0.11
0.06
0.02
0.09
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.05
0.01
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
7639132.60
1209571.42
260449.40
157581.96
1209571.42
260449.40
157581.96
225370.39
147124.22
80018.08
225370.39
147124.22
80018.08
295307.76
295307.76
4.07
0.35
0.64
0.18
0.35
0.64
0.18
0.55
0.34
0.29
0.55
0.34
0.29
0.63
0.63
1.06
0.55
0.26
0.08
0.55
0.26
0.08
0.60
0.18
0.20
0.60
0.18
0.20
0.35
0.35
F
0.75
0.23
36.90
210.39
0.30
14.04
0.04
2.76
2.05
0.76
0.79
0.20
0.68
0.60
0.20
0.15
5.73
9.48
12.73
0.23
6.75
1.15
0.31
0.27
8.81
0.47
3.03
1.20
0.99
1.26
0.04
5.45
19.46
33.63
1.45
16.18
1.48
1.68
2.36
0.61
0.62
1.43
12.58
0.72
0.30
p
0.392
0.705
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.655
< 0.001
0.840
0.056
0.134
0.418
0.533
0.815
0.512
0.588
0.865
0.698
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.792
0.006
0.289
0.819
0.733
< 0.001
0.703
0.061
0.293
0.388
0.289
0.846
0.008
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.240
< 0.001
0.229
0.184
0.107
0.480
0.572
0.245
< 0.001
0.498
0.754
gen. η2
0.012
0.001
0.020
0.067
0.001
0.008
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
0.006
0.018
0.007
< 0.001
0.013
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.008
0.001
0.003
0.001
0.002
0.002
< 0.001
0.019
0.033
0.018
0.005
0.027
0.001
0.007
0.003
0.001
0.002
0.002
0.016
0.002
0.001
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Table D.4. No-signal RT Bayesian analysis in Experiment 5. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of the 
factor or interaction had a deleterious effect on the model, whereas Bayes factors > 1 indicate that the factor or 
interaction could be removed without impairing the fit much. Note that ‘participant’ was included as a factor for 
all models, but this factor is not added to the model descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. 
distract = distractor type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type. 
Main analysis
Instructed condition only 
Uninstructed condition only 
Omitted factor(s)
Distract
Type
Condition:type
Condition
Distract by part
Condition by distract by part by type
Part
Condition by distract by part
Condition by distract by type
Part by type
Distract by type
Condition by distract
Condition by part
Distract by part by type
Condition by part by type
Distract
Type
Distract:part
Part
Distract by type
Distract by part by type
Part by type
Distract
Type
Distract by part
Distract by type
Distract by part by type
Part
part by type
Bayes Factor
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.23
0.44
0.53
0.61
0.66
0.92
1.26
1.31
2.10
5.45
15.47
0.00
0.00
18.30
19.16
26.77
33.41
63.26
0.00
3.17
11.37
20.19
26.55
78.87
87.01
Confidence interval
±126.46%
±126.61%
±100.21%
±103.06%
±100.01%
±99.77%
±104.66%
±103.96%
±112.99%
±101.07%
±117.18%
±131.65%
±127.69%
±100.85%
±116.17%
±20.90%
±20.70%
±27.20%
±18.78%
±24.48%
±17.65%
±21.04%
±56.17%
±30.79%
±29.60%
±35.73%
±31.2%
±43.83%
±30.20%
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Table D.5. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the stop-signal data in Experiment 5. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. type = word type. ps < 
0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Condition
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
Df2
46
92
46
46
92
46
46
92
92
46
92
92
46
92
92
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.28
0.22
0.86
0.13
0.01
0.29
0.00
0.04
0.09
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.04
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
1.52
1.04
1.01
0.39
1.04
1.01
0.39
0.62
0.62
0.28
0.62
0.62
0.28
0.65
0.65
F
8.48
9.63
39.23
14.87
0.52
13.27
0.13
3.05
6.61
0.29
0.54
1.03
0.00
2.96
0.28
p
0.006
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.562
0.001
0.717
0.052
0.002
0.591
0.586
0.363
0.975
0.057
0.759
gen. η2
0.044
0.034
0.123
0.020
0.002
0.045
< 0.001
0.007
0.014
< 0.001
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.007
0.001
CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX D
124
Table D.6. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the instructed condition only in Experiment 
5 with part, word type, and distract included as within-participants factors. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold. 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
23
23
46
46
23
46
Sum of 
squares 
effect
11078.02
272678.70
350341.90
12048.98
1987.93
2376.33
933.74
0.01
0.22
0.04
0.00
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.07
0.20
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.04
0.01
0.14
1.07
0.08
0.02
0.07
0.00
0.03
Sum of 
squares 
error
547919.98
185040.03
67823.77
112538.93
63177.04
40560.40
141689.52
0.15
0.44
0.09
0.24
0.18
0.13
0.35
0.39
0.20
0.03
0.32
0.09
0.10
0.18
0.41
0.68
0.15
0.31
0.31
0.15
0.28
F
0.47
33.89
118.81
2.46
0.72
1.35
0.15
2.20
11.66
10.57
0.28
2.15
9.55
1.53
4.17
23.16
29.88
1.50
3.46
9.43
0.70
8.10
36.03
11.34
1.52
5.32
0.12
2.61
p
0.538
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.082
0.490
0.265
0.914
0.123
0.001
0.004
0.818
0.139
0.002
0.226
0.024
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.230
0.044
0.003
0.595
0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.229
0.008
0.730
0.088
gen. η2
0.003
0.065
0.081
0.003
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.004
0.066
0.013
0.001
0.005
0.016
0.007
0.037
0.100
0.024
0.011
0.008
0.021
0.003
0.042
0.249
0.023
0.006
0.022
< 0.001
0.010
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Table D.7. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the uninstructed condition only in 
Experiment 5 with part, word type and distract included as within-subjects factors. Note: distract = distractor 
type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold.
Expectancy analyses. Analyses of the expectancy data revealed a main effect of word type (p 
< 0.001) and a reliable interaction between word type and condition (p < 0.001), reflecting the larger 
difference between the word types in the instructed condition (p < 0.001) than in the uninstructed 
condition (p = 0.001). Planned comparisons revealed that in the instructed condition participants 
expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words (6.74) than for the 0%-stop words (3.61), t(23) = 9.64, 
p < 0.001, gav = 3.08, and for the 20%-stop words (4.10), t(23) = 9.21, p < 0.001, gav = 2.97. The 
difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was also reliable, t(23) = -3.33, p = 
0.003, gav = -0.47. Similarly, in the uninstructed condition participants expected to stop more for the 
80%-stop words (5.08) than for the 0%-stop words (4.35), t(23) = 2.91, p = 0.008, gav = 0.53, and for 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
46
23
92
46
46
92
46
23
23
46
46
23
46
Sum of 
squares 
effect
2775.81
15764.69
370514.90
5320.16
5237.20
122.76
4194.88
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.09
0.08
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.00
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
661651.44
75409.38
89758.19
112831.46
83947.19
39457.68
153618.24
0.21
0.20
0.09
0.31
0.17
0.17
0.28
0.16
0.06
0.05
0.28
0.08
0.10
0.17
0.64
0.32
0.24
0.31
0.31
0.13
0.38
F
0.10
4.81
94.94
1.08
1.43
0.07
0.63
3.54
0.20
3.17
0.47
1.11
1.55
0.63
1.69
0.64
8.92
0.75
0.13
3.82
0.31
3.15
5.38
5.02
2.06
2.32
0.17
0.88
p
0.845
0.025
< 0.001
0.356
0.249
0.837
0.565
0.037
0.772
0.088
0.724
0.334
0.228
0.588
0.200
0.480
0.007
0.508
0.858
0.046
0.776
0.066
0.030
0.035
0.139
0.109
0.680
0.419
gen. η2
< 0.001
0.003
0.058
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.008
< 0.001
0.003
0.002
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.008
0.001
0.013
0.006
< 0.001
0.011
0.002
0.029
0.025
0.018
0.009
0.011
< 0.001
0.005
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the 20%-stop words (4.34), t(23) = 3.79, p < 0.001, gav = 0.59. The difference between the 0%-stop 
words and the 20%-stop words was not reliable, t(23) = 0.022, p = 0.983, gav = 0.00.
Experiment 6. Descriptive statistics for the task performance data are presented in Tables D.8 
and D.9, inferential statistics are presented in Table D.10 and D.12 (separate analyses for the 
instructed and uninstructed conditions are presented in Tables D.13 and D.14).
Task performance. I found a reliable main effect of word type on no-signal RTs (p < 0.001), 
the probability of correct responses (p = 0.001), the probability of missed responses (p = 0.043), and 
the probability of responding on stop-signal trials (p < 0.001). The main effect of distractor type 
(distractor, no-distractor) was also reliable for no-signal RTs, the probability of correct responses, and 
the probability of responding on stop trials (ps ≤ 0.002), but not for the probability of missed no-
signal responses (p = 0.440). The interactions between condition (instructed, uninstructed) and word 
type were reliable for no-signal RTs (p < 0.001) and the probability of responding on stop trials (p < 
0.001) reflecting the greater differences between the word types in the instructed condition than in the 
uninstructed condition. There was no reliable two-way interactions between word type and distractor 
type (ps ≥ 0.119). Table D.11 shows the outcome of the Bayesian analysis. As can be seen, the results 
are largely consistent with the ANOVAs reported in Tables D.10.
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Table D.8. Overview of the no-signal data in Experiment 6. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)], 
probability of a missed go response [p(miss)], and average go reaction time (RT) as a function of condition, 
word type, distractor type, and part. Accuracy is the ratio of correct no-signal trials to the number of correct and 
incorrect no-signal trials (missed trials are excluded). P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total 
number of no-signal trials. M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
Instructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(correct)
Distractors
M
0.93
0.93
0.90
0.93
0.94
0.92
0.93
0.93
0.91
0.95
0.95
0.93
0.95
0.96
0.96
0.95
0.95
0.94
SD
0.07
0.05
0.13
0.06
0.05
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.10
0.04
0.04
0.08
0.05
0.04
0.09
0.05
0.05
0.11
No distractors
M
0.93
0.92
0.91
0.95
0.94
0.94
0.93
0.93
0.85
0.94
0.94
0.95
0.96
0.96
0.93
0.95
0.95
0.94
SD
0.06
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.06
0.09
0.08
0.07
0.16
0.05
0.03
0.08
0.04
0.04
0.09
0.06
0.06
0.10
p(miss)
Distractors
M
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.03
SD
0.03
0.03
0.10
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.09
0.04
0.04
0.05
No distractors
M
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
SD
0.03
0.03
0.10
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.02
0.06
0.02
0.02
0.05
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.05
go RT
Distractors
M
913
926
969
968
982
1041
1016
1018
1102
927
943
953
1018
1032
1054
1056
1058
1075
SD
161
159
194
259
264
280
276
276
316
164
164
162
292
303
320
307
311
308
No distractors
M
880
885
927
922
936
1027
965
985
1075
870
879
904
982
974
1010
1010
1003
1035
SD
158
149
145
237
238
262
263
264
311
160
156
166
283
275
303
297
289
293
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Table D.9. Overview of the relevant stop-signal data in Experiment 6. Probability of responding on a stop trial 
[p(respond|signal)] and average SSD as a function of condition, word type, distractor type, and part. M = mean; 
SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
Uninstructed
Part 1
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 2
20%-stop
80%-stop
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(respond)
Distractors
M
0.46
0.35
0.48
0.35
0.50
0.36
0.39
0.41
0.48
0.43
0.50
0.44
SD
0.13
0.17
0.12
0.16
0.08
0.17
0.09
0.12
0.06
0.11
0.08
0.14
No distractors
M
0.39
0.33
0.47
0.34
0.49
0.36
0.35
0.32
0.47
0.44
0.49
0.46
SD
0.13
0.17
0.06
0.12
0.06
0.18
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.12
0.07
0.13
SSD
Distractors
M
465
465
513
519
493
495
565
570
442
446
415
414
SD
173
178
205
210
258
261
224
227
166
169
204
204
No distractors
M
587
591
619
623
465
467
613
615
622
625
553
556
SD
214
215
221
222
162
167
300
300
307
311
175
178
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Table D.10. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the no-signal data in Experiment 6. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. In the no-signal RT 
analysis, incorrect and missed no-signal trials were removed. type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
Df2
70
140
140
70
140
140
70
280
140
140
280
140
140
280
280
70
140
140
70
140
140
70
280
140
140
280
140
140
280
280
70
140
140
70
140
140
70
280
140
140
280
140
140
280
280
Sum of 
squares 
effect
60763.15
3157371.00
730815.40
614976.60
70810.58
169491.00
13219.55
31759.51
2934.04
9656.24
28348.02
1066.16
3690.91
4795.34
8200.87
0.18
0.06
0.11
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.02
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
Sum of 
squares error
65147721.30
10406859.00
668837.20
708947.80
10406859.00
668837.20
708947.80
986425.00
514823.60
297829.80
986425.00
514823.60
297829.80
703878.20
703878.20
3.28
0.77
0.71
0.20
0.77
0.71
0.20
0.85
0.35
0.33
0.85
0.35
0.33
0.60
0.60
1.06
0.48
0.34
0.11
0.48
0.34
0.11
0.45
0.10
0.13
0.45
0.10
0.13
0.19
0.19
F
0.07
21.24
76.49
60.72
0.48
17.74
1.31
2.25
0.40
2.27
2.01
0.14
0.87
0.48
0.82
3.94
5.17
10.40
1.38
1.07
2.41
0.04
1.71
2.03
1.00
2.05
3.23
0.46
2.90
2.57
0.12
0.05
4.01
0.59
2.05
1.74
1.71
0.85
0.05
0.13
1.32
2.14
0.04
0.27
1.81
p
0.799
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.555
< 0.001
0.257
0.092
0.662
0.119
0.093
0.856
0.422
0.672
0.472
0.051
0.008
0.001
0.244
0.343
0.116
0.842
0.175
0.135
0.369
0.120
0.042
0.561
0.043
0.064
0.726
0.954
0.043
0.440
0.133
0.191
0.196
0.440
0.951
0.776
0.270
0.122
0.895
0.829
0.151
gen. η2
0.001
0.038
0.009
0.008
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.025
0.008
0.015
0.001
0.002
0.003
< 0.001
0.003
0.001
0.001
0.004
0.002
< 0.001
0.003
0.003
0.001
< 0.001
0.007
< 0.001
0.005
0.003
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
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Table D.11. No-signal RT Bayesian analysis in Experiment 6. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of the 
factor or interaction had a deleterious effect on the model, whereas Bayes factors > 1 indicate that the factor or 
interaction could be removed without impairing the fit much. Note that ‘participant’ was included as a factor for 
all models, but this factor is not added to the model descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. Note: 
distract = distractor type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type. 
Main analysis
Instructed condition only 
Uninstructed condition only 
Omitted factor(s)
Part
Type
Distract
Condition by type
Condition by part
Condition by distract
Condition
Condition by distract by type
Part by type
Condition by part by type
Distract by type
Condition by distract by part by type
Distract by part
Distract:part by type
Condition by distract by part
Part
Type
Distract
Distract by type
Distract by part
Distract by part by type
Part by type
Part
Distract
Type
Distract by type
Distract by part
Distract by part by type
Part by type
Bayes Factor
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.03
5.03
11.28
13.91
101.88
117.19
123.91
126.63
129.53
199.86
613.79
796.95
0.00
0.05
0.92
12.15
18.34
30.86
71.44
0.00
0.00
0.53
13.18
31.46
37.37
96.71
Confidence interval
±119.21%
±94.87%
±94.69%
±96.26%
±104.23%
±90.51%
±100.7%
±96.08%
±82.66%
±102.94%
±80.76%
±94.28%
±101.93%
±95.13%
±115.45%
±48.01%
±43.9%
±45.34%
±43.3%
±45.41%
±43.12%
±42.89%
±54.2%
±56.11%
±58.57%
±55.68%
±60.1%
±56.58%
±58.44%
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Table D.12. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the stop-signal data in Experiment 6. 
Condition is included as a between-subjects factor, all other factors are within-subjects. type = word type. ps < 
0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Condition
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by 
distract
Df1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
Df2
70
140
70
70
140
70
70
140
140
70
140
140
70
140
140
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.12
0.89
1.10
0.09
0.17
0.39
0.00
0.08
0.13
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.05
Sum of 
squares 
error
3.56
3.30
1.26
0.59
3.30
1.26
0.59
1.21
0.96
0.45
1.21
0.96
0.45
0.67
0.67
F
2.30
18.86
61.03
10.31
3.63
21.53
0.00
4.64
9.70
0.27
0.17
0.72
0.85
0.55
5.42
p
0.134
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
0.036
< 0.001
0.968
0.014
< 0.001
0.608
0.828
0.475
0.361
0.578
0.005
gen. η2
0.010
0.069
0.084
0.007
0.014
0.031
< 0.001
0.007
0.011
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.004
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Table D.13. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the instructed condition only in 
Experiment 6 with part, word type and distract included as within-participants factors. type = word type. ps < 
0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-stop, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
35
35
70
70
35
70
Sum of 
squares 
effect
1319009.00
802089.70
223933.10
54354.20
303.58
6998.30
11504.42
0.05
0.12
0.00
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.14
1.40
0.04
0.06
0.04
0.01
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
4439376.10
456056.60
442994.70
633346.70
270729.30
184672.20
412381.40
0.47
0.41
0.15
0.59
0.19
0.23
0.34
0.32
0.24
0.06
0.29
0.05
0.08
0.09
1.65
0.81
0.39
0.68
0.61
0.22
0.30
F
10.40
61.56
17.69
3.00
0.04
1.33
0.98
3.97
9.97
0.32
2.51
4.53
0.99
2.98
0.61
3.64
0.12
1.51
0.82
0.10
1.07
3.06
60.39
3.98
2.90
2.03
1.06
1.44
p
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.039
0.960
0.269
0.397
0.023
< 0.001
0.575
0.075
0.015
0.347
0.039
0.545
0.060
0.728
0.230
0.447
0.819
0.362
0.061
< 0.001
0.072
0.062
0.151
0.309
0.245
gen. η2
0.035
0.022
0.006
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.012
0.026
< 0.001
0.009
0.006
0.001
0.006
0.003
0.014
< 0.001
0.007
0.001
< 0.001
0.002
0.018
0.154
0.006
0.007
0.005
0.001
0.002
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Table D.14. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance on the uninstructed condition only in 
Experiment 6 with part, word type and distract included as within-subjects factors. type = word type. Note: 
distract = distractor type (no-distractor, distractor); type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Expectancy analyses. Analyses of the expectancy data revealed a main effect of word type (p 
< 0.001) and a reliable interaction between word type and condition (p < 0.001), reflecting the larger 
difference between the word types in the instructed condition (p < 0.001) than in the uninstructed 
condition (p = 0.004). Planned comparisons revealed that in the instructed condition participants 
expected to stop more for the 80%-stop words (6.61) than for the 0%-stop words (3.77), t(35) = 9.05, 
p < 0.001, gav = 2.33, and for the 20%-stop words (4.31), t(35) = 7.50, p < 0.001, gav = 2.02. The 
difference between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was also reliable, t(35) = -4.29, p < 
0.001, gav = -0.44. Similarly, in the uninstructed condition participants expected to stop more for the 
80%-stop words (5.32) than for the 0%-stop words (4.85), t(35) = -3.12, p < 0.001, gav = 0.48, and for 
the 20%-stop words (5.03), t(35) = 2.08, p = 0.045, gav = 0.32. The difference between the 0%-stop 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
70
35
140
70
70
140
70
35
35
70
70
35
70
Sum of 
squares 
effect
1909172.00
98216.67
404263.00
5753.33
3696.62
6348.86
1491.79
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.92
0.09
0.04
0.03
0.11
0.00
0.04
Sum of 
squares 
error
5967482.90
212780.60
265953.20
353078.30
244094.30
113157.60
291496.80
0.30
0.31
0.05
0.27
0.16
0.10
0.26
0.16
0.09
0.05
0.16
0.05
0.05
0.10
1.65
0.45
0.20
0.53
0.35
0.23
0.37
F
11.20
16.16
53.20
0.57
0.53
1.96
0.18
1.80
1.66
1.84
0.49
0.35
0.13
2.40
1.89
0.94
2.61
0.30
1.34
0.06
1.02
19.44
7.03
7.47
1.76
10.70
0.08
4.22
p
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.614
0.545
0.156
0.893
0.178
0.205
0.183
0.680
0.702
0.841
0.079
0.158
0.364
0.115
0.711
0.268
0.842
0.383
< 0.001
0.012
0.010
0.181
< 0.001
0.780
0.019
gen. η2
0.043
0.002
0.009
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.006
0.005
0.001
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.007
0.008
0.002
0.003
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.003
0.176
0.021
0.010
0.006
0.024
< 0.001
0.010
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words and the 20%-stop words was not reliable, t(35) = -1.55, p = 0.130, gav = -0.19. Consistent with 
the combined analyses, participants in both the instructed and uninstructed conditions could 
distinguish between the words on the basis of their association with stopping.
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Appendix E
Go Stimuli
 I used 50 words in this study. 
Natural: pear, wasp, moth, calf, plum, crow, slug, dove, toad, swan, crab, pony, deer, worm, lamb, 
goat, frog, hawk, rice, lion, wolf, duck, bull, bear, tree.
Human-made: tram, coil, mast, gong, harp, wand, vase, raft, sofa, drum, fork, sock, coin, jeep, shed, 
pill, barn, sink, flag, pipe, bowl, belt, shoe, desk, book.
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Appendix F
Analyses of the Eye Data
In Experiment 5, an EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount camera system (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada) 
was calibrated at the beginning of each block. The gaze position of the right eye was tracked 
throughout each block (sampling rate: 250 Hz). The EyeLink was calibrated and controlled via 
Psychtoolbox (Cornelissen, Peters, & Palmer, 2002). Eye movement data were subsequently exported 
using the Eyelink Data Viewer (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada) for each participant. I generated a file 
with information about all fixations and a file with trial sequence information, and integrated these 
files using R for further analyses. 
In the analyses of the eye movement data, I excluded participants when no fixation was 
registered at the beginning of the trial event (i.e. the presentation of the word) on more than 15% of 
trials, as this could indicate that eye-movement registration was suboptimal. Based on this criterion, I 
excluded two participants (1 in the instructed condition, 1 in the uninstructed condition). Note that the 
inclusion of these participants did not substantially alter the overall pattern of behavioural results (not 
shown). I also excluded all fixations that were off screen (0.1%). 
In the analyses of the eye data, I focused on the number of fixations and the fixation location 
for two intervals: (1) the interval between the word presentation and the response on no-signal trials, 
and (2) after the stop signal on stop-signal trials. Eye-movements made 400 ms after the presentation 
of the stop signal were excluded; this value is based on the cut-off previously used in Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al. (2014) as the design used in the present study was suboptimal to accurately determine 
the SSRTs (which were used as the cut-off in Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). 
The descriptive statistics are in Tables F.1-F.4 and the inferential statistics are in Tables F.5-
F.7. If the number of fixations for a particular interval = 1, then the participant did not move their eyes 
during this time. Based on Verbruggen, Stevens, et al. (2014), I analysed the distance between the 
fixated location and the centre of the screen [distance = sqrt(x-coordinate^2 + y-coordinate^2)]. In 
Tables F.3 and F.4, I show the proportion of fixations that fell within 4 pre-defined regions: a region 
around the word in the centre of the screen, a region in which the distractors occurred, a region around 
the stop-signal, and an outside region; these regions with their coordinates are depicted in Figure F.1. 
Consistent with Verbruggen, Stevens, et al (2014), participants did not make many fixations during 
the intervals of interest, suggesting that they mostly fixated on the centre of screen (Tables F.1 and 
F.2). Furthermore, numerical differences between groups were very small. 
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Figure F.1. To analyse fixation location, I predefined 4 regions (squares): a central region around the word, a 
region with the distractors, a region around the stop signal, and an outside region. The size of each square is in 
pixels (as pixel coordinates were used for registration of fixation location). Screen size: 1024 x 768 pixels.
Analyses of the number of eye movements on no-signal trials showed that the main effect of 
word type was reliable (p = 0.008). Follow-up analyses showed a reliable main effect of word type in 
the instructed condition (p = 0.004) but was not reliable in the uninstructed condition (p = 0.579). This 
difference was supported by a reliable two-way interaction between condition and word type (p = 
0.011). Planned comparisons revealed that in the instructed condition participants made more eye 
movements for the 80%-stop words (1.42) than for the 0%-stop words (1.35), t(22) = -3.21, p = 0.003, 
gav = 0.15, and for the 20%-stop words (1.36), t(22) = -2.73, p = 0.012, gav = 0.11. The difference 
between the 0%-stop words and the 20%-stop words was also reliable, t(22) = -2.46, p = 0.022, gav = 
-0.04. 
On stop-signal trials, participants made slightly more eye movements for the 80%-stop words 
(1.11) than for the 20%-stop words (1.10) (p = 0.008). Follow-up analyses revealed that the main 
effect of word type was reliable in the uninstructed condition (p = 0.033) but was only marginally 
significant in the instructed condition (p = 0.071). The two-way interaction between condition and 
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word type was not reliable (p = 0.644). Together, these results support the view that the stimulus-stop 
associations influenced eye movements on no-signal and stop-signal trials. However, the word type 
differences were very small, and the distance analyses (see below) suggest that participants rarely 
moved their eyes to the signal location for stop words (for distance analyses, see Tables F.3-F.4). The 
main effect of distractor type on the number of fixations was not significant on no-signal trials (p = 
0.965) or on stop-signal trials (p = 0.159). The two-way interactions between word type and distractor 
type were also not significant on no-signal trials and on stop-signal trials (ps ≥ 0.542).
Analyses of the average distance between the fixated location and the central word region did 
not reveal any reliable differences between word types on no-signal (ps ≥ 0.395; Table F.5) nor on 
stop-signal trials (ps ≥ 0.364; Table F.6). In the instructed condition, the average distance was greater 
on distractor trials (43.71) than on no-distractor trials (40.47) on stop-signal trials (p = 0.016) but all 
other differences between distractor types were not reliable (ps ≥ 0.246). There was no word type by 
distractor type interaction on no-signal trials or on stop-signal trials (ps ≥ 0.081). Note, I did find a 
reliable three-way interaction between word type, distractor type, and part on stop-signals trials (p = 
0.030) but this interaction did not reach significance in the separate analyses of each condition (ps ≥ 
0.067). Furthermore, post-hoc tests revealed no reliable interaction between distractor type and part 
for the 20%-stop words (p = 0.146) or for the 80%-stop words (p = 0.221). Similarly, Bayesian 
analyses showed that omitting the word type, distractor type, part interaction did not have a negative 
effect on the model fit (BF = 12.06, ±68.67%). 
In sum, I find little evidence to support the view that participants moved their eyes to enable 
stop-signal detection following the presentation of the 80%-stop words compared with the 0%- and 
20%-stop words. Furthermore, the eye movement data provide further support for the idea that the 
effects of word type were similar when the associations were acquired through explicit instructions 
and task practice. 
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Table F.1. Overview of the number of fixations and average distance between the fixation location and the 
centre of the screen (in pixels) in the interval between the word presentation and the response for each 
condition, part, word type, and distractor type. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
Fixation
Distractors
M
1.38
1.41
1.44
1.36
1.38
1.45
1.35
1.35
1.42
1.26
1.25
1.29
1.20
1.18
1.15
1.13
1.14
1.11
SD
0.41
0.44
0.53
0.51
0.50
0.63
0.46
0.48
0.54
0.31
0.30
0.36
0.27
0.22
0.23
0.14
0.16
0.17
No distractors
M
1.35
1.37
1.39
1.35
1.35
1.46
1.29
1.31
1.36
1.27
1.28
1.33
1.22
1.20
1.19
1.18
1.17
1.19
SD
0.38
0.39
0.45
0.46
0.48
0.57
0.42
0.45
0.58
0.29
0.32
0.39
0.26
0.22
0.30
0.20
0.19
0.29
Distance
Distractors
M
40.31
42.71
38.45
40.49
41.11
39.67
39.29
39.55
38.83
36.74
36.55
37.44
28.66
28.49
25.78
28.86
29.36
31.48
SD
19.39
21.47
20.31
25.89
26.04
26.31
24.55
24.38
24.77
21.62
20.38
22.25
16.47
15.67
13.83
11.71
12.90
16.36
No distractors
M
39.00
39.83
39.14
38.86
38.67
40.38
37.02
38.69
38.03
36.92
37.15
36.05
28.44
27.79
29.01
29.30
29.40
29.59
SD
19.55
19.31
23.03
25.14
25.41
25.67
23.38
23.22
24.76
20.94
20.13
21.61
16.71
15.59
19.04
13.63
13.75
14.18
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Table F.2. Overview of the number of fixations and average distance between the fixation location and the 
centre of the screen (in pixels) in the interval after the stop signal for each condition, part, word type, and 
distractor type. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
Fixation
Distractors
M
1.16
1.18
1.13
1.14
1.12
1.14
1.09
1.11
1.06
1.07
1.05
1.04
SD
0.20
0.22
0.15
0.17
0.18
0.20
0.15
0.16
0.12
0.11
0.07
0.06
No distractors
M
1.13
1.14
1.11
1.13
1.11
1.11
1.11
1.13
1.05
1.07
1.06
1.05
SD
0.15
0.17
0.14
0.17
0.18
0.12
0.14
0.15
0.06
0.09
0.08
0.08
Distance
Distractors
M
42.04
41.53
45.71
44.63
43.01
45.34
35.38
37.35
29.67
27.72
29.10
28.35
SD
27.21
25.39
38.34
39.31
36.76
36.20
24.92
24.99
18.58
15.83
14.20
11.75
No distractors
M
38.32
38.25
41.96
42.32
42.19
39.89
35.36
36.62
27.29
29.43
29.56
29.37
SD
26.60
23.62
37.26
37.22
35.62
34.54
24.07
24.43
15.93
18.33
14.51
13.77
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Table F.3. Overview of the proportion of the fixations that fell within the 4 pre-defined regions during the 
interval between the word and the response on no-signal trials in the interval between the word presentation and 
the response for each condition, part, word type, and distractor type. D = distractors; ND = No distractors; M = 
mean; SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
Word region
D
M
0.72
0.71
0.74
0.75
0.74
0.77
0.74
0.75
0.78
0.72
0.73
0.71
0.83
0.84
0.87
0.79
0.79
0.78
SD
0.21
0.21
0.23
0.20
0.19
0.20
0.19
0.18
0.19
0.20
0.17
0.21
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.20
0.20
0.21
ND 
M
0.73
0.73
0.72
0.77
0.77
0.75
0.76
0.75
0.77
0.74
0.73
0.74
0.82
0.84
0.84
0.79
0.79
0.81
SD
0.21
0.20
0.25
0.19
0.19
0.21
0.18
0.18
0.21
0.19
0.19
0.23
0.18
0.16
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.18
Distractor region
D
M
0.24
0.24
0.23
0.20
0.20
0.18
0.21
0.21
0.17
0.24
0.23
0.26
0.15
0.14
0.12
0.20
0.20
0.20
SD
0.20
0.20
0.22
0.15
0.14
0.16
0.15
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.18
0.14
0.14
0.16
0.20
0.19
0.20
ND 
M
0.24
0.23
0.23
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.20
0.20
0.19
0.23
0.24
0.23
0.16
0.14
0.13
0.21
0.20
0.17
SD
0.20
0.19
0.24
0.13
0.14
0.17
0.14
0.14
0.17
0.15
0.15
0.19
0.16
0.14
0.15
0.19
0.19
0.16
Stop-signal region
D
M
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
SD
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.05
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.03
ND
M
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
SD
0.03
0.03
0.06
0.07
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.01
0.02
0.04
Outside region
D
M
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
SD
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.07
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.01
0.02
0.04
ND 
M
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
SD
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.02
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Table F.4. Overview of the proportion of the fixations that fell within the 4 pre-defined regions during the 
interval after the stop signal in the interval after presentation of the stop signal for each condition, part, word 
type, and distractor type. D = distractors; ND = No distractors; M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Instructed
Uninstructed
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
Word region
D
M
0.73
0.71
0.72
0.72
0.73
0.70
0.76
0.74
0.83
0.84
0.79
0.78
SD
0.23
0.24
0.26
0.26
0.25
0.24
0.20
0.19
0.18
0.16
0.22
0.22
ND 
M
0.73
0.72
0.74
0.74
0.72
0.75
0.74
0.74
0.85
0.82
0.79
0.78
SD
0.23
0.25
0.25
0.26
0.26
0.24
0.22
0.22
0.15
0.19
0.21
0.20
Distractor region
D
M
0.21
0.24
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.24
0.20
0.23
0.15
0.14
0.20
0.21
SD
0.20
0.21
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.16
0.17
0.14
0.15
0.14
0.20
0.21
ND 
M
0.24
0.24
0.20
0.20
0.23
0.20
0.22
0.23
0.13
0.16
0.21
0.20
SD
0.21
0.22
0.16
0.17
0.19
0.16
0.17
0.17
0.13
0.16
0.20
0.19
Stop-signal region
D
M
0.04
0.03
0.06
0.05
0.03
0.04
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
SD
0.05
0.06
0.12
0.09
0.07
0.08
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.03
0.01
ND
M
0.02
0.02
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
SD
0.04
0.05
0.09
0.08
0.08
0.07
0.03
0.04
0.02
0.03
0.01
0.03
Outside region
D
M
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.00
0.00
SD
0.06
0.05
0.05
0.06
0.08
0.06
0.10
0.08
0.04
0.02
0.01
0.01
ND 
M
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
SD
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.05
0.06
0.09
0.07
0.05
0.03
0.02
0.01
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Table F.5. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the word interval. Type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Word interval
Number of fixations
Distance
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
4
4
Df2
44
88
88
44
88
88
44
176
88
88
176
88
88
176
176
44
88
88
44
88
88
44
176
88
88
176
88
88
176
176
Sum of 
squares 
effect
5.88
1.00
0.20
0.00
0.36
0.19
0.27
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.14
0.04
0.01
0.00
0.01
13071.11
3448.82
37.77
70.53
2727.41
50.18
78.72
86.11
18.90
49.12
83.39
11.40
54.12
132.39
82.08
Sum of 
squares 
error
103.44
9.13
1.29
1.99
9.13
1.29
1.99
1.76
1.14
1.01
1.76
1.14
1.01
1.62
1.62
273765.99
43303.67
2926.34
3423.98
43303.67
2926.34
3423.98
6146.05
3267.00
2466.27
6146.05
3267.00
2466.27
4606.86
4606.86
F
2.50
4.82
6.90
0.00
1.74
6.32
5.91
0.33
0.28
0.47
3.43
1.59
0.41
0.11
0.33
2.10
3.50
0.57
0.91
2.77
0.75
1.01
0.62
0.25
0.88
0.60
0.15
0.97
1.26
0.78
p
0.121
0.019
0.008
0.965
0.191
0.011
0.019
0.771
0.747
0.542
0.025
0.212
0.576
0.925
0.755
0.154
0.051
0.536
0.346
0.087
0.450
0.320
0.580
0.719
0.381
0.592
0.804
0.354
0.290
0.495
gen. η2
0.046
0.008
0.002
< 0.001
0.003
0.002
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.037
0.010
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.008
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
CHAPTER 3: APPENDIX F
144
Table F.6. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the stop-signal interval. Type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Signal interval
Number of fixations
Distance
Condition
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Condition
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Condition by part
Condition by type
Condition by distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Condition by part by type
Condition by part by distract
Condition by type by distract
Part by type by distract
Condition by part by type by distract
Df1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
Df2
44
88
44
44
88
44
44
88
88
44
88
88
44
88
88
44
88
44
44
88
44
44
88
88
44
88
88
44
88
88
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.54
0.20
0.02
0.01
0.03
0.00
0.05
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.00
16193.59
564.24
1.41
355.66
3415.95
13.46
360.40
21.94
12.93
1.37
33.15
8.22
42.92
134.67
58.77
Sum of 
squares 
error
9.33
1.31
0.10
0.30
1.31
0.10
0.30
0.24
0.31
0.13
0.24
0.31
0.13
0.22
0.22
338042.94
46859.63
686.52
2519.06
46859.63
686.52
2519.06
1682.83
2133.38
587.69
1682.83
2133.38
587.69
1509.96
1509.96
F
2.56
6.57
7.82
2.05
0.84
0.22
7.62
1.54
1.13
0.08
1.06
1.09
0.18
1.71
0.21
2.11
0.53
0.09
6.21
3.21
0.86
6.30
0.57
0.27
0.10
0.87
0.17
3.21
3.92
1.71
p
0.117
0.008
0.008
0.159
0.389
0.644
0.008
0.220
0.328
0.774
0.350
0.340
0.670
0.192
0.777
0.154
0.537
0.765
0.017
0.061
0.358
0.016
0.566
0.762
0.750
0.424
0.840
0.080
0.030
0.192
gen. η2
0.044
0.016
0.002
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.004
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.039
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.009
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
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Table F.7. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the instructed condition only. Type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Word interval
Signal interval
Number of fixations
Distance
Number of fixations
Distance
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
44
22
22
44
44
22
44
44
22
22
44
44
22
44
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.17
0.38
0.14
0.05
0.03
0.00
0.01
159.59
87.19
149.14
84.19
0.71
102.71
48.04
0.05
0.01
0.06
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.01
638.16
3.08
716.05
1.78
2.74
14.48
121.97
Sum of 
squares 
error
5.05
0.94
1.38
1.10
0.78
0.56
1.12
22782.42
2072.94
2307.32
4402.15
1964.50
1017.55
2695.10
0.65
0.08
0.24
0.16
0.15
0.11
0.16
26408.78
384.79
2318.83
1056.91
1132.79
391.44
976.44
F
0.73
8.91
2.21
1.00
0.97
0.00
0.24
0.15
0.93
1.42
0.42
0.01
2.22
0.39
1.62
3.60
5.50
0.03
1.13
0.01
1.06
0.53
0.18
6.79
0.04
0.05
0.81
2.75
p
0.486
0.004
0.151
0.381
0.383
0.992
0.793
0.757
0.395
0.246
0.688
0.971
0.137
0.736
0.216
0.071
0.028
0.969
0.334
0.942
0.354
0.524
0.679
0.016
0.964
0.948
0.377
0.095
gen. η2
< 0.001
0.004
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.006
0.001
0.007
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
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Table F.8. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the uninstructed condition only. Type = word type. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Word interval
Signal interval
Number of fixations
Distance
Number of fixations
Distance
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Part
Type (20%-, 80%-stop)
Distract
Part by type
Part by distract
Type by distract
Part by type by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
44
22
22
44
44
22
44
44
22
22
44
44
22
44
Sum of 
squares 
effect
1.19
0.01
0.13
0.10
0.01
0.02
0.00
6016.64
0.76
0.11
85.30
29.59
0.53
166.43
0.17
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.00
3342.03
11.79
0.01
53.31
18.40
29.81
71.47
Sum of 
squares 
error
4.08
0.35
0.61
0.66
0.36
0.44
0.50
20521.25
853.40
1116.66
1743.90
1302.50
1448.72
1911.76
0.66
0.03
0.06
0.08
0.16
0.01
0.07
20450.85
301.72
200.22
625.92
1000.59
196.24
533.52
F
6.43
0.41
4.64
3.35
0.84
1.00
0.15
6.45
0.02
0.00
1.08
0.50
0.01
1.92
5.76
5.20
2.19
4.07
1.10
1.23
0.72
3.60
0.86
0.00
1.87
0.40
3.34
2.95
p
0.010
0.579
0.043
0.024
0.438
0.343
0.917
0.010
0.952
0.963
0.362
0.575
0.960
0.148
0.019
0.033
0.153
0.024
0.342
0.280
0.448
0.057
0.364
0.977
0.169
0.639
0.081
0.067
gen. η2
0.041
< 0.001
0.005
0.004
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.048
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.050
0.002
0.002
0.004
0.002
< 0.001
0.001
0.034
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
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Appendix G
Pilot Experiment 
 I also ran a pilot version of the stop distract where no stimulus-stop information was provided (i.e. 
this experiment was a procedural replication of the uninstructed condition). 
Method
Participants. Twenty-four students from University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or course credit. I excluded one participant because the percentage correct go trials 
was below 70%. The target sample size and exclusion criteria were decided in advance of data 
collection.
Apparatus and stimuli, procedure and analyses. The apparatus, stimuli, and procedure 
were identical to those of Experiment 5, except for the following changes: the experiment was run on 
a 21-in iMac, I did not track eye gaze position, and I did not obtain expectancy ratings following task 
completion. Participants were not provided with stimulus-stop contingency information. 
Results and Discussion
Analyses of no-signal RTs showed that there was a significant effect of word type (p = 0.018). 
Planned comparisons showed that no-signal RTs were generally longer for the 80%-stop words (M = 
785 ms) than for the 0%-stop words (M = 774 ms) and the 20%-stop words (M = 776 ms), t(22) = 
2.26, p = 0.034, gav = 0.09 (one-tailed t-test: p = 0.017), and t(22) = 1.99, p = 0.058, gav = 0.07 (one-
tailed t-test: p = 0.029), respectively. Table G.1 suggests that this difference between word types was 
largest in the final part of the experiment, but the interaction between part and word type was not 
significant (p = 0.643). 
The presence of distractors slowed no-signal RTs (no-distractor: 763 ms, distractor: 793 ms; p 
< 0.001; Table G.2). There was no reliable interaction between word type and the presence of 
distractors (p = 0.992); the three-way interaction between word type, distractor type, and part was also 
not significant (p = 0.826). 
The outcome of the Bayesian analyses on no-signal RTs are broadly consistent with the 
ANOVA. As can be seen in Table G.3, removal of the part or distractor factors had a deleterious effect 
on the model. However, all other factors or interactions could be dropped from the model. Note, the 
discrepancy between the Bayesian analyses and the ANOVA in terms of word type could be due to the 
restricted sample size in this pilot study. Therefore, in the main experiment I increased the sample size 
(and consequently, the power). 
In sum, the absence of an interaction between word type and distractor type in the pilot study 
replicates the findings of the uninstructed condition in the main study. Therefore, these findings 
provide further support for the idea that, in situations where no stimulus-stop contingency information 
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is explicitly instructed, participants form direct associations between the 80%-stop words and a stop 
representation via task practice. 
Table G.1. Overview of the go data. Probability of an accurate go response [p(correct)], probability of a missed 
go response [p(miss)] and average go reaction time (RT) as a function of word type, distractor type, and part. 
Accuracy is the ratio of correct go trials to the number of correct and incorrect go trials (missed trials are 
excluded). P(miss) is the ratio of omitted responses to the total number of go trials. M = mean; SD = standard 
deviation. 
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
0%-stop
20%-stop
80%-stop
p(correct)
Distractors
M
0.89
0.90
0.89
0.93
0.93
0.91
0.93
0.93
0.92
SD
0.07
0.06
0.11
0.07
0.06
0.12
0.07
0.07
0.11
No distractors
M
0.90
0.90
0.86
0.93
0.93
0.92
0.93
0.92
0.92
SD
0.06
0.05
0.12
0.06
0.04
0.10
0.06
0.06
0.14
p(miss)
Distractors
M
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.03
SD
0.03
0.04
0.07
0.04
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.06
No distractors
M
0.04
0.04
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
SD
0.04
0.04
0.05
0.03
0.03
0.08
0.03
0.03
0.06
no-signal RT
Distractors
M
764
766
774
788
795
800
815
811
825
SD
102
100
121
135
140
136
145
144
148
No distractors
M
730
738
741
762
762
765
784
785
805
SD
96
95
109
125
127
135
131
137
162
CHAPTER 3:APPENDIX G
149
Table G.2. Overview of repeated measures analyses of variance. In the no-signal RT analysis, incorrect and 
missed no-signal trials were removed. I did not analyse p(miss) because values were low. Type = word type. ps 
< 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Table G.3. No-signal RT Bayes analysis. Bayes factors < 1 indicate that the removal of the factor or interaction 
had a deleterious effect on the model whereas Bayes factors > 1 indicate that the factor or interaction could be 
removed. Note that ‘participant’ was included as a factor for all models, but this factor is not added to the model 
descriptions in the tables to reduce the amount of text. distract = distractor type (no-distractor, distractor); type = 
word type.
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Stop-signal trials: p(respond)
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Part
Distract
Type by part
Type by distract 
Part by distract
Type by part by distract
Type (0%-, 20%-, 80%-stop)
Part
Distract
Type by part
Type by distract
Part by distract
Type by part by distract
Type
Part
Distract
Type by part
Type by distract
Part by distract
Type by part by distract
Df1
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
2
2
1
4
2
2
4
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
Df2
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
44
44
22
88
44
44
88
22
44
22
 44
22
44
44
Sum of 
squares 
effect
9832
187212
90251
2613
23
721
1374
0.02
0.09
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.12
0.21
0.05
0.02
0.00
0.06
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
49364
466213
65262
91335
64422
49297
80576
0.22
0.28
0.12
0.45
0.21
0.16
0.28
0.19
0.59
0.11
0.32
0.12
0.34
0.41
F
4.38
8.83
30.04
0.63
0.01
0.32
0.38
2.10
7.15
0.11
0.18
0.15
0.18
0.74
13.88
7.83
10.11
1.23
0.07
3.51
0.47
p
0.018
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.643
0.992
0.726
0.826
0.134
0.002
0.748
0.946
0.864
0.837
0.565
0.001
0.001
0.004
0.301
0.794
0.039
0.626
gen. η2
0.002
0.028
0.014
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.007
0.031
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.046
0.079
0.021
0.007
< 0.001
0.022
0.004
Omitted factor(s)
Part
Distract
Type
Distract:type
Distract:part
Distract:part:type
Part:type
Bayes Factor
< 0.00
< 0.00
6.84
15.66
16.84
28.68
61.62
Confidence interval
±32.35%
±31.28%
±40.51%
±32.81%
±32.03%
±29.54%
±33.05%
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CHAPTER 4
THE ROLE OF SIGNAL DETECTION DURING STOP/GO LEARNING
It has recently been proposed that, at the most basic level, action control depends on three cognitive 
processes; signal detection, action selection, and action execution (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014; 
For an extended discussion, see Chapter 1). Each of these processes can be modulated via learning. In 
the present chapter, I tested part of this framework by examining how learning modulates signal 
detection processes in response inhibition tasks. 
Perceptual processes play an important, yet under-researched, role in successful stopping. 
One of the first stages of stopping a response often involves detecting a stop signal (e.g. noticing the 
oncoming vehicle when crossing a road or noticing a traffic light turning red). Indeed, computational 
modelling work suggests that a considerable proportion of the stopping latency is occupied by 
perceptual or afferent processes (Boucher, Palmeri, et al., 2007; Logan, Van Zandt, et al., 2014; 
Salinas & Stanford, 2013; for an overview of this work). Consistent with this idea, it has recently been 
demonstrated that people make adjustments to their attentional focus when they anticipate the 
presentation of a stop signal in the periphery of the screen (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014; for an 
extended discussion of this experiment, see Chapter 3). Similarly, electrophysiology research has also 
shown that early sensory event-related potential components, such as the N1 and the Selection 
Negativity, are modulated in contexts where participants are instructed to monitor for a stop signal but 
not in contexts where participants are instructed to ignore the stop signals (Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 
2016; Langford, Krebs, Talsma, Woldorff, & Boehler, 2016). This pattern of findings suggests that 
people adjust their attentional settings in situations where they are required to monitor for the signal 
(Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 2016). The ‘biased competition’ theory of visual attention suggests that when 
there is competition between sources of information, attention is biased to specific features of the 
visual object in order to resolve the competition (e.g. Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006; 
Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). Thus, Elchlepp, Lavric, et al. (2016) speculated that signal detection 
could be biased during performance of response inhibition tasks by increasing the baseline activity in 
the sensory neurons that code for specific features of the stop signal. Consequently, those features of 
the signal would be more likely to win the competition, and stopping would be more likely to be 
successful. In other words, successful stopping in stop-signal tasks depends on selective attention to 
the features of the stop signal. 
In stop learning tasks, the effects of learning on behaviour depends on participants not only 
attending to the stop signal, but also to the stop-associated stimuli. As suggested in Chapter 2, if 
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participants begin to ignore the stop-associated stimuli, the effects of stop learning on behaviour are 
likely to be diminished or even eliminated entirely. Thus, I concluded that attention likely plays an 
important role in mediating the effects of stop learning on behaviour. However, the relationship 
between attention and learning is not a one-way street. Attention can also be influenced by learning. 
In the go/no-go task, electrophysiology research has shown that the amplitude of the visual N1 
component30 decreased (i.e. became less negative) for the no-go stimuli relative to the go stimuli with 
training (Benikos, Johnstone, & Roodenrys, 2013; see also Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis). In 
particular, this amplitude difference was only found when the go/no-go task demanded rapid 
responding to the go stimuli. The change in the N1 amplitude observed by Benikos, Johnstone, et al. 
could indicate that participants attended more to the go stimuli than to the no-go stimuli with training. 
However, it is important to highlight that this is not always optimal for the effects of training on 
behaviour; in the Benikos, Johnstone, et al. experiment, no-go performance became worse with 
training not better. Thus, response inhibition training can influence attention to go-associated and 
stop-associated stimuli, but the effects of learning on behaviour depends on attention. Furthermore, 
Manuel and colleagues showed that following performance of an auditory go/no-go task the 
topography of auditory-event related potentials was modulated 61-104 ms for stimuli associated with 
stopping. Manuel, Grivel, et al. attributed this modulation to reduced activity in the decreased activity 
within left parietal cortices (i.e. no-go; Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010). It is likely that this effect was 
due to the effects of learning on the detection of the no-go stimuli (rather than direct activation of an 
inhibition or no-go network; see Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). Just as in the Benikos, et al. 
experiment, the design of this task emphasised rapid responding on go trials. Thus, when the task 
places emphasis on go processing, learning may influence selective attention to attributes of the go 
stimuli. 
Consistent with the idea that stop learning may influence attentional processes, Awh and 
colleagues suggested that attentional selection can be influenced by past experiences (Awh, 
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). However, although the aforementioned studies showed that learning 
may influence attention to the no-go stimuli, no study conducted to date has directly manipulated 
attention during stop learning. As such, our understanding of the effects of learning on attention in 
response inhibition tasks is based on mere speculation. Beyond the response inhibition literature, 
several studies have demonstrated that attention is sensitive to prior learning. For example, it has been 
shown that attention is biased towards stimuli that were predictive of high reward in a previous 
training task (e.g. Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Le Pelley, 
Mitchell, & Johnson, 2013; Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths, & Beesley, 2015). Furthermore, studies in 
30. The visual N1 component is thought to be sensitive to perceptual features of the stimulus and is modulated 
by attention (Näätänen and Picton, 1987). Furthermore, it has been found to be larger on trials where stopping 
was successful indicating that a component of stopping depends on the ability to attend to the stop signal 
(Bekker, Kenemans, Hoeksma, Talsma, & Verbaten, 2005). 
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the associative learning literature have shown that attention in human and animals is sensitive to the 
learned predictiveness of a given stimulus; stimuli that are consistently followed by the same outcome 
capture attention faster than stimuli that are not consistently followed by the same outcome (e.g. Le 
Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013; for a review, see Mitchell & Le Pelley, 2010). Thus, attentional 
selection is not solely determined by top-down control or by physical properties of the target stimulus, 
but can also be influenced by associative learning. On the basis of these experiments, it follows that 
learning in response inhibition tasks where the representation of the stop signal remains the same 
throughout training may result in attention being directed to the stop signal following the presentation 
of stop-associated stimuli. In the present chapter, I investigate the effects of learning on attentional 
selection in response inhibition tasks. 
The role of learning on attention would have important implications for our understanding of 
the associative architecture of stop learning outlined in Chapter 1 (see What is Learned?). To recap, I 
discussed the possibility that there are multiple pathways that will enable a stimulus that is 
consistently paired with stopping (or ‘not going’ in a go/no-go paradigm) to influence performance. 
One pathway is that participants could form a direct association between a stop-associated stimulus 
and the stop goal. This was the original hypothesis outlined by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a). In 
Chapter 2, I provide strong evidence for the direct pathway (see also Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 
2016). The other pathway is an association between the stop-associated stimulus and the stop goal that 
is mediated via a representation of the stop signal. The stimulus-signal learning pathway predicts that 
attention would become trained to features of the signal. The signal representation could include 
feature dimensions (e.g. colour, shape) alongside the spatial location and/or spatial configuration of 
the signal. Thus, unlike stimulus-stop learning, the retrieval of a stimulus-signal association would 
prime the detection of the stop signal. This could result in a lower probability of responding on stop 
signal trials for stop-associated items but would have no effect or very little effect on reaction times 
on no-signal trials31. However, to date, there has been mixed evidence in favour of the stimulus-signal 
route. For example, Bowditch and colleagues showed that reducing the contingencies between 
specific stimuli and the stop signals resulted in stronger effects of stop learning on task performance 
than when specific stimuli are paired with a single representation of a stop signal. (Bowditch, 
Verbruggen, et al., 2016). Furthermore, some indirect support was provided by some recent 
experiments in which the signal representation remained the same throughout training (the line 
beneath the stop- and go-associated stimuli became bold) whereby stop learning influenced the 
probability of responding on stop trials but had no effect on response latencies on go trials 
(Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014, Experiment 2). However, in Chapter 3, despite using a single 
representation of the stop signal throughout training, I did not find any evidence to support the idea 
31. A weak effect on RTs would arise from some partial activation of the stop goal via the indirect pathway (e.g. 
stimulus -> stop signal -> stop goal; see Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016). 
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that attention was directed towards the stop signal during stop learning. It is possible that the absence 
of an effect of stop learning on perceptual processes was due to the distractor manipulation that I 
implemented in that task. Alternatively, it could be that attention to the signal is not influenced by stop 
learning after all or that the effects of mediation on performance are much smaller than previously 
predicted by Verbruggen, Best, et al. (2013; for discussion of this possibility, see also Chapter 3). 
Therefore, in the present chapter, I adopted a different approach. 
The Present Chapter
In the present chapter, I investigate whether participants can acquire associations between specific 
stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal. Research in the visual attention literature has shown 
that the detection of a target stimulus is enhanced by the provision of a cue indicating its spatial 
location (Posner, 1980). To this end, I combined features of the stop learning tasks used in Chapter 2 
with features of spatial cueing tasks. In a typical spatial cueing task, participants are presented with a 
target stimulus in the periphery of the screen (usually either to the left or to the right of the centre), 
which is preceded by a ‘cue’ indicating that participants should expect the target to appear in a given 
signal location (Posner, 1980; Posner & Cohen, 1984). As such, on each trial in the Experiments 7-8 
presented in this chapter participants were presented with a cue in the centre of the screen that 
preceded the presentation of a stop or go signal which could occur on the right or on the left of the 
screen. I manipulated both the contingencies between the cues and stopping (or going) and the 
contingencies between the cues and the location of the stop (or go) signal. Participants were not 
informed about the cue-stop or cue-signal mappings. If participants acquired the associations between 
the cues and the signal location in this task, the general learning effect would be greater (i.e. a larger 
difference in go RTs on no-signal trials and the probability of responding on stop trials between the 
beginning and the end of training) for the cues that were consistently paired with the same signal 
location than for the cues that were paired with both signal locations with equal probability 
(Experiment 7). Furthermore, performance on trials in which the signal appeared in the trained 
location should be better than performance on trials in which the signal appeared in the untrained 
location (Experiment 8). Evidence that participants acquired the associations between the cues and the 
signal location would provide some of the strongest evidence to date for the idea that associations can 
form between stimuli and a representation of the stop signal. 
Experiment 7
In Experiment 7, a subset of cues was consistently associated with stop signals and another subset was 
consistently associated with go signals. I indexed stop/go learning during task performance via two 
measures. The first index was the probability of responding on stop-signal trials, that was predicted to 
become lower as a function of training. The second index was RT on correct go-signal trials, that was 
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predicted to decrease as a function of training. Furthermore, I also obtained stop/go expectancy 
ratings following task completion in which participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
expected to withhold their response for each of the images (cues) presented in the task.  Note that this 
experiment was originally designed as a pilot experiment for an ERP experiment. Therefore, to 
maximise the available trials for ERP analyses, the stop-associated cues were paired with a stop signal 
and the go-associated cues with a go signal on 100% of presentations. Due to these contingencies and 
the absence of a test phase, it was not possible to directly compare task performance for the stop-
associated and go-associated cues. However, Chapters 2 and 3 indicate that if participants acquired 
the stimulus-stop associations during task performance they would also generate expectancies 
consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. Therefore, I also obtained expectancy ratings 
following task completion. 
To investigate the role of signal detection during stop learning, I varied the location of the go/
stop signal on the screen; for a subset of cues, the signal was consistently presented in the same signal 
location whereas for another subset, the signal was presented in two signal locations with equal 
probability.
Method
Participants. Thirty-six volunteers from University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 20.39 years, SD = 3.10, 30 females, 33 right-handed). 
Five participants were excluded as the percentage of correct go responses was less than 70%32. All 
experiments of the present chapter were approved by the local research ethics committee at the School 
of Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the nature and 
possible consequences of the study were explained. The target sample size and exclusion criteria were 
decided in advance of data collection to ensure that I had enough power (0.80) to detect medium-sized 
effects in the within-subject comparisons.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The experiment was run on a 21-inch iMac (screen size: 
1920 × 1080 pixels) using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The cues were words presented in black 
lowercase font (Courier 16 point) and the go and stop signals consisted of coloured dots (size: 20 × 20 
pixels) presented on a grey background (RGB: 255 255 255; Figure 4.1). The word was presented in 
the centre of the screen and a go or stop signal was presented to the left of the word (x = -160 pixels, 
-4.2 cm from the centre) or to the right of the word (x = 160 pixels, 4.2 cm from the centre). A control 
signal was always on the opposite side. I created a list of 112 five- and six-letter words (Appendix H). 
The word could refer to a natural or a human-made object (56 natural words, 56 human-made words). 
32. This exclusion criteria was set on the basis of Experiments 5-6 (Chapter 3) which similarly required 
participants to categorise words as natural/human-made.  
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Figure 4.1. The left stop signal, right stop signal, left go signal, and right go signal trial structures in Experiment 
7. Each trial began with the presentation of three fixation dots, one in the centre of the screen, one to the left of 
the centre, and one to the right of the centre for 750 ms. Following the removal of the fixation dots, a word (i.e. 
the cue) was presented in the centre of the screen. After 500 ms, the go/stop signal replaced the dot to the left or 
to the right of the word and a control signal (which was presented on go and stop trials) was presented on the 
opposite side. The word and the signals remained on the screen for 750 ms (hence, MAXRT was 1250 ms). In 
this example the stop signal is represented as a pink dot, the go signal is represented by a blue dot and the 
control signal is represented by a yellow dot. Note: the dot colours were fully counterbalanced.
The experiment consisted of three parts, with four blocks per part. Each word was presented 
once per block. There were six different cue-types (see Table 4.1). First, stop-left cues were always 
paired with a stop signal and the stop signal always appeared to the left of the word. Second, stop-
right cues were always paired with a stop-signal and the stop signal always appeared to the right of 
the word. Third, stop-inconsistent cues were always paired with a stop signal, but on half of the trials 
the stop signal appeared to the left of the word and on the other half of trials the stop signal appeared 
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to the right of the word. Fourth, go-left cues were always paired with a go signal and the go signal 
always appeared to the left of the word. Fifth, go-right cues were always paired with a go signal and 
the go signal always appeared to the right of the word. Finally, go-inconsistent cues were always 
paired with a go signal but on half of the trials the go signal appeared to the left of the word and on 
the other half of trials the go signal appeared to the right of the word. Words were randomised over 
the stop/go-types across participants. Note that there were no ‘stop/go-inconsistent but location-
consistent’ cues. 
Table 4.1. The proportion of left stop-signal, right stop-signal, left go-signal, and right go-signal trials as a 
function of stop/go-type in Experiment 7. Note that for the analyses, the stop-left and stop-right cues were 
averaged (stop-consistent cues) and the go-left and the go-right cues were averaged (go-consistent cues). Note: 
the overall p(stop-signal) was 0.43.
On each trial, three black fixation dots were presented marking the central, left, and right 
stimulus locations (Figure 4.1). After 750 ms, the central fixation dot was replaced with a word. After 
500 ms, the fixation dots on the left and on the right of the word were replaced with coloured dots 
(aside from the colour change, the size and position of the dots were the same as the fixation). There 
were three dot colours: yellow (RGB: 255 155 0), pink (RGB: 255 0 155), and blue (RGB: 0 155 
255). On go trials, one of the dots on the left or on the right of the word was presented in the go signal 
colour (e.g. left = blue) and the dot on the other side of the word was presented in the control signal 
colour (e.g. right = yellow). On go trials, participants had to decide whether the word referred to a 
natural or human-made object. Half of the participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with their left index 
finger) when the word referred to a natural object, and the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) when 
the word referred to a human-made object. This mapping was reversed for the other half of 
participants. On stop trials, one of the dots on the left or on the right of the word was presented in the 
stop-signal colour (e.g. left = pink) and the dot on the other side of the word was presented in a 
control signal colour (e.g. right = yellow). The colours were fully counterbalanced over the go, stop, 
and control signals. The control signal was the same on go-signal and stop-signal trials. To increase 
the likelihood that participants would be required to inhibit a planned response on stop-signal trials, 
Cue-type
Stop-left
Stop-right
Stop-inconsistent
Go-left
Go-right
Go-inconsistent
No. of words
12
12 
24
16
16
32
% left stop 
signal
100
0
50
0
0
0
% right stop 
signal
0
100
50
0
0
0
% left go 
signal 
0
0
0
100
100
50
% right go 
signal
0
0
0
0
0
50
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the experimenter instructed participants to begin preparing their go response following the 
presentation of the word (i.e. the cue). At the end of each block, participants received feedback on 
their mean RT on go trials, the number of go errors, the number of missed go responses, and the 
percentage of failed stops. After 15 s had elapsed, participants had to press any key to start the next 
block.
Following completion of the experimental task, each word was again presented on the screen. 
The order of the words was randomised anew for each participant. Participants were asked to rate 
“How much do you expect to withhold your response when this word is presented?” on a scale, 
ranging from 1 (I definitely do not think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response) and 
9 (I definitely think this word indicates that I have to withhold my response). There was no response 
deadline for the expectancy ratings. 
Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). All data files and R scripts are deposited in Dropbox (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/
wflj1y7r4hb4tg4/AADZXtHg1sHkKilu39que0AHa?dl=0). For all analyses, I collapsed the stop-left 
cues and the stop-right cues as both of these cues consistently predicted a given signal location. These 
are referred herein to as stop-consistent cues. For the same reasons, I also collapsed the go-left cues 
and the go-right cues. These are referred to as go-consistent cues. Note that the delay between the 
presentation of the cues and the signals was always 500 ms. Consequently, it was not possible to 
estimate or analyse SSRT. I analysed p(respond|signal) to determine if stop/go learning influenced 
stopping performance (see also e.g. Chapters 2 and 3; Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 2016; Noël, 
Brevers, et al., 2016; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). 
ANOVAs were performed on correct RTs and the probability of correct responses on go-
signal trials, and on the probability of responding on stop-signal trials. Behavioural performance was 
analysed as a function of ‘part’ (there were 4 blocks per part: 1 = blocks 1-4; 2 = blocks 5-8; 3 = 
blocks 9-12) and cue-type (stop-consistent, stop-inconsistent, go-consistent, go-inconsistent) which 
were included as within-subjects factors. I also performed an ANOVA on the expectancy ratings with 
stop/go-type (stop-associated cues, go-associated cues) and location-type (consistent-signal location 
cues, inconsistent-signal location cues) as within-subjects factors. Where appropriate, I applied the 
Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity. For pairwise comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the 
reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). 
To examine support for the null hypothesis, I also computed Bayesian t-tests for all pairwise 
comparisons and Bayesian regressions for the stop/go expectancy-behaviour correlations (Rouder, 
Morey, et al., 2012). Bayes factors compare the likelihood of the data under the null hypothesis of no 
difference against the alternative hypothesis of a difference with an effect size that corresponds to the 
prior. The default prior assumes a large difference between conditions. A Bayes factor less than 0.33 
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constitutes support for the null hypothesis whereas a Bayes factor of more than 3 constitutes support 
for the alternative hypothesis. I calculated the Bayes factors with the BayesFactor package in R, using 
the default prior of 0.707 (Morey, Rouder, et al., 2015).
Results
Go analyses. Analyses of go RTs revealed a main effect of part (p < 0.001; Table 4.2) 
reflecting the decreasing RTs as function of training. However, there was no reliable main effect of 
cue-type (p = 0.104; Table 4.2; Figure 4.2) and the corresponding Bayes factor for the difference 
between the go-consistent cues and the go-inconsistent cues was 0.67. The two-way interaction 
between part and cue-type was also not reliable (p = 0.099; Table 4.2).
Analyses of the probability of correct go responses showed a similar pattern of results: an 
increase in the probability of correct go responses as a function of part (p < 0.001; Table 4.2; Figure 
4.2), but no reliable main effect of cue-type (p = 0.440; Table 4.2) and no reliable two-way interaction 
between part and cue-type (p = 0.887; Table 4.2). The Bayesian analyses supported the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the go-consistent and go-inconsistent cues (BF = 0.25).
The probability of missed go responses reliably decreased as a function of part (p < 0.001; 
Table 4.2). The main effect of cue-type did not reach significance (p = 0.079; Table 4.2), but the two-
way interaction between part and cue-type was reliable (p = 0.026; Table 4.2). Follow-up comparisons 
showed that the main effect of cue-type was reliable in part 1, t(30) = 2.47, p = 0.019, gav = 0.26, BF = 
2.57, but was not reliable in part 2, t(30) = -0.80, p = 0.430, gav = -0.08, BF = 0.26, or in part 3, t(30) = 
1.03, p = 0.313, gav = 0.62, BF = 0.31. However, as can be seen in Figure 4.2, the difference between 
the cue-types was very small (Mdiff = 0.02) and the probability of missed responses was numerically 
higher for the go-consistent cues than for the go-inconsistent cues (i.e. in the opposite direction to that 
predicted if participants acquired the the word-signal location associations). Thus, if anything, the 
probability of missed go response data further argues against the hypothesis that participants acquired 
associations between the cues and the signal locations.
Thus, go performance improved with training but there was no reliable evidence that 
participants acquired the stimulus-signal associations. Furthermore, the Bayesian analyses provided 
support for the null hypothesis of no difference between the cue-types in the probability of correct 
responses. 
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Figure 4.2. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel), the probability of correct go responses (middle 
panel), and the probability of missed go responses (lower panel) in Experiment 7 as a function of cue-type (go-
consistent, go-inconsistent) and part (1-3). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
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Stop analyses. Analyses of the probability of responding revealed a main effect of part (p = 
0.027 Table 4.2); as can be seen in Figure 4.3, the p(respond|signal) decreased with practice. There 
was no main effect of cue-type (p = 0.142; Table 4.2) and no reliable two-way interaction between 
cue-type and part (p = 0.336; Table 4.2). The Bayes factor for the overall difference between the stop-
consistent cues and the stop-inconsistent cues was 0.53. 
Expectancy ratings analyses. The expectancy ratings obtained following task completion 
revealed that participants expected to withhold their response more for stop-associated cues (6.73) 
than for the go-associated cues (2.58), F(1, 30) = 60.79, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.628. The Bayes factor 
was 1225723. There was no reliable stop/go rating difference between the consistent signal location 
cues (4.69) and the inconsistent signal location cues (4.62), F(1, 30) = 0.67, p = 0.420, gen. η2 < 
0.001. Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis of no difference between the consistent signal 
location cues and the inconsistent signal location cues (BF = 0.25). The two-way interaction between 
stop/go-type and location-type (consistent signal location, inconsistent signal location) was not 
reliable, F(1, 30) = 0.70, p = 0.783, gen. η2 < 0.001. Thus, participants were able to distinguish 
between the words on the basis of their association with the go and/or stop goal. 
To examine the relationship between the expectancy ratings and task performance, I analysed 
the correlation between the stop-minus-go cue expectancy ratings difference and the part 1-minus-part 
2 performance difference. This revealed that the expectancy ratings difference reliably correlated with 
the RT practice-effect, r(29) = 0.548, p = 0.001. BFregression = 23.16: participants who expected to 
withhold their response less for the go-associated cues (and more for the stop-associated cues) became 
faster throughout training. This suggests that, alongside general practice-effects, the improvement in 
go performance with training may also reflect the acquisition of associations between the go-
associated cues and responding (i.e. going). However, there was no reliable correlation between the 
stop-minus-go expectancy difference and the difference between part 1-minus-part 3 p(respond|stop) 
difference, r(29) = -0.277, p = 0.132, BFregression = 0.84. Note that uncorrected ps are reported. 
However, it is important to highlight that whilst the Bayesian regression provided strong evidence for 
a relationship between the expectancy ratings and the RT practice-effect, it supported neither the null 
hypothesis of no relationship nor the alternative hypothesis of a relationship between the expectancy 
ratings and the p(respond|stop) practice-effect.
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Figure 4.3. The probability of responding on stop trials in Experiment 7 as a function of signal location-type 
(go-consistent, go-inconsistent) and part (1-3). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals.
Table 4.2. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance in Experiment 7. In the no-signal RT analysis, 
incorrect and missed no-signal trials were removed. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Interim Discussion
Go and stop performance improved with task practice. Furthermore, the expectancy ratings obtained 
following task completion indicate that participants acquired the stimulus-stop/go contingencies in 
play: for go RTs, these expectancies reliably correlated with the magnitude of the RT training effect. 
However, despite finding evidence of stop/go learning, there was no support for the idea that 
participants acquired the associations between the cues and the location of the go/stop signal. The 
Go trials: go RT
Go trials: p(correct) 
Go trials: p(miss)
Stop-signal trials: p(respond|stop)
Part
Cue-type
Part by cue-type
Part
Cue-type
Part by cue-type
Part
Cue-type
Part by cue-type
Part
Cue-type
Part by cue-type
Df1
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
60
30
60
60
30
60
60
30
60
60
30
60
Sum of 
squares 
effect
562108.20
476.52
513.92
0.14
0.00
0.00
0.17
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.00
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
342233.78
5086.46
6326.63
0.29
0.05
0.03
0.18
0.01
0.02
0.51
0.01
0.03
F
49.27
2.81
2.44
13.91
0.61
0.12
29.77
3.31
4.04
4.34
2.28
1.11
p
< 0.001
0.104
0.099
< 0.001
0.440
0.887
< 0.001
0.079
0.026
0.027
0.142
0.336
gen. η2
0.342
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.149
0.001
< 0.001
0.245
0.002
0.006
0.034
< 0.001
< 0.001
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magnitude of the performance improvements were similar for the cues that were consistently 
associated with a single signal location and for the cues that were associated with two signal locations 
with equal probability. The Bayesian analyses for the probability of correct responses on go trials 
provided strong support for the null hypothesis of no difference between the go-consistent and go-
inconsistent cues. However, the Bayes factors for the go RTs, the probability of missed go responses, 
and the probability of responding on stop trials provided only tentative support for the null hypothesis. 
It is important to note, however, that there are some limits on the conclusions that can be 
drawn from this experiment (partly because it was originally designed an an ERP pilot). First, stop-
associated cues (and go-associated cues) in Experiment 7 were associated with the stop goal (or go 
goal for the go-associated cues) on 100% of presentations. Consequently, the design was suboptimal 
for dissociating the effects of stimulus-stop/go learning and stimulus-signal learning on behavioural 
task performance as it was not possible to compare the stop-associated and go-associated cues during 
training. Conclusions about the acquisition of item-specific stop/go associations in this experiment 
were based entirely on the expectancy ratings obtained following task completion. Thus, it is possible 
that signal learning has an additive effect on go/stop learning in a way that I could not detect in this 
experiment. Second, although the use of coloured targets is common in the ERP visual attention 
literature (e.g. Woodman, 2013), a stimulus is more likely to capture attention if it is highly 
perceptually salient (e.g. if it is brightly coloured; Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992). Thus, it is 
possible that the use of coloured signals made it too easy to distinguish between the go and stop 
signals, which could have reduced or diminished the effect of prior learning on selective attention. I 
address these issues in Experiment 8.
Experiment 8
In Experiment 8, I made several changes to the task design. First, participants did not have to respond 
to the words, but were instead instructed to attend to the words in anticipation for a recall test later in 
the experiment. It is possible that responding to the words in Experiment 8 influenced learning. For 
example, extensive research has shown that responding is faster and more accurate when the stimulus 
is presented in the same laterality as the response key (i.e. the ‘Simon effect’; Simon & Rudell, 1967). 
Therefore, the absence of a signal location training effect could be due to the conflict between the 
associative retrieval of the trained signal location and the response hand33. Second, the go signal and 
the stop signal differed in stimulus orientation (square, diamond) rather than in colour and I increased 
the distance between the words and the signals. I expected that these modifications would make the 
33. Post-hoc analyses revealed some support for this idea: the probability of correct responses on go trials was 
lower on incompatible trials (where the signal location of the go signal and the response hand were in opposite 
spatial signal locations; 0.89) than on compatible trials (where the signal location of the go signal and the 
response hand where in the same spatial signal location; 0.93), t(30) = 5.82, p < 0.001, gav = 0.84. Similarly, was 
also a reliable difference in the go RTs between the incompatible trials (897 ms) and the compatible trials (884 
ms), t(30) = -5.85, p < 0.001, gav = -0.20.
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go and stop signals harder to distinguish and thus reduce the influence of stimulus saliency on signal 
detection (see Awh, Belopolsky, et al., 2012). Third, I manipulated the contingency between the words 
and stopping and the contingency between the words and the signal location, such that the words were 
not paired with stopping (or going) and the same stop-signal location on all presentations (i.e. instead 
of a 100%-contingency mapping, I used a 80%-contingency mapping). It was anticipated that this 
would allow me to better index the effects of stimulus-stop/go learning and/or stimulus-signal 
location learning on task performance throughout training. In addition to the stop expectancy ratings 
obtained in Experiment 7, participants also rated where they expected the stop signal to appear on the 
screen (i.e. to the left or to the right of word) following task completion. Finally, it was possible that 
the behavioural measures (i.e. go RTs and the probability of responding on stop trials) were not 
sensitive enough to capture the effects of signal location learning. Therefore, in Experiment 8 I also 
obtained eye-movement data. The gaze position of the right eye was tracked throughout task 
performance to provide an additional dependent variable of shifts of attentional focus within each 
trial. Previous research has shown that gaze position can be used as of selective attention in learning 
tasks (e.g. Rehder & Hoffman, 2005). In the present experiment, two measures were obtained; the 
number of fixations on each trial and the distance (in pixels) between the fixation location and the 
trained signal location (i.e. to the left or to the right of the cue). If participants acquired the 
associations between the cues and the signal location, it was predicted that (1) there would be an 
increased number of fixations on trials in which the signal appeared in the untrained location than on 
trials in the signal appeared in the trained location and (2) the distance from the fixated location and 
the trained signal location would decrease with task practice.
Method
Participants. Thirty-two volunteers from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£10) or partial course credit (M = 20.25 years, SD = 3.13, 24 females, 31 right-
handed). Two participants were excluded and replaced due to technical difficulties with the eye-
tracking software; no participants were replaced for performance-related reasons.
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor 
(screen size: 1024 × 768 pixels) using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). Eye movements were recorded 
throughout task performance. An EyeLink 1000 Desktop Mount camera system (SR Research, 
Ottawa, Canada) was calibrated at the beginning of each block (there were 120 trials between 
calibrations)34. The gaze position of the right eye was tracked throughout each block (sampling rate: 
500 Hz). The EyeLink was calibrated and controlled via Psychtoolbox (Cornelissen, Peters, et al., 
2002). 
34. Note that the numbers of trials (and time durations) between calibrations using this system is consistent with 
previous research (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). 
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The cues consisted of a word in white lowercase font (Courier 16 point) presented on a black 
background (Figure 4.4). For half the participants, the go signal was a diamond and the stop signal 
was a square; for the other half, the go signal was a square and the stop signal was a diamond (size: 24 
× 24 pixels). Aside from the orientation, the go signal and stop signal were identical. On half of all 
trials, the go signal or stop signal was presented to the left of the word (x = -256 pixels, -6.8 cm from 
the centre); on the other half, the go signal or stop signal was presented to the right of the word (x = 
256 pixels, 6.8 cm from the centre). The control signal was always a circle, presented on the opposite 
side to the go/stop signal (Figure 4.3). I randomly created three lists of 12 four-letter words (Appendix 
I) anew for each participant. Two word lists were used in the main task, and the remaining word list 
was used in a recognition ratings task following completion of the main task. To encourage 
participants to attend to the words, the presentation of the two word lists alternated on a block-by-
block basis in the main task (e.g. wordlist 1, wordlist 2, wordlist 1, …). The experiment consisted of 
three parts with four blocks per part. There were 120 trials per block. Each word was presented 10x 
per block; there were 7 presentations that were paired with a consistent response goal (e.g. stop) and 
consistent signal location (e.g. left stop signal); 1 presentation that was consistent with the trained 
response (e.g. stop) but inconsistent with the trained signal location (e.g. right stop signal); 1 
presentation that was inconsistent with the trained response (e.g. go) but consistent with the trained 
signal location (e.g. left go signal); and 1 presentation that was inconsistent with the trained response 
(e.g. go) and inconsistent with the trained signal location (e.g. right go signal). There were four cue-
types in equal proportions (see Table 4.3); stop-left cues were mostly presented on left stop signal 
trials; stop-right cues were mostly presented on right stop signal trials; go-left cues were mostly 
presented on left go signal trials; and go-right cues were mostly presented on right go signal trials. 
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Figure 4.4. The left stop signal, right stop signal, left go signal, and right go signal trial structures in Experiment 
8. Each trial began with the presentation of three fixation dots, one in the centre of the screen, one to the left of 
the centre, and one to the right of the centre for 500 ms. Following the removal of the fixation dots, a four-letter 
word (i.e. the cue) was presented in the centre of the screen. After 1000 ms, the go/stop signal appeared around 
the dot to the left or to the right of the word and a control signal (which was presented on go and stop trials) 
appeared around the dot on the other side. The word and the signals remained on the screen for 1000 ms (hence, 
MAXRT was 2000 ms). In this example, the stop-signal is represented as a square, and the go signal is 
represented by a diamond. The control signal was always a circle.
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Table 4.3. The proportion of left stop-signal, right stop-signal, left go-signal, and right go-signal trials per block 
as a function of cue-type in Experiment 8. Note that there were 24 words used in the experimental task in total, 
with two lists of 12 words which alternated on a block-by-block basis (i.e. there were 12 words per block). Note: 
the overall p(stop-signal) was 0.50. 
On each trial, three black fixation dots were presented marking the central, left, and right 
stimulus locations (Figure 4.4). After 500 ms, the central fixation dot was replaced with a word. After 
1000 ms, one shape appeared around the fixation dot to the left of the word and one shape appeared 
around the fixation dot on the right of the word. There were three shapes (square, diamond, and 
circle): for half of the participants, the go signal was the square and the stop signal was the diamond; 
for the other half, the go signal was the diamond and the stop signal was the square. The control signal 
was always the circle. On go trials, participants responded by pressing the spacebar on a keyboard 
with their right index finger. Participants were informed that the aim of the study was to investigate 
memory for simple four-letter words, as such they were instructed to attend to the words and try to 
remember as many as possible for a memory recall test following task completion. At the end of each 
block, I presented as feedback to the participant their mean RT on go trials, the number of go errors, 
the number of missed go responses, and the percentage of failed stops. After 15 s had elapsed, 
participants had to press a key to start the next block.
Following completion of the main task, participants completed two ratings tasks in which 
each word was again presented on the screen. The order of the words was randomised anew for each 
participant. First, participants were asked to rate “How much do you expect to withhold your response 
when this word is presented?” on a scale, ranging from 1 (I definitely do not think this word indicates 
that I have to withhold my response) to 9 (I definitely think this word indicates that I have to withhold 
my response). Second, participants were asked to rate “Where do you expect the stop signal to appear 
on the screen?” on a scale, ranging from 1 (I definitely expect the stop signal to appear on the left) to 
9 (I definitely expect the stop signal to appear on the right). 
Following completion of the main task and the expectancy ratings, I probed memory for the 
words presented in the task. Before proceeding, however, it is important to highlight these measures 
were obtained following completion of the stop/go and signal location expectancy ratings tasks 
meaning that the recall of the words could be higher than if I obtained these measures immediately 
following completion of the main task. Note, however, that memory performance was not of primary 
Cue-type
Stop-left
Stop-right
Go-left
Go right
No. of words
3
3 
3
3
% left stop signal
70
10
10
10
% right stop signal
10
70
10
10
% left go signal 
10
10
70
70
% right go signal
10
10
10
10
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interest in the present chapter. Nevertheless, I report these data because they provide an indirect 
measure of the extent to which participants attended to the words during the main task and/or 
expectancy ratings tasks. First, participants performed a free recall test whereby they were instructed 
to write down as many words as they could remember from the main task in 80 seconds. This 
procedure was based on previous research on the recall of automatic processes (Snyder, Ashitaka, 
Shimada, Ulrich, & Logan, 2014). Second, participants were presented with each of the 24 words 
from the main task and 12 novel words that had not been previously presented. Participants were 
asked to rate “How do you think that this word was presented in the main task?” on a scale, ranging 
from 1 (I definitely think this word was presented in the main task) and 9 (I definitely do not think this 
word was presented in the main task)35. 
Analyses. The behavioural analyses were identical to Experiment 7, except that behavioural 
performance data was analysed as a function of stop/go-type (stop-associated cues, go-associated 
cues), signal-location (congruent with training, incongruent with training), and part. Furthermore, I 
did not analyse the p(miss) as values were very low. Figure 4.4 presents an overview of the 
descriptive statistics for the go RTs and the p(respond|stop) and Table 4.4 presents an overview of the 
inferential statistics. Note that, unlike in Experiment 7, I could not examine the p(correct) as 
participants responded with only one keypress on go trials (i.e. there was no go choice task). 
For the analyses of the eye movement data, the eye data were exported using the Eyelink Data 
Viewer (SR Research, Ottawa, Canada) for each participant. I generated a file with information about 
all fixations and a file with trial sequence information, and integrated these files using R for further 
analyses. I excluded participants from the analyses when no fixation was registered at the beginning 
of the trial event (i.e. the presentation of the word cue) on more than 15% of trials, as this could 
indicate that eye-movement registration was suboptimal. Based on this criterion, I excluded four 
participants. Note that the inclusion of these participants did not substantially alter the overall pattern 
of behavioural results (not shown). I also excluded all fixations that were off screen (0.2%). In the 
analyses of the eye data, I focussed on the number of fixations and the fixation signal location for two 
intervals: (1) the interval between the word (cue) presentation and the presentation of the stop/go 
signal, and (2) the interval after the presentation of the stop/go signal. The analyses in the word 
interval (prior to the presentation of the signal) indexes anticipatory ‘proactive’ shifts in attention 
whereas the analyses in the signal interval indexes ‘reactive’ shifts in attention following signal 
presentation. Eye-movements made 471 ms after the presentation of the stop/go signal were excluded. 
I based this value on the mean average go RT value (note, this value is also broadly consistent with 
35. Participants recalled a mean average of 15 words (SD = 5.18) out of 24 words used in the task. A one-sample 
t-test revealed that this was significantly greater than zero, t(31) = 16.34, p < 0.001. The recognition ratings task 
also revealed a highly reliable difference between the old words used in the task (1.17) and the novel words 
(8.36), t(31) = -30.44, p < 0.001, gav = -9.02. Thus, it seems that participants did attend to the words during task 
completion, even though the words were task irrelevant.
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the cut-off used in Chapter 3). For the location analyses, I analysed the distance between the fixated 
location and the location of the consistently trained signal [distance = sqrt(x-coordinate^2 + y-
coordinate^2)]. Note, if the number of fixations for a particular interval = 1, then the participant did 
not move their eyes during this time. Eye movement data in the interval between the word 
presentation and the presentation of the signals was analysed as a function of stop/go-type (stop-
associated cues, go-associated cues), location-type (left-associated cues, right-associated cues), and 
part (1-3). Eye movement data in the interval after the presentation of the stop/go signal was analysed 
as a function of stop/go-type (stop-associated cues, go-associated cues), signal-location (congruent 
with training, incongruent with training), signal-type (stop signal, go signal), and part (1-3). The 
descriptive statistics for the eye movement data can be found in Tables 4.5 and 4.7 and the inferential 
statistics can be found in Table 4.6 and 4.8 (separate analyses for the stop-associated items and for the 
go-associated items are presented in Tables 4.9 and 4.10). 
Results
Go analyses. Analyses of go RTs revealed that the main effect of part was reliable (p = 0.005; 
Table 4.5; Figure 4.4). However, there was no reliable difference between the stop-associated and go-
associated cues (p = 0.915; Table 4.4) and no reliable difference between the consistent and 
inconsistent signal location trials (p = 0.362; Table 4.4). The two-way interaction between stop/go-
type and the signal-location was not reliable (p = 0.865; Table 4.5). All other interactions were not 
reliable (ps ≥ 0.551; Table 4.4). Bayesian analyses supported the null hypotheses of no difference 
between the stop-associated cues and the go-associated cues, BF = 0.19, and of no difference between 
the consistent and inconsistent signal location trials, BF = 0.28. Taken together, these analyses suggest 
that performance benefited from non-specific task practice, but that the stimulus-stop/go 
contingencies and the stimulus-signal contingencies did not influence go task performance.
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Figure 4.5. Reaction times for the correct go trials (upper panel) and the probability of responding on stop trials 
(lower panel) in Experiment 8 for the go-associated items (left panels) and for the stop-associated items (right 
panels) as a function of signal location-type (consistent signal location, inconsistent signal location) and part 
(1-3). Error bars reflect 95% confidence intervals. 
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Table 4.4. Overview of repeated measures Analyses of Variance in Experiment 8, with stop/go-type (stop-
associated, go-associated), signal-location (congruent signal location, incongruent signal location), and part 
(1-3) as within-subjects factors. In the no-signal RT analysis, incorrect and missed no-signal trials were 
removed. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Stop analyses. Analyses of the probability of responding revealed that the main effect of part 
was not reliable (p = 0.112; Table 4.4; Figure 4.5). Numerically, the p(respond|signal) was lower for 
the stop-associated cues (0.03) than for the go-associated cues (0.04). However, this difference did not 
reach statistical significance (p = 0.072; Table 4.4). However, the two-way interaction between part 
and stop/go-type was reliable (p = 0.006; Table 4.4); consistent with the ‘automatic inhibition’ 
hypothesis, the p(respond|stop) became lower for the stop-associated cues than for the go-associated 
cues (Figure 4.5). This indicates that the stimulus-stop/go associations influenced stop performance. 
Combined analysis
Go trials: go RT
Stop-signal trials: p(respond|stop)
Stop-associated cues only 
Go trials: go RTs
Stop-signal trials: p(respond|stop)
Go-associated cues only
Go trials: go RTs
Stop-signal trials: p(respond|stop)
Part
Stop/go-type
Signal-location
Part by stop/go-type
Part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-location
Part by stop/go-type by signal-location
Part
Stop/go-type
Signal-location
Part by stop/go-type
Part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-location
Part by stop/go-type by signal-location
Part
Signal-location
Part by signal-location
Part
Signal-location
Part by signal-location
Part
Signal-location
Part by signal-location
Part
Signal-location
Part by signal-location
Df1
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
Df2
62
31
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
Sum of 
squares 
effect
37140.47
3.83
148.01
311.89
1515.16
9.63
535.26
0.01
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.00
17459.93
41.07
1900.69
0.00
0.00
0.00
19992.42
116.57
149.73
0.02
0.00
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
73577.01
10330.14
5362.99
16074.06
19538.16
10247.00
26840.59
0.08
0.04
0.03
0.08
0.06
0.05
0.06
57184.14
10713.65
37094.95
0.04
0.02
0.05
32466.92
4896.34
9283.80
0.12
0.06
0.08
F
15.65
0.01
0.86
0.60
2.40
0.03
0.62
2.26
3.47
1.29
5.54
0.98
0.58
0.92
9.47
0.12
1.59
0.97
0.01
0.63
19.09
0.74
0.50
4.79
1.10
1.15
p
< 0.001
0.915
0.362
0.551
0.099
0.866
0.536
0.112
0.072
0.264
0.006
0.368
0.451
0.402
< 0.001
0.733
0.213
0.386
0.916
0.534
< 0.001
0.397
0.609
0.012
0.302
0.323
gen. η2
0.027
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.009
0.007
0.002
0.020
0.003
0.001
0.003
0.024
< 0.001
0.003
0.006
< 0.001
0.005
0.030
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.038
0.004
0.006
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However, there was no reliable difference between the consistent signal location trials and the 
inconsistent signal location trials (p = 0.264; Table 4.4) and the two-way interaction between stop/go-
type and signal-location was also not reliable (p = 0.451; Table 4.4). The corresponding Bayes factor 
for the difference between the consistent and inconsistent signal location trials was 0.34. All other 
interactions were also not reliable (ps ≥ 0.381; Table 4.4).
Eye movement analyses. 
Word interval. Analyses of the number of eye movements in the interval between the 
presentation of the word and the presentation of the go/stop signal revealed a reliable main effect of 
part (p < 0.001; Table 4.6) reflecting an increasing number of fixations as a function of task practice 
(Table 4.5). The mean number of fixations was slightly higher for the cues associated with a right 
signal (2.07) than for the cues associated with a left signal (2.05; p = 0.044; Table 4.6). However, the 
corresponding Bayesian analysis was inconclusive (BF = 1.04). All other main effects and interactions 
were not reliable (ps ≥ 0.201; Table 4.6). 
Analyses of the average distance between the fixated signal location and the trained signal 
location did not reveal any reliable main effects or interactions (ps ≥ 0.416; Table 4.6) and Bayesian 
analyses confirmed that there was no difference between the stop-associated and go-associated cues 
(BF = 0.25) and between the consistent-left and consistent-right cues (BF = 0.24). 
Table 4.5. Overview of the number of fixations and average distance between the fixation signal location and 
the trained signal location (in pixels) in the interval between the word presentation and the stop/go signal 
presentation for each stop/go-type (go-associated, stop-associated), location-type (left-associated cues, right-
associated cues), and part (1-3). M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Fixation
left-associated
M
1.83
1.85
2.11
2.09
2.22
2.21
SD
0.37
0.41
0.49
0.51
0.57
0.60
right-associated
M
1.85
1.86
2.13
2.16
2.21
2.21
SD
0.40
0.39
0.53
0.56
0.58
0.59
Distance
left-associated
M
256.12
258.93
259.43
258.74
260.04
258.21
SD
17.82
17.48
13.64
12.05
15.67
11.44
right-associated
M
257.19
255.87
255.70
254.59
256.70
255.08
SD
16.55
19.65
13.79
13.23
13.54
14.20
CHAPTER 4: SIGNAL DETECTION DURING STOP/GO LEARNING
172
Table 4.6. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the word interval. Stop/go-type (stop-associated, go-associated), location-type (consistent-left, 
consistent-right), and part (1-3) were within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Stop/go-type
Location-type
Part
Stop/go-type by location-type
Stop/go-type by part
Location-type by part
Stop/go-type by location-type by part
Stop/go-type
Location-type
Part
Stop/go-type by location-type
Stop/go-type by part
Location-type by part
Stop/go-type by location-type by part
Df1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
Df2
27
27
54
27
54
54
54
27
27
54
27
54
54
54
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.00
0.03
8.08
0.01
0.01
0.02
0.01
32.93
623.21
14.52
43.88
87.90
132.60
77.13
Sum of 
squares 
error
0.25
0.17
9.50
0.14
0.57
0.51
0.43
1959.09
46612.73
2131.92
1943.60
2660.46
12750.41
3471.37
F
0.20
4.47
22.95
1.72
0.30
1.32
0.61
0.45
0.36
0.18
0.61
0.89
0.28
0.60
p
0.657
0.044
< 0.001
0.201
0.744
0.276
0.548
0.506
0.553
0.833
0.442
0.416
0.630
0.552
gen. η2
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.089
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.008
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.002
0.001
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Signal interval. Analyses of the number of eye movements in the interval after the stop/go 
signal presentation revealed a main effect of part (p < 0.001; Table 4.8) reflecting a decreasing 
number of fixations as a function of task practice (Table 4.7). Thus, participants moved their eyes less 
in this interval with task practice. Participants made slightly more eye-movements on stop-signal trials 
(1.74) than on go-signal trials (1.68; p < 0.001; Table 4.8). However, there was no reliable difference 
between the trials in which the signal location was congruent with training and the trials in which the 
signal location was incongruent with training (p = 0.473; Table 4.8). There was also no reliable two-
way interaction between stop/go-type and signal-location (p = 0.897; Table 4.8). All other main 
effects and interactions were not reliable (ps ≥ 0.128; Table 4.8). Bayesian analyses supported the null 
hypotheses of no difference between the stop-associated cues and the go-associated cues (BF = 0.20) 
and the null hypothesis of no difference between the consistent signal location trials and the 
inconsistent signal location trials (BF = 0.26). 
Analyses of the average distance measure revealed that the main effect of part was reliable (p 
< 0.001; Table 4.8) reflecting an increasing distance between the fixation and the trained signal as a 
function of task practice (Table 4.7). The average distance was greater on stop-signal trials (252 
pixels) than on go-signal trials (245 pixels; p < 0.001; Table 4.8) and the two-way interaction between 
part and signal was reliable (p < 0.001; Table 4.8). Follow-up analyses revealed that, although the 
increase was numerically greater on the go-signal trials, the main effect of part was reliable on both 
go signal trials, F(2, 54) = 72.94, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.483, and on stop-signal trials, F(2, 54) = 
12.29, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.107. Thus, this pattern of results indicate a general (i.e. non-specific) 
effect of training in which participants fixated on the signals less as a function of training. 
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Table 4.7. Overview of the number of fixations and average distance between the fixation signal location and 
the trained signal location (in pixels) in the interval after the stop signal for each stop/go-type (stop-associated, 
go-associated), signal-location (congruent signal location, incongruent signal location), signal-type (go signal, 
stop signal), and part (1-3). M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
The difference between the go-associated and the stop-associated cues was not reliable (p = 
0.170; Table 4.7). The Bayes factor for the corresponding difference was 0.47. There was no reliable 
two-way interaction between stop/go-type and part (p = 0.569; Table 4.8). The three-way interaction 
between stop/go-type, signal-type, and part did reach significance (p = 0.033; Table 4.8). However, 
the two-way interaction between stop/go-type and part did not reach significance on go-signal trials, 
F(2, 54) = 2.86, p = 0.066, gen. η2 = 0.012, or on stop-signal trials, F(2, 54) = 0.50, p = 0.586, gen. η2 
= 0.002. Furthermore, this three-way interaction does not fit with my prior predictions; it is unclear 
why stop/go learning would influence the fixation distance on go-signal trials more than on stop-
signal trials (or vice versa). Thus, it is possible that the reliable three-way interaction reflects a 
spurious effect (for a discussion of issues surrounding multiple comparisons in ANOVAs, see Cramer, 
van Ravenzwaaij, et al., 2016).
Go signal
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Stop signal
Part 1
Part 2
Part 3
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Go-associated
Stop-associated
Fixation
congruent signal 
location
M
1.84
1.87
1.59
1.58
1.60
1.61
1.90
1.92
1.70
1.66
1.65
1.65
SD
0.49
0.52
0.31
0.34
0.30
0.35
0.58
0.55
0.41
0.33
0.35
0.32
incongruent signal 
location
M
1.85
1.82
1.59
1.62
1.56
1.57
1.92
1.91
1.67
1.68
1.64
1.62
SD
0.48
0.45
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.32
0.59
0.58
0.35
0.35
0.33
0.33
Distance
congruent signal 
location
M
217.59
221.06
258.93
259.32
256.21
261.26
243.47
242.18
253.68
259.14
252.25
256.15
SD
31.48
32.37
23.59
31.35
21.59
27.53
32.62
27.58
31.33
20.65
32.30
20.99
incongruent signal 
location
M
216.02
219.40
256.37
253.38
253.83
266.81
243.41
244.35
258.17
257.89
261.60
255.40
SD
38.64
33.90
27.63
29.22
29.64
29.62
29.02
33.01
33.29
35.64
36.34
29.06
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Table 4.8. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance in the signal interval. Stop/go-type (stop-associated, go-associated), signal-location (congruent location, 
incongruent location), signal-type (stop-signal, go-signal), and part (1-3) were within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 
are highlighted in bold. 
There was also no reliable difference between trials in which the signal location was 
congruent with training and trials in which the signal was incongruent with training (p = 0.473; Table 
4.8). The Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis of no difference between these trials (BF = 
0.22). There was no reliable two-way interaction between stop/go-type and signal-location (p = 0.897; 
Table 4.8). All other main effects and interactions were also not reliable (ps ≥ 0.170; Table 4.8). 
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Stop/go-type
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-type
Stop/go-type by part
Signal-type by part
Stop/go-type by signal-location
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-type by part
Stop/go-type by signal-type by signal-location
Stop/go-type by part by signal-location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal by signal-location
Stop/go-type
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-type
Stop/go-type by part
Signal-type by part
Stop/go-type by signal-location
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal-type by part
Stop/go-type by signal-type by signal-location
Stop/go-type by part by signal-location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Stop/go-type by signal by signal-location
Df1
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
Df2
27
27
54
27
27
54
54
27
27
54
54
27
54
54
54
27
27
54
27
27
54
54
27
27
54
54
27
54
54
54
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.00
0.71
9.54
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.07
0.02
0.00
717.51
8934.07
105647.00
34.11
454.35
319.13
26172.32
97.64
590.42
552.39
1383.91
381.05
226.35
94.38
796.31
Sum of 
squares 
error
0.37
0.78
11.51
0.43
0.27
0.79
1.25
0.44
0.27
0.69
0.78
0.41
0.86
0.71
0.78
9749.93
11420.89
54349.03
5498.49
6955.59
15138.45
19125.01
7357.98
8237.09
11115.25
10308.01
5917.42
12013.26
14099.98
12637.36
F
0.00
24.40
22.40
0.53
0.62
0.04
0.47
0.02
0.37
1.48
0.14
0.03
2.17
0.79
0.17
1.99
21.12
52.48
0.17
1.76
0.57
36.95
0.36
1.94
1.34
3.62
1.74
0.51
0.18
1.70
p
0.968
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.473
0.436
0.956
0.627
0.897
0.549
0.237
0.867
0.863
0.128
0.460
0.848
0.170
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.686
0.195
0.569
< 0.001
0.554
0.176
0.269
0.033
0.198
0.603
0.832
0.193
gen. η2
< 0.001
0.006
0.079
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.036
0.307
< 0.001
0.002
0.001
0.099
< 0.001
0.002
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.001
< 0.001
0.003
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Table 4.9. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance for the stop-associated cues. In the word interval, location-type (consistent-left, consistent-right), and 
part (1-3) were within-subjects factors. In the stop-signal interval, signal-location (congruent location, 
incongruent location), signal-type (stop-signal, go-signal), and part (1-3) were within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 
are highlighted in bold. 
Word interval
Stop-signal interval
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Location-type
Part
Location-type by part
Location-type
Part
Location-type by part
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Signal-type by part
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Signal-type by part
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by signal-location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
Df2
27
54
54
27
54
54
27
54
27
54
27
54
54
27
54
27
54
27
54
54
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.03
3.83
0.03
498.92
20.61
10.45
0.29
4.86
0.01
0.01
0.00
0.08
0.01
2679.46
54460.63
8.16
14214.75
11.42
516.82
524.36
Sum of 
squares 
error
0.14
5.72
0.45
22250.18
2325.67
9218.58
0.59
6.45
0.53
1.13
0.27
0.73
0.59
6939.97
33051.48
8808.22
17486.43
3670.03
9924.06
12363.44
F
6.62
18.08
1.86
0.61
0.24
0.03
13.35
20.35
0.30
0.28
0.34
3.06
0.54
10.42
44.49
0.03
21.95
0.08
1.41
1.15
p
0.016
< 0.001
0.166
0.443
0.785
0.919
0.001
< 0.001
0.589
0.736
0.567
0.060
0.585
0.003
< 0.001
0.875
< 0.001
0.774
0.254
0.319
gen. η2
0.001
0.081
0.001
0.014
0.001
< 0.001
0.005
0.082
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
< 0.001
0.023
0.322
< 0.001
0.110
< 0.001
0.004
0.005
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Table 4.10. Overview of Analyses of Variance performed to compare number of fixations and the average 
distance for the go-associated cues. Results discussed in the text are identified in bold. In the word interval, 
location-type (consistent-left, consistent-right), and part (1-3) were within-subjects factors. In the stop-signal 
interval, signal-location (congruent location, incongruent location), signal-type (stop-signal, go-signal), and part 
(1-3) were within-subjects factors. 
Expectancy ratings analyses. Expectancy ratings analyses. Analyses of the stop/go 
expectancy ratings showed that participants expected to stop slightly more for the stop-associated 
cues (5.13) than for the go-associated cues (4.56). This difference was reliable, t(31) = -2.45, p = 
0.020, gav = 0.65. However, it is important to note that the Bayesian analyses were inconclusive (BF = 
2.45). The stop-minus-go expectancy ratings difference did not reliably correlate with the 
corresponding RT difference, r(30) = -0.081, p = 0.661, BFregression = 0.36, nor the corresponding 
p(respond|stop) difference, r(30) = 0.16, p = 0.374, BFregression = 0.46. 
Analyses of the stop/go location expectancy ratings showed no reliable main effect of 
location-type (left-associated cues, right-associated cues), F(1, 31) = 0.80, p = 0.377, gen. η2 = 0.007. 
There was also no reliable location-rating difference between the mean ratings between the stop-
associated cues (4.67) and the go-associated cues (4.94), F(1, 31) = 3.28, p = 0.080, gen. η2 = 0.027. 
However, the two-way interaction between signal location-type and stop/go-type (stop-associated, go-
Word interval
Stop-signal interval
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Number of fixations
Distance from trained signal
Location-type
Part
Location-type by part
Location-type
Part
Location-type by part
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Signal-type by part
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Signal-type
Part
Signal-location
Signal-type by part
Signal-type by signal-location
Part by signal-location
Signal-type by part by signal-location
Df1
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
Df2
27
54
54
27
54
54
27
54
27
54
27
54
54
27
54
27
54
27
54
54
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.00
4.25
0.00
168.18
81.82
199.29
0.42
4.68
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.01
6708.96
51505.45
123.59
13341.47
960.05
261.93
366.33
Sum of 
squares 
error
0.17
4.36
0.49
26306.15
2466.71
7003.19
0.47
5.85
0.34
0.90
0.41
0.83
0.90
11436.51
36436.00
4048.26
11946.60
10484.49
13204.44
14373.89
F
0.41
26.37
0.19
0.17
0.90
0.77
24.41
21.62
0.23
0.43
0.05
0.81
0.41
15.84
38.17
0.82
30.15
2.47
0.54
0.69
p
0.529
< 0.001
0.827
0.681
0.405
0.418
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.637
0.655
0.823
0.449
0.658
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.372
< 0.001
0.128
0.588
0.507
gen. η2
< 0.001
0.097
< 0.001
0.004
0.002
0.005
0.007
0.076
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.051
0.293
0.001
0.097
0.008
0.002
0.003
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associated) was marginally significant, F(1, 31) = 3.66, p = 0.065, gen. η2 = 0.026. As the interaction 
was marginally significant, I conducted some follow-up analyses. These showed that the difference 
between the stop-left cues (4.88) and the stop-right cues (4.48) was marginally significant, t(31) = 
2.00, p = 0.055, gav = 0.50, BF = 1.07 (one-tailed: p = 0.973). Note, however, that if participants 
acquired the stimulus-signal location contingencies, there should be lower ratings for the stop-left 
cues than for the stop-right cues. Thus, if anything, the expectancy ratings are in the opposite 
direction. As expected, there was also no difference between the go-left and go-right cues, t(31) = 
-0.57, p = 0.574, gav =-0.14, BF = 0.22. 
Chapter Discussion
In the present chapter, I investigated how learning influences attention in a stop/go task. Across two 
experiments, I found evidence of stop/go learning on task performance and on expectancy ratings 
obtained following task completion. Therefore, I conclude that participants learned to stop and/or go 
in both experiments. These findings replicate the overall pattern of results reported in Chapters 2 and 
3. However, despite finding evidence of stimulus-stop/go learning, I found no reliable evidence that 
participants acquired the associations between the stop-associated and go-associated cues and the 
spatial location of the stop/go signal. 
In Experiment 7, I compared cues that were always paired with the presentation of a stop/go 
signal in the same spatial location (e.g. always to the left of the cue or always to the right of the cue) 
with cues that were paired with the presentation a stop/go signal in two spatial locations with equal 
probability (e.g. sometimes to the left and sometimes to the right of the cue). There were no overall 
differences in stop or go task performance and no difference in the magnitude of the practice-effect 
between these cues. However, it is important to highlight that although these differences were not 
statistically significant, the Bayesian analyses provided only tentative support for the null hypothesis. 
Thus, I cannot rule out the possibility that some signal location learning occurred in this task. 
Therefore, in Experiment 8 I made some modifications to the task design to better allow for 
the comparison of stimulus-stop/go and stimulus-signal learning during task performance. First, I 
adapted the task such that participants were no longer required to respond to the stimulus. Thus, I 
could examine the effects of signal location learning without any potential interference relating to 
(in)congruency between the signal location and the response hand. Second, I modified the 
contingencies between specific stimuli and the signal location, such that for each stop/go-type there 
were trials that were consistent with both the trained response goal (e.g. stop) and consistent with the 
trained signal location (e.g. left), trials that were consistent with the trained response goal (e.g. stop) 
but inconsistent with the trained signal location (e.g. right), trials that were inconsistent with the 
trained response goal (e.g. go) but consistent with the trained signal location (e.g. left), and trials that 
were inconsistent with both the trained response goal (e.g. go) and with the trained signal location 
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(e.g. right). Consistent with the predictions of the ‘automatic inhibition’ account, a reliable difference 
emerged between the stop-associated and go-associated cues in the probability of responding on stop 
trials. However, despite finding evidence for stop/go learning, I found no reliable difference between 
task performance on trials in which the signal location was congruent with training and task 
performance on trials in which the signal location was incongruent with training. Bayesian analyses 
supported the null hypothesis of no difference between the congruent and incongruent trials in go RTs, 
in the eye-movement data, and in the expectancy ratings following task completion. Therefore, on the 
basis of these findings, I conclude that participants did not learn to associate specific stimuli with the 
spatial signal location of the stop or go signal in this paradigm. 
There are at least two plausible explanations for the absence of a stimulus-signal learning 
effect. First, it is possible that participants learned direct associations between the cues with stopping/
going. The automatic inhibition account assumes that during stop learning a direct association 
between the stop-associated stimuli and the stop goal is acquired (for an extended discussion, see 
Chapter 2). Thus, when participants acquire direct stimulus-stop associations, the presentation of stop-
associated cues primes the stop goal and initiates the stop process. Thus, in situations where 
participants acquire direct stimulus-stop associations, the need for stop-signal detection is diminished. 
However, although the direct association idea could account for the pattern of results observed in 
Experiment 7, this is less clear in Experiment 8. The reasons are discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (see 
Can Participants Acquire Indirect (Stimulus-Signal) Associations?). Second, it is possible that the 
participants detected the signals on the basis attentional selection influences aside from stimulus-
signal learning. For example, it is well-known that attentional control can be driven by bottom-up or 
exogenous factors, such as items that contrast with surrounding stimuli on the basis of a visual feature 
value (e.g. brightness) are detected faster (e.g. the ‘pop-out’ effect; for an overview, see Connor, 
Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). In addition, Awh and colleagues suggested that attentional control can also be 
influenced by selection history, such that attentional selection for a given feature (e.g. colour) can be 
primed (Awh, Belopolsky, et al., 2012). For example, it has been demonstrated that in a search 
reaction time task containing two equally salient colour singletons, participants could only eliminate 
the inference from the irrelevant singleton when the selected feature matched that of the previous trial 
(Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2011). Thus, it is possible that the influence of learning could not 
compete with other selection influences in the present task. Future research is required to determine 
whether stimulus-signal associations would influence performance in situations were the go/stop 
signals are harder to distinguish, and where the trial sequences are controlled to eliminate trial-by-trial 
attentional selection priming effects. Third, it is possible that the measures used in the present chapter 
were not sensitive enough to detect the effects of signal location learning. For example, in future 
research it could be interesting to increase the number of possible signal locations in a search array as 
CHAPTER 4: SIGNAL DETECTION DURING STOP/GO LEARNING
180
this would increase the demand on visual attention (for example arrays, see Woodman, 2013). The 
N2-posterior-contralateral (N2pc) event-related potential component could provide a useful 
alternative measure as this component has been previously used as an index of attention to targets in a 
search array, and is sensitive to the effects of trial repetition (e.g. Woodman & Luck, 2003). Unlike 
eye-movements which capture overt attention, the benefit of the N2pc is that it also captures covert 
attention (i.e. attention to objects without movement of the eyes; see Luck, 2009). However, it is 
important to highlight that the N2pc components requires a minimum of 250 trials per condition per 
participant (Woodman, 2010) meaning that future researchers must satisfy this requirement whilst 
ensuring that the training protocol ensures that it is possible to detect some learning across time. 
In Chapter 1, I discussed the idea that when the stop-signal representation remains the same 
throughout training participants could acquire an association between the stop-associated cues and the 
stop signal. The retrieval of stimulus-signal associations would prime the representation of the stop 
signal rather than the stop goal or the stop response (see also Chapter 2; Bowditch, Verbruggen, et al., 
2016; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014). The retrieval of stimulus-signal associations should result in 
lower probability of responding for the stop-associated cues than for the go-associated cues but, 
unlike the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations, there should be no (or very little) difference between 
the stop-associated and go-associated cues in go RTs. The absence of stimulus-signal location learning 
seems inconsistent with this account. However, I cannot completely rule out an involvement of 
stimulus-signal learning in the present chapter, especially as the pattern of behavioural performance in 
Experiment 8 match the predictions of the stimulus-signal learning account; an effect of learning on 
the probability of responding, but no difference between go RTs for the stop-associated and go-
associated cues. There are two possible explanations for these results. First, it is possible that 
participants acquired associations between the stop-associated (and/or go-associated) cues and 
representation of the signal that did not include spatial signal location. For example, the stop and go 
signals were always presented in the same colour in Experiment 7 (e.g. yellow = stop; blue = go, or 
vice versa) and always in the same shape in Experiment 8 (e.g. diamond = stop; square = go, or vice 
versa), regardless of the signal location contingencies. Indeed, several studies have provided evidence 
in support for independent attentional selection of colour and spatial signal location (e.g. Andersen, 
Muller, & Hillyard, 2009; Kasten & Navon, 2008). Thus, it is possible that learning primed features of 
the signal representation, independent of spatial signal location. Research in the selective attention 
literature suggests that, in situations where the spatial signal location is uncertain, colour-based 
attentional selection is more efficient (Adams & Chambers, 2012). Future research should investigate 
whether participants can acquire associations between stop- or go-associated cues and other features 
of the signal representation, such as colour. Second, it is possible that signal detection processes are 
less important during stop learning than originally thought and that differences in the effects of 
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learning on the probability of responding and go RTs arise due to differences in the sensitivities of 
these measures. This idea is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (see What is Learned?, Chapter 7). If this 
is the case, we do not have to assume that participants learned two qualitatively different stimulus-
stop and stimulus-signal associations when learning influences stop performance but not go 
performance. 
Finally, at the beginning of this Chapter, I discussed a recent framework that proposed that 
action control depends on three basic cognitive processes; signal detection, action selection, and 
action execution that are influenced by development, rule activation and maintenance, monitoring, 
proactive control and, importantly for the present purposes, associative learning (Verbruggen, 
McLaren, et al., 2014). If it turns out that attention to the stop signal is not influenced by learning in 
response inhibition tasks, this would suggest that the influence of associative learning on signal 
detection processes may be less than previously anticipated. The implications of these findings are 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
Conclusion
Taken together, the experiments presented in this chapter provide further evidence that participants 
can acquire item-specific stop/go associations. However, across two experiments, I find no evidence 
to support the idea that participants acquired the associations between specific stimuli and the spatial 
location of the stop or go signal. Thus, these findings suggest that, for spatial location features held 
within representations of the stop signal, the acquisition of stimulus-signal associations is not an 
inevitable consequence of performing a stop learning task where the representation of the stop signal 
remains the same throughout training. 
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Appendix H 
Words used in Experiment 7 
We used 112 words (56, five-letter, 56 six-letter) in this experiment. Half of the words referred to 
natural objects, the other half referred to human-made objects. The natural and human-made words 
were matched on SUBTLEX frequency (M= 2.39, SD = 0.51). 
   
Natural: sheep, eagle, otter, camel, hippo, grape, shark, snail, raven, chimp, horse, moose, llama, 
squid, chick, onion, lemon, panda, maple, snake, finch, sloth, apple, acorn, peach, cedar, basil, rhino, 
monkey, turtle, lizard, peanut, iguana, banana, papaya, orchid, turkey, tomato, donkey, walnut, potato, 
baboon, carrot, rabbit, falcon, salmon, weasel, pepper, ferret, shrimp, walrus, pigeon, celery, garlic, 
gibbon, radish. 
Human-made: brick, scarf, canoe, cabin, diary, label, whisk, ferry, quill, leash, apron, spoon, shawl, 
bench, banjo, skirt, penny, torch, arrow, swing, medal, couch, piano, brush, wagon, towel, buggy, 
badge, brooch, crayon, cement, teacup, cradle, pajama, sandal, seesaw, jigsaw, napkin, paddle, helmet, 
funnel, statue, sleigh, eraser, jumper, stereo, anchor, cinema, poster, violin, candle, pillow, dinghy, 
bucket, guitar, corset.
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Appendix I 
Words used in Experiment 8 
There were 36 words in this experiment. Words were randomly allocated to three word lists of 12 
words each anew for each participant. Two of the word lists were used in the main task, the remaining 
word list was used in the recognition ratings following task completion (For more details, see 
Procedure). Participants were not required to respond to the words in this experiment, so all words 
referred to natural objects. The words were taken from those used in Experiments 5-6 (Chapter 3).
Words: mule, calf, kiwi, wren, swan, newt, leaf, stag, lime, clam, crow, flea, pear, wasp, moth, rice, 
plum, germ, slug, dove, toad, boar, crab, pony, deer, worm, lamb, goat, frog, hawk, tree, lion, wolf, 
duck, bull, bear.
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CHAPTER 5
BEHAVIOURAL PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION AND 
NON-INHIBITION TASKS
It was recently suggested that one of the biggest problems in the cognitive control literature is that 
researchers often fall into the trap of referring to general constructs, such as ‘inhibition’ without 
specifying what the underlying mechanisms are (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Consistent with 
this suggestion, the effects of training in response inhibition tasks are typically explained in terms of 
strengthening or improving a general ‘inhibitory control’ mechanism rather than identifying how 
training influences the processes underlying action control (see, e.g. Spierer, Chavan, & Manuel, 
2013). Referring to general constructs, such as ‘inhibitory control’, is problematic because it does not 
explain how training influences performance. To address this issue, Verbruggen and colleagues 
proposed that various forms of action control depend on three basic cognitive processes: signal 
detection, action selection, and action execution (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Indeed, these 
processes can account for performance in both inhibition and non-inhibition tasks (e.g. Logan & 
Bundesen, 2003; Monsell & Mizon, 2006; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Schall, 2001; Smith & Ratcliff, 
2004). Furthermore, each of these processes can be modulated by learning. In the present chapter, I 
address the third outstanding issue highlighted in Chapter 1; whether the effects of learning on action 
selection processes are specific to inhibition tasks or whether they represent task-general (non-
inhibition, Chapter 1) effects. In particular, I compare the effects of training on behavioural task 
performance in the go/no-go task with the effects of training on behavioural task performance in the 
two-choice task. This comparison could further our understanding of what is learned in response 
inhibition tasks and how training influences behaviour.
The comparison of the go/no-go task with the two-choice task has been the subject of 
investigation since the original work conducted by Donders (1868/1969); the typical finding is that go 
response latencies are shorter and accuracy is greater in the go/no-go task than in the two-choice task 
(Gomez, Ratcliffe & Perea, 2007). This difference was initially attributed to the presence of a 
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response-selection stage in the two-choice task but not in the go/no-go task36. However, more recent 
work suggests that the action selection demands in these tasks are more similar than previously 
thought. For example, neuroimaging research has shown that the pre-supplementary motor area (a 
brain region shown to be critically involved in action selection in choice tasks) is also activated on go 
and no-go trials in the go/no-go task (Simmonds, Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008; Mostofsky & Simmonds, 
2008). As outlined in Chapter 1, the pre-SMA is a key component of the ‘inhibitory control network’ 
involved in updating current action plans and monitoring for response conflict (e.g. Ridderinkhof, 
Ullsperger, et al., 2004). Similarly, performance of inhibition and non-inhibition tasks has been shown 
to elicit similar electrophysiological signatures thought to reflect medial prefrontal cortex activity 
(e.g. the N2 component; Smith, Smith, Provost, & Heathcote, 2009; for an overview, see Chapter 6). 
Thus, these findings suggest that performance of inhibition and non-inhibition tasks could recruit 
similar brain regions. Indeed, it has even been suggested that response execution and response 
inhibition are similar at a neural level (Jasinska, 2013; Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008). Combined, 
these findings suggest that response selection/execution and response inhibition are most likely ‘two 
sides of the same coin’ that draw on common neural substrates (Mostofsky and Simmonds, 2008).
Consistent with this conclusion, research using diffusion models also suggest that there are 
similarities between response selection and response inhibition. According to these models, response 
selection can be explained in terms of the accumulation of activation towards a response threshold; 
the response that reaches the threshold first is selected and then executed (e.g. Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; 
Smith & Ratcliff, 2004; for an overview, see Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016). Although 
these models have primarily been used to account for response selection processes, more recent 
modelling work shows that these models can also account for response inhibition. For example, a 
diffusion model with response boundaries for the go and no-go responses provided a better fit for the 
go/no-go task performance data than a model with no response boundary for the no-go response 
(Gomez, Ratcliff, et al., 2007; see also Logan, Van Zandt, et al., 2014, for a diffusion version of the 
independent race model). This modelling work accommodates the shorter RTs and lower accuracy on 
go trials in the go/no-go task (compared with trials in the two-choice task) as a bias in the starting 
point of the go activation (Gomez, Ratcliff, et al., 2007; see also Ratcliff, Smith, et al., 2016). This 
36. Donders (1868/1969) originally argued that performance in the two-choice task requires the insertion of an 
action selection stage of processing (e.g. left key press vs. right key press) in addition to the stimulus-
categorisation stage (e.g. diamond vs. square) required in both the two-choice and go/no-go tasks (for an 
overview, see Ulrich, Mattes & Miller, 1999). Indeed, there is some evidence that suggests that an additional 
response selection process is inserted in the two-choice task that is not present in the go/no-go task (Vidal, 
Burle, Grapperon & Hasbroucq, 2011). However, this has only been observed using a go/no-go task in which 
participants had to decide between two responses ion go trials in addition to the no-go response (e.g. digit 3 = 
‘right key press’; digit 4 = ‘left key press’; digits 7 and 8 = no-go). This could indicate that there may be some 
hierarchy of response selection (e.g. digit -> go or no-go -> [if go: left keypress or right keypress]). Note, 
however, that in tasks similar to those used in the present chapter, the weight of evidence is in favour of the 
view that the action selection processes required in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks are more similar than 
different. 
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suggests that, just as in the two-choice task, performance of the go/no-go task is best considered as a 
choice between alternative responses (e.g., Band, Ridderinkhof, & van der Molen, 2003; Donkers & 
van Boxtel, 2004; Gomez, Ratcliff, et al., 2007). Logan, Van Zandt, et al. (2014) also argued that go 
responses and stop responses in a stop-signal paradigm differ primarily in the conditions that trigger 
them and the outcome rather than in selection mechanisms; in other words, they differ in content 
rather than form. Combined, these studies indicate that similar selection mechanisms are likely to be 
involved in response-inhibition and choice tasks37.
To date, some indirect evidence exists suggesting that learning in these tasks may recruit 
similar mechanisms. For example, practice-induced improvements in both tasks have been attributed 
to the retrieval of associations between a given stimulus and a given (motor or inhibitory) response. 
Memory-retrieval accounts (such as the Instance theory; Logan,1988; for an overview, see Modelling 
Performance in Response Inhibition Tasks, Chapter 1) can account for training-effects in both 
inhibition and non-inhibition tasks. For example, previous research has demonstrated that, just as in 
the go/no-go task, there is a performance cost in choice tasks when acquired stimulus-response (S-R) 
associations are reversed (Horner & Henson, 2009; 2011; see also Race, Shanker & Wagner, 2009). 
Henson and Horner (2009; 2011) attributed this cost to the automatic retrieval of instances containing 
information at various processing stages, including response selection (cf. Verbruggen, Best, et al., 
2014). Response-congruency effects that can be attributed to the retrieval of stimulus-response 
associations have also been observed in several other (non-inhibition) tasks, including task-switching 
(e.g. Wylie & Allport, 2000; Koch & Allport, 2006; Waszak, Hommel, & Allport 2003; Schneider, 
2015; Waszak, Pfister, & Kiesel, 2013; Wendt & Kiesel, 2008) and interference control (e.g. Cohen-
Kdoshay & Meiran, 2009; Wenke, De Houwer, De Winne & Liefooghe, 2014) paradigms. For 
example, in some task-switching designs, conflict between S-R associations can result in slower 
responding, increased errors, and a larger task-switch cost38 for incongruent stimuli (that are 
associated with a different response in each task) than for congruent stimuli (that are associated with 
the same response in each task; e.g., Sudevan & Taylor, 1987; Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Thus, there 
is good evidence to suggest that in various tasks (including the two-choice task) practice can lead to 
delayed responding when there is a conflict with established S-R associations. Thus, it seems that 
practice-related effects on response selection are central to performance of a range of tasks. 
On the basis of these findings, it seems plausible that action control processes are modulated 
by task practice in a similar fashion in both non-inhibition and inhibition tasks. However, the effects 
37. It is important to note, however, that some recent studies indicate that there might be differences as well 
(Bender, Filmer, Garner, Naughtin, & Dux, 2016; Rae, Hughes, Weaver, Anderson, & Rowe, 2014). For 
example, Bender, Filmer, et al. (2016) found in a correlational study that response-inhibition tasks and response-
selection tasks loaded on different factors. Thus, there might be both unity and diversity in these tasks.  
38. The decrement in performance (longer RTs and higher errors rates) when the task changes compared to 
when the task stays the same (Monsell, 2003). 
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of training in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks have not been compared in the same experimental 
design meaning that claims about the specificity of learning in response inhibition tasks are currently 
based on cross-experimental comparisons. This is problematic because similarities (and indeed 
differences) between these tasks could be masked by the various inconsistencies between these 
experiments. Therefore, the first step in investigating whether response inhibition training influences a 
general action selection mechanism is to compare the go/no-go and two-choice tasks using the same 
experimental design. 
The Present Chapter
The aim of the present chapter was to provide an initial investigation into the specificity behavioural 
effects of task practice on action selection processes in the go/no-go task. For the purposes of the 
research presented in this thesis, the present chapter also served as an exploratory behavioural pilot 
for the event-related potential experiments reported in Chapter 6. I used a modified version of the task 
used by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a; Experiment 2) in their original demonstration of automaticity 
in the go/no-go task. This task had a training (acquisition) phase, followed by a test phase where I 
introduced a new judgment task. Half of all stimuli were associated with different responses in the 
training and test phases (incongruent stimuli) whereas the other half of stimuli were associated with 
the same response in the training and test phases (congruent stimuli). The introduction of a new 
judgment task in the test phase meant that performance could no longer benefit from the retrieval of 
the acquired stimulus-category associations. The novel contribution of Experiments 9-10 was that I 
also included a two-choice task condition which was identical to the go/no-go task except that 
participants had to make a keypress response on every trial. Participants were randomly allocated to 
the two-choice task condition or to the go/no-go task condition (between-subjects). 
For the purposes of the present study, mediation of the stimulus-response or stimulus-stop 
(no-go) associations via a category representation was undesirable because associations between 
categories and responding and/or categories and stopping could differentially contribute to the effects 
of training on performance in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks. Therefore, I made two main 
modifications to the original Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) task design to minimise the contribution 
of category-related costs; I used a smaller stimulus set (four chequerboards; see Figure 5.1) than in the 
Verbruggen and Logan task (60 words). Research suggests that participants are more likely to rely on 
stimulus-response associations when the stimulus-set is smaller (e.g. Forrest, Monsell, & McLaren, 
2014). Furthermore, participants were required to perform a visual judgment task in Experiments 9-10 
rather than a word semantic judgment (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 2). 
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Figure 5.1. Stimuli and trial structure. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross in the centre of 
the screen for 250 ms. Following the removal of the fixation cross, a chequerboard was presented in the centre 
of the screen. After 250 ms, the chequerboard was replaced with a blank screen. The maximum reaction time 
(MAXRT) was 1000 ms. Feedback (‘correct’, ‘incorrect’ or ‘too slow’ in case participants did not response 
before the RT threshold in Experiment 9; ‘too slow’ or a blank screen in Experiment 10) was presented for 250 
ms. Note: frequent/infrequent refers to the spatial frequency of the chequerboards not stimulus presentation 
frequency.
Experiment 9
Method
Participants. Sixty-four students from the University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 19.11 years, SD = 1.25, 48 females, 58 right-handed). 
Six participants were removed and replaced due to technical problems with the stimulus presentation 
computers; no participants were removed for performance-related reasons. All experiments of the 
present chapter were approved by the local research ethics committee at the School of Psychology, 
University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the nature and possible 
consequences of the study were explained. The target sample size and exclusion criteria were decided 
in advance of data collection to ensure that I had enough power to detect medium-sized effects in my 
within-subject comparisons and within-between-subject interactions. 
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Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The stimuli were presented on 19-inch monitors (screen 
size: 1280 × 1024 pixels) using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997) in a multiple testing environment. The 
stimuli consisted of four chequerboards (size: 140 × 140 pixels; Figure 5.1), which varied along two 
dimensions: frequency (3 × 3 or 9 × 9) and orientation (0° or 45°). All stimuli were presented on a 
grey background (RGB: 169 169 169). 
Participants were randomly assigned to the go/no-go task condition or to the two-choice task 
condition (between-subjects). All participants started with a training phase, which consisted of twelve 
blocks, followed by a test phase, which consisted of two blocks. Each block consisted of 80 trials and 
each stimulus was presented 20 times per block. Half the participants decided whether the 
chequerboards were high or low frequency in the training phase and decided whether the 
chequerboards were orientated as diamond or square in the test phase. For the other half, the order 
was reversed. Participants received instructions on the screen for the test phase after they finished the 
training phase and were required to press any key to confirm that they understood the new judgment 
task or to alert the experimenter if they had any questions. In the test phase, half of the stimuli were 
congruent (the same response was required in the training and test phases) and half of the stimuli were 
incongruent (e.g. no-go stimulus in the training phase and go stimulus in the test phase in the go/no-
go task; respond left in the training phase and respond right in the test phase in the two-choice task). 
On each trial, a fixation cross (30 × 30 pixels) was presented in the middle of the screen for 
250 ms. The chequerboard appeared in the centre of the screen (replacing the fixation cross). After 
250 ms, the chequerboard was replaced with a blank screen. In the go/no-go task condition, half of the 
participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) when the go stimulus was presented; 
the other half had to press the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) when the go stimulus was 
presented. All participants in this condition had to refrain from pressing any key when the no-go 
stimulus was presented. In the two-choice task condition, participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with 
the left index finger) for one set of chequerboards (e.g high spatial frequency) and the ‘m’ key (with 
the right index finger) for the other set of chequerboards (e.g. low spatial frequency; Figure 5.1). All 
mappings were counterbalanced. The response deadline was 1000 ms post-chequerboard presentation.
Fast responding was encouraged via a (covert) response threshold that was adaptively tracked 
throughout task performance. The response threshold was initially set at 500 ms and was continually 
adjusted using a four-up/one-down tracking procedure: the response threshold decreased by 50 ms 
following four consecutive correct responses executed within the response threshold but increased by 
50 ms for all other responses (regardless of whether they were correct or incorrect). The minimum 
response threshold value was 50 ms and the maximum response threshold value was 950 ms 
(MAXRT - 50 ms). In the go/no-go task, the response threshold tracking procedure was based on 
responding on go trials only. Separate tracking procedures were implemented for the left and right 
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responses in the two-choice task. All response threshold values were reset to 500 ms at the beginning 
of the test phase. After the response deadline elapsed (1000 ms), feedback was presented (‘correct’, 
‘incorrect’, or ‘too slow’ in case the participant did not respond before the response threshold), which 
remained on the screen for 250 ms. The feedback and threshold procedure were designed to 
encourage fast and accurate responding. The next trial started immediately after the feedback. 
There was a break after every block. During the break, feedback on mean RTs (on go trials in 
the go/no-go task condition; on left and right response trials in the two-choice task condition), the 
number of errors (two-choice task condition only), the number of missed responses (on go trials in the 
go/no-go task and on all trials in the two-choice task condition), and the percentage of responses on 
no-go trials (go/no-go task condition only). After 15 s had elapsed, participants had to press a key to 
start the next block.
Analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). All data files and R scripts are deposited in Dropbox (https://www.dropbox.com/sh/
1bj5jb9xfcabu0j/AADw7XgnC4X-Su1JkMe-U_zRa?dl=0). I performed ANOVAs on correct RTs39 on 
go trials and the probability of responding on no-go trials [p(respond|no-go)] in the go/no-go task; and 
on correct RTs and the probability of correct responses on all trials in the two-choice task. Note, 
choice accuracy refers to the probability that participants selected the correct response between two 
alternatives (left key press/right key press); consequently it was not possible to perform an analysis 
with ‘task’ as a between-subjects factor as participants responded using only one response key on go 
trials in the go/no-go task. Similarly, it was not possible to include ‘task’ as a between-subjects factor 
in the p(respond|no-go) analyses because participants responded on all trials in the two-choice task 
(i.e. there were zero no-go trials). Missed responses were rare (2% in Experiment 9; 1% in 
Experiment 10) so were not analysed further. RTs ≤ 1 ms were removed prior to analyses (0.003% of 
all trials) as these indicate that participants held down the response key between trials. Where 
appropriate, I applied the Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity. For pairwise 
comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). For the test phase 
analyses, I also calculated Bayes factors for all main effects and interaction contrasts in the ANOVA 
designs (Rouder, Morey, et al., 2012). Bayes factors compare the likelihood of the data under the null 
hypothesis of no difference between groups against the alternative hypothesis of a difference greater 
than 0. Bayes factors were calculated with the BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior 
(0.707; Morey, Rouder, et al., 2015).
39. Note, correct RTs were analysed regardless of whether the response was executed before or after the go 
response threshold (as adjusted via the tracking procedure), so long as the response was executed before the 
response deadline (1000 ms following chequerboard presentation). 
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Results and Discussion
Training phase. Training phase. All stimuli were consistently associated with only one 
response during the training phase so I did not expect any differences between the congruent and 
incongruent items. Initial analyses (not reported) confirmed that there was no main effect of 
congruency in the training phase (all ps ≥ 0.290) so I did not analyse this further.
Analyses of correct go RTs revealed that the main effect of block was significant (p < 0.001; 
Table 5.1) indicating that mean RTs decreased as a function of task practice. Follow-up analyses 
showed that the main effect of block was reliable in the go/no-go task (p < 0.001; Table 5.1) and in 
the two-choice task (p = 0.017; Table 5.1)40. As expected, responding was reliably slower in the two-
choice task (386 ms) than in the go/no-go task (349 ms; p < 0.001; Table 5.1). The two-way 
interaction between task and block was also reliable (p = 0.009; Table 5.1) reflecting the steeper 
decrease in RTs with practice in the go/no-go task than in the two-choice task (Figure 5.2). 
In addition to the analyses of RTs, I also conducted two additional analyses on choice 
accuracy in the two-choice task and on the probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go 
task. Analyses of the probability of correct responses in the two-choice task revealed a main effect of 
block (p < 0.001; Table 5.1) indicating that choice accuracy increased as a function of practice. 
Analyses of the probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task revealed that the main 
effect of block was not reliable (p = 0.179; Table 5.1). The absence of a learning effect in the 
probability of responding is probably due to a floor effect as values were already low in the first block 
and reached asymptote from block two onwards (Figure 5.4). 
Taken together, the training phase data provides strong evidence for learning in both tasks (as 
expected): as can be seen in Figures 5.2 and 5.3, the pattern of responding in the RT and choice 
accuracy data shows that task performance benefited from practice.
40. Planned comparisons confirmed that responding at the beginning of training (blocks 1-2) were reliably 
slower than responding at the end of training (blocks 11-12) in the two-choice task, t(31) = 1.83, p = 0.038, gav = 
0.24 (one-tailed), and in the go/no-go task, t(31) = 4.35, p < 0.001, gav = 0.67 (one-tailed).
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Figure 5.2. Reaction times of correct responses on go trials in the go/no-go task (left panel) and on all trials in 
the two-choice task (right panel) in Experiment 9. Blocks 1-12 were the training phase; blocks 13-14 were the 
test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Table 5.1. Overview of the Analyses of Variance on the training phase data (blocks 1-12) in Experiment 9 with 
block as a within-subjects factor and task as a between-subjects factor. The separate analyses for the go/no-go 
task and the two-choice task are also presented. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Combined task analysis 
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Block
Task by block
Block
Block
Block
Block
Df1
1
11
11
11
11
11
11
Df2
62
682
682
341
341
341
341
Sum of 
squares 
effect
256275.53
 39128.03
18204.83
39598.56
0.06
17550.56
0.12
Sum of 
squares 
error
1434674.6
349635.1
349635.1
151812.80
1.19
197049.60
0.76
F
11.08
6.94
3.24
8.09
1.45
2.76
4.85
p 
0.001 
< 0.001 
0.009 
< 0.001 
0.180
0.018 
< 0.001 
gen. η2
0.126
0.021
0.010
0.063
0.025
0.014
0.056
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Figure 5.3. The probability of correct responses in the two-choice task in Experiment 9. Blocks 1-12 were the 
training phase; blocks 13-14 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Test phase. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, RTs were slightly longer for the incongruent stimuli 
than for the congruent stimuli in the two-choice task (incongruent: 370 ms, congruent: 365 ms) and in 
the go/no-go task (incongruent: 336 ms, congruent: 329 ms). Analyses of the RTs revealed that the 
main effect of congruency was reliable (p = 0.007; Table 5.2). The main effect of task was reliable (p 
< 0.001; Table 5.2) but the two-way interaction between task and congruency was not reliable (p = 
0.632; Table 5.2). Table 5.3 shows the outcome of the Bayesian analysis. As can be seen, the results 
are largely consistent with the ANOVAs reported (Table 5.2). Table 5.3 shows that dropping task, 
congruency and block had a deleterious effect on the model. All other factors or interactions could be 
dropped (Table 5.3 also shows the separate models for the two-choice and go/no-go tasks). However, 
the separate model for the two-choice task showed that the congruency factor could be dropped 
without impairing the model fit so I remain cautious about interpreting the numerical difference 
observed in the two-choice task as (entirely) due to the retrieval of the acquired stimulus-response 
associations in this task. 
Analyses of choice accuracy in the two-choice task revealed a reliable main effect of 
congruency (p = 0.008; Table 5.2; see also Figure 5.3) reflecting lower accuracy for the incongruent 
stimuli than for the congruent stimuli. The decreased accuracy for the incongruent stimuli than for the 
congruent stimuli is consistent with the Instance theory (Logan, 1988; Logan, 2002): following the 
presentation of the incongruent stimuli, the previously encoded instances are automatically retrieved 
and when these instances win the race against the algorithmic processes, the incorrect response is 
executed. Consistent with the absence of a block effect in the training phase, analyses of the 
p(respond|no-go) data revealed that the main effect of congruency was not reliable (p = 0.694; Table 
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5.2; Figure 5.4) and Bayesian analyses showed that the congruency factor could be dropped without 
impairing the model fit (Table 5.3).
Figure 5.4. The probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task in Experiment 9. Blocks 1-12 
were the training phase; blocks 13-14 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Table 5.2. Overview of the Analyses of Variance on the test phase data (blocks 13-14) in Experiment 9 with 
congruency and block as within-subjects factors and task as a between-subjects factor. The separate analyses for 
the go/no-go task and the two-choice task are also presented. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Congruency
Block
Task by congruency
Task by block
Congruency by block
Task by congruency by 
block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
Sum of 
squares 
effect
79949.22
2409.17
2094.19
72.96
33.56
994.47
638.58
1660.31
798.78
1613.42
0.00
0.00
0.00
821.82
1328.96
19.63
0.04
0.00
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
527580.92
19476.63
31320.01
19476.63
31320.01
14086.41
14086.41
12355.65
8781.62
6436.08
0.18
0.26
0.20
7120.98
22538.39
7650.33
0.15
0.21
0.14
F
9.40
7.67
4.15
0.23
0.07
4.38
2.81
4.17
2.82
7.77
0.01
0.16
0.05
3.58
1.83
0.08
7.92
0.56
0.22
p 
0.003 
0.007 
0.046 
0.632
0.797
0.041
0.099
0.050
0.103
0.009
0.694
0.919
0.820
0.068
0.186
0.780
0.008 
0.458
0.642
gen. η2
0.119
0.004
0.004
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
0.001
0.008
0.004
0.008
0.001
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.002
0.003
< 0.001
0.028
0.003
0.001
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Table 5.3. Bayesian analysis for the test phase data (blocks 13-14) in Experiment 9. Bayes factors < 1 indicate 
that the removal of the factor or interaction had a deleterious effect on the model whereas Bayes factors > 1 
indicate that the factor or interaction could be removed without substantially impairing the model fit. Note that 
‘participant’ was included as a factor for all models, but this factor is not added to the model descriptions in the 
tables to reduce the amount of text. 
Training vs. test phase. In addition to the main analyses, I also performed two extra analyses 
to compare performance between the training phase and the test phase. First, I performed an analysis 
to explore whether the observed RT difference between the incongruent and congruent stimuli in the 
go/no-go task was due to the interference between the acquired stimulus-stop (no-go) associations and 
go processing (rather than the absence of go learning in the training phase). To this end, I compared 
RTs in the go/no-go task in the first two blocks in the training phase (blocks 1-2) with RTs in the two 
blocks of the test phase (blocks 13-14). If the difference in RT between the incongruent and congruent 
stimuli reflects the automatic retrieval of the no-go response associated to the incongruent stimuli 
during training, responding should speed up more in the training phase (blocks 1-2) than in the test 
Omitted Factor(s)
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Congruency
Block
Block by congruency
Block by task:by congruency
Task by congruency
Block by task
Block by congruency
Congruency
Block
Block by congruency
Congruency
Block
Block
Congruency
Block by congruency
Congruency
Block by congruency
Block
Bayes Factor
0.10
0.27
0.39
1.47
1.74
4.58
5.37
0.40
0.41
1.55
3.95
5.03
5.49
1.13
1.98
3.76
0.20
3.59
3.79
Confidence Interval
±12.74%
±12.28%
±11.20%
±12.20%
±11.70%
±11.40%
±11.64%
±4.31%
±4.27%
±4.16%
±3.94%
±3.91%
±3.93%
±5.37%
±5.42%
±5.31%
±3.68%
±3.58%
±3.57%
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phase (blocks 13-14) for the incongruent stimuli than for the congruent stimuli41. Analyses showed 
that the three-way interaction between congruency, phase and block was marginally significant, F(1, 
31) = 3.84, p = 0.059, gen. η2 = 0.007. As this interaction was marginally significant, I conducted 
some follow-up analyses. These follow-up comparisons revealed that the two-way interaction 
between block and phase was reliable for the incongruent stimuli, F(1, 31) = 13.66, p < 0.001, gen. η2 
= 0.077: responding became faster between the first and second blocks in the training phase (Mdiff = 17 
ms) but responding became slower between the first and second blocks of the test phase (Mdiff = -12 
ms). This interaction did not reach significance for the congruent stimuli, F(1, 31) = 3.24, p = 0.081, 
gen. η2 = 0.011, but the numerical difference between the first and second blocks in the training phase 
(Mdiff = 13 ms) was greater than in the first and second blocks in the test phase (Mdiff = 3 ms). This 
suggests that the response slowing induced by the retrieval of trained stimulus-stop (no-go) 
associations in addition to a more general slowing induced by the retrieval of trained associations in a 
novel task context. 
Second, I compared overall RTs at the end of the training phase (blocks 11-12) with RTs in 
the test phase (blocks 13-14) to investigate whether the introduction of the novel judgment task 
induced a general decrement in performance. These analyses revealed that there were no costs 
induced by the introduction of the novel judgment task. If anything, responding was faster in the test 
phase (M = 350 ms, SD = 3 ms) than in the final blocks of the training phase (M = 358 ms, SD = 5 
ms): this difference was marginally significant, F(1, 62) = 3.99, p = 0.050, gen. η2 = 0.006. The two-
way interaction between phase (end of training vs. test phase) and task was not reliable, F(1, 62) = 
0.19, p = 0.667, gen. η2 < 0.001. Furthermore, there was no reliable difference in performance 
between the end of training and the test phase in choice accuracy in the two-choice task, F(1, 31) = 
1.60, p = 0.215, gen. η2 = 0.008, nor in the p(respond|no-go) in the go/no-go task, F(1, 31) = 0.57, p = 
0.457, gen. η2 = 0.005. Table 5.4 shows the outcome of the Bayesian analyses. As can be seen, the 
results are broadly consistent with the ANOVAs reported. Thus, it is possible that the effects of 
reversing the acquired mappings were short-lived and participants rapidly acquired the new mappings. 
Taken together, this suggests that any prior stimulus-category learning during the training phase did 
not substantially impair performance in the test phase when the previous categories were no longer 
relevant. The role of stimulus-category learning is discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (see Mediation via 
a Category Representation, Chapter 7). 
41. Note that this analysis was originally conducted by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a). 
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Table 5.4. Bayesian analyses for the difference between performance at the end of training vs. in the test phase 
in Experiment 9. For details, see Table 5.3. For the separate analyses of the go/no-go task and the two-choice 
task, ‘phase’ was the only factor. Therefore, for these analyses, the Bayes factors of the model including the 
phase factor was computed against the intercept-only model. As can be seen, all Bayes Factors (except for RTs 
in the two-choice only model) are < 1 indicating that the model including the phase factor provided a worse fit 
for the data than the intercept-only model. Note, the Bayes Factor for the RTs in the two-choice only model 
reflects the speeding (not slowing) of responding in the test phase than in the final blocks of training, providing 
further evidence against the idea that the introduction of the novel judgment task in the test phase impaired 
performance.
Experiment 10
In Experiment 9, it was found that performance improved with task practice in both the go/no-go and 
two-choice tasks during the training phase. In the test phase, I found some reliable differences 
between the congruent and incongruent stimuli in go response latencies in the go/no-go task and in 
choice accuracy in the two-choice task. However, these differences were numerically smaller than 
expected based on the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, Experiment 2) findings. Therefore, in 
Experiment 10, three main changes were made to the task procedure. First, the response tracking 
procedure was modified to push participants to respond as quickly as possible. It was important to 
encourage rapid responding, as sluggish responding could reduce the probability that any acquired 
stimulus-response or stimulus-stop associations would influence task performance (for RT percentiles, 
see Figure B.4, Chapter 2). In Experiment 9, I observed that the implementation of the tracking 
procedure resulted in a higher response threshold in the two-choice task (M = 695 ms, SD = 129) than 
in the go/no-go task (M = 435 ms, SD = 66 ms), F(1, 62) = 103.27, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.625. 
Omitted Factor(s)
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Factor
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Phase
Task by phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Bayes Factor
0.05
0.08
4.88
Bayes Factor
0.95
0.27
2.76
0.35
Confidence interval
±5.91%
±5.78%
±6.68%
Confidence interval
±2.41%
±1.94%
±2.59%
±2.07%
CHAPTER 5: BEHAVIOURAL PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION AND NON-INHIBITION TASKS
199
Consequently, participants in the two-choice task condition received fewer ‘too slow’ feedback 
messages (relative to ‘incorrect’ feedback messages) than participants in the go/no-go task condition. 
In Experiment 10, the tracking procedure was adjusted based only on responding on correct trials to 
ensure that the tracking procedure did not take into account response accuracy (only response 
latencies). I expected that this modified tracking procedure would push participants to respond 
quickly more than in Experiment 9. Furthermore, ‘too slow’ feedback messages were only presented 
when the RT exceeded the threshold and did not present feedback on other trials (cf. ‘correct’, 
‘incorrect’, ‘too slow’ feedback messages in Experiment 9). 
Second, an instruction screen with the stimulus-response and stimulus-stop (no-go) mappings 
was presented at the beginning of each block to better match the procedures in the training phase and 
in the test phase (cf. in Experiment 9, participants were instructed only the beginning of each phase). 
This modification ensured that the improvements during the training phase could not be due to 
participants forgetting the task instructions (and therefore learning by feedback). 
Third, the number of blocks in the training (blocks 1-18; cf. blocks 1-12 in Experiment 9) and 
test (blocks 19-21; cf. blocks 12-14 in Experiment 9) phases was increased. The addition of extra 
blocks in the training and test phases provided useful pilot experiment for the experiments reported in 
Chapter 6 where additional training (and test; see Appendix K) phase blocks were needed to increase 
the signal-to-noise ratio in the event-related potential analyses (i.e. I wanted to make sure that the 
effects of training/test were still present when the number of blocks increased).
Method
Participants. Sixty-four students from University of Exeter participated for monetary 
compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 19.59 years, SD = 1.51, 54 females, 60 right-handed). 
None of the participants took part in Experiment 9. Eight participants were removed and replaced; 
three due to technical problems with the stimulus presentation computers, four in the two-choice task 
because the percentage of correct trials was < 60%42 and one in the go/no-go task because 73 (out of 
80 trials) in the final block had RTs of 1 ms. Similar exclusion criteria were applied in Experiment 9 
(see Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, & analyses above) suggesting that this participant held down the 
response key throughout the block.
Stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and analyses. The stimuli, apparatus, procedure and 
analyses were identical to Experiment 9 except for the following: there were eighteen blocks in the 
training phase and three blocks in the test phase. After the response deadline elapsed (1000 ms), I 
presented the words ‘too slow’ in the centre of the screen when participants did not respond before the 
42. Note that it is a common finding that accuracy is lower in the two-choice task than in the go/no-go task (e.g. 
Gomez, Ratcliff, et al., 2007). Therefore, the exclusion criteria was set as < 60% correct trials in the two-choice 
task rather than < 70% correct trials as used in the other go/stop tasks presented in this thesis (see, e.g. Chapters 
3 & 4). 
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response threshold. The feedback message on ‘too slow’ trials remained on the screen for 250 ms; on 
all other trials, a blank screen was presented for 250 ms. The response threshold tracking procedure 
was modified such that the response threshold decreased by 50 ms following four consecutive correct 
responses executed within the threshold but increased by 50 ms for correct responses executed after 
the response threshold (in Experiment 9, the threshold increased by 50 ms for all other responses, 
regardless of whether they were correct/incorrect). To ensure that participants paid attention to the 
new judgment task and to encourage them to prepare in advance, I presented a new instruction screen 
at the beginning of the test phase blocks with the words ‘ATTENTION: NEW RULE!’ at the bottom 
of the screen in red (RGB: 255 0 0). Participants were required to press the ‘s’ key confirm that had 
understood the new rule and to start the next block. At the beginning of all other blocks, I presented a 
rule instruction screen with the word ‘REMINDER!’ at the bottom of the screen to encourage 
participants to attend to the rules. Participants were required to press the ‘n’ key to start the next 
block. 
Results and Discussion
Training phase. Analyses of correct RTs revealed that the main effect of block was 
significant (p < 0.001; Table 5.5) indicating that mean RTs decreased as a function of practice (Figure 
5.5). Follow-up analyses indicated that the main effect of block was reliable in the go/no-go task (p < 
0.001; Table 5.5) and in the two-choice task (p < 0.001; Table 5.5). The two-way interaction between 
task and block was reliable (p = 0.020; Table 5.5) reflecting the increased the speeding of RTs as a 
function of block in the two-choice task than in the go/no-go task (i.e. the reverse of the interaction 
found in Experiment 9; Figure 5.2) suggesting that my modified tracking procedure was effective in 
encouraging fast responding, particularly in the two-choice task43. Furthermore, a post-hoc 
comparison of response latencies in Experiment 10 and in Experiment 9 confirmed that responding 
was reliably faster in Experiment 10 (M = 339 ms, SD = 42 ms) than in Experiment 9 (M = 367 ms, 
SD = 47 ms), F(1, 124) = 14.00, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.10144. Surprisingly, there was no reliable main 
effect of task in the overall RTs (p = 0.547; Table 5.5) so I plotted RT distributions to explore the 
absence of this effect. These distributions showed that responding was faster in the two-choice task 
than in the go/no-go task in the fastest RTs but that this difference reversed for the slowest RTs (as 
reflected by a reliable two-way interaction between task and percentile; see Appendix J).
43. Consistent with these findings, there was also no reliable difference between response threshold values in 
the go/no-go task (M = 395 ms, SD = 45 ms) and in the two-choice task (M = 412 ms, SD = 56 ms), F(1, 62) = 
1.84, p = 0.180, gen. η2 = 0.028.
44. Note that I only examined blocks 1-12 in this comparison to ensure that any between-experiment differences 
were not due to the increased number of training blocks in Experiment 10 compared with Experiment 9. 
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Figure 5.5. Reaction times of correct responses on go trials in the go/no-go task (left panel) and on all trials in the two-choice task (right panel) in Experiment 10. Blocks 
1-18 were the training phase; blocks 19-21 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Analyses of the probability of correct responses in the two-choice task revealed a main effect 
of block (p < 0.001; Table 5.5). However, as can be seen in Figure 5.6, this reflects decreasing choice 
accuracy with task practice. Analyses of the probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go 
task also revealed a similar pattern: the main effect of block was reliable (p < 0.001; Table 5.5) but 
this reflects the increasing p(respond|no-go) with training (Figure 5.7). This suggests that whilst the 
modified tracking procedure and feedback was successful in encouraging fast responding, this was at 
the expense of more error-prone performance. In support of this idea, post-hoc tests revealed that 
choice accuracy in the two-choice task was reliably lower in Experiment 10 (0.79) than in Experiment 
9 (0.84)3, F(1, 62) = 9.47, p = 0.003, gen. η2 = 0.132, and the p(respond|no-go) was reliably greater in 
Experiment 10 (M = 0.15, SD = 0.08) than in Experiment 9 (M = 0.12, SD = 0.05), F(1, 62) = 4.40, p 
= 0.039, gen. η2 = 0.066. Note that the relatively high error rates in these tasks was most likely due to 
the adaptive response threshold tracking procedure (see Method above) that encouraged participants 
to prioritise rapid responding. 
Table 5.5. Overview of the Analyses of Variance on the training phase data (blocks 1-18) in Experiment 10 with 
block as a within-subjects factor and task as a between-subjects factor. The separate analyses for the go/no-go 
task and for the two-choice task are also presented. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Block
Task by block
Block
block
Block
Block
Df1
1
17
17
17
17
17
17
Df2
62
1054
1054
527
527
527
527
Sum of 
squares 
effect
10792.83
240122.17
31222.00
60604.22
0.53
210739.90
0.68
Sum of 
squares 
error
1826833.80
776055.70
776055.70
163305.30
3.53
612750.40
2.98
F
0.37
19.18
2.49
11.50
4.68
10.66
7.04
p 
0.547
< 0.001 
0.020 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
< 0.001 
gen. η2
0.004
0.084
0.012
0.066
0.065
0.107
0.091
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Figure 5.6. The probability of correct responses in the two-choice task in Experiment 10. Blocks 1-18 were the 
training phase; blocks 19-21 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Test phase. Analyses of the RTs revealed no reliable main effect of congruency (p = 0.875; 
Table 5.6; see Figure 5.3). The main effect of task was not reliable (p = 0.876; see Appendix J for RT 
distribution analyses) and the two-way interaction between task and congruency was also not reliable 
(p = 0.295; Table 5.6); Table 5.7 shows the outcome of the Bayesian analysis. As can be seen, the 
results are consistent with the ANOVAs reported (Table 5.6). Table 5.7 shows that all factors or 
interactions could be dropped (Table 5.7 also shows the separate models for the two-choice and go/
no-go tasks). Taken together, I conclude that there was no difference between the incongruent and 
congruent stimuli in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks. 
Analyses of the probability of correct responses in the two-choice task revealed no reliable 
main effects of congruency (p = 0.546; Table 5.6; Figure 5.6). Bayesian analyses confirmed that the 
congruency factor could be dropped from the model (Table 5.7). As can be seen in Figure 5.7, the 
probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task was slightly higher for the incongruent 
stimuli than for the congruent stimuli. Analyses revealed that this difference was reliable (p = 0.026; 
Table 5.6). This suggests that when pushed to respond quickly during training, stopping performance 
is influenced by the retrieval of old stimulus-go associations.
CHAPTER 5: BEHAVIOURAL PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION AND NON-INHIBITION TASKS
204
Table 5.6. Overview of the Analyses of Variance on the test phase data (blocks 19-21) in Experiment 10 with 
congruency and block as within-subjects factors and task as a between-subjects factor. The separate analyses for 
the go/no-go task and the two-choice task are also presented. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Congruency
Block
Task by congruency
Task by block
Congruency by block
Task by congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Congruency
Block
Congruency by block
Df1
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
Df2
62
62
124
62
124
124
124
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
62
31
62
62
Sum of 
squares 
effect
372.51
9.59
1097.40
434.76
1608.95
988.02
1286.74
157.60
25.13
746.25
0.05
0.02
0.01
286.75
2681.22
1528.51
0.01
0.03
0.01
Sum of 
squares 
error
951905.26
24145.97
61588.26
24145.97
61588.26
40487.96
40487.96
12389.39
20866.71
11713.66
0.26
0.53
0.41
11756.57
40721.55
28774.30
0.70
1.81
0.31
F
0.02
0.02
1.10
1.12
1.62
1.51
1.97
0.39
0.04
1.97
5.45
1.42
0.92
0.76
2.04
1.65
0.37
0.53
0.79
p 
0.877
0.876
0.332
0.295
0.204
0.226
0.150
0.535
0.963
0.147
0.026 
0.249
0.404
0.391
0.145
0.207
0.546
0.506
0.457
gen. η2
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
0.001
< 0.001
0.003
0.014
0.008
0.004
< 0.001
0.003
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.001
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Table 5.7. Bayesian analysis for the test phase data in Experiment 10. For details, see Table 5.3.
Omitted Factor(s)
Combined task analysis
Reaction times
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Block by task
Block by task by congruency
Task by congruency
Block by congruency
Congruency
Block
Block by congruency
Congruency
Block
Congruency
Block
Block by congruency
Block
Block by congruency
Congruency
Congruency
Block by congruency
Block
Bayes Factor
2.90
4.29
4.64
6.14
6.96
9.93
10.35
3.54
4.53
15.87
0.42
4.61
5.65
2.12
3.35
5.22
5.18
9.31
9.36
Confidence interval
±22.69%
±29.29%
±24.93%
±20.27%
±17.34%
±18.59%
±17.2%
±6.92%
±7.26%
±6.58%
±5.91%
±5.32%
±5.34%
±7.61%
±7.58%
±7.96%
±6.41%
±5.93%
±5.9%
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Figure 5.7. The probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task in Experiment 10. Blocks 1-18 
were the training phase; blocks 19-21 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.Figure 5.7. 
The probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task in Experiment 10. Blocks 1-18 were the 
training phase; blocks 19-21 were the test phase. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Training vs. test phase. As in Experiment 9, I performed two additional analyses to 
investigate whether there were any overall differences between the training and test phases. First, I 
compared RTs in the go/no-go task for the first three blocks in the training phase (blocks 1-3) with 
RTs in the three blocks in the test phase (blocks 19-21). Contrary to my predictions, this revealed that 
the three-way interaction between congruency, phase, and block was not reliable, F(1, 31) = 0.131, p 
= 0.720, gen. η2 < 0.001. Follow-up comparisons revealed that the two-way interaction between block 
(the first three blocks in the training phase vs. the three blocks in the test phase) and phase (training 
vs. test) was reliable for the incongruent stimuli, F(1, 31) = 6.52, p = 0.015, gen. η2 = 0.037, and for 
the congruent stimuli, F(1, 31) = 6.29, p = 0.018, gen. η2 = 0.047. Consistent with the pattern of 
results in Experiment 9, responding for the incongruent stimuli became faster during the first three 
blocks of the training phase (block 1: 353 ms; block 2: 341 ms; block 3: 338 ms) but responding for 
these items became slower during the test phase blocks (block 19: 316 ms; block 20: 321 ms; block 
21: 320 ms); responding for the congruent stimuli became faster in the first three blocks in the 
training phase (block 1: 354 ms; block 2: 342 ms; block 3: 330 ms) which was greater in magnitude 
that the speed-up across the test phase blocks (block 19: 320 ms; block 20: 315 ms; block 21: 317 
ms). Combined, this analysis provides support for the idea that performance in the test phase was 
influenced partially by the retrieval of old stimulus-stop (no-go) associations.
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Second, I compared performance between the end of the training phase (blocks 16-18) and 
the test phase (blocks 19-21). As in Experiment 9, introducing the new judgment task in the test phase 
did not result in a difference in performance compared with at the end of training in RTs, F(1, 62) = 
1.16, p = 0.284, gen. η2 = 0.001, choice accuracy, F(1, 31) = 1.13, p = 0.295, gen. η2 = 0.005, or in the 
p(respond|no-go), F(1, 31) = 1.06, p = 0.310, gen. η2 = 0.006. The two-way interaction between phase 
and task on RTs was also not reliable, F(1, 62) = 1.85, p = 0.668, gen. η2 < 0.001. Bayesian analyses 
were also broadly consistent with ANOVAs reported (Table 5.8) . Taken together, these findings 
suggest that the stimulus-stop (no-go) and stimulus-response associations were not mediated via 
strong stimulus-category associations in either the go/no-go task or in the two-choice task because 
(strong) mediation via a category representation should result in a decrement in performance between 
the end of training and the test phase (for a discussion of the factors that could influence the extent to 
which the stimulus-stop associations are mediated via a category representation, see Mediation via a 
Category Representation, Chapter 7). 
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Table 5.8. Bayesian analyses for the difference between performance at the end of training vs. in the test phase 
in Experiment 10. For details, see Table 5.4.
Chapter Discussion
Across two experiments presented in this chapter, I show that performance improved with task 
practice; response latencies decreased in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks (Experiments 1-2) and 
choice accuracy increased in the two-choice task (Experiment 9) during the training phase. In the test 
phase, I examined whether memory-retrieval influenced performance via the introduction of a novel 
judgment task. For half of the stimuli the response changed between the training and test phases 
(incongruent stimuli); for the other half, the response stayed the same (congruent stimuli). Across both 
experiments, I found some evidence of differences between the incongruent and congruent stimuli in 
go RTs in the go/no-go task (Experiment 9), in the p(respond|no-go) in the go/no-go task (Experiment 
10), and in choice accuracy in the two-choice task (Experiment 9). However, these differences were 
much smaller than expected. In what follows, I propose two possible non-associative influences on 
performance during the training phase of inhibition and non-inhibition tasks. 
The Role of Non-Associative Processes
The pattern of responding observed during the training phase in Experiments 9-10 is consistent with 
the idea that, as a function of task practice, performance shifted from an entirely algorithmic action 
selection process towards the retrieval of the appropriate response from memory (i.e. Instance theory 
Logan, 1988, 1990). However, as mentioned above, it is notable that the differences between the 
congruent and incongruent items in the test phase were much smaller than expected. This indicates 
that performance was not fully automatised by the end of training (see Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). 
Omitted factor(s)
Combined task analysis 
Reaction times
Factor
Go/no-go task only
Reaction times: go trials
p(respond|no-go): no-go trials
Two-choice task only
Reaction times: all trials
Choice accuracy: all trials
Task
Phase
Task by phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Phase
Bayes Factor
2.26
2.43
5.58
Bayes Factor
0.20
0.34
0.46
0.24
Confidence Interval
±6.56%
±6.49%
±6.42%
Confidence Interval
±2.47%
±2.12%
±3.05%
±2.20%
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In previous stop learning studies, improvements observed during training have been attributed to the 
acquisition of associations between specific stimuli and the correct response (e.g. ‘go’ or ‘no-go’). 
According to this idea, when stimuli are repeated, the acquired associations are retrieved from 
memory, and the repetition priming effects observed in the training phase are the first step towards 
automatisation (see e.g. Logan, 1988, 1990). However, the negligible cost in performance observed 
between the congruent and incongruent items in both the go/no-go and two-choice tasks in 
Experiments 9-10 suggests that the effects of training on behavioural performance in these tasks is 
unlikely to reflect entirely associative (memory-retrieval) processes. 
One (non-associative) explanation is that participants require some time to find an appropriate 
balance between speed and accuracy, particularly when the task instructions emphasise that 
participants should prioritise speed over accuracy (as in Experiment 10) or vice versa. Consistent with 
this suggestion, Chein and Schneider (2012) suggested that there are three hierarchically organised 
learning systems: a metacognitive system (involved in the generation of new routines, task 
sequencing, and monitoring), a cognitive control network (involved in attention control and selection, 
action sequencing, reinforcement, and arousal), and a representational system (involved in associative 
learning). According this framework, when people begin performing a new task there is an initial 
formation stage in which the metacognitive system is involved in establishing the task strategies and 
behavioural routines that are required for the execution of the task. Once these routines are 
established, the person moves into a controlled-execution stage, in which the ‘cognitive control 
network’ is involved in guiding action selection via attentional control, arousal, and reinforcement 
signals. During these earlier learning stages, associative mechanisms within the representation system 
are involved in slowly strengthening the key stimulus-response relationships that underlie task 
execution, gradually allowing cognitive-control resources to disengage as task performance becomes 
practiced and, eventually automatic. Thus, the early stages of learning involve monitoring for 
information consistent with the task goals. It is only after sufficient practice that performance is 
supported entirely by the representational system. For the purposes of the present chapter, the key 
feature of this model is that it highlights that the effects of training on behaviour do not necessarily 
reflect entirely associative processes. Thus, it seems that the effects of task practice in inhibition and 
non-inhibition tasks depends on an interplay of bottom-up learning processes and top-down control 
processes, alongside non-specific practice-effects (e.g. rule learning, monitoring etc.) arising from 
adjustments to response priorities. 
The findings in the present chapter also provide some evidence that practice-effects may be 
sensitive to task demands. In Experiment 10, I modified the go response thresholds and the trial 
feedback to push participants to respond faster than in Experiment 9. Analyses of the training phase 
data suggests task performance was sensitive to these modifications: responding was faster, choice 
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accuracy was lower, and the p(respond|no-go) was higher in Experiment 10 than in Experiment 9. 
Furthermore, the practice-effects on response latencies in the training phase (i.e. shorter RTs at the 
end of the training phase compared with the beginning of the training phase) were larger in 
Experiment 10 than in Experiment 9, although the practice-effects previously observed in choice 
accuracy in the two-choice task were abolished. Analyses of the test phase in Experiment 10 showed 
no reliable differences in go/no-go and two-choice task performance between the incongruent and 
congruent stimuli in the test phase in response latencies or in choice accuracy (cf. Experiment 9 where 
I observed some small but reliable differences) but I did find a small but reliable cost in the 
probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task. These findings were supported by 
Bayesian analyses. The absence of a cost in go performance (despite stronger practice-effects on go 
performance during training) indicates participants engaged top-down control processes to mitigate 
any response delay incurred by the retrieval of an incorrect response (Logan, 1988, 1990). Logan 
argued that there is a race between algorithmic processes and memory-retrieval processes. This could 
explain why the effects of memory-retrieval on task performance appear to be sensitive to response 
priorities; if the task does not push participants enough, algorithmic processing is slower and there is a 
higher probability that the memory-retrieval process will win the race (hence a small congruency 
effect in Experiment 9). By contrast, if the task pushes participants a lot, they may exert more top-
down control to bias action selection in favour of fast algorithmic processing, reducing the probability 
that the memory-retrieval process will win the race45 (see Figure 5.8). Pushing participants might also 
encourage them more to shield attention from distracting features of the stimuli that are not part of the 
specified task set (i.e. those associated with the old trained response; cf. Dreisbach & Haider, 2009).
45. To be clear, I refer here to fast responding as a result of strategic adjustments rather than fast responding as a 
result of impulsive tendencies. 
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Figure 5.8. Visual depiction of the probability of the algorithmic process ‘winning’ the race based on a Logan’s 
(1988, 1990) race model. The probability of the algorithmic process winning the race is represented by the area 
under the curve to the left of the dashed line. As the go RT distribution is shifted to the right, the probability of 
the algorithmic process winning decreases; as the distribution is shifted to the left, the probability of the 
algorithmic process winning increases. Note: for simplicity, I represent the duration of the memory retrieval 
process as constant in this figure, but in reality the duration of the memory retrieval would most likely vary 
depending on the number of instances stored in memory.
A key outstanding issue addressed in this chapter concerned the specificity of learning in 
response inhibition tasks. The comparison of behavioural performance between the go/no-go and two-
choice tasks provides some insight into this issue. Across both tasks, I find strong practice-effects in 
response latencies during training. These findings are consistent with previous research that has 
shown that action selection in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks are strongly related (e.g. Mostofsky 
& Simmonds, 2008). However, the conclusion that learning has similar effects on action selection in 
inhibition and non-inhibition tasks is entirely based on the observation that the learning curves were 
similar in both experiments. It is possible that different learning mechanisms produce similar learning 
effects. Therefore, in Chapter 6, I follow-up on these findings using event-related potentials to index 
the processes modulated by practice in go/no-go and two-choice tasks. I also primarily use a within-
subjects design in Chapter 6 to reduce the possibility that between-task differences could be 
accounted for by indirect consequences of task performance (such as fatigue) and to increase the 
power to detect small to medium-sized differences between-tasks (the present chapter was sufficiently 
powered to detect within-task differences and within-between interactions, but not between-task 
differences). 
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An outstanding issue raised the present chapter is why the observed differences between the 
incongruent and congruent stimuli in the go/no-go task are smaller than in previous work (Verbruggen 
and Logan, 2008a). There are at least three explanations that could account for the small differences 
observed in the present chapter. First, it is possible that the behavioural effects of interference between 
the incongruent and congruent stimuli in the present chapter were simply short-lived and were 
consequently masked by rapid re-learning of the new associations. However, note that a visual 
inspection of the data argues against this suggestion; if anything, the differences between the 
incongruent and congruent stimuli seem larger in the second test phase block than in the first (this 
conclusion is further supported by a reliable two-way interaction between congruency and block in go 
RTs in Experiment 9; see Table 5.1). Second, it is possible that the use of a smaller stimulus set than 
in the Verbruggen and Logan, 2008a) task, may have enabled participants to adjust their response 
settings in preparation for, or rapidly during, the test phase. Third, it is possible that the Verbruggen 
and Logan (2008a) go/no-go task was more difficult. Consistent with this idea, mean reaction times 
on go trials in the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) task were noticeably slower than in my task. Slower 
reaction times could have increased the probability that the memory retrieval process won the race 
(see above for a discussion of this idea). For an extended discussion of these ideas, see Chapter 7. 
Conclusion
Taken together, I conclude that during practice of inhibition and non-inhibition tasks participants can 
acquire various associations between a stimulus and the response-related information contained 
within an ‘instance’ (Logan, 1988, 1990). However, in addition to memory-based effects, these 
findings highlight that non-associative practice-effects also play a role in both inhibition and non-
inhibition tasks. Furthermore, the findings presented in this chapter also suggest that what is learned 
and retrieved in go/no-go and choice tasks depends on task design and response priorities. Thus, these 
findings open the door to further investigations into the specificity of response inhibition training 
(such as the experiments reported in Chapter 6).
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Appendix J 
RT Distributions
To investigate the absence of difference in response latencies between the go/no-go and two-choice 
tasks in Experiment 10, I plotted RT percentiles for the training and test phases. For comparison, I 
also plotted the response latencies for Experiment 9 where I found, as expected, that responding was 
faster in the go/no-go task than in the two-choice task (Tables 6.1 & 6.2). Visual inspection of the 
percentile plots suggests that in Experiment 9 responding was faster in the the go/no-go task than in 
the two-choice task across the whole RT distribution, but the biggest difference in response latencies 
between the go/no-go and two-choice tasks emerged in the slow end of the RT distribution. This 
conclusion is supported by a reliable interaction between task and percentile in the training phase, 
F(8, 496) = 9.77, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.013, and in the test phase, F(8, 496) = 12.33, p < 0.001, gen. 
η2 = 0.015. However, in Experiment 10 responding was faster in the two-choice task than in the go/
no-go task in the fast end of the RT distribution but was faster in the go/no-go task than in the two-
choice task in the slow end of the RT distribution (i.e the direction of the difference between tasks 
reversed across the RT distribution). This conclusion is also supported by a reliable two-way 
interaction between task and percentile in the training phase, F(8, 496) = 7.80, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 
0.016, and in the test phase, F(8, 496) = 7.46, p < 0.001, gen. η2 = 0.015. This suggests that the 
absence of a main effect of task on RTs in Experiment 10 is because the distribution of RTs was 
different between the conditions: in the two-choice task, the distribution was more spread out than in 
the go/no-go task and the RT at the onset of the distribution (10th percentile) was faster in the two-
choice task than in the go/no-go task.
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Figure J.1. The RT distributions for Experiment 9 (left panels) and Experiment 10 (right panels) as a function of 
phase (training phase: upper panels; test phase: lower panels) and task (go/no-go task; two-choice task).
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CHAPTER 6
THE ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY OF PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION 
AND NON-INHIBITION TASKS
In Chapter 5, I found qualitatively similar effects of training on behavioural performance in inhibition 
and non-inhibition tasks. This could indicate that learning to inhibit a response is achieved through the 
same or similar mechanisms as learning to select and execute a motor response. This would provide 
strong support for the idea that response inhibition and response execution depend on similar basic 
processes (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). However, evidence of 
similar behavioural outcomes of training does not necessarily constitute evidence that similar (neural) 
mechanisms were involved. Therefore, in the present chapter, I follow-up on the behavioural findings 
reported in Chapter 5 by comparing the effects of training in go/no-go and two-choice tasks on two 
event-related potential components thought to index processes involved in action selection (the N2 
and the P3 components). 
Event-related potentials (ERPs) provide an online measure of brain activity with up to 
millisecond precision46. Performance of response inhibition tasks is associated with two ERP 
components: the N2, a negative component peaking approximately 200-300 ms following stimulus 
presentation, and the P3, a positive component peaking approximately 300-500 ms following stimulus 
presentation (e.g. Eimer, 1993; Falkenstein, Koshlykova, Kiroj, Hoorman, & Hohnsbein, 1995; 
Falkenstein, Hoorman, & Hohnsbein, 1999; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Kiefer, Marzinzik, Weisbrod, 
Scherg, & Spitzer, 1998; Pfefferbaum, Ford, Weller, & Kopell,1985). The established finding is that 
the N2 and P3 components are larger (i.e. more negative and more positive, respectively) on stop (or 
no-go) trials than on go trials (e.g. Bekker, Kenemans, Hoeksma, Talsma, & Verbaten, 2005; Bruin & 
Wijers, 2001; Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2008).
Whilst some studies have attributed the N2 and P3 components solely to processes associated 
with response inhibition (e.g. Bruin & Wijers, 2001; Kok, Ramautar, De Ruiter, Band, & 
Ridderinkhof, 2004; Lavric, Pizzagalli, & Forstmeier, 2004; Jodo & Kayama, 1992), other studies 
have suggested that these components index more general processes that are also involved in 
performance of non-inhibition tasks. For example, the N2 component has been linked to processes 
involved in the resolution of conflict between response options and the P3 component has been linked 
to evaluative and attentional processes involved in memory-updating processes (Gajewski & 
46. ERP amplitudes are thought to reflect the level of engagement in cognitive processes whereas peak latencies 
reflect the timing of cognitive processes (e.g. Luck, 2005). 
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Falkenstein, 2012; Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2012) and, more generally, the neural response to 
the outcome of internal decision-making processes (Nieuwenhuis, Aston-Jones, & Cohen, 2005). In 
support of conflict interpretation of the N2 component, it has been shown that the N2 is more negative 
on relatively infrequent trials regardless of whether going or stopping is required (Enriquez-Geppert, 
Konrad, Pantev, & Huster, 2010; Wessel, Danielmeier, Morton, & Ullsperger, 2012) and more 
negative when the similarity between the go and no-go stimuli is high (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & 
Cohen, 2004; Smith & Douglas, 2011)47. In support of task-general interpretations of the P3 
component, research suggests that the P3 component consists of at least two subcomponents with 
different scalp distributions and corresponding underlying processes; a frontally-maximal ‘P3a’ and a 
parietally-maximal ‘P3b’ (e.g. Berti, 2008; Donchin, 1981; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1997; 
Friedman, Cycowicz, & Gaeta, 2001; Polich, 2007; Verleger, Jaskowski, & Wascher, 2005). The P3a 
and P3b components are thought to occur during memory updating (Polich & Kok, 1995) with the 
P3a reflecting an attentional process involved in the selection of relevant information from memory 
and the P3b reflecting context-updating processes and/or processes that mediates the link between 
perception and motor response selection (e.g. Donchin, 1981; Friedman, Cycowicz, et al., 2001; 
Polich, 2007; Verleger, Jaskowski, et al., 2005). Note that the aforementioned ‘no-go P3’effect (i.e. 
larger P3 amplitudes for no-go stimuli than for go stimuli) corresponds to the P3a in this model, 
whereas more parietal P3 components (such as the P3b) can display the opposite effect (i.e. more 
positive amplitudes for go stimuli than for no-go; Pfefferbaum, Ford, et al., 1985).
To date, a small number of studies have utilised ERPs to index the neural signatures of 
training in the go/no-go task. Note that whilst some studies have reported effects of training on early 
sensory and attentional components in the go/no-go task (Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013; see also 
Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010) these effects are most likely to reflex associative processes influencing 
the detection of the no-go stimulus rather than direct activation of an inhibition or no-go network (i.e. 
as suggested by the automatic inhibition hypothesis; Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; see also Stimulus 
Detection, Chapter 7). Therefore, as I am interested in the effects of training on action selection 
processes, I focus on the N2 and P3 components in this chapter. 
Although research in the stop learning literature generally converges on the finding that the 
N2 and P3 components peak earlier at the end of training than at the beginning of training, the effects 
of training on the amplitudes of these component are less clear. As can be seen in Table 6.1, Benikos 
and colleagues showed that N2 amplitudes became less negative after go/no-go training (Benikos, 
Johnstone, et al., 2013; Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis), and they proposed that this could reflect a 
reduction in the level of response conflict triggered by the go and no-go stimuli with training 
47. Thus, according to the conflict interpretation, the larger (more negative) N2 amplitudes typically observed 
for no-go stimuli could reflect a bias towards go responding in response inhibition tasks, such that no-go or 
stop-signal trials require the reconfiguration of responses and/or the reconfiguration of attentional settings from 
the default ‘go’ setting(s) (see Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2013).
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(Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013). However, in another experiment, Schapkin and colleagues found 
that amplitudes in the N2 range became more negative with training for the no-go stimuli but not for 
the go stimuli (Schapkin, Falkenstein, Marks, & Griefahn, 2007). Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. 
attributed this difference to an ‘improvement in the cognitive inhibition process in terms of a more 
coherent activation of the related brain units’ (Schapkin, Johnstone, et al., 2007, p. 1286). A similar 
picture emerges for the P3 amplitudes; whilst some research reported that P3 amplitudes became more 
positive after training (Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013; Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis), other 
research reported no reliable change (Jodo & Inoue, 1990).
 Inconsistencies between these studies are most likely due, at least in part, to (1) the varying 
number of training trials and sessions; (2) variations in go response deadlines (see Benikos, 
Johnstone, et al., 2013); and (3) low statistical power, with the majority of previous studies testing 
eleven or fewer participants (i.e. Jodo & Inoue, 1990; Schapkin, Falkenstein, et al., 2007).
 Thus, although the N2 and P3 components appear to be sensitive to the effects of go/no-go 
training, it remains an outstanding issue exactly how go/no-go training modulates the specific 
processes underlying task performance. Furthermore, it is unclear the extent to which the reported 
effects on the N2 and P3 components are specific to training in inhibitory control tasks or whether 
they reflect more general training effects also found in non-inhibition tasks.
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Table 6.1. Overview of go/no-go training studies with behavioural and N2 and/or P3 outcome measures. Note: vGNG: visual go/no-go task; ↓ amplitudes = more negative, ↑ 
amplitudes = more positive; ↓ latencies = earlier, ↑ latencies = later; NS = not studied. For an extended overview of previous inhibitory training studies and outcomes, see 
Spierer, Chavan, et al., 2013). * The direction of this result depended on task difficulty (as manipulated by the go reaction time deadline). ** Note that these effects were 
observed after three days of a three week training protocol (total trials = 6000); however, there were no further reliable differences after three days. 
Study
Benikos (unpublished 
PhD thesis, Study 3)
Benikos (unpublished 
PhD thesis, Study 4)
Benikos, Johnstone, et al. 
(2013)
Jodo & Inoue (1990)
Schapkin, Johnstone, et 
al. (2007)
Task
vGNG
vGNG
vGNG
vGNG
vGNG
# Training Trials
800
(30% no-go condition; 
15% no-go condition; 
70% no-go condition)
800
(70% no-go)
800 
(30% no-go)
1200
(50% no-go)
~ 600 out of 6000
(50 % no-go)
# Sessions
1
1
1
6 
(1 per day)
6 
(2 x per day for 3 
days)
# Participants
54
(18 per condition)
18
(go/no-go between-
subjects condition)
60 
(20 per low/medium/
high difficulty 
condition)
10
8
Behavioural 
outcomes
↓ Go RT
no change: 
p(respond|no-go)
↓ Go RT
↓ Go RT
↓ or ↑ p(respond|
no-go)*
↓ Go RT
p(respond|no-go): 
NS
↓ Go RT
↓ p(respond|no-go)
ERP amplitudes
↓ N1 (in Fz)
↑ P2 (in Pz)
↓ N2 (in Fz)
↑ P3 (in Pz)
↓ N1 (in Fz)
↑ P2 (in Pz)
↓ N2 (in Fz)
↑ P3 (in Pz)
↓ N1 (in Fz)
↑ P2 (in Pz)
↓ N2 (in Fz)
↑ P3 (in Pz)
no change: P3 (in Fz, 
Cz & Pz)
↑ N2 (in Fz) ** 
ERP latencies
↓ N1 (in Fz)
↓ P2 (in Pz)
↓ N2 (in Fz)
↓ P2 (in Pz)
↑ N2 (in Fz)
↓ N1 (in Fz)
↓ P2 (in Pz)
↓ N2 (in Fz)
↓ P3 (in Pz)
↓ P3 (in Fz, Cz & 
Pz)
NS
Specificity 
Go & no-go
Go & no-go
N2 amplitude: 
go only
No-go only
No-go only
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The Present Chapter
In the present chapter I used ERPs to extend the behavioural findings reported in Chapter 5 and to 
examine how the neural signatures of action selection are modulated by training in the go/no-go and 
two-choice tasks. Although some research has compared the effects of go/no-go and two-choice task 
performance on the N2 and P3 components, no research to date compared the effects of training48. 
Evidence for similar training effects on the N2 and P3 components in these tasks would not only have 
important implications for our understanding of the brain mechanisms linked to inhibitory control 
training, but would also contribute to the wider on-going debate in the ERP literature concerning 
whether the N2 and P3 components index inhibition-related processes or more task-general processes. 
For the action control literature, evidence of similar effects of training on the N2 and/or P3 components 
in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks would add weight to the claim that response execution and 
response inhibition share similar overlapping processes (see Bunge, 2004; Duncan & Owen, 2000; 
Buch, Mars, Boorman, & Rushworth, 2010; Mostofsky & Simmons, 2008; Verbruggen, McLaren, et 
al., 2014). For the ERP literature, evidence of similar effects of training on the N2 and/or P3 
components in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks would add weight to claims that these components 
index task-general processes rather than those exclusively linked to response inhibition.
As previous studies have found inconsistent effects of training on the N2 and P3 components 
(see above), I first conducted an exploratory pilot ERP study using a between-subjects task similar to 
the tasks used in Experiment 9-10 (Chapter 5). There was a training (acquisition) phase in which the 
stimulus category defined how the participant should respond, followed by a test phase in which the 
acquired associations were reversed. Consistent with my predictions, the behavioural task performance 
data confirmed that reaction times decreased during the training phase for the go and two-choice 
stimuli. Analyses of the ERPs showed that mean amplitudes in the N2 range (200-300 ms post-
stimulus49) were (numerically) less negative at the end of training than at the beginning of training for 
the go, no-go and two-choice stimuli. For the two-choice stimuli, mean amplitudes in the P3a range 
(310-410 ms post-stimulus) and in the P3b range (300-400 ms post-stimulus) were more positive at the 
end of training than at the beginning of training for the two-choice task. However, for the go (and no-
go) stimuli there were no reliable differences between the beginning and the end of training. Whilst this 
could indicate that there are some differences between the effects of training between the go/no-go and 
two-choice tasks, it is also possible that these differences reflect indirect consequences of task 
performance (such as fatigue; see Kato, Endo & Kizuka, 2009). Furthermore, the power in this pilot 
experiment was too low to allow for firm conclusions about the absence of a reliable effect in the go/
no-go task. Nevertheless, these findings confirm prior findings that training influences N2 and P3 
48. For example, Smith and colleagues found that the N2 amplitude was more negative for any unexpected 
stimulus, regardless of whether it required response execution on go and two-choice trials or response inhibition 
on no-go trials (Smith, Smith, et al., 2009).
49. Details regarding how these time-windows were selected are reported in EEG data acquisition below.
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amplitudes, even if the specificity of this effect requires further investigation. In addition, the direction 
of the observed amplitude N2 differences are also consistent with some prior research discussed above 
(see Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013; Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis; Table 6.1). 
To advance on the pilot experiment, in Experiments 11-12 (presented in the main body of this 
chapter) I used a within-subjects design in which participants alternated between performance of the 
go/no-go and two-choice tasks on a block-by-block basis. This eliminated any indirect consequences of 
task performance and increased the power to detect small to medium-sized differences between-tasks, 
however the within-subjects nature of the design meant that it was not possible to include a test 
(reversal) phase. Note that in the pilot study, I found there was a small but reliable performance cost in 
the test phase (relative to the end of training) and amplitudes in the P3a range (for the two-choice 
stimuli only) and in the P3b range were less positive in the test phase than at the end of training. 
However, I did not find any statistically reliable evidence that this reversal influenced the ERP 
amplitudes in the go/no-go task or that this reversal influence ERP peak latencies. Furthermore, the 
work presented in Chapter 5 also indicated that the reversal effects in the test phase were small. Thus, I 
focussed only on the effects of training in Experiments 11-12.
Experiment 11
In Experiment 11, participants alternated between performance of the go/no-go and two-choice tasks 
on a block-by-block basis. There were two stimuli per task with a 1:1 stimulus-to-response mapping 
(e.g. diamond = go; square= no-go; blue circle = left keypress; yellow circle = right keypress). 
Different stimulus sets were used in each task to avoid between-task interference (e.g. chequerboards = 
go/no-go task; coloured circles = two-choice task, or vice versa). Performance at the beginning of 
training (the first three blocks of each task) was compared with performance at the end of training (the 
final three blocks of each task). Training-effects were indexed via three behavioural indices of 
performance: reaction times, the probability of responding on no-go trials (in the go/no-go task) and 
choice accuracy (in the two-choice task). Alongside the behavioural indices, mean amplitudes and peak 
latencies were also measured in time-windows and electrodes corresponding to the N2, P3a, and P3b 
components.
To examine the effects of task practice on motor-related processes, I also computed response-
locked readiness potentials for the go and two-choice stimuli. The readiness potential is thought to be 
generated in the primary motor cortex and supplementary motor areas, with activity larger in the 
hemisphere that is contralateral to the response hand (for an overview, see e.g. Eimer, 1998). For the 
experiments reported in this chapter, the response-locked components were particularly important for 
the interpretation of the stimulus-locked ERP training differences in the P3a and P3b ranges as 
differences in these components could reflect temporally overlapping differences in motor-related 
processes rather than the processes linked to the P3a and/or P3b components. 
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Method
Participants. Thirty-two right-handed volunteers from the University of Exeter participated 
for monetary compensation (£10) or partial course credit (M = 20.03 years, SD = 4.05, 27 females). 
Eleven participants were removed and replaced due to low trial numbers in the ERP averages (see the 
ERP analyses section for the exclusion criteria; for similar exclusion criteria see Elchlepp, Lavric, et 
al., 2016). All experiments of the present chapter were approved by the local research ethics committee 
at the School of Psychology, University of Exeter. Written informed consent was obtained after the 
nature and possible consequences of the study were explained. The target sample size and exclusion 
criteria were decided in advance of data collection to ensure that I had enough power (0.80) to detect 
medium-sized effects. 
Apparatus, stimuli, and procedure. The experiment was run on a 21-inch iMac (screen size: 
1920 × 1080 pixels) using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997). The stimuli consisted of two chequerboards, 
which varied along the orientation dimension (0° or 45°) and two circles, which varied along the colour 
dimension (yellow [RGB: 255 204 102] or blue [RGB: 102 102 255]). All stimuli were 140 x 140 
pixels and were presented on a grey background (RGB: 169 169 169). Participants alternated between 
the go/no-go task and the two-choice task on a block-by-block basis. The order of the first task block 
was counterbalanced across participants (e.g. participant 1: GN-TC-GN-TC…; participant 2: TC-GN-
TC-GN…). In total there were 18 blocks; 9 blocks of the go/no-go task and 9 blocks of the two-choice 
task. Each block consisted of 80 trials and each stimulus within the relevant stimulus set (e.g. 
chequerboards or circles; Figure 6.1) was presented 40 times per block. Half of the participants decided 
whether the chequerboards were orientated as diamond or square in the go/no-go task and whether the 
circles were coloured blue or yellow in the two-choice task. For the other half of participants, the 
judgments were reversed. Participants received instructions on the screen at the beginning of each 
block to remind them of the stimulus-response and/or stimulus-stop (no-go) mappings in the upcoming 
block. If the average RT of correct responses in the previous block (of the relevant task) was greater 
than the running average RT of all preceding blocks (of the relevant task) participants received a 
warning message presented in red (RGB: 255 0 0) at the bottom of the instruction screen (‘Please try to 
respond faster in this block!’). Similarly if the average number of correct responses (in the two-choice 
task) was less than the running average of all the preceding blocks or if the number of responses on no-
go trials (in the go/no-go task) was greater than the running average of all the preceding blocks of the 
go/no-go task, participants also received a warning message presented in red (RGB: 255 0 0) at the 
bottom of the instruction screen (‘Please try to be more accurate in this block!’). Participants were 
required to press any key to start the next block. 
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Figure 6.1. Stimulus sets used in (a) Experiment 11 and (b) Experiment 12. 
On each trial, a fixation cross (30 × 30 pixels) was presented in the middle of the screen for 
500 ms. The stimulus (a chequerboard or a circle) appeared in the centre of the screen (replacing the 
fixation cross). After 250 ms, the stimulus was replaced with a blank screen. In the go/no-go task, half 
of the participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) when the go stimulus was 
presented; the other half had to press the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) when the go stimulus 
was presented. Participants had to refrain from pressing any key when the no-go stimulus was 
presented. In the two-choice task, participants had to press the ‘c’ key (with their left index finger) for 
one stimulus (e.g. blue circle) and the ‘m’ key (with their right index finger) for the other (e.g. yellow 
circle; Figure 6.1). All stimulus-response mappings were counterbalanced. After 1000 ms, the response 
deadline elapsed and a blank screen was presented for 250 ms. 
There was a break after every block. During the break, feedback on mean correct RTs (on go 
trials in the go/no-go task; or on left keypress trials and right keypress trials in the two-choice task), the 
number of choice errors (two-choice task only), the number of missed responses (on go trials in the go/
no-go task and on all trials in the two-choice task), and the percentage of responses on no-go trials (go/
no-go task only) was presented on the screen. After 15 s elapsed, participants had to press any key to 
start the next block.
EEG data acquisition. The electroencephalogram (EEG) was acquired using 64 Ag/AgCl 
active electrodes (ActiCap, Brain Products, Munich, Germany) connected to BrainAmp amplifiers 
(Brain Products, Munich, Germany). The EEG was sampled continuously at 500 Hz with a bandpass of 
0.016-100 Hz, the reference was at CZ and the ground was at AFz. There were 62 electrodes on the 
CHAPTER 6: ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY OF PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION AND NON-INHIBITION TASKS
223
scalp and one on each earlobe (for the configuration, see Figure 6.2). Electrode impedances were kept 
below 10 kΩ. 
Figure 6.2. Electrode arrangement. The amplitudes and latencies of the highlighted electrodes were subjected to 
statistical analyses (Fz: stimulus-locked N2 and P3a components; Pz: stimulus-locked P3b component; C3 & C4: 
response-locked readiness potentials). 
Analyses. All raw and processed behavioural and EEG data are deposited in Dropbox (https://
www.dropbox.com/sh/emswlmmu941080s/AADj-qKRDQ2oSCffOeO7zVkda?dl=0). Prior to all 
analyses I subsetted the data; for participants who responded with a left keypress on go trials in the go/
no-go task, I analysed only left keypress responses in the two-choice task; for participants who 
responded with a right keypress response on go trials, I analysed only right keypress responses in the 
two-choice task. Thus, I could ensure equal trial numbers across each stimulus type (go, no-go, two-
choice). This was especially important for the ERP analyses (see ERP analyses). For planned and 
follow-up comparisons, Hedge’s gav is the reported effect size measure (Lakens, 2013). Where 
appropriate, I applied the Huyhn-Feldt correction for violations of sphericity (unadjusted degrees of 
freedom are reported). For all planned comparisons, Bayes factors were calculated with the 
BayesFactor package in R, using the default prior of 0.707 (Morey, Rouder, et al., 2015). A Bayes 
factor of greater than 3 is often taken as substantial evidence for the alternative hypothesis, whereas a 
Bayes factor of less than 0.33 is taken as substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (Dienes, 2011).
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Behavioural analyses. All data processing and analyses were completed using R (R 
Development Core Team, 2014). I performed analyses of variance on correct RTs on go trials and the 
probability of responding on no-go trials [p(respond|no-go)] in the go/no-go task; and on correct RTs 
and the probability of correct responses [p(correct)] in the two-choice task. The probability of missed 
responses were very low (≤ 0.01) so were not analysed further. Reaction times were analysed as a 
function of ‘part’ (there were 3 blocks per part: ‘beginning’ = first three training blocks of each task; 
‘end’ = final three training blocks of each task) and stimulus (go, two-choice). Note, p(correct) refers 
here to the probability that participants executed the correct response from two alternatives (i.e. left 
keypress vs. right keypress), consequently I could not include the ‘stimulus’ factor here. Similarly, I 
could not include the ‘stimulus’ factor in the p(respond|no-go) analyses because, by their very nature, 
participants responded on all go trials. 
ERP analyses. The EEG was filtered off-line with a 20 Hz low-pass (24 dB/oct) and a 0.1 Hz 
high pass (12 dB/oct) filter. The raw EEG data was visually inspected for non eye-movement artifacts: 
muscle activity, drifts, and large amplitudes in the alpha frequency band. To correct eye blink artifacts, 
I ran an Independent Component Analysis on the whole data (Infomax ICA, Bell & Sejnovski, 1995), 
implemented in Vision Analyzer (BrainProducts, Munich, Germany). Sixty-three ICA components 
were obtained from every participant’s EEG (the same as the number of electrodes submitted to the 
ICA). An average of 5 components with characteristic eye-blink and eye-movement topographies and 
time-courses were excluded. Following this ICA-based artifact subtraction, the EEG was re-referenced 
to the linked ears. For the stimulus-locked ERPs, segments were cut from -100 ms preceding stimulus 
presentation to 600 ms following stimulus presentation, time-locked to the presentation of the stimulus 
and baseline corrected50 relative to the average amplitude of the 100 ms preceding the stimulus 
presentation. For the response-locked ERPs, segments were cut from -1000 ms preceding the response 
to 200 ms following the response, and the first 100 ms of that segment (from -1000 ms to -900 ms) was 
used as a baseline. 
Consistent with the behavioural analyses, I excluded from all ERP analyses segments 
associated with errors and all segments in blocks 7 to 12 as these were not in the ‘beginning’ or in the 
‘end’ parts. The resulting segments were visually inspected for residual ocular, muscle, movement, and 
other artifacts. Segments containing such artifacts were removed. The remaining EEG segments were 
averaged for every participant as a function of part (beginning, end)51 and stimulus (go, no-go, two-
50. Baseline correction is the subtraction of the mean amplitude of the baseline interval from each time-sample 
following the baseline. The baseline intervals used in the present study are consistent with previous research (see, 
e.g. Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 2016). 
51. The data was analysed as ‘beginning’ and ‘end’ parts to ensure that there were sufficient trial numbers for the 
ERP analyses. Note that I did not analyse the middle three blocks of each task as the data in this middle interval 
was expected to fall somewhere between the beginning and end phases. The beginning/end approach is consistent 
with previous ERP studies that have investigated the effects of go/no-go training (e.g. Manuel, Grivel, et al., 
2010).
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choice). The segments were not separated until after the artifact rejection to ensure that the 
experimenter was blind to the segment condition during the artifact rejection process. As can be seen in 
Table 6.2, all stimulus-locked averages in Experiment 11 contained ≥ 88 segments meaning that there 
were sufficient trials to examine the N2 and P3 components (for guidelines, see Rietdijk, Franken & 
Thurik, 2014)52. All descriptive and inferential statistics were computed using R (R Development Core 
Team, 2014). Analyses were restricted to the sites Fz (N2 and frontal P3a) and Pz (parietal P3b), 
although the amplitudes at the other electrodes are represented in the topographic maps represented in 
Figure 6.4. The selection of these electrodes for the N2, P3a, and P3b components was on the basis of 
previous research (see, e.g. Smith, Smith, et al., 2009). 
Table 6.2. Overview of the average number of artifact-free ERP segments contributing to the stimulus-locked and 
response-locked waveform grand averages as a function of experiment (Experiment 11, Experiment 12), stimulus 
(go, no-go, two-choice) and part (beginning, end). M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Some studies in the go/no-go literature have used the peak minima or peak maxima to measure 
the amplitudes of the N2 and P3 components, respectively (e.g. Bokura, Yamaguchi, Kobayashi, 2001; 
Falkenstein, Hoorman, et al., 1999; Niewenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2003; Smith, Johnstone, & Barry, 2008) 
whereas others have used the mean amplitude in specified N2 and P3 time-windows (e.g. Bruin, 
Wijers, van Staveren, 2001; Eimer, 1993). I adopt the latter approach as peak amplitude measures have 
the following shortcomings (for an extended discussion of these ideas see Luck, 2005): (1) one must 
use relatively large time windows in order to capture the peak minima/maxima. Consequently, when 
the minimum or maximum voltage is measured, the rising or falling edge of an overlapping component 
could be measured rather than the desired component; (2) peak amplitude uses a single time point to 
Experiment 11
Experiment 12
Go
No-go
Two-choice
Go
No-go
Two-choice
Stimulus-locked
Beginning
M
101
97
96
97
86
85
SD
12
11
11
21
23
20
End
M
94
89
88
96
87
84
SD
14
12
15
22
22
21
Response-locked
Beginning
M
102
-
95
98
-
83
SD
12
-
15
20
-
21
End
M
95
-
85
100
-
83
SD
14
-
16
20
-
21
52. To avoid excessive fatigue in my participants, I aimed to keep the duration of the experiment at around 1 hr, 
excluding the EEG preparation procedures. Furthermore, I did not provide any instructions about restricting eye 
movements or eye-blinks as research has demonstrated that spontaneous eye blinking is related to inhibitory 
control function (e.g. Colzato, van den Wildenberg, van Wouwe, Pannebakker, & Hommel, 2009). This meant 
that I had 120 trials per cell in Experiment 11 and 126 trials per cell in Experiment 12 prior to EEG 
preprocessing. I had previously established that each participants’ ERP average should contain at least 25 trials 
(for a similar criterion, see Elchlepp, Lavric, et al., 2016). After applying the exclusion criteria, there were 11 
participants in Experiment 11 and 8 participants in Experiment 12 that had less than 25 segments remaining and 
were therefore removed and replaced.
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measure a component that lasts several hundred milliseconds making it sensitive to noise; (3) peak 
amplitude will be artificially increased when the noise level is higher (for example, when there are 
fewer trials contributing to the average); and (4) peak amplitude is a non-linear measure meaning that 
the peak amplitudes may not correspond to the grand average waveforms. In contrast, the mean 
average amplitude has several (relative) advantages: (1) a narrower time window can be used; (2) mean 
amplitude is less sensitive to high-frequency noise as a range of time points are used; (3) mean 
amplitude measures do not become biased when noise levels increase (consequently, one can compare 
mean average amplitudes from waveforms with differing numbers of trials and/or differing lengths of 
time window); (4) one can measure amplitudes in the N2 and P3 ranges, even when there is no clear 
peak in the participant’s data; and (5) mean amplitude is a linear measure meaning that the analysed 
amplitude is represented in the grand average waveform. However, note that analyses of the peak 
amplitudes (not presented) revealed a broadly similar pattern of results. 
Peak latencies were first computed within the following time-windows: 180-350 ms (N2), 
300-500 ms (P3a), and 250-450 ms (P3b). These values were based on visual inspection of the data and 
are broadly consistent with the time ranges identified in the ERP literature (for an overview, see e.g. 
Rietdijk, Franken, et al., 2014). Although several of the aforementioned shortcomings of peak 
amplitude measures also apply to peak latencies, there are few good alternatives for latency analyses. 
However, I did take some steps to mitigate these shortcomings. First, by subsetting the two-choice 
trials I ensured that the trial numbers were similar across the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli (for 
ERP segment numbers, see Table 6.2). Thus, I could be sure that noise in the peaks for these stimuli 
were similar and could therefore draw comparisons accordingly. Second, as participant’s waveforms 
are typically too noisy to identify each peak I used the ‘jackknifing’ technique (Miller, Patterson, & 
Ulrich, 1998). Thus, I computed the grand average of all but one of the participants’ waveforms, 
omitting each participant’s data in turn. Next, I selected the greatest positive or negative amplitudes 
within the three manually specified time-windows. Peak detections were performed separately for each 
sub-average, stimulus, and part. Mean amplitude time-windows were defined on the basis of the peak 
latencies values and visual inspection of the grand average waveforms53. The mean average amplitude 
and peak latencies were computed within the following time windows: 180-280 ms (N2), 300-400 ms 
(P3a), and 270-370 ms (P3b). 
For each mean average amplitude and peak latency, I computed an ANOVA to compare the go 
and no-go stimuli in the go/no-go task with part (beginning; end) and stimulus (go; no-go) as within-
subjects factors; and an ANOVA to compare the go and two-choice stimuli with part and stimulus (go; 
53. The peak latencies were first obtained and this peak latency value was rounded to the nearest 10 ms. The 
mean amplitude windows were defined by subtracting 50 ms from this value and adding 50 ms to this value to 
produce a 100 ms window that captured the peak. 100 ms windows for these components are common; however, 
to ensure that these windows corresponded to and sufficiently captured the component of interest each 
participants raw data was visually inspected within these windows. However, no further amendments were made 
on the basis of this final inspection stage.
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two-choice) as within-subject factors. The former analysis examines the effects of task practice on 
processes relating to response execution and response inhibition, whilst the latter analysis compares the 
effects of task practice on response execution in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks. Before testing for 
significance, the F values for the jack-knifed peak latencies were adjusted according to Fc = F/(n - 1)2 
and follow-up T values were adjusted according to tc = t(n-1), where n is the number of observations 
per cell (for a proof of these adjustments, see Ulrich & Miller, 2001). I followed up on any null 
findings between the beginning and end of training using Bayesian analyses. Note, however, that it was 
not possible to compute Bayes factors for the peak latencies because no Bayesian equivalent has been 
developed yet for the jack-knifing procedure. 
Finally, response-locked waveforms were analysed for the go and two-choice stimuli. These 
analyses were particularly useful for the interpretation of stimulus-locked effects: any differences in the 
amplitudes of the P3a or P3b sub-components between the beginning and the end of training for the go 
and two-choice stimuli could otherwise be attributed to temporally overlapping differences in motor-
related activity between these stimuli. To isolate response-related activity from non-lateralised ERP 
defections arising from components occurring at approximately the same time as response preparation 
and/or execution (e.g. the P3a and P3b), I used the averaging procedure outlined by Coles (1989). I 
subtracted the amplitude in an electrode positioned over the motor cortex ipsilateral to the response 
hand (C4 for right-hand responses and C3 for left-hand responses; see Figure 6.2) from the amplitude 
in an electrode contralateral to the response hand (C3 for right-hand responses and C4 for left-hand 
responses). I averaged these difference waveforms for the left-hand and right-hand responses. As I 
subsetted the two-choice data (see Analyses above), these averages were computed between-subjects 
for both the go and two-choice stimuli. This two-step procedure should remove all sensory, cognitive, 
and non-lateralised motor potentials as the corresponding stimuli were not lateralised in the 
experiments presented in this chapter. The mean amplitude in the 200 ms preceding response execution 
was submitted to an ANOVA with stimulus (go, two-choice) and part (beginning, end) as within-
subjects factors. 
Results
Behavioural Results
As expected, analyses of the RTs revealed that responding was reliably slower in the two-choice task 
(359 ms) than in the go/no-go task (329 ms; p = 0.006; Tables 6.3 & 6.4). However, there was no 
reliable difference between RTs at the beginning and the end of training (p = 0.526; Table 6.4). The 
two-way interaction between task and part was also not reliable (p = 0.317; Table 6.5), and Bayesian 
analyses supported the null hypothesis of no difference between the beginning and the end of training 
(BF = 0.24). 
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Table 6.3. Overview of the behavioural data in Experiment 11 and Experiment 12. Average reaction times (RT) 
for go and two-choice stimuli, the probability of an accurate response to the two-choice task [p(correct)] and the 
probability of responding to the no-go stimuli in the go/no-go task [p(respond|no-go)] as a function of stimulus 
(go, no-go, two-choice) and part (beginning, end). Accuracy is the ratio of correct two-choice trials to the number 
of correct and incorrect two-choice trials (missed trials are excluded). M = mean; SD = standard deviation. 
In addition to RTs, I also analysed the p(correct) in the two-choice task and the p(respond|no-
go) in the go/no-go task (Table 6.3). These analyses revealed no reliable difference in choice accuracy 
between the beginning of training and the end of training, t(31) = 0.96, p = 0.347, gav = 0.18, BF = 
0.29, and that the p(respond|no-go) reliably increased between the beginning of training and the end of 
training, t(31) = -2.70, p = 0.011, gav = -0.31, BF = 4.03. Taken together, these results provide no 
evidence that task practice improved behavioural task performance in the go/no-go or two-choice tasks. 
If anything, no-go performance became worse (not better) with training. 
Table 6.4. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the reaction time data for the go and two-choice stimuli in 
Experiment 11 and Experiment 12 with stimulus and part as within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
ERP Results 
Figures 6.3 present the stimulus-locked grand average waveforms, Figure 6.4 presents the 
topographies, and Figure 6.5 presents the mean average amplitudes and the peak latencies in the 
analysed time windows. Tables 6.5 and 6.6 present an overview of the inferential statistics.
Experiment 11
Experiment 12
Go
No-go
Two-choice
Go
No-go
Two-choice
RT
Beginning
M
331
-
356
417
-
473
SD
47
-
43
57
-
65
End
M
326
-
355
382
-
430
SD
42
-
50
45
-
58
p(correct)
Beginning
M
-
-
0.91
-
-
0.85
SD
-
-
0.07
-
-
0.13
End
M
-
-
0.91
-
-
0.87
SD
-
-
0.07
-
-
0.10
p(respond|no-go)
Beginning
M
-
0.05
-
-
0.10
-
SD
-
0.05
-
-
0.07
-
End
M
-
0.07
-
-
0.07
-
SD
-
0.06
-
-
0.07
-
Experiment 11
Experiment 12
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
31
31
31
39
39
39
Sum of 
squares 
effect
22800.14
297.15
95.54
108167.70
58748.40
618.61
Sum of 
squares 
error
109985.81
16941.38
5063.86
117473.19
28201.23
14279.88
F
6.43
0.54
0.58
35.91
81.24
1.69
p
0.017
0.466
0.450
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.201
gen. η2
0.081
0.001
< 0.001
0.177
0.105
0.001
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N2 range. 
Mean amplitudes. Consistent with previous research, the mean amplitude in the N2 range was 
more negative for the no-go stimuli than for the go stimuli in the go/no-go task (p < 0.001; Table 6.5). 
Consistent with the behavioural data, there was no reliable change in the mean amplitude between the 
beginning and the end of training (p = 0.744; Table 6.5) and Bayesian analyses supported the null 
hypothesis of no difference (BF = 0.19). The two-way interaction between stimulus (go, no-go) and 
part reached significance (p = 0.043; Table 6.5); as can be seen in Figure 6.5, amplitudes in the N2 
range were slightly more negative at the end of training than at the beginning of training for the go 
stimuli, but were slightly less negative at the end of training than at the beginning of training for the 
no-go stimuli. However, follow-up analyses revealed no reliable main effect of part for the go stimuli, 
t(31) = 0.59, p = 0.562, gav = 0.07, BF = 0.22, or for the no-go stimuli, t(31) = -1.37 p = 0.180, gav = 
-0.16, BF = 0.44. 
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed no reliable difference in the mean 
amplitude between these stimuli (p = 0.083; Table 6.5). Whilst there was no reliable main effect of part 
(p = 0.137, BF = 0.54; Table 6.5), the two-way interaction between stimulus (go, two-choice) and part 
was significant (p = 0.005; Table 6.5). Follow-up analyses confirmed that, unlike for the go stimuli (see 
above), the mean amplitude for the two-choice stimuli was reliably less negative at the end of training 
than at the beginning of training, t(31) = -3.85, p = 0.001, gav = -0.38, BF = 55.39 (see Figures 6.3 & 
6.5). 
Peak latencies. Analyses of the peak latencies in the N2 range revealed that amplitudes peaked 
11 ms earlier for the no-go stimuli than for the go stimuli (pc = 0.019; Table 6.6; Figure 6.5). However, 
analyses in the go/no-go task showed no reliable difference between the peak latencies in the beginning 
and the end of training (pc = 0.442; Table 6.6) and no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus 
and part (pc = 0.685; Table 6.6). The comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed no reliable 
main effects or interactions (pcs ≥ 0.717; Table 6.6).
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Table 6.5. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked mean amplitudes in Experiment 11 for 
the go vs. no-go comparison with part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go) as a within-subjects factors; and 
for the go vs. two-choice comparison with part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, two-choice) as within-subjects 
factors. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
N2 range: Mean amplitude
P3a range: Mean amplitude
P3b range: Mean amplitude
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
Sum of 
squares 
effect
90.43
0.35
3.51
21.49
4.97
12.34
202.11
21.59
1.76
28.18
1.11
5.13
530.06
38.12
3.51
93.28
27.15
0.83
Sum of 
squares 
error
119.44
99.88
24.33
207.21
66.27
42.23
328.26
219.51
63.52
333.65
135.27
57.89
424.59
284.25
45.46
386.13
251.69
35.49
F
23.47
0.11
4.48
3.21
2.33
9.06
19.09
3.05
0.86
2.62
0.25
2.75
38.70
4.16
2.39
7.49
3.34
0.72
p
< 0.001
0.744
0.043
0.083
0.137
0.005
< 0.001
0.091
0.361
0.116
0.618
0.107
< 0.001
0.050
0.132
0.010
0.077
0.402
gen. η2
0.071
< 0.001
0.003
0.018
0.004
0.011
0.053
0.006
< 0.001
0.010
< 0.001
0.002
0.105
0.008
0.001
0.022
0.006
< 0.001
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Figure 6.3. Stimulus-locked waveforms for the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli in Experiment 11 as a function 
of part (beginning, end) in electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz. The stimulus was presented at 0 ms.
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P3a range. 
Mean amplitudes. Consistent with the go/no-go ERP literature, the mean amplitude in the P3a 
range was more positive for the no-go stimuli than the go stimuli (p < 0.001; Table 6.5; Figures 6.3 & 
6.5). However, there was no reliable main effect of part (p = 0.091; Table 6.6) and no reliable two-way 
interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.361; Table 6.6). However, the Bayesian analyses only 
revealed anecdotal support for the null hypothesis of no difference between the beginning and the end 
of training (BF = 0.73).
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed no reliable main effect of stimulus (p 
= 0.116; Table 6.5) or part (p = 0.618; Table 6.5). The two-way interaction between stimulus and part 
was also not reliable (p = 0.107; Table 6.5). The Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the beginning and the end of training (BF = 0.21).
Peak latencies. There were no reliable main effects or interactions in the peak latencies in the 
P3a range in the comparison of the go and no-go stimuli (pcs ≥ 0.300; Table 6.6) or in the comparison 
of the go and two-choice stimuli (pcs ≥ 0.491; Table 6.6). 
CHAPTER 6: ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY OF PRACTICE-EFFECTS IN INHIBITION AND NON-INHIBITION TASKS
233
Figure 6.4. Topographies for the beginning minus end difference as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-
choice) and analysed time-window (N2: 180-280 ms; P3a: 300-400 ms; P3b: 270-370 ms) for Experiment 11. 
* denotes the location of the analysed electrode in each time-window (N2 & P3a: Fz; P3b: Pz).
P3b range. 
Mean amplitudes. The mean amplitude in the P3b range was more positive for the go stimuli 
than for the no-go stimuli (p < 0.001; Table 6.5; see also Figures 6.3 & 6.5). Thus, the decision to 
analyse the P3a and P3b separately appears justified given the differential pattern of amplitudes 
between the go and no-go stimuli across these sub-components (cf. amplitudes were more positive for 
the no-go stimuli than for the go stimuli in the P3a range). As can be seen in Figure 6.3, the mean 
amplitudes in the P3b range were numerically less positive at the end of training than at the beginning 
of training. However, this difference was only marginally significant (p = 0.050; Table 6.5). The 
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corresponding Bayes factor was 1.1654. The two-way interaction between stimulus and part was not 
reliable (p = 0.132; Table 6.5). 
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed that the mean amplitude was more 
positive for the go stimuli than for the two-choice stimuli (p = 0.010; Table 6.5; this difference is 
discussed further in the Response-locked analyses section). However, there was no reliable main effect 
of part (p = 0.077; Table 6.5) and no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.402; 
Table 6.5). The Bayes factor for the difference between the beginning and the end of training was 0.83. 
Peak latencies. Amplitudes in the P3b range peaked 8 ms later for the no-go stimuli than for 
the go stimuli (pc = 0.011; Table 6.6; Figure 6.5). However, there were no other reliable main effects or 
interactions in the comparison of the go and no-go stimuli (pcs ≥ 0.087; Table 6.6) or in the comparison 
of the go and two-choice stimuli (pcs ≥ 0.319; Table 6.6).
54. Note that this difference is in the opposite direction to the predicted amplitude difference based on the ERP 
pilot study (Appendix K) and also the findings previously reported in the literature (Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 
2013; Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis). Given the absence of reliable behavioural training-effects, it is possible 
that the observed effects in the present study were due to fatigue rather than learning. Consistent with this idea, 
Kato and colleagues showed that amplitudes of the P3 component became less positive with the time spent on the 
task (Kato, Endo, et al., 2009). Kato, Endo, et al. attributed this to the effects of fatigue which impaired the 
intensity of response-related processes. Another, potentially compatible, explanation is that the observed P3b 
difference reflects habituation to the visual stimuli. Consistent with this idea, it has been shown that habituation 
results in less positive P3 amplitudes (Ravden & Polich, 1998). This could account for differences between the 
results in Experiment 11 and previous research as there were only 2 stimuli used per task in Experiment 11 (cf. 4 
shapes per task in the ERP pilot study and 8 shapes were used by Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013). 
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Table 6.6. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked peak latencies in Experiment 11 with part 
(beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) as a within-subjects factors. As these analyses were 
performed on jack-knifed averages, the F values were adjusted according to Fc = F/(n - 1)2, where n is the number 
of observations per cell (see Analyses section for a detailed explanation of this procedure). pcs < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold.
N2: Peak latency
P3a: Peak latency
P3b: Peak latency
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
31
Sum of 
squares 
effect
3938.28
371.28
42.78
81.28
34.03
47.53
1313.28
790.03
7.03
153.13
8.00
512.00
1785.03
371.28
2032.03
1200.50
136.13
200.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
20.72
19.72
8.22
29.72
20.97
11.47
63.72
22.97
25.97
152.88
34.00
34.00
7.97
25.72
20.97
37.50
29.88
14.00
F
5892.57
583.69
161.37
84.79
50.31
128.48
638.93
1066.27
8.39
31.05
7.29
466.82
6944.12
447.52
3004.14
992.41
141.25
442.86
Fc
6.13
0.61
0.17
0.09
0.05
0.13
0.66
1.11
0.01
0.03
0.01
0.49
7.23
0.47
3.13
1.03
0.15
0.46
pc
0.019
0.442
0.685
0.768
0.821
0.717
0.421
0.300
0.926
0.859
0.931
0.491
0.011
0.500
0.087
0.317
0.704
0.502
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Figure 6.5. (a) Mean average amplitude in the N2 range (180-280 ms) and N2 peak latency (b) mean average 
amplitude in the P3a range (300-400 ms) and peak P3a latency; and (c) mean average amplitude in the P3b range 
(270-370 ms) and peak P3b latency, in Experiment 11 as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) and part 
(beginning, end). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Note that the confidence intervals are small for the 
peak latencies due to the jack-knifing procedure (see ERP analyses).
Response-locked analyses. Analyses of the mean amplitude in the 200 ms preceding response 
execution revealed that mean amplitudes were less negative for the go stimuli than for the two-choice 
stimuli (p = < 0.001; Table 6.7; for grand average waveforms, see Figure 6.6). This finding is 
consistent with previous work suggesting that (lateralised) readiness potentials are sensitive to the level 
of competition between responses (i.e. the ‘Gratton dip’; Gratton, Coles, Sirevaag, Eriksen, & 
Donchin, 1988). There was no reliable difference between the beginning and the end of training (p = 
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0.207; Table 6.7) and no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.214; Table 6.7). 
However, the Bayesian analyses provided only anecdotal support for the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the beginning and the end of training (BF = 0.40).
Table 6.7. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the response-locked average amplitudes (-200 to 0 ms) in 
Experiment 11 with part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, two-choice) as a within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold. 
Figure 6.6. Lateralised readiness potentials for the go and two-choice stimuli in Experiment 11 as a function of 
part (beginning, end). The response was executed at 0 ms. 
Interim Conclusions
In Experiment 11, there was no evidence that behavioural performance improved with task practice in 
the go/no-go and two-choice tasks (for similar results, see Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010). Furthermore, I 
found no significant overall main effects of part on mean amplitudes or peak latencies in the N2, P3a, 
and P3b time-windows. Interestingly, however, further interactions highlighted an effect of training on 
amplitudes in the N2 range for the two-choice stimuli but not for the go stimuli. Follow-up 
comparisons confirmed that the mean amplitude in the N2 range was significantly less negative at the 
end of training than at the beginning of training for the two-choice stimuli. 
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
Df2
31
31
31
Sum of 
squares 
effect
38.11
2.91
1.09
Sum of 
squares 
error
60.16
54.29
20.98
F
19.63
1.66
1.61
p
< 0.001
0.207
0.214
gen. η2
0.066
0.005
0.002
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Although the exact functional correlates of the N2 component are debated (see Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2008), research broadly converges on the finding that amplitudes in the N2 range are less 
negative in conditions with low response conflict than in conditions with high response conflict (e.g. 
Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, et al., 2010; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2003; Ramautar, Kok, et al., 
2004). These findings are consistent with the interpretation that the N2 component reflects control 
processes over response selection (see, e.g. Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2013). This interpretation 
could is account for the present results; as can be seen in the RT analyses, the present study replicates 
the common finding that response latencies are shorter in the go/no-go task than in the two-choice task. 
Several researchers have attributed this difference to greater competition between response alternatives 
in the two-choice task relative to the go/no-go task (for an overview, see Chapter 5). Thus, if 
amplitudes in the N2 range are assumed to reflect the intensity of conflict resolution processes, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that short-term training would result in a larger effect on the N2 component for 
two-choice stimuli than for go stimuli. It is, however, puzzling that changes in N2 amplitudes were not 
accompanied by any training-effects on behavioural task performance. For example, responding is 
usually faster and accuracy higher in conditions where response conflict is low compared with 
conditions in which response conflict is high (Donkers & Van Boxtel, 2004) so training-induced 
changes in the level of response conflict should manifest in decreasing RTs and/or increasing accuracy 
between the beginning and the end of training. 
One possibility is that ERP amplitudes afford a more direct measure of cognitive processes 
and, as such, they may be more sensitive to the effects of practice than behavioural measures. 
Consistent with this suggestion, previous research has shown that changes in ERPs can precede the 
emergence of training-effects on behaviour (Atienza, Cantero, & Dominguez-Marin, 2002). If this were 
the case in Experiment 11, one would expect the corresponding effects of training on behaviour to 
emerge in longer-term training designs. Another possibility is that the observed change in N2 
amplitudes reflects an effect independent of training, for example due to habituation of N2 amplitudes 
over time. However, it is unclear why habituation would differentially affect two-choice stimuli over 
go or no-go stimuli. Furthermore, unlike amplitudes in the P3 range, there is no evidence in the 
literature to suggest that the N2 amplitudes become less negative due to repeated exposure to visual 
stimuli independent of response execution (Ravden & Polich, 1998). Similarly, although fatigue has 
been shown to result in less positive P3 amplitudes as a function of time spent on the task, no reliable 
fatigue-induced change on N2 amplitudes was found (Kato, Endo, et al., 2009). Importantly, 
participants alternated between performance of the go/no-go and two-choice tasks on a block-by-block 
basis in Experiment 11 meaning that the effects of fatigue should similarly influence amplitudes in the 
go/no-go and the two-choice tasks. 
Before proceeding, it is important to investigate further why I did not observe any behavioural 
practice-effects in this experiment. There are at least two possibilities. First, it is possible that the use of 
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a 1:1 stimulus-response mapping made the task too simple (cf. a 2:1 mapping was used in Experiments 
9-10, Chapter 5, and in the EEG pilot experiment, Appendix K). If this were the case, the majority of 
the training effect may have occurred rapidly, within the ‘beginning’ part of the training phase55. 
Second, it is possible that the requirement to alternate between performance of the go/no-go task and 
the two-choice task on a block-by-block basis interfered with the practice-effects on performance. 
After all, research in the task-switching literature indicates that there is a performance decrement when 
switching between tasks relative to repeatedly performing the same task (see e.g. Monsell, 2003). To 
investigate these possibilities, I conducted a behavioural control experiment. A detailed description of 
the procedure and the results of that experiment can be found in Appendix L. To briefly summarise, 
there were two between-subjects groups: an alternating task order group and a serial task order group. 
In the alternating task order group, participants alternated between the go/no-go task and the two-
choice task on a block-by-block basis (as in Experiment 11). In the serial task order group, participants 
performed all the training blocks of the go/no-go task followed by all the training blocks of the two-
choice task (task order was counterbalanced). Furthermore, four stimuli were used in each task (versus 
two stimuli per task in Experiment 11) to increase the task difficulty. The results showed that RTs 
generally became faster between the beginning and the end of training. Crucially, there was no 
difference in the magnitude of the training effect between the alternating and serial conditions. The 
presence of a behavioural improvement for go and two-choice stimuli in both the alternating and serial 
conditions argues against the idea that switching between performance of the go/no-go and two-choice 
tasks interferes with the effects of training on behaviour. Thus, it seems most likely that the absence of 
a practice-effect in Experiment 11 was due to task simplicity.
Experiment 12
In Experiment 12, I used the same procedure as in Experiment 11 except that I used twelve stimuli 
across the experiment (six per task). Based on the RT results in the behavioural control experiment 
(Appendix L), it was predicted that the increased stimulus-set size would result in a reliable 
performance improvement between the beginning and the end of training. As the duration of the task 
was the same as in Experiment 11, any additional differences between the ‘beginning’ and the ‘end’ 
phases of training on the amplitude and/or the latency of the N2 and P3 components can be more 
confidently attributed to effects of task practice rather than general non-specific effects of stimulus 
exposure or repeated task practice, such as habituation and/or fatigue.
Method
55. Consistent with this suggestion, there was a reliable main effect of block (1-3) within the ‘beginning’ part of 
training was reliable in RTs, F(2, 62) = 5.63, p = 0.006, gen. η2 = 0.010. The two-way interaction between block 
and stimulus (go, two-choice) was not reliable, F(2, 62) = 0.16, p = 0.814, gen. η2 < 0.001. 
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Participants. Forty right-handed volunteers56 from the University of Exeter participated for 
monetary compensation (£10) or partial course credit (M = 20.15 years, SD = 1.78, 31 females). Two 
participants were removed and replaced as their percentage of correct go trials in the go/no-go task was 
< 70% (i.e. they missed too many responses and/or pressed an incorrect key on these trials) and seven 
participants were removed and replaced due to low trial numbers in the ERP averages (see ERP 
analyses above, for the exclusion criteria).
Stimuli, apparatus, and procedures. The stimuli, apparatus, and procedure were identical to 
Experiment 11, except for the following: the stimuli consisted of six shapes and six coloured circles 
(see Figure 6.1). Each block consisted of 84 trials and each stimulus within the relevant set (e.g. shapes 
or circles) was presented 16 times per block. 
Analyses. The analyses were identical to Experiment 11, except for the following: I excluded 
an average of 5 ICA components with characteristic eye-blink and eye-movement topographies and 
time-courses. The peak latency time-windows were identical to Experiment 11. However, unlike in 
Experiment 11, amplitudes in the P3a range had a broad plateau meaning that estimating the latency of 
this component was not appropriate as small amplitude variations on the plateau could result in large 
latency variations. As it was not possible to obtain an accurate peak latency measure in the P3a 
window, I instead extracted the latencies for the amplitude rising 50% of the peak maximum (cf. 
Kiesel, Miller, Jolicoeur, & Brisson, 2008). The time point at which the criterion was reached was 
determined using linear interpolation (Kiesel, Miller, et al., 2008). Note, I could not examine the falling 
50% of the peak maximum as this occurred beyond the end of the segment for some stimuli.
As I could not use the peak latency as a guide to identify the mean amplitude window for the 
P3a component, I adopted the approach used in Elchlepp, Lavric, et al. (2016) and extended the mean 
amplitude time-window for the P3a component to 300-500 ms in order to sufficiently capture the broad 
plateau. Mean amplitudes were computed within the following time windows: 190-290 ms (N2), 
300-500 ms (P3a), and 350-450 ms (P3b)57.
Results
Behavioural Results
Analyses of the RTs revealed that responding was reliably slower to the two-choice stimuli (445 ms) 
than to the go stimuli (406 ms; p < 0.001; Tables 6.3-6.4). The main effect of part was reliable (p < 
0.001; Table 6.4), reflecting the decrease in RTs between the beginning of training and the end of 
training. There was no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.201; Table 6.4). 
56. Due to the increase in the number of stimuli, I required more participants in Experiment 12 than in 
Experiment 11 to ensure that the task, stimulus, and response mappings were fully counterbalanced. 
57. Note that although I make no direct comparisons between components or indeed experiments in these 
analyses, mean average amplitude measures do not become biased when noise levels increase. Thus, the use of a 
shorter window for this component in Experiment 11 should not differentially bias the measurement compared 
with the present experiment. 
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Analyses of no-go performance revealed that the probability of responding reliably decreased 
between the beginning of training and the end of training, t(39) = 2.67, p = 0.011, gav = 0.33, BF = 3.80. 
However, analyses of choice accuracy in the two-choice task revealed no reliable main effect of part 
reliable, t(39) = - 0.72, p = 0.478, gav = - 0.10, BF = 0.22. Thus, unlike in Experiment 11, go and stop 
performance benefitted from task practice. This suggests that the increased stimulus-set used in this 
experiment was effective in increasing the magnitude of the training-effects on behavioural 
performance. 
ERP Results
Figure 6.7 presents the stimulus-locked grand average waveforms, Figure 6.8 presents the 
topographies, and Figure 6.9 presents the mean average amplitudes and the peak latencies for the N2, 
P3a, and P3b components; Tables 6.8 and 6.9 present an overview of the inferential statistics for the 
mean average amplitudes and the peak latencies, respectively.
N2 range. 
Mean amplitudes. As expected, the mean amplitude in the N2 range was reliably more 
negative for the no-go stimuli than for the go stimuli in the go/no-go task (p < 0.001; Table 6.8). 
Importantly, the main effect of part was reliable (p < 0.001; Table 6.8); the N2 amplitude was less 
negative at the end of training than at the beginning of training (Figures 6.7 and 6.9). The two-way 
interaction between part and stimulus was not reliable (p = 0.226; Table 6.8). 
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli showed that the mean amplitude in the N2 
range was more negative for the two-choice stimuli than for the go stimuli (p = 0.036; Table 6.8). 
Consistent with the go/no-go analyses, the mean amplitude was reliably less negative at the end of 
training than at the beginning of training (p = 0.001; Table 6.8). However, the two-way interaction 
between stimulus and part was also reliable (p = 0.005; Table 6.8). As can be seen in Figure 6.7, the 
mean amplitude difference between the beginning and the end of training was numerically larger for 
the go stimuli than for the two-choice stimuli. Follow-up analyses showed that the main effect of part 
was reliable for the go stimuli, t(39) = -4.51, p < 0.001, gav = -0.38, BF = 395.12, and was marginally 
significant for the two-choice stimuli, t(39) = -1.90, p = 0.064, gav = -0.16, BF = 0.87. 
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Table 6.8. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked mean amplitudes in Experiment 12 with 
part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) as within-subjects factors. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
N2 range: Mean amplitude
P3a range: Mean amplitude
P3b range: Mean amplitude
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
Sum of 
squares 
effect
29.12
57.21
1.58
17.96
37.84
7.12
16.55
58.83
1.35
6.19
99.21
1.27
316.87
8.47
14.13
9.96
73.21
3.56
Sum of 
squares 
error
59.47
124.71
40.79
147.66
109.49
30.61
128.08
294.38
31.02
277.98
223.93
71.13
366.81
404.73
77.89
395.16
249.83
119.13
F
19.09
17.89
1.51
4.74
13.48
9.07
5.04
7.79
1.70
0.87
17.28
0.70
33.69
0.82
7.08
0.98
11.43
1.16
p
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.226
0.036
0.001
0.005
0.031
0.008
0.120
0.357
0.002
0.409
< 0.001
0.372
0.012
0.328
0.002
0.287
gen. η2
0.015
0.030
0.001
0.009
0.019
0.004
0.007
0.026
0.001
0.003
0.043
0.001
0.067
0.002
0.003
0.002
0.017
0.001
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Figure 6.7. Stimulus-locked waveforms for the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli in Experiment 12 as a function 
of part (beginning, end) in electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz. The stimulus was presented at 0 ms. 
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Peak latencies. A comparison of the go and no-go stimuli revealed no main effect of stimulus 
(pc = 0.348; Table 6.9). Although amplitudes peaked numerically earlier at the end of training than at 
the beginning of training (Figure 6.9), this difference was not reliable (pc = 0.414; Table 6.9). There 
was also no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (pc = 0.921). 
Table 6.9. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked peak latencies in Experiment 12 with 
part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) as a within-subjects factors. As these analyses were 
performed on jack-knifed averages, the F values were adjusted according to Fc = F/(n - 1)2, where n is the number 
of observations per cell (see ERP analyses section, for a detailed explanation of this procedure). pcs < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold.
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed no reliable difference in the peak 
amplitudes between these stimuli (pc = 0.239; Table 6.9). Amplitudes peaked 22 ms earlier at the end of 
training than at the beginning of training; this difference reached significance (pc = 0.045; Table 6.9). 
Visual inspection of Figure 6.9 indicates that the difference between the beginning and the end of 
training was greater for the two-choice stimuli (Mdiff = 36 ms) than for the go stimuli (Mdiff = 8 ms). 
However, there was no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (pc = 0.198; Table 6.9).
N2: Peak latency
P3a: Peak latency (50%)
P3b: Peak latency
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
39
Sum of 
squares 
effect
2739.03
2418.03
27.23
7507.60
19624.90
7344.10
777.32
5219.94
232.92
5926.80
2750.64
20.62
3572.10
0.40
25.60
13.23
429.03
632.03
Sum of 
squares 
error
77.98
90.98
69.78
134.40
117.10
109.90
27.18
26.14
8.39
76.99
21.90
16.38
27.90
27.60
18.40
43.78
35.98
32.98
F
1369.95
1036.58
15.22
2178.55
6536.05
2606.19
1115.16
7788.76
1082.15
3002.46
4897.52
49.09
4993.26
0.57
54.26
11.78
465.10
747.50
Fc
0.90
0.68
0.01
1.43
4.30
1.71
0.73
5.12
0.71
1.97
3.22
0.03
3.28
0.00
0.04
0.01
0.31
0.49
pc
0.348
0.414
0.921
0.239
0.045
0.198
0.397
0.029
0.404
0.168
0.081
0.858
0.078
0.985
0.851
0.930
0.583
0.487
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P3a range. 
Mean amplitudes. Consistent with the ERP literature (for an overview, see the introduction of 
this Chapter), the mean amplitude in the P3a range was more positive for the no-go stimuli than for the 
go stimuli (p = 0.031; Table 6.8). The mean amplitude was reliably more positive at the end of training 
than at the beginning of training (p = 0.008; Table 6.8). There was no reliable two-way interaction 
between stimulus (go, no-go) and part was not reliable (p = 0.120; Table 6.8). 
A comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli revealed no reliable main effect of stimulus (p 
= 0.357; Table 6.8). However, the mean amplitude in the P3a range was more positive at the end of 
training than at the beginning of training (p = 0.002; Table 6.8; Figure 6.7). The two-way interaction 
between stimulus and part was not reliable (p = 0.409; Table 6.8). 
Peak latencies. Amplitudes for the go and no-go stimuli rose to 50% of peak amplitude at 320 
ms (see Method). There was no reliable difference between the criterion latencies for the go and no-go 
stimuli (pc = 0.397; Table 6.9). However, amplitudes rose to criterion 11 ms earlier in the go/no-go task 
at the end of training than at the beginning of training; this difference was reliable (pc = 0.029; Table 
6.9; Figure 6.9). The two-way interaction between stimulus and part (pc = 0.404; Table 6.9).
The P3a for the go and two-choice stimuli rose to 50% of peak amplitude at 328 ms. There was 
no reliable difference between the go and two-choice stimuli (pc = 0.168; Table 6.9). Although the P3a 
rose to criterion 8 ms earlier at the end of training than at the beginning of training, this difference did 
not reach significance (pc = 0.081; Table 6.9). The two-way interaction between stimulus and part was 
not reliable (pc = 0.858; Table 6.9). 
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Figure 6.8. Topographies for the beginning minus end difference as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-
choice) and analysed time-window (N2: 190-290 ms; P3a: 300-500 ms; P3b: 350-450 ms) in Experiment 12. 
* denotes the location of the analysed electrode in each time-window (N2 & P3a: Fz; P3b: Pz).
P3b range. 
Mean amplitudes. Consistent with the results in Experiment 11, the mean amplitude in the P3b 
range was more positive for the go stimuli than for the no-go stimuli (p < 0.001; Table 6.8). There was 
no reliable main effect of part (p = 0.372; Table 6.8), but the two-way interaction between stimulus (go, 
no-go) and part was reliable (p = 0.012; Table 6.8); as can been seen in Figure 6.9, the mean amplitude 
in the P3b range was numerically more positive at the end of training than at the beginning of training 
for the go stimuli, but there was no similar change for the no-go stimuli. Follow-up comparisons 
revealed a reliable main effect of part for the go stimuli, t(39) = -2.14, p = 0.039, gav = -0.19, BF = 
1.31, but no reliable main effect of part for the no-go stimuli, t(39) = 0.22, p = 0.828, gav = 0.03, BF = 
0.17. Note that the Bayesian analyses provide support for the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the beginning and the end of training for the no-go stimuli. 
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There was no reliable difference in the mean amplitude in the P3b range between the go and 
two-choice stimuli (p = 0.328; Table 6.8). Crucially, the mean amplitude was more positive at the end 
of training than at the beginning of training (p = 0.002; Table 6.8). The two-way interaction between 
stimulus and part was not reliable (p = 0.287; Table 6.8).
Peak latencies. There were no reliable main effects or interactions in the P3b peak latencies 
(pcs ≥ 0.078; Table 6.9). 
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Figure 6.9. (a) Mean average amplitude in the N2 range (190-290 ms) and N2 peak latency (b) mean average 
amplitude in the P3a range (300-500 ms) and peak P3a latency; and (c) mean average amplitude in the P3b range 
(350-450 ms) and peak P3b latency, in Experiment 12 as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) and part 
(beginning, end). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Due to the broad peak of the P3a component, I could 
not obtain an accurate peak latency (particularly for the no-go stimuli). Therefore, I used the latency at 50% of 
peak amplitude for this component (see Kiesel, Miller, et al., 2007). Note that the confidence intervals are small 
for the peak latencies due to the jack-knifing procedure (see ERP analyses above).
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Response-locked analyses. Consistent with the findings in Experiment 11, the mean 
amplitude in the 200 ms preceding response execution was less negative for the go stimuli than for the 
two-choice stimuli (p = 0.013; Table 6.10; Figure 6.10). Similarly, there was no reliable difference 
between the amplitude at the beginning of training and the amplitude at the end of training (p = 0.364; 
Table 6.10). The corresponding Bayes factor was 0.25. There was also no reliable two-way interaction 
between stimulus and part (p = 0.994; Table 6.10). Thus, the training-effects observed in the P3a and 
P3b ranges are unlikely to be entirely due to motor response-related effects. 
Figure 6.10. Lateralised readiness potentials for the go and two-choice stimuli in Experiment 12 as a function of 
part (beginning, end). The response was executed at 0 ms. 
Table 6.10. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the response-locked average amplitudes (-200 to 0 ms) in 
Experiment 12 with part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, two-choice) as a within-subjects factors.
Chapter Discussion
The aim of this chapter was two-fold: (1) to investigate how training in inhibition tasks influences the 
ERP signatures associated with action selection processes and (2) to compare the effects of training in 
inhibition and non-inhibition tasks on ERPs in a within-subjects training design. To this end, I 
compared the mean amplitudes and peak latencies of the N2, P3a, and P3b components at the 
beginning and the end of task performance.
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
Df2
39
39
39
Sum of 
squares 
effect
9.43
0.81
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
53.77
37.24
17.08
F
6.84
0.84
0.00
p
0.013
0.364
0.994
gen. η2
0.013
0.001
< 0.001
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Based on an exploratory ERP pilot experiment (Appendix K), I predicted that the N2 would 
become less negative (i.e. smaller) at the end of training than at the beginning of training and that the 
P3a and P3b sub-components would become more positive (i.e. larger) at the end of training than at the 
beginning of training58. I also predicted that behavioural performance would improve during training. 
Contrary to my predictions, Experiment 11 showed no reliable improvement in behavioural 
performance between the beginning and the end of training in the go/no-go and two-choice tasks. If 
anything, performance on no-go trials declined across the training phase. Consistent with these 
behavioural results, I also found no reliable overall differences in the peak latencies or mean 
amplitudes of the N2, P3a, or P3b components. Nevertheless, despite no reliable overall differences, 
further interactions revealed that, unlike for the go stimuli in the go/nogo task, mean amplitudes in the 
N2 range for the two-choice stimuli became less negative with training. A common interpretation is 
that the N2 component reflects control processes involved in the resolution of conflict between 
competing responses (e.g. Enriquez-Geppert, Konrad, et al., 2010; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2003; 
Ramautar, Kok, et al., 2004). Thus, it is plausible that the observed amplitude effect is linked to 
training-induced improvements in the resolution of conflict, especially as the competition between 
responses in the two-choice task is considered to be greater than the competition between the ‘go’ and 
‘no-go’ responses the go/no-go task (see, e.g. Gomez, Ratcliff & Perea, 2007) . However, the absence 
of a behavioural training effect fundamentally complicates the interpretation of this effect; without a 
reliable training-effect on behaviour it is impossible to conclusively attribute the N2 amplitude 
difference observed in the two-choice task to the effects of training.
Based on a behavioural follow-up experiment (Appendix L), I concluded that the absence of a 
behavioural training-effect in Experiment 11 was most likely due to the use of a 1:1 stimulus-response 
mapping which limited the magnitude of training-effects on performance. Therefore, in Experiment 12 
I introduced eight additional stimuli in order to increase the task difficulty. Based on the results of the 
behavioural follow-up experiment, it was anticipated that this would result in reliable behavioural task 
improvements between the beginning and the end of training. All other aspects of the task remained the 
same as in Experiment 11. Analyses of the behavioural data showed that increasing the stimulus set-
size was effective; the RTs on correct go and two-choice trials and the probability of responding on no-
go trials decreased between the beginning and the end of training. Thus, any effects of training on the 
ERPs in Experiment 12 can be more confidently attributed to the effects of training than those in 
Experiment 11 (where there was no reliable behavioural improvement). Therefore, in the remainder of 
this Chapter Discussion, I focus on the differences between the beginning and the end of training on 
the N2, P3a, and P3b components in Experiment 12.
58. It is important to note that the pilot study also indicated that these differences could be larger in the two-
choice task than in the go/no-go task. However, as a between-subjects design was used, it is possible that these 
differences reflect between-task differences rather than qualitative differences in the effects of training. The 
within-subjects design used in Experiments 11-12 addressed this limitation.
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The N2 Component
In the N2 range, I found that mean amplitudes became less negative with training for the go, no-go, and 
two-choice stimuli. This finding is consistent with my predictions based on the exploratory pilot study 
presented in Appendix K. Evidence that training similarly influenced all three stimulus types provides 
support for the interpretation of the N2 as reflecting task-general conflict monitoring processes rather 
than processes linked only with response inhibition.
The idea training influences the resolution of conflict between responses is entirely consistent 
with memory-retrieval accounts (Hommel, 1998, 2004; Logan, 1988; for a full overview of memory-
retrieval accounts, see Modelling Performance in Response Inhibition Tasks, Chapter 1). As discussed 
in Chapter 1, memory-retrieval accounts state that, with consistent training, stimuli become associated 
or ‘bound’ with the correct response and these associations are stored as instances or event-files in 
memory. When participants begin performing a task they rely on general algorithms and require top-
down control to resolve conflict between the various available responses in the task. However, with 
training, participants begin to rely on the retrieval of past responses from memory, reducing the need 
for conflict monitoring. In other words, memory-retrieval accounts suggest that less effort is needed to 
monitor for conflict between responses when the correct response can be automatically retrieved from 
memory. Importantly, the finding that the N2 component became less negative across the go, no-go and 
two-choice stimuli supports the idea that the resolution of conflict plays an important role in training in 
both inhibition and non-inhibition tasks.
However, whilst the observed reduction in the N2 amplitude in the go/no-go task is consistent 
with some previous findings (Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis, Study 3 and Study 4), it is at odds with 
other ERP findings in the go/no-go training literature. In particular, Schapkin and colleagues report that 
following go/no-go training, the amplitude of the N2 component were was more negative at the end of 
training than at the beginning of training (Schapkin, Johnstone, et al., 2007). There are several 
plausible explanations that could account for the inconsistency between the findings in Experiment 12 
and those of Schapkin, Johnstone, et al.. Firstly, it is possible that the Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. task 
induced additional conflict between the go and no-go stimuli than in Experiment 12. For example, 
Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. used a go/no-go task in which there were both response compatible and 
response incompatible trials. On go trials, participants in the Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. study had to 
respond to the uppercase German word for ‘press’ (‘DRÜCK’) and the lowercase word for 
‘stop’ (‘stopp’); on no-go trials, participants had to withhold their response to the uppercase word for 
‘stop’ (‘STOPP’) and the lowercase word for ‘press’ (‘drück’). Thus, as features of the stimuli became 
associated with the go or stop goal with training, it is plausible that the presentation of response 
incompatible trials would begin to partially activate the incorrect response further increasing the need 
for conflict monitoring processes with training. This could have manifested in the more negative N2 
amplitudes observed at the end of training in their study. Secondly, it is possible that inconsistencies 
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between the findings reported in Experiment 12 and those of Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. could reflect 
the effects of long-term versus short-term training. In Schapkin, Johnstone, et al.’s experiment the N2 
amplitude became more positive after three days of training (comprising two 20 minute go/no-go 
training sessions per day). Furthermore, prior to commencement of the training phase, participants in 
their study completed a practice phase until the number of omission errors on go trials did not exceed 
two out of 200 trials. Thus, whilst Experiment 12 primarily indexed the early stages of learning (as the 
task was entirely novel to participants), it is likely that the Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. study indexed the 
later stages of learning. Future research is required to investigate whether the effects of short-term and 
long-term training have different (and possibly opposing) effects on the processes underlying 
performance. Thirdly, only eight participants were tested in the Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. study 
meaning that the findings reported in their experiment are likely to be influenced by individual 
differences. On this basis, it is important to determine whether the Schapkin, Johnstone, et al. findings 
could be replicated in a sufficiently powered experimental design. In Experiment 12, I tested 40 
participants and I ensured that I had sufficient trial numbers contributing to the ERP averages to obtain 
a reliable measure. Thus, Experiment 12 was sufficiently powered to detect medium-sized effects in the 
ERP analyses.
The P3 Component(s)
It is commonly accepted that the P3 component is best considered a non-unitary component comprising 
a frontal P3a sub-component and a temporo-parietal P3b sub-component that reflect separable 
processes. Whilst the amplitude of the frontal P3 is commonly more positive for the no-go stimuli than 
for the go stimuli, the parietal P3 component has been reported to be more positive for the go stimuli 
than for the no-go stimuli (Pfefferbaum, Ford, et al., 1985). To ensure that I captured these sub-
components, I analysed and here report activity in frontal and parietal electrodes during the P3 time-
window separately. Although it remains currently unclear exactly what the P3a and P3b sub-component 
reflects, an increasing body of literature has set about investigating what factors influence the 
amplitude and latency of the P3 component(s)59. The present chapter adds to this body of research in 
considering the effects of training in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks. 
The frontal P3a component. In the P3a range, amplitudes were reliably more positive at the 
end of training than at the beginning of training for the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli (Experiment 
12). This finding is also consistent with the pilot ERP experiment (Appendix K) and previous ERP 
results obtained for go and no-go stimuli following go/no-go training (Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013; 
Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis; see also Song, Ding, Fan, & Chen, 2002). 
59. Note that the lack of complete agreement on the interpretation of these components is not a particular concern 
for the purposes of the present chapter. Importantly, I was interested in how similar the effects of training for the 
go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli on these components were. 
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A common interpretation is that the frontal P3a sub-component is thought to reflect frontal 
lobe activation associated with attentional processes required for the selection of relevant information 
from working memory (e.g. Berti, 2008; Duncan-Johnson & Donchin, 1977; for a theoretical overview, 
see Polich, 2003, 2007). The idea that attentional processes involved in memory updating may be 
influenced by training is also consistent with previous findings showing that attention plays a key role 
in the encoding and the retrieval of instances from memory (e.g. Boronat & Logan, 1997; Logan & 
Etherton, 1994). After all, instances stored in memory can contain various information about a stimulus 
(including a representation of its visual features). Thus, it is plausible that as performance begins to 
depend more on the retrieval of instances stored in memory and less on algorithmic processes, the 
engagement of attentional processes associated with memory updating would increase. Importantly, the 
presence of similar increased P3a amplitudes across the go, no-go and two-choice stimuli argues 
against the interpretation of this component as solely reflecting (top-down) inhibitory control 
processes, as has been previously assumed (for an overview, see e.g. Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 
2013). 
However, whilst the memory-retrieval interpretation seems plausible in the context of the 
observed training results, it is important to highlight that this account is purely speculative. Therefore, 
future research is required to directly test this explanation. For example, it is firstly important to 
establish whether the observed increase in amplitudes of the frontal P3a component and the less 
negative amplitudes of the frontal N2 component are additive, as it is possible that the observed more 
positive frontal P3a amplitude difference is not functionally separable to the observed N2 effect. For 
example, it is possible that the P3a effect simply reflects the ‘down-stream’ effects of the observed N2 
reduction (i.e. less negative amplitudes). An inspection of Figure 6.7 suggests that this is unlikely as 
the absolute amplitude difference observed in the frontal P3 range is larger than the absolute amplitude 
difference observed in the N2 range. However, it is not possible to conclusively rule this out. 
The parietal P3b component. Analyses in the parietal P3b range revealed that amplitudes 
became more positive at the end of training than at the beginning of training. However, unlike for the 
amplitudes in the frontal P3a range, this difference was only reliable for the go and two-choice stimuli, 
and was not reliable for the no-go stimuli (Figure 6.9). Bayesian analyses supported the null hypothesis 
of no difference for the no-go stimuli. 
Consistent with these findings, several studies have shown a linear increase in the amplitude of 
the parietal P3b component during learning (Donchin & Coles, 1988; Pineda, Westerfield, Kronenberg, 
& Kubrin, 1997; Luft, Takase, & Bhattacharya, 2014). Furthermore, the P3b component has been 
shown to increase during performance of the Wisconsin card sorting task but to decrease when the task 
required that participants acquire a new rule (Barcelo, Munoz-Cespedes, Pozo, & Rubia, 2000; see also 
Morgan, Luu, & Tucker, 2016). However, despite being the subject of extensive research, the exact 
processes indexed by the parietal P3b component remains unclear.
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Whilst some accounts suggest that the parietal P3b component reflects processes relating the 
updating of context information in working memory (Polich, 2007), other accounts suggest that the 
P3b component reflects the reactivation of acquired stimulus-response associations (Verleger, 
Jaskowski, et al., 2005). According to the latter account, the P3b component indexes the ‘bridge’ from 
stimulus to response (see also Verleger, Schroll, & Hamker, 2013) with larger P3b amplitudes when the 
stimulus-response associations can be readily retrieved from memory. The observed increase in the P3b 
amplitudes at the end of training is consistent with both interpretations. Firstly, it is possible that the 
increase in the P3b amplitude reflects the formation of representations of the task context with training 
(i.e. consistent with the context-updating account; Polich, 2007). The retrieval of this contextual 
information could serve to facilitate subsequent retrieval of the contextually-relevant response (see, 
e.g;. Morgan, Luu, & Tucker, 2016). Secondly, it is also possible that the increase in the P3b 
amplitudes reflects the formation of associations between the go and two-choice stimuli and the 
corresponding motor response (consistent with the ‘stimulus-response associations account’; Verleger, 
Jaskowski, et al., 2005). According this this account, the P3b component could index processes that are 
specifically linked with the selection of a motor response. Consistent with this idea, across 
Experiments 11 and 12 I found that overall P3b amplitudes (i.e. independent of training) were more 
positive for the go stimuli than the no-go stimuli.
Importantly, the finding that the P3b amplitudes only reliably increased for the go and two-
choice stimuli and not for the no-go stimuli could indicate that there are additional processes 
influenced during the acquisition of associations between specific stimuli and motor responding, that 
are not influenced during the acquisition of associations between specific stimuli and response 
inhibition. In other words, this could indicate that, there might be differences in the effects of training 
on response execution and response inhibition trials as well as similarities (Bender, Filmer, et al., 2016; 
Rae, Hughes, et al., 2014). To test this idea, future research should aim to distinguish between the 
effects of training on the frontal P3a and the parietal P3b components further. In particular, the use of 
principle component analyses or independent component analyses would help to further differentiate 
the effects of training on these P3 sub-components (see Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2010 for a practical 
example).
Conclusion
The aim of the present chapter was to investigate how training in inhibition and non-inhibition tasks 
modulates the neural signatures of action selection and response inhibition processes. Using a within-
subjects design in which participants alternated between performance of the go/no-go and two-choice 
tasks on a block-by-block basis, I demonstrate that the N2, P3a, and P3b components are sensitive to 
the effects of training in these tasks (Experiment 12) and that these ERP effects are mostly eliminated 
when training does not influence behavioural task performance (Experiment 11). Importantly, I find 
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similar effects of training on the N2 and frontal P3a components across the go, no-go, and two-choice 
stimuli. Thus, these results extend the work presented in Chapter 5, address some of the 
methodological limitations highlighted in Chapter 5, and open the door to future research using ERPs 
to investigate the specificity of response inhibition training. On the basis of the results presented in this 
chapter, I conclude that there is most likely strong overlap between the effects of training on the action-
selection processes that are involved in performing inhibition and non-inhibition tasks.
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Appendix K
Between-Subjects Pilot ERP Experiment
This experiment was designed as a pilot experiment to compare the effects of training in the go/no-go 
and two-choice tasks on the N2, P3a, and P3b components. In this experiment, participants were 
randomly allocated (between-subjects) to the go/no-go task condition or to the two-choice task 
condition (for a similar design, see Experiments 9 & 10, Chapter 5). Participants completed a training 
phase (blocks 1-18) whereby the stimulus-response (and stimulus-stop (no-go) in the go/no-go task) 
mappings were consistent throughout task performance (e.g. diamond = go, square = no-go or diamond 
= left key press, square = right key press); followed by a test phase (blocks 19-21) in which the 
acquired mappings were reversed (e.g. square = go, diamond = no-go or square = left key press, 
diamond = right key press). As in Experiments 11-12, training phase performance was analysed as a 
function of ‘part’: the first three blocks in the training phase were the ‘beginning’ part, the final three 
blocks in the training phase were the ‘end’ part; the three blocks in the test phase were the ‘test’ part. 
Method
Participants. Forty right-handed volunteers from University of Exeter participated for 
monetary compensation (£10) or partial course credit (M = 21.85 years, SD = 2.92, 24 females). Seven 
participants were removed and replaced due to low trial numbers in the ERP averages (see the ERP 
analyses section in the main text, for the exclusion criteria). Participants were randomly allocated to 
the go/no-go task condition or to the two-choice task condition (between-subjects). 
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and behavioural analyses. The apparatus, stimuli, and 
procedure were identical to Experiment 11, except for the following: the stimuli consisted of four 
chequerboards, which varied along the orientation dimension (0° or 45°) (the stimuli were identical to 
those used in Chapter 5, see Figure 5.1). All participants started with a training phase, which consisted 
of eighteen blocks followed by a test phase, which consisted of three blocks. Each block consisted of 
80 trials and each stimulus was presented 20 times per block. In the training phase, the stimuli were 
consistently mapped onto the same response; in the test phase, the stimulus-response mapping was 
reversed. All mappings were fully counterbalanced.
Separate ANOVAs were performed for the training and test phases with ‘part’ (beginning/end 
in the training phase analyses, end/test in the test phase analyses) as a within-subjects factor. In the 
analyses of the correct RTs, I also included stimulus (go, two-choice) as a between-subjects factor.
EEG/ERP analyses. The EEG set-up and pre-processing steps were the same as in Experiment 
11 & 12. For each participant, I excluded an average of 5 components following the ICA with 
characteristic eye-blink and eye-movement topographies and time-courses. The average number of 
segments in each average are reported in Table K.1. There was no peak minima in the N2 range 
(180-350 ms), especially for the go stimuli (see Figure K.1), so it was not possible to estimate the peak 
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latencies within this window. Otherwise, the peak latency time-windows for the P3a and P3b 
components were the same as in Experiments 11-12. Furthermore, the P3b had a broad plateau, 
particularly for the no-go stimuli (see Figure K.1), so I instead extracted the latencies for the amplitude 
rising 50% of the peak maximum (see Experiment 12 for details). Mean amplitudes were analysed in 
the following windows: N2 (200-300 ms), P3a (310-410 ms), and P3b (300-400 ms). For the P3a and 
P3b components, the mean amplitude windows were based on the peak latencies and visual inspection. 
It was not possible to use the peak latency to identify a suitable mean amplitude window for the N2 
range. Therefore, a 200-300 ms window was used on the basis of previous research (for an overview 
see e.g., Huster, Enriquez-Geppert, et al., 2013). Visual inspection of the grand average waveforms 
confirmed that this window was appropriate. Note, for the analyses of the go and two-choice stimuli 
‘stimulus’ was included as a between-subjects factor. All other ANOVAs were as reported for 
Experiment 11. 
Table K.1. Overview of the average number of artifact-free ERP segments contributing to the stimulus-locked 
and response-locked waveform grand averages as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) and part 
(beginning, end, test) for the pilot experiment. M = mean; SD = standard deviation.
Behavioural results
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table K.2 and inferential statistics are reported in Table K.3.
Training phase. Analyses of correct RTs showed that there was no reliable difference between 
the overall RTs for go and two-choice stimuli (p = 0.271; Table K.3). However, the main effect of part 
was significant (p = 0.002; Table K.3) indicating that mean RTs decreased between the beginning and 
the end of training. There was no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and phase (p = 0.110; 
Table K.3). Analyses of the probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go revealed no 
reliable main effect of part, t(19) = 0.67, p = 0.510, gav = 0.10, BF = 0.28. Similarly, analyses of the 
probability of correct responses in the two-choice task revealed that there was no reliable difference 
between the beginning and the end of training, t(19) = -0.37, p = 0.715, gav = -0.09 BF = 0.25. 
Go
No-go
Two-choice
Stimulus-locked
Beginning
M
101
89
89
SD
16
17
14
End
M
97
88
89
SD
17
13
11
Test
M
100
87
86
SD
14
13
11
Response-locked
Beginning
M
101
-
86
SD
15
-
14
End
M
96
-
84
SD
15
-
12
Test
M
99
-
82
SD
16
-
12
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Table K.2. Overview of the behavioural data in the between-subjects EEG pilot experiment. Average reaction 
time (RT) for go and two-choice stimuli, probability of an accurate response in the two-choice task [p(correct)] 
and the probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task [p(respond|no-go)] as a function of task (go/
no-go, two-choice) and part (beginning, end, test). p(correct) is the ratio of correct two-choice trials to the 
number of correct and incorrect two-choice trials (missed trials are excluded). M = mean; SD = standard 
deviation. 
Test phase. RTs were numerically longer in the test phase than at the end of training (see Table 
K.2); this difference was marginally significant (p = 0.052; Table K.3). There was no reliable 
difference in RTs between the go and two-choice stimuli (p = 0.204; Table K.3) but the two-way 
interaction between stimulus and part did reach significance (p = 0.048; Table K.3). Follow-up 
analyses revealed that the cost in reaction times between the end of training and the test phase was 
significant for the two-choice stimuli, t(19) = -2.17, p = 0.043, gav = -0.42, BF = 1.57, but was not 
reliable in the go/no-go task, t(19) = 0.051, p = 0.960, gav = 0.01, BF = 0.23. Note, however, that 
although the Bayesian analyses revealed substantial support for the null hypothesis of no difference 
between the end of training and the test phase for the go stimuli, there was only anecdotal support for 
the alternative hypothesis for the two-choice stimuli. 
Analyses of choice accuracy in the two-choice task revealed no reliable difference between the 
end of training and the test phase, t(19) = 1.13, p = 0.272, gav = 0.21, BF = 0.41. Similarly, the 
probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task was higher in the test phase than at the 
end of training, t(19) = -2.40, p = 0.027, gav = -0.44, BF = 2.29. Thus, reversing the acquire stimulus-go 
and stimulus-response associations resulted in a small, but reliable cost in the two-choice and go/no-go 
tasks. 
Go
No-go
Two-choice
RT
Beginning
M
349
-
374
SD
42
-
60
End
M
339
-
344
SD
36
-
50
Test
M
338
-
368
SD
38
-
60
p(correct)
Beginning
M
-
-
0.83
SD
-
-
0.09
End
M
-
-
0.85
SD
-
-
0.06
Test
M
-
-
0.82
SD
-
-
0.08
p(respond|no-go)
Beginning
M
-
0.13
-
SD
-
0.02
-
End
M
-
0.12
-
SD
-
0.01
-
Test
M
-
0.15
-
SD
-
0.02
-
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Table K.3. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the reaction time data during the training phase and the test 
phase with part (end, test) as a within-subjects factor and stimulus (go, two-choice) as a between-subjects factor 
for the between-subjects EEG pilot experiment. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
ERP results
Figures K.1 presents the stimulus-locked grand average waveforms, Figure K.2 presents the mean 
average amplitudes and the peak latencies, and Figure K.3 presents the response-locked (lateralised) 
readiness potentials. Tables K.4- K.8 present overviews of the inferential statistics.
Training phase. As expected, the mean amplitude in the N2 range were less negative for the 
go stimuli than for the no-go stimuli (Figure K.1). Furthermore, consistent with the findings in 
Experiment 12, the amplitudes in the N2 range became less negative at the end of training than at the 
beginning of training (Table K.4). Analyses of the go and no-go stimuli showed that this difference was 
marginally significant in the comparison of the go and no-go stimuli (p = 0.075; Table K.4) and 
reached significance in the comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli (p < 0.001; Table K.4). 
Training phase
Test phase
Stimulus
Part
Task by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
38
38
38
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
4856.19
8296.48
1898.52
6221.90
2685.59
2784.12
Sum of 
squares 
error
147794.39
26933.67
26933.67
141710.69
25248.85
25248.85
F
1.25
11.71
2.68
1,67
4.04
4.19
p
0.271
0.002
0.110
0.204
0.052
0.048
gen. η2
0.027
0.045
0.011
0.036
0.016
0.016
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Table K.4. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the mean average amplitude in the N2 range (200-300 ms 
post-stimulus), in the P3a range (310-410 ms post-stimulus), and in the P3b range (300-400 ms) in the training 
phase in the EEG pilot experiment. In the comparison between the go and no-go stimuli, part (beginning, end) 
and stimulus (go, no-go) were within-subjects factors. In the comparison between the go and two-choice stimuli, 
part (beginning, end) is a within-subjects factor and stimulus (go, two-choice) is a between-subjects factor. ps < 
0.05 are highlighted in bold. 
N2 range: Mean amplitude
P3a range: Mean amplitude
P3b range: Mean amplitude
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
part
stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
73.18
18.01
2.22
0.69
95.44
16.28
36.64
48.55
0.53
31.40
7.32
108.17
175.46
28.14
0.20
35.77
0.048
30.65
Sum of 
squares 
error
73.19
96.51
29.22
877.33
170.34
170.34
177.47
225.34
36.18
1573.43
260.46
260.46
230.65
192.72
34.66
1809.94
310.44
310.44
F
19.00
3.54
1.44
0.03
21.29
3.63
3.92
4.09
0.28
0.76
1.07
15.78
14.45
2.77
0.11
0.75
0.01
3.75
p
< 0.001
0.075
0.244
0.864
< 0.001
0.064
0.062
0.057
0.604
0.389
0.308
< 0.001
0.001
0.112
0.742
0.392
0.939
0.060
gen. η2
0.091
0.024
0.003
0.001
0.083
0.015
0.018
0.024
< 0.001
0.016
0.004
0.056
0.099
0.017
< 0.001
0.017
< 0.001
0.014
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Figure K.1. (a) Stimulus-locked waveforms for the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli in the ERP pilot 
experiment as a function of part (beginning, end, test) in electrodes Fz, Cz, and Pz. The stimulus was presented at 
0 ms. 
Consistent with the pattern of results in Experiment 11, analyses of mean amplitudes in the P3a 
range revealed that amplitudes were numerically less positive at the end of training than at the 
beginning of training in the go/no-go task; this difference was marginally significant (p = 0.057; Table 
K.4). The main effect of part in the comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli was not significant (p 
= 0.308; Table K.4), but the two-way interaction between stimulus and part was reliable (p < 0.001). As 
can be seen in Figure K.2, amplitudes became more positive for the two-choice stimuli at the end of 
training, but became less positive at the end of training for the go stimuli. There were no overall 
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reliable differences between the beginning and the end of training on the amplitudes P3b range (ps ≥ 
0.112; Table K.4). In addition to training-effects on amplitudes, a comparison of the go and two-choice 
stimuli also showed an effect of training on peak latencies; amplitudes in the P3b range reached 50% of 
peak amplitudes 12 ms earlier at the end of training than at the beginning of training (p = 0.038; Table 
K.5). There were no main effects of part on the P3a peak latencies (ps ≥ 0.237; Table K.5). Note that I 
could not examine N2 peak latencies in this experiment because there was no identifiable peak minima, 
particularly for the go stimuli (see Analyses).
Consistent with Experiments 11 and 12, the analyses of the response-locked waveforms 
revealed no reliable main effect of part (p = 0.250; Table K.8) and Bayesian analyses supported the null 
hypothesis of no difference between the beginning and the end of training (BF = 0.32). There was also 
no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.412; Table K.8). Thus, it is unlikely 
that the differences observed for the two-choice stimuli are due to training-induced differences in 
processes related to motor preparation and execution. 
Table K.5. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked peak latencies in the P3a range (310-410 
ms post-stimulus), and in the P3b range (300-400 ms) in the training phase in the EEG pilot experiment. In the 
comparison between the go and no-go stimuli, part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go) are within-subjects 
factors. In the comparison between the go and two-choice stimuli, part (beginning, end) is a within-subjects 
factor and stimulus (go, two-choice) is a between-subjects factor. Note that unlike Experiments 11-12 I could not 
analyse peak latencies in the N2 range as there was no clear peak minima, particularly for the go stimuli. As these 
analyses were performed on jack-knifed averages, the F values were adjusted according to Fc = F/(n - 1)2, where 
n is the number of observations per cell (see Analyses section for a detailed explanation of this procedure). pcs < 
0.05 are highlighted in bold.
P3a: Peak latency
P3b: 50% peak latency
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
45.00
245.00
24.20
0.45
328.05
6.05
77.24
668.80
283.60
22.86
2936.58
2040.30
Sum of 
squares 
error
7.00
15.00
11.80
29.50
23.90
23.90
42.29
45.66
16.47
324.26
67.16
67.16
F
122.14
310.33
38.97
0.58
521.59
9.62
34.70
278.31
327.26
2.68
1661.58
1154.45
Fc
0.34
0.86
0.11
0.00
1.44
0.03
0.10
0.77
0.91
0.01
4.60
3.20
pc
0.568
0.365
0.746
0.968
0.237
0.871
0.760
0.391
0.353
0.932
0.038
0.082
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Figure K.2. Topographies for (a) the beginning minus end difference and (b) the end minus test difference as a 
function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) and analysed time-window (N2: 200-300 ms; P3a: 310-410 ms; P3b: 
300-400 ms) for the ERP pilot experiment.
Test phase. Consistent with Experiments 11 and 12, the mean amplitude in the N2 range was 
less negative for the go stimuli than for the no-go stimuli (p < 0.001; Table K.6; Figure K.1), the mean 
amplitude in the P3a range was more positive for the no-go stimuli than for the go stimuli (p = 0.021; 
Table K.6), and the mean amplitude in the P3b range was more positive for the go stimuli than for the 
no-go stimuli (p < 0.001; Table K.6). In the comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli, amplitudes in 
the P3b range were reliably less positive in the test phase than at the end of training (p = 0.009; Table 
K.6). Furthermore, there was a reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part on amplitudes in 
the P3a range (p = 0.001; Table K.6). Follow-up analyses revealed that amplitudes became reliably less 
positive for the two-choice stimuli, t(19) = 3.38, p = 0.003, gav = 0.39, BF = 13.71, but there was no 
reliable difference for the go stimuli, t(19) = -1.53, p = 0.142, gav = -0.20, BF = 0.63. There were also 
no reliable differences in the mean amplitudes in the N2, P3a, or P3b ranges between the end of 
training and the test phase in the comparisons of the go and no-go stimuli (ps ≥ 0.213; Table K.6) or in 
the mean amplitude in the N2 range comparison of the go and two-choice stimuli (p = 0.103; Table 
K.6). There were also no reliable main effects of part in the latency analyses (ps ≥ 0.120; Table K.2); 
and no reliable main effects of part in the response-locked waveforms (p = 0.614; Table K.8; Figure 
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K.5) and no reliable two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.299; Table K.5). Bayesian 
analyses supported the null hypothesis of no difference between the beginning and the end of training 
in the response-locked waveforms (BF = 0.19).
Figure K.3. Mean average amplitudes in the N2 range (200-300 ms), in the P3a range (310-410 ms), and in the 
P3b range (300-400 ms) in the ERP pilot experiment as a function of stimulus (go, no-go, two-choice) and part 
(beginning, end, test). Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure K.4. Peak latencies in the P3a range and in the P3b range. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. Note, 
due to the broad peak of the P3b component, I could not obtain an accurate peak latency, particularly for the no-
go stimuli. Therefore, I used the latency at 50% of peak amplitude (see Kiesel, Miller, et al., 2007).
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Figure K.5. Lateralised readiness potentials for the go and two-choice stimuli in the ERP pilot experiment as a function of part (beginning, end, test). The response was 
executed at 0 ms. 
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Table K.6. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the mean average amplitude in the N2 range (200-300 ms 
post-stimulus), in the P3a range (310-410 ms post-stimulus), and in the P3b range (300-400 ms) in the test phase 
in the EEG pilot experiment. In the comparison between the go and no-go stimuli, part (beginning, end) and 
stimulus (go, no-go) as within-subjects factors. In the comparison between the go and two-choice stimuli, part 
(beginning, end) is a within-subjects factor and stimulus (go, two-choice) is a between-subjects factor. ps < 0.05 
are highlighted in bold. 
N2 range: Mean amplitude
P3a range: Mean amplitude
P3b range: Mean amplitude
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
146.15
3.88
4.18
3.02
9.32
9.78
26.21
3.60
2.76
88.79
9.14
43.31
148.62
3.25
0.36
77.09
26.44
7.49
Sum of 
squares 
error
87.82
44.43
53.31
864.72
126.74
126.74
79.02
103.14
60.08
1554.00
127.78
127.78
98.35
57.82
47.81
2045.70
130.88
130.88
F
31.62
1.66
1.49
0.13
2.80
2.93
6.30
0.66
0.87
2.17
2.72
12.88
28.71
1.07
0.14
1.43
7.68
2.17
p
< 0.001
0.213
0.237
0.718
0.103
0.095
0.021
0.426
0.362
0.149
0.107
0.001
< 0.001
0.315
0.708
0.239
0.009
0.149
gen. η2
0.157
0.005
0.005
0.003
0.009
0.010
0.017
0.002
0.002
0.050
0.005
0.025
0.100
0.002
< 0.001
0.034
0.012
0.003
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Table K.7. Overview of the Analyses of Variance of the stimulus-locked peak latencies in the P3a range (310-410 
ms post-stimulus), and in the P3b range (300-400 ms) in the test phase in the EEG pilot experiment. In the 
comparison between the go and no-go stimuli, part (beginning, end) and stimulus (go, no-go) as within-subjects 
factors. In the comparison between the go and two-choice stimuli, part (beginning, end) is a within-subjects 
factor and stimulus (go, two-choice) is a between-subjects factor. As these analyses were performed on jack-
knifed averages, the F values were adjusted according to Fc = F/(n - 1)2, where n is the number of observations 
per cell (see Analyses section for a detailed explanation of this procedure). pcs < 0.05 are highlighted in bold.
Table K.8. Overview of the Analyses of Variance on the response-locked average amplitudes (-200, 0) in the ERP 
pilot experiment in the training phase and the test phase with part (beginning, end phases; end, test phases) as 
within-subjects factors and stimulus (go, two-choice) as a between-subjects factor. ps < 0.05 are highlighted in 
bold. 
Training phase
Test phase
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
38
38
38
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
0.04
0.92
0.46
0.04
0.27
1.15
Sum of 
squares 
error
350.81
25.60
25.60
301.42
39.41
39.41
F
0.00
1.36
0.69
0.00
0.26
1.11
p
0.950
0.250
0.412
0.944
0.614
0.299
gen. η2
< 0.001
0.003
0.002
< 0.001
0.001
0.003
P3a: Peak latency
P3b: 50% peak latency
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Go vs. No-go
Go vs. Two-choice
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Stimulus
Part
Stimulus by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
19
19
19
38
38
38
19
19
19
38
38
38
Sum of 
squares 
effect
344.45
54.45
48.05
8.45
31.25
36.45
59.43
1778.90
321.12
34.57
654.79
1190.80
Sum of 
squares 
error
8.55
10.55
4.95
41.10
18.30
18.30
65.58
35.41
57.16
364.99
45.89
45.89
F
765.44
98.06
184.43
7.81
64.89
75.69
17.22
954.52
106.74
3.60
542.25
986.14
Fc
2.12
0.27
0.51
0.02
0.18
0.21
0.05
2.64
0.30
0.01
1.50
2.73
pc
0.162
0.608
0.483
0.884
0.674
0.650
0.829
0.120
0.593
0.921
0.228
0.107
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Appendix L
Behavioural Control Experiment
This experiment served two purposes: (1) to investigate whether alternating between performance of 
the go/no-go task and the two-choice task on a block-by-block basis interferes with practice-effects on 
behavioural performance; and (2) to investigate whether increasing the number of stimuli in each task 
(and consequently the stimulus:response mappings) influenced the magnitude of the practice-effect on 
behavioural task performance (relative to Experiment 11). 
Method
Participants. Thirty-two right-handed volunteers from University of Exeter participated for 
monetary compensation (£5) or partial course credit (M = 20.59 years, SD = 3.60, 25 females). Five 
participants were removed and replaced; one due to technical problems with the stimulus presentation 
computer; four as their choice accuracy on two-choice trials was ≤ 65%.
Apparatus, stimuli, procedure, and analyses. The stimuli, apparatus, procedure, and 
analyses were identical to Experiment 11 except for the following: Participants were randomly 
allocated to the alternating condition or to the serial condition (between-subjects). In the alternating 
condition, participants alternated between performing the go/no-go task and the two-choice task on a 
block-by-block basis (as in Experiment 11, the order of the first block was counterbalanced); in the 
serial condition, half of the participants performed all the training blocks of the go/no-go task followed 
by all the training blocks of the two-choice task (and vice versa for the other half of participants). The 
stimuli consisted of four shapes and four coloured circles (stimuli S1-S4 in Figure 6.1). Each stimulus 
was presented 20 times per block; there was a two-to-one stimulus-to-response mapping in each task. 
For half of the participants, the coloured circles were used in the go/no-go task and the shapes in the 
two-choice task; for the other half, the shapes were used in the go/no-go task and the coloured circles 
in the two-choice task. The analyses were identical to Experiment 11, except that condition 
(alternating, serial) was included as a between-subjects factor. 
Results and Discussion
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table L.1 and inferential statistics are presented in Table L.2.
Analyses of RTs revealed that the main effect of part was significant (p < 0.001, Table L.2) 
indicating that mean RTs decreased with task practice (Table L.1). As expected, participants were faster 
to respond to go stimuli than to two-choice stimuli (p < 0.001; Table L.2), but there was no reliable 
two-way interaction between stimulus and part (p = 0.971; Table L.2). There was no reliable overall 
difference in mean RTs between the alternating and serial conditions (p = 0.061; Table L.2). Crucially, 
the two-way interaction between condition (alternating vs. serial) and part was not significant (p = 
0.659, Table L.2). Similarly, there was no reliable three-way interaction between condition, part, and 
task (p = 0.793; Table L.2). All other main effects and interactions were also not reliable (Table L.2).
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Table L.1. Overview of the behavioural data of the control experiment. Average go reaction time (RT) for go and 
two-choice stimuli, probability of an accurate response in the two-choice task [p(correct)] and the probability of 
responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task [p(respond|no-go)] as a function of condition (alternating task 
order, serial task order), task (go/no-go, two-choice) and part (beginning, end). Accuracy is the ratio of correct 
two-choice trials to the number of correct and incorrect two-choice trials (missed trials are excluded). M = mean; 
SD = standard deviation. 
Table L.2. Overview of the Analyses of Variance with task and part as within-subjects factors and condition 
(alternating task order, serial task order) as a between-subjects factor for the control experiment. ps < 0.05 are 
highlighted in bold. 
Table L.3 shows the outcome of the Bayesian ANOVA. As can be seen, the results are largely 
consistent with the ANOVA reported in Table L.2. Table L.3 shows that dropping the stimulus and part 
factors had a deleterious effect on the model. All other factors or interactions could be dropped. These 
analyses provide further support for the conclusion that alternating between performance of the go/no-
go and two-choice tasks does not influence the magnitude of practice-effects on RTs much. 
Alternating condition
Serial condition
Go
No-go
Two-choice
Go
No-go
Two-choice
RT
Beginning
M
368
-
418
393
-
449
SD
29
-
59
46
-
54
End
M
350
-
398
369
-
427
SD
24
-
57
39
-
60
p(correct)
Beginning
M
-
-
0.87
-
-
0.88
SD
-
-
0.07
-
-
0.06
End
M
-
-
0.90
-
-
0.85
SD
-
-
0.07
-
-
0.07
p(respond|no-go)
Beginning
M
-
0.97
-
-
0.97
-
SD
-
0.03
-
-
0.02
-
End
M
-
0.96
-
-
0.96
-
SD
-
0.02
-
-
0.03
-
Reaction times
p(respond|no-go)
Two-choice accuracy
Condition
Part
Stimulus
Condition by part
Condition by stimulus
Part by stimulus
Condition by part by stimulus
Condition
Part
Condition by part
Condition
Part
Condition by part
Df1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Df2
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
30
Sum of 
squares 
effect
22297.55
13848.65
90252.25
115.08
618.86
0.54
26.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.00
Sum of 
squares 
error
177005.08
17377.98
70035.67
17377.98
70035.67
11888.07
11888.07
0.04
0.00
0.00
0.25
0.05
0.05
F
3.77
23.91
38.66
0.20
0.27
0.00
0.07
1.46
2.09
0.59
1.22
0.16
3.98
p
0.061
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.659
0.610
0.971
0.793
0.236
0.158
0.450
0.278
0.900
0.024
gen. η2
0.075
0.048
0.246
< 0.001
0.002
< 0.001
< 0.001
0.041
0.008
0.002
0.033
0.000
0.029
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In addition to analysing RTs, I also analysed choice accuracy in the two-choice task and the 
probability of responding on no-go trials in the go/no-go task. There was no reliable main effect of part 
in choice accuracy in the two-choice task (p = 0.900; Table L.2) and no reliable difference between 
overall choice accuracy in the alternating and serial task order conditions (p = 0.278; Table L.2). The 
two-way interaction between condition and part did reach significance (p = 0.024; Table L.2). As can 
be seen in Table L.1, choice accuracy numerically increased between the beginning and the end of 
training in the alternating condition, but numerically decreased between the beginning and the end of 
training in the serial condition. However, follow-up comparisons revealed that the main effect of part 
was not reliable in the alternating condition, t(15) = -1.62, p = 0.126, gav = -0.35, BF = 0.75, or in the 
serial condition, t(15) = 1.78, p = 0.096, gav = 0.31, BF = 0.92. Consistent with previous results (see 
Chapter 5), there was no reliable difference in the p(respond|no-go) between the beginning of training 
and the end of training (p = 0.158; Table L.2). Furthermore, there was no reliable main effect of 
condition (p = 0.236; Table L.2) and no reliable two-way interaction between part and condition (p = 
0.450; Table L.2). Thus, even when task difficulty was increased, choice accuracy and the p(respond|
no-go) did not change with task practice.
Table L.3. Bayesian ANOVA for the reaction time data (for the go and two-choice stimuli).
Omitted factor(s)
Stimulus
Part
Condition
Condition:part
Condition:stimulus
Condition:part:stimulus
Part:stimulus
Bayes Factor
0.00
0.00
0.48
1.78
2.46
2.65
4.35
Confidence interval
±88.02%
±57.20%
±45.34%
±42.18%
±44.98%
±44.26%
±42.56%
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how stimulus-stop associations are acquired and to explore the 
conditions under which stop learning influences behaviour. Three main outstanding issues were 
addressed: (1) what is learned in response inhibition tasks; (2) the role of expectancies during stop 
learning; and (3) the specificity of stop learning. In this chapter, I summarise how the research 
presented in this thesis contributes to our understanding of each of these issues, highlight some 
limitations, and provide some suggestions for future research. 
What is Learned?
A recent review proposed that there are at least two pathways through which learning could arise in 
response inhibition tasks (Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014; for a visual depiction of these pathways, see 
Figure 1.4, Chapter 1); the direct pathway in which an unmediated link is formed between a specific 
stimulus and the stop goal, and the indirect pathway in which a link is formed between a stimulus and 
the stop goal that is mediated via a representation of whatever stop-signal or no-go category is used in 
the experimental task. According to this framework, the acquisition of direct associations would result 
in the automatic retrieval of the stop goal from memory following the presentation of stop-associated 
stimuli (i.e. the original ‘automatic inhibition’ hypothesis; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) whereas the 
acquisition of indirect associations would result in priming of stop-signal detection or some (weak) 
activation of the stop goal if the link is strong enough. Thus, these pathways have important 
implications for understanding what is learned in response inhibition tasks. One of the main 
contributions of this thesis was to investigate whether there is any evidence to support the existence of 
these proposed associative pathways.
Can Participants Acquire Direct (Stimulus-Stop) Associations?
Most previous research in the stop learning literature could not distinguish between the direct and the 
indirect pathways because the stop signal or no-go category remained the same throughout task 
performance (e.g. Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al., 2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Therefore, in 
Chapter 2 (Experiments 1-4) I developed a task that combined features of the go/no-go task and the 
stop-signal task in which the stop signal rule changed at the beginning of each block.
Across four experiments, I showed that responding on go trials was slower and that the 
probability of responding on stop trials was lower for stop-associated items than for go-associated 
items and control items (that were not particularly associated with either go or stop; for the specific 
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contingencies, see Table 2.1). As the representation of the stop signal was constantly changing, I 
conclude that the most parsimonious explanation for these findings is that participants acquired a direct 
association between the stop-associated stimuli and the stop goal, rather than an association between 
the stop-associated stimuli and the representation of a single signal representation. Together, these 
findings provide the strongest evidence to date for the original ‘automatic inhibition’ hypothesis that 
participants can learn direct stimulus-stop associations that are not mediated via a single stop signal 
representation. More generally, the idea that response inhibition can become a ‘learned reflex’ 
contributes to a growing body of research suggesting that control functions, such as response 
inhibition, interference control, and task switching, can rely on both bottom-up control and top-down 
control60 (for an overview, see Chapter 5).
Can Participants Acquire Indirect (Stimulus-Signal) Associations?
The potential for stimulus-signal associations could suggest that previously observed RT slowing and 
neural activations (e.g. Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, et al., 2011) for stop-associated stimuli could be 
mediated by a link between the stimulus, the stop signal, and the stop goal. Thus, the issue of whether 
participants can acquire stimulus-signal associations plays an important role in our understanding of 
what is learned in response inhibition tasks. 
In Experiments 7-8 (Chapter 4), I present a direct investigation of whether participants could 
acquire associations between specific stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal. In addition to 
manipulating the contingencies between specific stimuli and the stop goal (as in typical stop learning 
tasks; e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 5), I also manipulated the contingencies between 
the stop- and go-associated stimuli and the spatial location of the stop/go signal. If participants could 
acquire stimulus-signal associations in this task, I predicted that (1) performance would improve during 
training for items consistent paired with the same signal location compared with items paired with two 
signal locations with equal probability (Experiment 7) and (2) performance would be better on trials 
where the signal appeared in the trained signal location than on trials where the signal appeared in the 
untrained location (Experiment 8). However, I found no evidence to support these predictions and 
Bayesian analyses provided support for the null hypotheses of no difference. Importantly, despite 
finding no evidence to support the idea that participants acquired stimulus-signal associations, there 
was reliable evidence in both experiments that participants acquired the stimulus-stop/go associations61. 
60. For example, in the task-switching domain Logan and colleagues argued that, in addition to top-down 
reconfiguration, switching between tasks could also be achieved via the retrieval of acquired associations 
between cues, stimuli, and responses (Logan & Bundesen, 2003; Schneider & Logan, 2005).
61. To maximise the number of stimulus-signal training trials, there were no control items (that were not 
particularly associated with stopping or going) in Experiments 7-8. Consequently, I could not distinguish between 
stimulus-stop and stimulus-go learning. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, it is likely that learning in response 
inhibition tasks reflects some combination of both stimulus-stop and stimulus-go learning. 
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Taken together, the findings reported in Chapter 4 clearly demonstrate that participants did not acquire 
associations between specific stimuli and the spatial location of the stop signal. 
Nevertheless, it could be possible that the paradigm used in Experiments 7-8 (Chapter 4) may 
have underestimated the contribution of stimulus-signal learning. After all, the pattern of behavioural 
results obtained in Experiment 8 is consistent with the predictions of the indirect pathway (i.e. an effect 
of learning on stop performance but no effect of learning on go performance). Thus, one could perhaps 
argue that the paradigm used in Experiments 7-8 was not sensitive enough to detect attentional shifts 
on the basis of the stimulus-signal associations or that the stop/go task used in Experiments 7-8 does 
not well generalise to the kind of tasks that are used in the majority of stop learning studies. However, I 
suggest that this explanation is unlikely on the basis of the findings reported in Chapter 3. 
In Experiments 5-6 (Chapter 3), I adapted a paradigm developed to investigate the role of 
signal detection processes in top-down response inhibition (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). In this 
study, the stop signal was always presented in the periphery of the screen. The introduction of a 
perceptual distractor manipulation meant that it was possible to identify whether participants adjusted 
their attentional settings to detect the stop signal during task performance (as reflected by an increased 
distractor effect when participants expected a stop signal to appear in the periphery; see Verbruggen, 
Stevens, et al., 2014). The use of the perceptual distractor manipulation was a particularly good way to 
to test the main prediction of the indirect (stimulus-signal) pathway that the presentation of stop-
associated should prime the detection of the stop signal; if participants acquired stimulus-signal 
associations, the distractor effect on no-signal trials should have been larger following the presentation 
of stop-associated (80%-stop) items than following the presentation of go-associated (20%-stop) items. 
In Chapter 3, I found clear evidence that item-specific stop learning influenced task performance and 
expectancy ratings obtained following task completion. However, there was no evidence that the 
distractors influenced performance more for the go-associated stimuli than for the stop-associated 
stimuli. Thus even if we assume that participants acquired stimulus-signal associations in this task, the 
effects of mediation on performance were negligible. 
Combined, the research presented in this thesis provides no clear support for the stimulus-
signal pathway (for similar conclusions, see Bowditch, unpublished PhD thesis). It might be possible to 
salvage evidence for the stimulus-signal route if we assume that stimulus-signal learning prioritises 
certain features of the stop signal (e.g. colour) more than others. In support of this suggestion, research 
in the visual attention domain has suggested that attentional selection can occur on the basis of 
independent features, with colour and shape gaining priority over spatial location (Andersen, Müller, & 
Hillyard, 2009; Kasten, & Navon, 2008; Saenz, Buracas, & Boynton, 2002). To investigate this 
suggestion in the context of stimulus-signal learning, it could be informative to cue attention to various 
signal attributes (e.g. colour, shape, location, orientation) on trial-by-trial basis (for an example, see 
Muller, Reimann, & Krummenacher, 2003). Cueing attention to various signal attributes would allow 
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future research to directly investigate the possibility that some features of the signal representation may 
mediate the stimulus-stop association more strongly than other features. Nevertheless, it is important to 
highlight that even if it does turn out that the effects of mediation are stronger for some stimulus 
attributes than others, this would suggest that the stimulus-signal pathway operates under very 
restricted conditions. Thus, on the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis, the idea that response 
inhibition will always operate through the indirect (stimulus-signal) pathway when the stimulus-stop 
associations are mediated via a single representation of the stop signal throughout training seems 
highly unlikely. 
Given that evidence for stimulus-signal learning is weak, an important issue is raised: why 
does stimulus-stop learning sometimes influence stop performance but not go performance (e.g. as in 
Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014, Experiment 2)? In Chapter 4, I suggested an alternative explanation that 
could account for an effect of stop learning on stop performance, but not on go performance. 
According to the race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984; see Modelling Performance in Response 
Inhibition Tasks, Chapter 1), performance of response inhibition tasks depends on a balance between 
going and stopping; increasing the go response threshold will increase the finishing time of the go 
process and decrease the probability of responding on stop trials; decreasing the go response threshold 
will decrease the finishing time of the go process and increase the probability of responding on stop 
trials (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; see also Ratcliff, 1978). In other words, the probability of 
responding on stop trials is sensitive to the go RT distribution. Thus, it is possible that stop learning 
could primarily influence the fastest RTs because when responses are slowed as a consequence of 
strategic waiting the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations would no longer have an effect. In other 
words, strategic waiting and automatic slowing could be non-additive factors on performance. It is 
therefore possible that if stop learning primarily influences the fastest reaction times in the distribution, 
the effects of stop learning could manifest in the probability of responding on stop trials, but have no 
substantial effect on the go RT (which represents the mean of the whole go RT distribution). If this 
were the case, differences between the effects of learning on go and stop performance (e.g. as observed 
in Verbruggen, Best, et al., 2014, Experiment 2; see also Experiment 4, Chapter 2) would not reflect the 
acquisition qualitatively different kinds of learning than in other stop learning experiments, but rather 
differences in the sensitives of go RTs and the probability of responding on stop trials to stimulus-stop 
learning. To provide an initial test of this idea, I plotted RT distributions for the item-specific stop 
learning experiments presented in this thesis. As can be seen in Appendix M, there is some evidence to 
suggest that when the stimulus-stop contingencies are acquired via task practice (i.e. under uninstructed 
conditions) the slowing for the stop-associated items emerges (numerically) at the fast end of the RT 
distribution (see also Experiment 4, Figure B.4, Appendix B). However, it is important to note that 
(consistent with the RT distribution under instructed conditions; see Figure M.1), the RT distributions 
for Experiments 1-3 (Figure B.1-B.3, Appendix B) showed the reverse pattern: the slowing for the 
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stop-associated stimuli emerged at the slow end of the distribution. Therefore, to test this idea more 
directly in future research, it could be useful to use a paradigm in which there would be training phase 
whereby the stimulus-stop mappings are consistent. In a subsequent test phase there would be one 
condition in which successful stopping would be rewarded over fast go responding (stop-reward) and 
other condition in which fast go response would be rewarded over successful stopping (go-reward). If 
the latency of the go response plays a role, it follows that the slowing for the old stop-associated items 
would be greater in the go-reward condition than in the stop-reward condition. 
Is Stop Learning Special?
It was recently suggested that one of the biggest problems in the action control literature is that 
researchers often fall into the trap of referring to general constructs, such as ‘inhibition’ without 
specifying what the underlying mechanisms are (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). Consistent with 
this idea, the effects of training are often explained in terms of strengthening or improving general 
constructs, such as ‘inhibitory control’, rather than specifying how the processes underlying action 
control are influenced by training. In this thesis, I aimed to advance on this position by considering 
whether the effects of learning are specific to inhibition tasks or whether they represent task-general 
(non-inhibition) effects. To this end, Experiments 9-12 compared the effects of training in the go/no-go 
and two-choice tasks. Several studies have suggested that response selection and response inhibition in 
these tasks are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (e.g. Mostofsky & Simmonds, 2008) and similar training/
test phase effects to those found in the go/no-go task have also been found in non-inhibition (go only) 
tasks (e.g. Horner & Henson, 2009). However, the effects of learning in the go/no-go and two-choice 
tasks had not previously been compared in the same experimental design. Thus, it was previously 
impossible to draw any conclusions about the specificity of learning in response inhibition tasks as 
similarities (or indeed differences) between inhibition and non-inhibition tasks could be due to 
between-experiment effects. Furthermore, it was not possible to determine whether the similar 
behavioural effects observed for the inhibition and non-inhibition tasks could be attributed to the same 
underlying (neural) processes. 
Therefore, in Experiments 9-10 (Chapter 5), I compared performance (between-subjects) in the 
go/no-go (inhibition) and two-choice (non-inhibition) tasks during a training phase in which the 
stimulus category determined how the participants should respond and in a test phase where the 
acquired associations were reversed (for further details of the experimental design, see Mediation via a 
Category Representation, Chapter 7). Importantly, the results showed similar improvements in 
performance during the training phase in both the go/no-go and two-choice tasks. Furthermore, the 
difference between the congruent and the incongruent test items62 was small (but reliable) in both tasks 
62. For the ‘congruent items’ the response remained the same between the training and test phases; for the 
‘incongruent items’ the response changed between the training and test phases. 
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(Experiment 9) or absent in both tasks (Experiment 10). The similarity between effects of training in 
the go/no-go and two-choice tasks is consistent with memory-retrieval accounts which suggest that, as 
a function of task practice, performance shifts from entirely rule-based, algorithmic processing towards 
performance on the basis of retrieved instances from memory (Logan, 1988, 1990). However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, non-specific training effects are likely to also contribute to behavioural 
improvements during the training phase of both tasks. 
However, similarities in the behavioural outcomes of training in these tasks do not necessarily 
mean that the same (neural) mechanisms were in play across inhibition and non-inhibition tasks. 
Furthermore, Experiments 9-10 used a between-subjects design in which participants were randomly 
assigned to the go/no-go task group or to the two-choice task group. Although this allowed for the 
inclusion of the test phase63, it left open the possibility that the observed behavioural similarities were 
the result of indirect consequences of task performance (such as fatigue) rather than due to the effects 
of learning. 
Therefore, in Experiments 11-12 (Chapter 6), I used event-related potentials to investigate 
whether the neural signatures of go/no-go and two-choice task performance were similarly influenced 
by training. I used a within-subjects design in these experiments in which participants alternated 
between performance of the go/no-go task and the two-choice task on a block-by-block basis to reduce 
any between-task confounds. In the analyses of the ERP data, I focussed on the N2 and P3 components 
as these components have been linked to processes required for performance of both the go/no-go task 
and the two-choice task (for an overview, see Chapter 6). Analyses of the ERP data showed similar 
effects of training on the N2 and P3a components across the go, no-go, and two-choice stimuli; the N2 
component was less negative at the end of training than at the beginning of training and the P3a 
component was more positive at the end of training than at the beginning of training. The observed 
pattern ERP of results fits with the common interpretation that the N2 component reflects conflict 
monitoring processes (Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, et al., 2003; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004),and the 
P3a reflects the attentional processes involved in memory updating (Polich, 2007). Furthermore, these 
findings were consistent with other ERP research that previously investigated the effects of training in 
the go/no-go task (Benikos, unpublished PhD thesis; Benikos, Johnstone, et al., 2013). However, it is 
also important to note that I also found some differences between the go, two-choice stimuli, and no-go 
stimuli; whilst the P3b component was more positive at the end of training than at the beginning of 
training for the go and two-choice stimuli, there was no change between the beginning and the end of 
training for the no-go stimuli. One interpretation of the P3b component is that it reflects the formation 
of links between stimuli and a specific (motor) response (Verleger, Jaskowski, & Wascher, 2005). Thus, 
it plausible that this component would index additional effects of training for go and two-choice stimuli 
63. It would not have been possible to include a test phase in a within-subjects version as the results would have 
most likely been confounded by order-effects of task performance. 
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(where a motor response was required) than for no-go stimuli. Importantly, these results suggest that 
similar general processes are involved in the acquisition of associations in inhibition and non-inhibition 
tasks. However, learning to respond (on go trials in the go/no-go task and on all trials in the two-choice 
task) may additionally influence processes relating to motor responding.
From Associations to Behaviour
In addition to considering the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations, it 
is also important to consider the mechanisms through which acquired stimulus-stop associations could 
influence behaviour. Therefore, in this section, I discuss what the research presented in this thesis tells 
us about how stimulus-stop learning could influence task performance. Firstly, I discuss the 
contribution of this thesis to theoretical models of stop learning; secondly, I discuss the role of 
expectancies in mediating the link between associations and behaviour. 
How do Stimulus-Stop Associations Influence Behaviour?
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) suggested that the effects of stop learning on behaviour can be 
explained by the interactive race model64 (Boucher, Palmeri, et al., 2007; for an extended discussion of 
this model, see Modelling Performance in Response Inhibition Tasks, Chapter 1): following training, 
the go unit can be activated via the retrieval of an association between the go stimulus and going, and 
the stop association can be activated via the retrieval of an association between the go stimulus and 
stopping. Following the retrieval of the stimulus-stop association, activation in the stop unit slows the 
rate of accumulation in the go unit, increasing go RTs relative to control stimuli that were not 
particularly associated with either stopping or going. Note that this interpretation assumes that the 
activation of the stop unit is weaker when it is incorrectly activated on go trials than when it is 
correctly activated on no-go or stop-signal trials, which explains why go responding is slowed down 
following the retrieval of a stimulus-stop association but is not (or is only occasionally) completely 
inhibited. This suggests that there is an interplay between top-down control (activated on the basis of 
the go stimulus) and bottom-up control (activated via the retrieval of the stimulus-stop association). 
The findings reported in Experiments 1-6 (Chapters 2 & 3) are consistent with the predictions of this 
model; the presentation of stop-associated items under uninstructed conditions slowed responding on 
go trials but did not result in outright stopping (i.e. there was no increased probability of missed 
responses for the stop-associated items).
64. To briefly recap, response inhibition can be modelled as a race between a ‘go’ process triggered by the 
presentation of the go stimulus and a ‘stop’ process triggered by the presentation of the no-go stimulus or the stop 
signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984). The key premise is that the process that finishes first determines whether a 
response is executed or not: when the stop process finishes before the go process, response inhibition is 
successful; when the go process finishes before the stop process, response inhibition is unsuccessful. According 
to the interactive race model, the go and stop process remain independent for the majority of their latencies 
before they interact towards the end. 
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION
279
However, whilst the interactive race model can account for the effects of stop learning under 
uninstructed (implicit) conditions, the findings of Experiments 5-6 (Chapter 3) suggest that the slowing 
for stop-associated items could operate through a slightly different mechanism when the stimulus-stop 
contingencies are acquired via explicit instruction. In Chapter 3, analyses of task performance on no-
signal trials revealed that, alongside the expected slowing for the stop-associated (80%-stop) items, 
accuracy was also lower for the stop-associated items than for the other item types when the stimulus-
stop associations were acquired through explicit task instructions. There was no evidence of this 
accuracy effect in the uninstructed condition. In Chapter 3, I proposed that these results can be 
explained by the blocked-input model of response inhibition (Logan, Yamaguchi, et al., 2015); 
consistent with the interactive race model, the blocked-input account predicts decreased go activity 
following the presentation of stop-associated stimuli. However, the blocked-input model suggests that 
decreased go activity is achieved by removing input to the go unit rather than by slowing the rate of 
accumulation in the go unit. Thus, when input to the relevant go unit is blocked, the probability of the 
incorrect response (and indeed the probability of a missed response) may increase. Future research is 
required to test this blocked-input idea and to examine whether similar effects on go accuracy that are 
observed under instructed conditions would also emerge under uninstructed conditions with sufficient 
training. 
More generally, the accuracy data obtained in Chapter 3 highlights an unanswered question: do 
stimulus-stop associations have a specific or a global effect on go performance? The aforementioned 
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) theoretical interpretation suggests that stimulus-stop associations that 
are acquired through task practice may have a global effect on responding (i.e. inhibit all go responses). 
Consistent with this idea, research in the sequential after-effects literature shows that the retrieval of 
(implicit) stimulus-stop associations acquired on a ‘prime’ trial influenced performance on a 
subsequent ‘probe’ trial regardless of the specific keypress response that was inhibited on the prime 
trial (Giesen & Rothermund, 2014; for an extended discussion of this experiment, see Does Stimulus-
Stop Learning Have a Global or Specific Effect on Responding?, Chapter 1). However, the research 
presented in Chapter 3 suggests that when participants have explicit instructed awareness of the 
stimulus-stop contingencies, the contingencies could have more selective effects on go responding (i.e. 
stop left keypress). Consistent with this idea, it has been shown that stopping becomes more selective 
when participants have foreknowledge of which response to stop, but employ a global stopping 
mechanism when they do not have such foreknowledge (Aron & Verbruggen, 2008). 
Although very speculative, this could indicate that stimulus-stop associations acquired through 
task practice could operate through different neural pathways to stimulus-stop associations acquired 
through task instructions. For example, Aron and Verbruggen (2008) suggest that that global stopping 
engages the ‘hyperdirect’ neural pathway (between the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia) whereas 
selective stopping engages the ‘indirect’ neural pathway (between the thalamus, external and internal 
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globus pallidus, and subthalmic nucleus; for further details of these pathways, see The Neural 
Mechanisms of Response Inhibition, Chapter 1). This stimulus-stop associations acquired via 
experience could operate through the ‘hyperdirect’ pathway whereas stimulus-stop associations 
acquired via task instructions could operate through the ‘indirect’ pathway. Future research could 
utilise neuroimaging techniques to test this idea.
What Role do Expectancies Play in Stop Learning? 
Evidence that participants generate expectancies that are consistent with the stimulus-stop 
contingencies could indicate that the response slowing for old stop items is due to strategic top-down 
effects rather than the development of bottom-up control (as originally assumed by Verbruggen and 
Logan (2008a); see Chapter 1). Yet, prior to the research presented in this thesis, the role of 
expectancies in stop learning tasks had not been investigated. One of the main contributions of this 
thesis was to investigate the role of expectancies during stop learning. 
Across eight experiments presented in this thesis (Experiments 1-8), I found that participants 
generated expectancies that were consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies in play following task 
completion (Experiments 1-3, 5-8) or during task completion (Experiment 4). However, in Chapter 3 I 
found that evidence of expectancies do not necessarily indicate that the slowing for stop-associated 
items is the result of controlled, explicit processes rather than automatic processes. To examine the 
contributions of explicit expectancies and learning, I introduced a between-subjects expectancy 
manipulation in which one group of participants were informed about the stimulus-stop contingencies 
(instructed group) whereas another group did not receive any information about the stimulus-stop 
contingencies (uninstructed group). The results showed that the stimulus-stop contingencies influenced 
task performance under both instructed and uninstructed conditions and participants in both conditions 
generated expectancies that were consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies. However, these 
experiments also highlighted some differences: in the instructed condition, the expectancy ratings 
correlated with task performance whereas in the uninstructed condition, the expectancy ratings did not 
correlate with performance. These results suggest that the effect of stimulus-stop contingencies on 
behaviour can arise from explicit, top-down expectancies or from learning through experience. 
However, it is important to note that although these findings suggest different contributions of 
explicit and implicit processes to stop learning under instructed and uninstructed conditions, they do 
not necessarily provide conclusive evidence that explicit and implicit processes have a separable 
influence on learning under these conditions. In future research, it would therefore be beneficial to 
further distinguish between the relative contributions of explicit and implicit processes during 
uninstructed item-specific stop learning. One feature of explicit processing is that it is resource-
intensive (e.g. McLaren, Green, & Mackintosh, 1994). For example, Waldron and Ashby (2001) found 
that the execution of a concurrent task (a numerical Stroop task) resulted in a larger decrement on 
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performance in a rule based task than in an information-integration task. The inclusion of a concurrent 
load manipulation during the acquisition of uninstructed stimulus-stop associations could be an 
effective way to examine the contribution of implicit (automatic) processes and rule-based processes to 
learning.
Another outstanding issue that arises from the expectancy data presented in this thesis concerns 
the extent to which the expectancy ratings obtained under uninstructed conditions reflect awareness of 
the stimulus-stop contingencies in play. It is notable that whilst the expectancy ratings obtained under 
uninstructed conditions were consistent with the stimulus-stop associations in play, the differences 
between the stimulus-types were numerically small especially relative to the differences observed 
under instructed conditions (Chapter 3). Consequently, I assumed that the effects of the stimulus-stop 
contingencies on expectancy ratings under uninstructed conditions were not necessarily indicative of 
conscious, verbalisable awareness of the stimulus-stop contingencies. However, I did not directly test 
this assumption. Furthermore, even if the expectancy ratings did not capture awareness in these tasks, 
this does not rule out the possibility that the expectancy ratings would begin to reflect explicit 
awareness in longer-term training designs. Indeed, it has been suggested that associative learning 
processes can give rise to conscious representations as learning develops (Perruchet, 2015). Note, 
however, that follow-up tests reported in Chapter 3 showed no reliable correlation between the 
expectancy ratings and task performance in final part of training in the uninstructed condition 
suggesting that this explanation cannot entirely account for the differences observed between the 
instructed and the uninstructed conditions. Nevertheless, future research should examine the extent to 
which the expectancy ratings capture conscious awareness of stimulus-stop associations. Dienes (2008) 
suggests that in order to show evidence for unconscious knowledge one must be able to show that a 
person has knowledge but does not know they have it (the ‘guessing criterion’). Thus it would be 
beneficial to obtain confidence ratings for each stimulus-stop expectancy rating; if the effects of the 
stimulus-stop contingencies on expectancy ratings are reliable but the person believes that they are 
guessing (i.e. the confidence ratings are not above baseline), this would provide much stronger 
evidence for the conclusion that participants are not explicitly aware of the contingencies under 
uninstructed conditions.
Furthermore, if it does turn out that these expectancies reflect awareness, it is important to 
consider whether awareness of the contingencies means that inhibition driven by the stimulus-stop 
contingencies is no longer automatic. For example, Tzelgov (1997) argued that awareness does not 
necessarily mean that performance is not automatic. Instead, Tzelgov argued that the defining feature 
of non-automatic processing is ‘monitoring’ and not awareness. In this context, monitoring refers to 
‘the intentional setting of the goal of behaviour and to intentional evaluation of the outcome of the 
process’ (Tzelgov, 1997, p. 444). Furthermore, research in the associative learning domain suggests 
that main difference between the stimulus-stop learning under aware and unaware conditions could be 
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the kind of representation that is linked with the stimulus: an abstract, rule-like representation (X–‘if x 
then stop’), or more concrete stimulus–response associations (X–stop; McLaren, et al., 1994; see also 
Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). In other words, even if subjects are aware of the contingencies, 
this does not necessarily imply that an entirely different form of learning has taken place compared 
with situations in which subjects were not aware of the contingencies.
Top-Down and Bottom-Up Influences on Response Inhibition
One of the major contributions of the research presented in this thesis is to highlight that learning in 
response inhibition tasks depends on an interplay of top-down and bottom-up influences. In this 
section, I integrate some of these findings and propose how top-down and bottom-up control could 
interact during stimulus-detection and action selection stages to influence what is learned in response 
inhibition and when stop learning influences in behaviour. A visual depiction of these ideas is presented 
in Figure 7.1.
Stimulus Detection
In Chapter 2, I proposed that attention may be necessary for stimulus-stop associations to be retrieved 
from memory. In Experiments 1-3, I found no evidence that the acquired stimulus-stop associations 
influenced task performance in the test phase (when the mappings were reversed), despite effects of 
learning in the training phase and on expectancy ratings obtained following task completion. The 
presence of an effect of stimulus-stop learning in the expectancy ratings suggests that participants had 
not forgotten the stimulus-stop associations in the test phase. However, unlike in other stop learning 
experiments in the literature, Experiments 1-3 did not require participants to attend to the stop-
associated stimuli meaning that participants could have begun to ignore the stop-associated stimuli 
without impairing overall task performance. Consistent with this possibility, there was some evidence 
to suggest that the influence of stimulus-stop learning began to diminish towards the end of the training 
phase (Experiment 1 & Experiment 3). In Experiment 4, I made some changes to the task design to 
encourage participants to attend to the stop-associated stimuli; the stop-associated stimuli were 
presented before the stop or go signals and participants were required to provide an expectancy rating 
on each trial. The results showed a clear effect of stimulus-stop learning in both the training phase (on 
the p(respond|stop) and expectancy ratings) and test phase (on go RTs, the p(respond|stop), and on 
expectancy ratings) in this experiment. The idea that top-down attentional settings might play a role in 
mediating the effects of stimulus-stop learning on behaviour is consistent with theoretical evidence. 
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For example, the Instance theory suggests that processing episodes will only be retrieved from memory 
if participants attend to each stimulus presentation (Logan, 1988; Logan & Etherton, 1994)65. 
It is plausible that when the stop-associated stimuli are task-irrelevant (Experiments 1-3) or the 
task demands rapid responding (Experiments 9-10) participants can apply a ‘selection bias’ towards a 
specific stimulus attribute. In the visual attention literature, it is an established idea that stimulus 
representations held in working memory can enable top-down control of attentional settings via the 
activation of cells selective for the features of the stimulus held within the representation (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). These settings can be flexibly adjusted; for example, behavioural experiments show 
that during task performance participants can dynamically change the attentional weights for specific 
stimulus attributes in accordance with task demands (Olivers & Eimer, 2011). 
Consistent with this ‘selection bias’ idea, research in the stop learning literature suggests that 
not only is the task-relevance of the stimuli important for stop learning (see above) but so is the relative 
importance of the go and stop processes. Benikos and colleagues demonstrated that in conditions where 
the go response deadline was easy (1000 ms) or medium difficulty (500 ms) the amplitudes of the N1 
component66 for the go and no-go stimuli were the same at the end of training (Benikos, Johnstone, et 
al., 2013). However, when the go response deadline was strict (300 ms) the amplitude of the N1 
component was reduced (i.e. less negative) for the no-go stimuli relative to the go stimuli at the end of 
training. Note that there was no difference between the N1 amplitudes between the go and no-go 
stimuli at the beginning of training. Benikos, Johnstone, et al. suggest that participants in the strict 
deadline condition directed attention away from the no-go stimuli and towards the the go stimuli in 
order to respond within the strict deadline. In other words, participants adjusted the attentional 
weighting of features corresponding to the go and no-go stimuli to prioritise attentional processing of 
the go stimuli (for similar ERP effects, see Manuel, Grivel, et al., 2010). 
However, attention to the stop-associated stimuli is unlikely to be influenced by only top-down 
factors, it is highly plausible that attention is influenced by bottom-up factors (driven by the acquisition 
of the stimulus-stop associations) as well. Consistent with this suggestion, it has been shown that 
attentional selection can be modulated by past experiences, including learning (Awh, Belopolsky, & 
Theeuwes, 2012). For example, research in the associative learning literature shows that stimuli that 
are predictive of a given response outcome capture attention faster than stimuli that do not consistently 
predict the same outcome (Le Pelley, Vadillo, & Luque, 2013). Thus, stimuli that are consistently 
associated with stopping could capture attention faster than stimuli that are paired with both stopping 
65. As discussed in Chapter 1, Giesen and Rothermund (2014) found that the identity of a task-irrelevant 
stimulus could become associated with stopping and influence task performance. However, the argument here is 
that participants can strategically bias attention away from stimulus attributes in accordance with top-down goals. 
Thus, although the task-irrelevance of the stop-associated stimuli is sufficient to induce a strategic bias, it is not 
an inevitable consequence. 
66. The N1 component is sensitive to perceptual features of a stimuli and can be modulated by attention 
(Näätänen and Picton, 1987).
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and going with equal probability due to the ‘learned predictiveness’ of the stop-associated stimuli. 
Another way stimulus-stop learning could influence stimulus detection is via a link between the 
appetitive/aversive systems (for an overview, see Alternative routes, below). For example, it has been 
shown that the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations could devalue and decrease the motivational 
value of stop-associated stimuli (Ferrey, Frischen, & Fenske, 2012; Veling, Aarts, et al., 2013a; Veling, 
Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008. This could indirectly influence attention to stop-associated stimuli; 
for example, it has been shown that the predicted value of a stimulus influences how much attention is 
paid to it, with attention preferentially allocated to motivationally-relevant stimuli (e.g. Fenske & 
Eastwood, 2003). Thus, if (and when) devaluation does occur, this could indicate that attention to the 
stop-associated stimuli decreases with learning. These accounts suggest that attention to the stop-
associated stimuli could be both increased and decreased by learning. Future research should examine 
the effects of training on the attentional capture of stop-associated stimuli and how these various 
influences on attention could interact. 
In summary, it seems that attention can influence learning in response inhibition tasks, but 
learning could also influence attention. Alongside top-down influences on attention during learning, I 
suggest that the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations could influence attentional capture. This 
could even facilitate or impair further learning; according to Awh and colleagues, past attentional 
selection episodes are retrieved in subsequent trials when the relevant context is encountered again 
(Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). In future research, it could be useful to examine under what 
conditions task-irrelevant stimuli that co-occur with the presentation of task-relevant stop-associated 
stimuli also become associated with the stop goal. Furthermore, it is possible that the use of neutral 
images increased the extent to which participants began to ‘tune out’ their attention in Experiments 1-3. 
Motivationally-salient images capture attention even if they are task-irrelevant (e.g., Anderson, Laurent 
& Yantis, 2011). Consequently, if task-irrelevant, but motivationally-salient images are used as the 
stop-associated stimuli, the attentional capture to the images should be increased and the ‘tuning out’ of 
attention could be slowed. Thus, the salience of task-irrelevant stop-associated stimuli could be a key 
consideration for future research. 
Action Selection
Response inhibition depends on the outcome of a race between a ‘go’ process and a ‘stop’ process; 
inhibition is successful when the stop process finishes before the go process whereas response 
inhibition is unsuccessful when the go response reaches the response threshold first (Logan & Cowan, 
1984). Activation in the stop unit can occur via the presentation of a stop-signal (or no-go stimulus) or 
following the retrieval of a stimulus-stop association from memory (as demonstrated in this thesis). I 
propose that the activation of the stop unit via the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations slows the rate 
of accumulation in the go unit (see How do Stimulus-Stop Associations Influence Behaviour? above). 
CHAPTER 7: GENERAL DISCUSSION
285
As shown in this thesis, this will result in longer reaction times. However, training in response 
inhibition tasks does not necessarily mean that learning will always influence go responding. 
For example, in Experiments 9-10, I found that performance benefited from task practice: 
reaction times on go and two-choice trials decreased (Experiments 9-10) and the accuracy on two-
choice trials became lower (Experiment 9) throughout the training phase . However, in the test phase of 
both experiments, there was little or no difference between the congruent items (where the response 
remained the same between the training and test phases) and incongruent items (where the response 
changed between training and test phases). Importantly, the absence of a difference was most obvious 
when the task instructions emphasised rapid responding (Experiment 10). To account for this pattern of 
results, I suggest that when the task demands the rapid reconfiguration of responding (in order to 
maximise accuracy or response speed) participants engage top-down control processes (in accordance 
with these higher-order task goals) in order to reduce any potential interference resulting from the 
retrieval of acquired stimulus-stop or stimulus-response associations. For example, when the instructed 
(explicit) task goal is to maintain rapid or accurate responding, participants may deploy a top-down 
‘task-set’ to overcome any potential interference from prior stimulus-response or stimulus-stop 
learning. Dreisbach and colleagues (2008, 2009, 2011) suggest that participants can form task-sets to 
shield task performance from potential interference, such that when participants are informed of a task 
rule, performance is less susceptible to interference from competing response options than when 
performance is driven by stimulus-response associations (Dreisbach & Haider, 2009). According to this 
idea, one of the main functions of top-down control is to shield processing from potential interference 
between response tendencies. Shielding could occur by biasing attention to specific stimulus features 
(see Stimulus Detection, Chapter 7) or by activating top-down bias signals to enable the selection of the 
required response (e.g. go; Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014; see also Chun, Golomb, & Turk-
Browne, 2011).
The presentation of new task rules at the beginning of the test phase, in combination with the 
instruction to respond as quickly as possible, may have encouraged task shielding in Experiments 9-10. 
Following the reversal of acquired stimulus-stop associations, the need for top-down ‘shielding’ could 
also be identified following the detection of conflict at the response level between the required 
response (i.e. ‘go’) and the response retrieved from memory (i.e. ‘stop’; e.g. Botvinick, Braver, et al., 
2001). This could be an effective way to activate top-down control. For example, research using the 
Stroop task has shown that the detection of conflict enables the prioritisation of colour name responses 
over more automatic responses associated with the word meaning (for an overview, see Botvinick, 
Cohen, & Carter, 2004). The conflict monitoring account states that when conflict is detected, top-
down control adjustments are made to enhance task-relevant processing and eliminate or, at the very 
least, diminish the effects of task-irrelevant responses. Consistent with this idea, in Experiment 2, I 
found that participants were slower to respond to the stop-associated images than to the go-associated 
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images in the first half of trials in block 13 (the first block of the test phase), but this was in the 
opposite direction in the second half of block 13. To account for this pattern, I suggested that this 
reversal could be due to an increased error signal in the first half of the test phase. In other words, the 
detection of conflict between the go and stop responses could rapidly activate top-down control to 
reduce the interference from the acquired stimulus-stop associations. 
In future research, it would be useful to test whether the interference from the retrieval of old 
stimulus-stop associations is sensitive to top-down control by comparing the magnitude of the 
interference between the previously acquired stimulus-stop associations and the new task instructions 
in a condition where participants are explicitly instructed to avoid the effects of retrieving the old 
stimulus-stop associations, with a condition in which participants are not provided with any 
instructions to minimise interference (e.g. as in the original Verbruggen & Logan 2008a study). 
Figure 7.1. An visual depiction of how top-down control and bottom-up learning could influence stimulus 
detection and action selection processes during performance of response inhibition tasks.
Is ‘automatic inhibition’ truly automatic? Before proceeding, it is important to briefly address 
the extent to which ‘automatic inhibition’ is driven by ‘automatic’ processes. After all, a defining 
feature of automatic processes is the idea that they occur independent of top-down influences (e.g. 
Posner & Snyder, 1975). This is in direct contrast to the account provided above in which the effects of 
stimulus-stop learning on behaviour can be modulated by top-down control settings (see also 
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Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c; for a discussion of this research, see Response inhibition as a ‘prepared 
reflex’, Chapter 1). In this way, ‘automatic inhibition’ clearly does not fit with the traditional 
description of ‘automatic’ processing. Nevertheless, I highlight that this does not rule out the idea that 
stimulus-stop learning is automatic in the sense that it relies on memory-retrieval processes (consistent 
with theories of automaticity; Logan, 1988). Indeed, the research presented in this thesis provides 
strong support for the idea that inhibition can become ‘automatic’ in that it can be triggered by the 
retrieval of direct stimulus-stop associations from memory. In other words, stop learning can be 
‘automatic’ in the Logan sense because the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations can facilitate the 
automatisation of response inhibition which may, on some trials, rely exclusively on the retrieval of 
stimulus-stop associations. However, stop learning is not ‘automatic’ in the Posner and Snyder sense 
because it is can still be influenced by top-down attentional and executive control settings. Future 
research is required to test exactly how top-down and bottom-up control interact in response inhibition 
tasks and to examine the factors that influence the relative contributions of top-down and bottom-up 
factors. 
Implications for Applied Research
In addition to contributing to our theoretical understanding of stimulus-stop learning, this thesis also 
has implications for more applied research. In this section, I highlight three of the main implications. 
First, the results presented in Chapter 2 indicate that attentional settings influence learning in 
response inhibition tasks. Even when salient images are used as stimuli (e.g. as in the food studies; see 
Practical Applications, Chapter 1), participants may still adjust their attentional settings, and ignore the 
images to a certain degree. Currently, the task-relevance of the stop-associated images used in applied 
stop-training studies varies. Whilst the task-relevance of the images may not influence engagement in 
impulsive behaviours (e.g. impulsive eating can be prompted by incidental processing of food cues in 
the environment; see, e.g. Lawrence, Hinton, Parkinson, & Lawrence, 2012), the results presented in 
this thesis suggest that designs in which participants must attend to the images should produce 
‘stronger’ stimulus-stop associations that will have a more pronounced influence on stop-learning. 
Second, in order to maximise the inhibitory control training effects, this thesis suggests that it 
is important to consider how other features of the stop learning task design could influence what is 
learned. For example, in Experiments 1-4, I devised a novel task that combined features of the go/no-
go task and the stop-signal task. In Experiments 1-3, there was no delay between the presentation of 
the images and the go/stop signal (i.e. zero ms); in Experiment 4, there was a variable delay between 
the images and the go/stop signal but, unlike in typical stop-signal tasks, the go and stop signal 
occurred at the same moment (i.e. there was no delay between the go and the stop signals). But to 
avoid the possibility that subjects would simply wait on all trials, I used a low overall proportion of 
stop trials (0.25), imposed a relatively strict response deadline (750 ms) and provided feedback if the 
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participant did not respond in time. Combined, this provided an effective design in which which to 
investigate stop learning it allowed me to manipulate the go/stop signal representation whilst 
maximising the number of correct stop trials. After all, previous work indicates that stimulus-stop 
associations are less likely to be learned when inhibition is unsuccessful (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, 
2008b; Verbruggen, Logan, et al., 2008). The idea that the stop outcome is important is further 
supported by studies in the applied domain. Stop learning effects on task performance and on food- and 
alcohol consumption have been observed after both go/no-go and stop-signal training. However, a 
recent meta-analysis indicates that go/no-go training has stronger effects on appetitive behaviour than 
stop training (Jones, Di Lemma, et al., 2016). This could be due to generally higher success rates in the 
go/no-go task (Jones, Di Lemma, et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Thus, I suggest that a 
consideration of features of applied stop training tasks, such as the timing, the proportion of stop trials, 
and the go response deadline, could be key to understanding the efficacy of training on food and 
alcohol consumption. Therefore, future research should manipulate these task features to discern how 
they influence outcome measures, such as food or alcohol consumption. 
Third, a key concern in the applied domain is whether qualitatively different learning processes 
occur when the stimulus-stop associations are implicit (i.e. uninstructed) and when stimulus-stop 
associations are explicit (i.e. instructed). Although Chapter 3 (Experiments 5-6) indicates that 
expectancies do not necessarily correlate with performance, I find consistent evidence that participants 
generate expectancies that are consistent with the stimulus-stop contingencies in play (Experiments 
1-8). This raises the question; to what extent are training effects in the inhibitory training domain due 
to expectancies and task demands (Boot, Simons, et al. 2013 raised a similar issue)? Furthermore, the 
extent to which the effects of stimulus-stop learning on expectancy ratings equates to other dependent 
variables used in the stop-training studies, such as food intake, is also unclear. Most studies in the 
inhibitory control training domain do not include a dependent variable that is sensitive enough to 
measure expectancies (see Newell & Shanks, 2014), such as expectancy ratings (e.g. Stothart, Simons, 
Boot & Kramer, 2014). However, the research presented in this thesis suggests that this would provide 
a useful addition to applied inhibitory control training studies. 
Avenues for Future Research
Alongside the outstanding issues outlined above, there are also some more general issues relating to 
nature of associations acquired in response inhibition tasks that should be addressed in future research. 
Alternative Routes 
Alongside the direct and indirect pathways (see What is Learned?, Chapter 7), Verbruggen, Best, et al. 
(2014) also proposed a third possibility that stimulus-stop associations could influence behaviour 
through a link with the Pavlovian aversive and appetitive centres (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; 
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Dickinson & Dearing, 1979; Konorski, 1967). Verbruggen, Best, et al. suggest that learning in response 
inhibition tasks could operate through links between the ‘stop system’ and the aversive system, and 
between the ‘go system’ and the appetitive system (for an overview, see McLaren & Verbruggen, 
2014). 
Consistent with this suggestion, several studies in the applied inhibitory control training 
literature have shown that images associated with stopping show a reduction in rated valence (Veling, 
Aarts, et al., 2013a; Veling, Holland, & van Knippenberg, 2008) and more negative implicit affective 
reactions (Houben, Nederkoorn, & Jansen, 2012b; Veling & Aarts, 2009). Furthermore, Ferrey, 
Frischen, and Fenske (2012) showed that stop associations not only influence the hedonic value of 
stop-associated stimuli but also the motivational value. In a first experiment, Ferrey, Frischen, et al. 
paired sexually attractive images with either stopping or going. Following a training phase, participants 
were required to rate the attractiveness of the images. These ratings showed that participants rated 
images that were paired with stopping as less attractive than the images associated with going. In a 
second experiment, Ferrey, Frischen, et al. showed that heterosexual males made fewer key presses to 
view the sexually-appealing images that were previously paired with stopping (no-go) than to un-
appealing images or control (scrambled) images. Thus, not only does stop learning devalue the stop-
associated stimuli but it could also influence the motivational value of stimuli, discouraging 
participants from responding to previously appealing ‘approach’ stimuli.
In the experiments presented in this thesis, I always used affectively neutral images or words. 
However, manipulating the appetitive/aversive properties of the stop-associated stimuli could be an 
effective way to enhance the effects of stimulus-stop learning on behaviour. For example, in addition to 
measuring the perceived value of the stop-associated stimuli at the end of training, it could be useful to 
compare the effects of stop learning for aversive stimuli (e.g. stimuli associated with monetary loss in a 
prior training task) compared with the effects of stop learning for appetitive stimuli (e.g. stimuli 
associated with monetary reward in a prior training task). If the appetitive/aversive systems play a role, 
I predict that the effects of stop learning should be enhanced for the aversive stimuli compared with the 
appetitive stimuli. This would have theoretical implications for our understanding of the links between 
the appetitive/aversive systems and action control, and could also provide a potential avenue to 
increase the effects of stimulus-stop learning in the applied inhibition training domain.
Mediation via a Category Representation
The majority of experiments in the stop learning literature can be placed into two groups: those in 
which stopping is trained by manipulating the pairings of specific stimuli and the presentation of a stop 
signal (e.g. as in Experiments 1-8 in this thesis) and those in which the stimulus-stop (no-go) 
associations are instructed by a stimulus-category rule (e.g. as in Experiments 9-10 in this thesis). As 
discussed above, this thesis found no evidence to support the idea that the stimulus-stop association is 
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strongly mediated by a representation of the stop signal. However, this does not rule out the possibility 
that the stimulus-stop associations acquired in the go/no-go task are mediated via the go/no-go 
category (e.g., ‘desk = non-living -> non-living = no-go’, instead of ‘desk = no-go’; Verbruggen, Best, 
et al., 2014). Indeed, mediation of the stimulus-stop association via a category representation could 
even present an adaptive advantage in that it reduces the memory load of having to store all the 
individual stimuli and would instead allow for optimal performance by storing only the category rule 
(e.g. natural vs. human-made; for a similar idea in the context of task-switching, see Arrington & 
Logan, 2004). 
Initial research by Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) supports the idea that participants acquire 
stimulus-category associations during performance of the go/no-go task; despite the reversal of the go/
no-go associations in a test phase, Verbruggen and Logan found that performance was initially slightly 
better for the old no-go items than for novel items that were not presented during the training phase. 
This suggests that performance for the old items benefitted from the retrieval of stimulus-category 
associations acquired during training whereas the novel items could not benefit from prior stimulus-
category learning (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a, Experiment 1). Furthermore, in another experiment, 
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, Experiment 2) showed that when a new categorisation task was 
introduced in the test phase, there was general (non-specific) cost between the end of the training phase 
and the test phase. This suggests that training in this task probably benefited from the consistent 
stimulus-category associations, such that when the new judgment task was introduced participants 
could no longer rely on the old category labels.
However, the research presented in this thesis suggests that mediation via the go/no-go 
category on performance is not an inevitable consequence of go/no-go task performance, especially 
when the stimulus set is small. In Experiments 9-10 (Chapter 5), I adapted the aforementioned 
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, Experiment 2) task in order to examine the specificity of learning in the 
go/no-go task67. The paradigm comprised a training phase in which the stimulus-category and stimulus-
response (go or no-go) mappings remained the same (e.g. diamond = go; square = no-go), followed by 
a test phase in which a new judgment task was introduced (e.g. ‘infrequent’ (3 x 3) chequerboard = go; 
‘frequent’ (9 x 9) chequerboard = no-go). Thus, just as in the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) paradigm, 
performance could benefit from stimulus-category associations during the training phase but the 
introduction of a new judgment task in the test phase meant that performance could no longer benefit 
from the retrieval of the acquired stimulus-category associations. The main differences between the 
task used in Experiments 9-10 and the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, Experiment 2) version were that 
I used a smaller stimulus-set (4 items vs. 60 items) and that I used visual discrimination tasks 
67. Note that although there was a two-choice task condition in Experiments 9-10, I focus only on the go/no-go 
version here for comparison with the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) experiment. However, there is no clear 
reason why the effects of category mediation would differentially influence performance in the go/no-go task 
more than in the two-choice task, or vice versa. 
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(diamond/square; frequent/infrequent chequerboards) rather than semantic judgment tasks (living/non-
living; smaller/bigger). The results showed that, unlike in the Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, 
Experiment 2) experiment, there was no reliable difference in performance between the final blocks in 
the training phase and blocks in the test phase. 
Therefore, I propose that the extent of mediation via a category could depend, at least in part, 
on the stimulus-set size; when the stimulus-set is large, participants are more likely to rely on abstract 
category representations (thus acquiring mediated stimulus-category-stop associations) and when the 
stimulus-set is small(er) participants could acquire more direct stimulus-stop associations. The 
suggestion that stimulus set-size may influence the acquisition of stimulus-stop versus more abstract 
category-stop associations is consistent with research in the task-switching literature which suggests 
that people tend to use ‘task-sets’68 when the stimulus-set is large but rely on associations when the 
stimulus-set is small (Forrest, Monsell, & McLaren, 2014). Future research should test this idea by 
varying the stimulus set-size in go/no-go training tasks and measuring the magnitude of the cost 
between the end of training and the test phase. It could also be useful to sufficiently debrief participants 
in that experiment in order to discern whether they based performance on a category representation 
(e.g. living/non-living) or whether they relied on remembering individual stimulus-stop (and stimulus-
go) associations.
Transfer to a New Stimulus Set
A related outstanding issue concerns the extent to which stop learning transfers to novel settings. 
Whilst the potential effects of stimulus-signal learning on performance were construed by Verbruggen, 
Best, et al. (2014) as being highly specific to trials in which the trained signal appeared, mediation of 
the stimulus-stop association via a category representation may actually be beneficial as it could 
indicate a higher level of abstraction held within the associations. For example, it has been suggested 
that rules have ‘compositional hierarchy’ in which more abstract representations can modulate more 
specific stimulus-action representations (e.g. rather than apple -> stop, apple = fruit = stop; Cole, 
Laurent, & Stocco, 2013). Thus, if stimulus-stop associations become mediated by a category 
representation this could encourage transfer to a novel stimuli. Consistent with this idea, it has recently 
been found that participants are able to generalise category-response associations to novel stimuli 
whereas stimulus-response associations do not improve performance above baseline for novel stimuli 
(Longman, Milton, Wills, & Verbruggen, under review). This suggests that the acquisition of category-
stop associations could even facilitate learning in novel contexts. However, category-stop learning and 
stimulus-specific stop learning have not been directly compared and it has not been investigated how 
stimulus-specific stop learning could transition into abstract category-stop learning. 
68. A ‘task set’ refers to the configuration of the cognitive system that is required to perform a given task (e.g. 
Rogers & Monsell, 1995).
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A consideration of how stop learning could transfer to novel stimulus sets and the situations 
under which transfer could occur was beyond the scope of the research presented in this thesis. 
However, alongside being of theoretical interest, transfer is a central concern to research in the applied 
inhibitory control domain (for an overview of this research, see Practical Applications, Chapter 1). 
Indeed, some effects of applied inhibitory control training on food and alcohol consumption have been 
reported outside of the lab suggesting that some level of abstraction must occur in these studies (as 
people never see the exact training images in real life; for an example, see Houben, Havermans, et al. 
2012). As a first step, future research should investigate the acquisition of stimulus-category stop rules 
by using stimuli in which a category-stop rule can be abstracted during training. It seems likely that the 
acquisition of an abstract category-stop association would transfer to novel situations more than the 
acquisition of a stimulus-specific stop association. To test this idea in future research, one could insert a 
‘transfer’ phase with a new stimulus set (e.g. a new set of living/non-living words) following training. 
If participants acquired specific stimulus-stop associations, the effects of training should not transfer to 
the novel stimuli, whereas if participants abstracted a category-stop rule during the course of learning 
some transfer to to the novel items should be observed. 
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, this thesis has demonstrated that response inhibition can become a ‘bottom-up’ act of 
control driven by the retrieval of stimulus-stop associations from memory. However, a major 
contribution of this thesis is to highlight that the effects of stop learning on behaviour most likely 
depends on an interplay of top-down and bottom-up factors. To account for these findings, I proposed 
how top-down and bottom-up factors could interact during stimulus detection and action selection 
stages of processing. Considering how top-down and bottom-up control interacts, and establishing the 
factors that influence the relative contributions of top-down and bottom-up factors are key questions 
for future research. In this way, ‘banishing the control homunculus’ from theories of action control lies 
not in distinguishing between top-down and bottom-up factors, but in understanding how top-down and 
bottom-up factors interact in order to give rise to a flexible, adaptive, efficient system capable of 
outsourcing control where possible and overriding bottom-up influences whenever the situation 
requires. Therefore, this thesis calls for researchers in the action control domain to consider top-down 
and bottom-up control as dependent, rather than independent, influences on behaviour.
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Appendix M
RT Percentiles
To investigate the possibility that the effects of stop learning were sensitive to response speed, I plotted 
RT percentiles for the item-specific training data in Experiments 5-6 (combined; Chapter 3) and 
Experiment 8 (Chapter 4). Under conditions where the stimulus-stop contingencies were not instructed 
(Figure M.1(b) and Figure M.2) there was a trend towards the slowing for the stop-associated items 
emerging at the faster end of the distribution. However, the interactions between stimulus type and 
percentile did not reach statistical significance in Experiments 5-6 (p = 0.255) or in Experiment 8 (p = 
0.390). When the stimulus-stop contingencies were acquired via explicit instructions, there was no 
similar trend (Figure M.1(a); Experiments 5-6); the slowing was largest in the middle of the RT 
distribution (the stimulus-type by percentile interaction was reliable, p < 0.001).
RT percentiles for Experiments 1-4 can be found in Appendix B. To briefly recap, these 
percentile analyses revealed that for Experiments 1-3 the slowing for the stop-associated stimuli 
emerged at the slow end of the distribution (which I attributed to the processing of the images) whereas 
for Experiment 4 the slowing for the stop-associated stimuli emerged at the fast end of the RT 
distribution (which I attributed to the presentation of the images prior to the presentation of the stop/go 
signal). 
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Figure M.1. Go RTs (in ms) in Experiments 5-6 (combined) in the instructed condition for the three stimulus-
types (0%-stop, 20%-stop, 80%-stop) as a function of percentile. 
Figure M.2. Go RTs (in ms) in Experiments 5-6 (combined) in the uninstructed condition for the three stimulus-
types (0%-stop, 20%-stop, 80%-stop) as a function of percentile. 
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Figure M.3. Go RTs (in ms) in Experiment 8 for the two stimulus-types (go-associated, stop-associated) as a 
function of percentile. 
REFERENCES
296
REFERENCES
Adams, R. C., & Chambers, C. D. (2012). Mapping the timecourse of goal-directed attention to 
location and colour in human vision. Acta Psychologica, 139(3), 515–523. doi:10.1016/
j.actpsy.2012.01.014
Allom, V., & Mullan, B. (2015). Two inhibitory control training interventions designed to improve 
eating behaviour and determine mechanisms of change. Appetite, 89, 282–290. doi:10.1016/
j.appet.2015.02.022
Allom, V., Mullan, B., & Hagger, M. (2015). Does inhibitory control training improve health 
behaviour? A meta-analysis. Health Psychology Review, 7199, 1–38. doi:
10.1080/17437199.2015.1051078
Andersen, S. K., Müller, M. M., & Hillyard, S. A. (2009). Color-selective attention need not be 
mediated by spatial attention. Journal of Vision, 9(6), 1–7. doi:10.1167/9.6.2.
Anderson, B. A., Laurent, P. A., & Yantis, S. (2011). Value-driven attentional capture. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences USA, 108(25), 10367–10371. doi:10.1073/pnas.1104047108
Anderson, B. A., & Folk, C. L. (2012). Contingent involuntary motoric inhibition: the involuntary 
inhibition of a motor response contingent on top-down goals. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 38(6), 1348–1352. doi:10.1037/a0030514
Anderson, B. A., & Folk, C. L. (2014). Conditional automaticity in response selection: contingent 
involuntary response inhibition with varied stimulus-response mapping. Psychological Science, 
25(2), 547–554. doi:10.1177/0956797613511086
Anselme, P., Robinson, M. J. F., & Berridge, K. C. (2013). Reward uncertainty enhances incentive 
salience attribution as sign-tracking. Behavioural Brain Research, 238, 53–61. doi:10.1016/
j.bbr.2012.10.006
Aron, A. R. (2007). The neural basis of inhibition in cognitive control. The Neuroscientist, 13(3), 214–
228. doi:10.1177/1073858407299288
Aron, A. R., Durston, S., Eagle, D. M., Logan, G. D., Stinear, C. M., & Stuphorn, V. (2007). 
Converging evidence for a fronto-basal-ganglia network for inhibitory control of action and 
cognition. The Journal of Neuroscience, 27(44), 11860–11864. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3644-07.2007
Aron, A. R., & Verbruggen, F. (2008). Stop the presses! Dissociating a selective from a global 
mechanism for stopping. Psychological Science, 19(11), 1146–1153. doi:10.1111/
j.1467-9280.2008.02216.x
REFERENCES
297
Aron, A. R. (2011). From reactive to proactive and selective control: Developing a richer model for 
stopping inappropriate responses. Biological Psychology, 69, e55–e68. doi:10.1016/
j.biopsych.2010.07.024
Aron, A. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2006). Cortical and subcortical contributions to stop signal response 
inhibition: Role of the subthalamic nucleus. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26(9), 2424–2433. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4682-05.2006
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., & Poldrack, R. A. (2014). Inhibition and the right inferior frontal cortex: 
One decade on. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(4), 177–185. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2013.12.003
Aron, A. R., Robbins, T. W., & Poldrack, R. A. (2004). Inhibition and the right inferior frontal cortex. 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(4), 170–177. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.02.010
Arrington, C. M., & Logan, G. D. (2004). The cost of a voluntary task switch. Psychological Science, 
15(9), 610–615. doi:10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00728.x
Ashby, F. G., Ell, S. W., & Waldron, E. M. (2003). Procedural learning in perceptual categorization. 
Memory & Cognition, 31(7), 1114–1125. doi:10.3758/BF03196132
Atienza, M., Cantero, J. L., & Dominguez-Marin, E. (2002). The time course of neural changes 
underlying auditory perceptual learning. Learning & Memory, 9(3), 138–150. doi:10.1101/
lm.46502
Awh, E., Belopolsky, A. V., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). Top-down versus bottom-up attentional control: A 
failed theoretical dichotomy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16(8), 437–443. doi:10.1016/
j.tics.2012.06.010
Band, G. P. H., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & van der Molen, M. W. (2003). Speed-accuracy modulation in 
case of conflict: the roles of activation and inhibition. Psychological Research, 67(4), 266–279. 
doi:10.1007/s00426-002-0127-0
Barcelo, F., Munoz-Cespedes, Juan, M., Pozo, M. A., & Francisco, J. R. (2000). Attentional set 
shifting modulates the target P3b response in the Wisconsin card sorting test. 
Neuropsychologia, 38(10), 1342–1355. doi:10.1016/S0028-3932(00)00046-4
Bari, A., & Robbins, T. W. (2013). Inhibition and impulsivity: Behavioral and neural basis of response 
control. Progress in Neurobiology, 108, 44–79. doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2013.06.005
Bechara, A., Noel, X., & Crone, E. (2006). Loss of willpower: Abnormal neural mechanisms of 
impulse control and decision making in addiction. In R. W. Wiers & A. W. Stacy (Eds.), 
Handbook of implicit cognition and addiction (pp. 225–232). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 
Publications.
REFERENCES
298
Bekker, E. M., Kenemans, J. L., Hoeksma, M. R., Talsma, D., & Verbaten, M. N. (2005). The pure 
electrophysiology of stopping. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 55(2), 191–198. 
doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2004.07.005
Bell, A. J., & Sejnovski, T. J. (1995). An information-maximisation approach to blind separation and 
blind deconvolution. Neural Computation, 7, 1004–1034.
Bender, A. D., Filmer, H. L., Garner, K. G., Naughtin, C. K., & Dux, P. E. (2016). On the relationship 
between response selection and response inhibition: An individual differences approach. 
Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics. doi:10.3758/s13414-016-1158-8
Benikos, N. (2014). Optimising the training-induced changes of inhibitory control (Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation). University of Wollongong, New South Wales.
Benikos, N., Johnstone, S. J., & Roodenrys, S. J. (2013). Short-term training in the Go/Nogo task: 
Behavioural and neural changes depend on task demands. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 87(3), 301–312. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.12.001
Berkman, E. T., Kahn, L. E., & Merchant, J. S. (2014). Training-induced changes in inhibitory control 
network activity. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34(1), 149–157. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3564-13.2014
Berti, S. (2008). Object switching within working memory is reflected in the human event-related 
brain potential. Neuroscience Letters, 434(2), 200–205. doi:10.1016/j.neulet.2008.01.055
Best, M., Lawrence, N. S., Logan, G. D., McLaren, I. P. L., & Verbruggen, F. (2015). Should I stop or 
should I go? The role of associations and expectancies. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Human Perception and Performance, 42(1), 115–137. doi:10.1037/xhp0000116
Bestmann, S. (2012). Functional modulation of primary motor cortex during action selection. In R. 
Chen & J. C. Rothwell (Eds.), Cortical connectivity (pp. 183–205). Berlin, Germany: Springer.
Bissett, P. G., & Logan, G. D. (2011). Balancing cognitive demands: control adjustments in the stop-
signal paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
37(2), 392–404. doi:10.1037/a0021800
Bokura, H., Yamaguchi, S., & Kobayashi, S. (2001). Electrophysiological correlates for response 
inhibition in a Go/NoGo task. Clinical Neurophysiology, 112(12), 2224–2232. doi:10.1016/
S1388-2457(01)00691-5
Boot, W. R., Simons, D. J., Stothart, C. ., & Stutts, C. (2013). The pervasive problem with placebos in 
psychology: Why active control groups are not sufficient to rule out placebo effects. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(4), 445–454. doi:10.1177/1745691613491271
REFERENCES
299
Boronat, C. B., & Logan, G. D. (1997). The role of attention in automatization: does attention operate 
at encoding, or retrieval, or both? Memory & Cognition, 25(1), 36–46. doi:10.3758/
BF03197283
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). Evaluating the 
demand for control: Anterior cingulate cortex and conflict monitoring. Psychological Review, 
108(3), 624–652. doi:10.1038/46035
Botvinick, M. M., Cohen, J. D., & Carter, C. S. (2004). Conflict monitoring and anterior cingulate 
cortex: An update. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(12), 539–546. doi:10.1016/
j.tics.2004.10.003
Boucher, L., Palmeri, T. J., Logan, G. D., & Schall, J. D. (2007). Inhibitory control in mind and brain: 
an interactive race model of countermanding saccades. Psychological Review, 114(2), 376–
397. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.114.2.376
Bowditch, W.A. (2016). Response inhibition and associative learning: Training stimulus specific 
response inhibition (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of Exeter, UK.
Bowditch, W. A., Verbruggen, F., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2015). Associatively mediated stopping: 
Training stimulus-specific inhibitory control. Learning & Behavior, 1–13. doi:10.3758/
s13420-015-0196-8
Bowley, C., Faricy, C., Johnstone, S. J., & Smith, J. L. (2013). The effects of inhibitory control 
training on alcohol consumption, implicit alcohol-related cognitions and brain electrical 
activity. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 89, 342–348.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The Psychophysics Toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10(4), 433–436.
Bruin, K. J., Wijers, A. A, & van Staveren, A. S. J. (2001). Response priming in a go/nogo task: do we 
have to explain the go/nogo N2 effect in terms of response activation instead of inhibition? 
Clinical Neurophysiology : Official Journal of the International Federation of Clinical 
Neurophysiology, 112(9), 1660–1671. doi:10.1016/S1388-2457(01)00601-0
Bruin, K. J., & Wijers, A. A. (2002). Inhibition, response mode, and stimulus probability: A 
comparative event-related potential study. Clinical Neurophysiology, 113(7), 1172–1182. doi:
10.1016/S1388-2457(02)00141-4
Buch, E. R., Mars, R. B., Boorman, E. D., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2010). A network centered on 
ventral premotor cortex exerts both facilitatory and inhibitory control over primary motor 
cortex during action reprogramming. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(4), 1395–1401. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.4882-09.2010
REFERENCES
300
Bunge, S. A. (2004). How we use rules to select actions: A review of evidence from cognitive 
neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 4(4), 564–579. doi:10.3758/
CABN.4.4.564
Chambers, C. D., Bellgrove, M. A., Gould, I. C., English, T., Garavan, H., McNaught, E., Kamke, M., 
& Mattingley, J. B. (2007). Dissociable mechanisms of cognitive control in prefrontal and 
premotor cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology, 98(6), 3638–3647. doi:10.1152/jn.00685.2007
Chambers, C. D., Bellgrove, M. A., Stokes, M. G., Henderson, T. R., Garavan, H., Robertson, I. H., 
Morris, A. P., & Mattingley, J. B. (2006). Executive “brake failure” following deactivation of 
human frontal lobe. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 18(3), 444–455. doi:
10.1162/089892906775990606
Chambers, C. D., Garavan, H., & Bellgrove, M. A. (2009). Insights into the neural basis of response 
inhibition from cognitive and clinical neuroscience. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
33(5), 631-646. doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2008.08.016
Chavan, C. F., Mouthon, M., Draganski, B., van der Zwaag, W., & Spierer, L. (2015). Differential 
patterns of functional and structural plasticity within and between inferior frontal gyri support 
training-induced improvements in inhibitory control proficiency. Human Brain Mapping, 
36(7), 2527–2543. doi:10.1002/hbm.22789
Chein, J. M., & Schneider, W. (2012). The brain’s learning and control architecture. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 21, 78–84. doi:10.1177/0963721411434977
Chevrier, A., Noseworthy, M. D., & Schachar, R. (2007). Dissociation of response inhibition and 
performance monitoring in the stop signal task using event-related fMRI. Human Brain 
Mapping, 28, 1347-1358. doi:10.1002/hbm.20355
Chikazoe, J., Jimura, K., Hirose, S., Yamashita, K., Miyashita, Y., & Konishi, S. (2009). Preparation to 
inhibit a response complements response inhibition during performance of a stop-signal task. 
The Journal of Neuroscience: The Official Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 29(50), 
15870–15877. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3645-09.2009
Chiu, Y.C., & Aron, A. R. (2014). Unconsciously Triggered Response Inhibition Requires An 
Executive Setting. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 143(1), 56–61. doi:10.1037/
a0031497
Chiu, Y.C., Aron, A. R., & Verbruggen, F. (2012). Response suppression by automatic retrieval of 
stimulus-stop association: evidence from transcranial magnetic stimulation. Journal of 
Cognitive Neuroscience, 24(9), 1908–18. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00247
Cohen-Kdoshay, O., & Meiran, N. (2009). The representation of instructions operates like a prepared 
reflex: flanker compatibility effects found in first trial following S-R instructions. 
Experimental Psychology, 56(2), 128–133. doi:10.1027/1618-3169.56.2.128
REFERENCES
301
Cohen, J. R., & Poldrack, R. A. (2008). Automaticity in motor sequence learning does not impair 
response inhibition. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 15(1), 108–115. doi:10.3758/
PBR.15.1.108
Cohen, M. X., & Frank, M. J. (2009). Neurocomputational models of basal ganglia function in 
learning, memory and choice. Behavioural Brain Research, 199(1), 141–156. doi:10.1016/
j.bbr.2008.09.029
Cole, M. W., Laurent, P., & Stocco, A. (2013). Rapid instructed task learning: a new window into the 
human brain’s unique capacity for flexible cognitive control. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral 
Neuroscience, 13(1), 1–22. doi:10.3758/s13415-012-0125-7
Coles, M. G. H. (1989). Modern mind-brain reading: Psychophysiology, physiology, and Ccgnition. 
Psychophysiology, 26(3), 251–269. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1989.tb01916.x
Colzato, L. S., Van Den Wildenberg, W. P. M., Van Wouwe, N. C., Pannebakker, M. M., & Hommel, 
B. (2009). Dopamine and inhibitory action control: Evidence from spontaneous eye blink rates. 
Experimental Brain Research, 196(3), 467–474. doi:10.1007/s00221-009-1862-x
Connor, C. E., Egeth, H. E., & Yantis, S. (2004). Visual attention: Bottom-up versus top-down. 
Current Biology, 14, R850-R852. doi:10.1016/j.cub.2004.09.041
Cornelissen, F. W., Peters, E. M., & Palmer, J. (2002). The eyelink toolbox: Eye tracking with 
MATLAB and the psychophysics Toolbox. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & 
Computers, 34(4), 613–617. doi:10.3758/BF03195489
Cramer, A. O. J., van Ravenzwaaij, D., Matzke, D., Steingroever, H., Wetzels, R., Grasman, R. P. P. P., 
Waldorp, L., & Wagenmakers, E.J. (2016). Hidden multiplicity in exploratory multiway 
ANOVA: Prevalence and remedies. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23(2), 640–647. doi:
10.3758/s13423-015-0913-5
Crews, F. T., & Boettiger, C. A. (2009). Impulsivity, frontal lobes and risk for addiction. 
Pharmacology, Biochemistry, and Behavior, 93(3), 237–47. doi:10.1016/j.pbb.2009.04.018
de Wit, H. (2009). Impulsivity as a determinant and consequence of drug use: a review of underlying 
processes. Addiction Biology, 14, 22–31. doi:10.1111/j.1369-1600.2008.00129.x
Della Libera, C., & Chelazzi, L. (2009). Learning to attend and to ignore is a matter of gains and 
losses. Psychological Science, 20(6), 778–784. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02360.x
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual attention. Annual Review 
of Neuroscience, 18, 193-222. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.18.1.193
REFERENCES
302
Dickinson, A., & Balleine, B. (2002). The role of learning in the operation of motivational systems. In 
C. R. Gallistel (Ed.), Steven’s handbook of experimental psychology, Vol. 3. Learning, 
motivation, & emotion (pp. 497–533). New York: Wiley.
Dickinson, A., & Dearing, M. F. (1979). Appetitive-aversive interactions and inhibitory processes. In 
A. Dickinson & R. A. Boakes (Eds.), Mechanism of learning and motivation (pp. 203–231). 
Hilldale, N.J: Erlbaum.
Dienes, Z. (2011). Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: Which side are you on? Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 6(3), 274–290. doi:10.1177/1745691611406920
Dienes, Z. (2007). Subjective measures of unconscious knowledge. Progress in Brain Research, 168, 
1–45. doi:10.1016/S0079-6123(07)68005-4
Dienes, Z., Altmann, G. T. M., Kwan, L., & Goode, A. (1995). Unconscious knowledge of artificial 
grammars is applied strategically. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, 
and Cognition, 2(5), 1322–1338. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.21.5.1322
Ditye, T., Jacobson, L., Walsh, V., & Lavidor, M. (2012). Modulating behavioral inhibition by tDCS 
combined with cognitive training. Experimental Brain Research, 219(3), 363–368. doi:
10.1007/s00221-012-3098-4
Dodds, C. M., Morein-Zamir, S., & Robbins, T. W. (2011). Dissociating inhibition, attention, and 
response control in the frontoparietal network using functional magnetic resonance imaging. 
Cerebral Cortex, 21(5), 1155–1165. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhq187
Donchin, E. (1981). Surprise!... Surprise? Psychophysiology, 18(5), 493–513. doi:10.1111/
j.1469-8986.1981.tb01815.x
Donchin, E., & Coles, M. G. H. (1988). Is the P300 component a manifestation of context updating? 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11(03), 357-427. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00058027
Donders, F. C. (1868/1969). On the speed of mental processes. Acta Psychologica, 30, 412–431. doi:
10.1016/0001-6918(69)90065-1
Donkers, F. C. L., & Van Boxtel, G. J. M. (2004). The N2 in go/no-go tasks reflects conflict 
monitoring not response inhibition. Brain and Cognition, 56, 165–176. doi:10.1016/
j.bandc.2004.04.005
Dreisbach, G., & Haider, H. (2009). How task representations guide attention: further evidence for the 
shielding function of task sets. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 35(2), 477–486. doi:10.1037/a0014647
Dreisbach, G., & Haider, H. (2008). That’s what task sets are for: Shielding against irrelevant 
information. Psychological Research, 72(4), 355–361. doi:10.1007/s00426-007-0131-5
REFERENCES
303
Dreisbach, G., & Wenke, D. (2011). The shielding function of task sets and its relaxation during task 
switching. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 37(6), 
1540–1546. doi: 10.1037/a0024077
Duncan-Johnson, C. C., & Donchin, E. (1977). On quantifying surprise: The variation of event-related 
potentials with subjective probability. Psychophysiology, 14(5), 456–467. doi:10.1111/
j.1469-8986.1977.tb01312.x
Duncan, J. (2006). EPS Mid-Career Award 2004: Brain mechanisms of attention. Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology (2006), 59(1), 2–27. doi:10.1080/17470210500260674
Duncan, J., & Owen, A. M. (2000). Common regions of the human frontal lobe recruited by diverse 
cognitive demands. Trends in Neurosciences, 23(10), 475–483. doi:10.1016/
S0166-2236(00)01633-7
Egner, T., & Hirsch, J. (2005). Cognitive control mechanisms resolve conflict through cortical 
amplification of task-relevant information. Nature Neuroscience, 8(12), 1784–1790. doi:
10.1038/nn1594
Eimer, M., & Coles, M. G. H. (2003). The lateralized readiness potential as an on-line measure of 
central response activation processes. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 
30(1), 146–156. doi:10.3758/BF03209424
Eimer, M. (1993). Effects of attention and stimulus probability on ERPs in a Go/Nogo task. Biological 
Psychology, 35(2), 123–138. doi:10.1016/0301-0511(93)90009-W
Elchlepp, H., Lavric, A., Chambers, C. D., & Verbruggen, F. (2016). Proactive inhibitory control: A 
general biasing account. Cognitive Psychology, 86, 27–61. doi:10.1016/
j.cogpsych.2016.01.004
Enriquez-Geppert, S., Konrad, C., Pantev, C., & Huster, R. J. (2010). Conflict and inhibition 
differentially affect the N200/P300 complex in a combined go/nogo and stop-signal task. 
NeuroImage, 51(2), 877–887. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.02.043
Enticott, P. G., Bradshaw, J. L., Bellgrove, M. a, Upton, D. J., & Ogloff, J. R. P. (2009). Stop task 
after-effects: The extent of slowing during the preparation and execution of movement. 
Experimental Psychology, 56(4), 247–251. doi:10.1027/1618-3169.56.4.247
Falkenstein, M., Hoormann, J., & Hohnsbein, J. (1999). ERP components in Go/Nogo tasks and their 
relation to inhibition. Acta Psychologica, 101(2-3), 267–291. doi:10.1016/
S0001-6918(99)00008-6
Falkenstein, M., Koshlykova, N. A., Kiroj, V. N., Hoormann, J., & Hohnsbein, J. (1995). Late ERP 
components in visual and auditory Go/Nogo tasks. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology/ Evoked Potentials, 96(1), 36–43. doi:10.1016/0013-4694(94)00182-K
REFERENCES
304
Fenske, M. J., & Eastwood, J. D. (2003). Modulation of focused attention by faces expressing 
emotion: evidence from flanker tasks. Emotion, 3(4), 327–343. doi:10.1037/1528-3542.3.4.327
Fernie, G., Peeters, M., Gullo, M. J., Christiansen, P., Cole, J. C., Sumnall, H., & Field, M. (2013). 
Multiple behavioural impulsivity tasks predict prospective alcohol involvement in adolescents. 
Addiction, 108(11), 1916–1923. doi:10.1111/add.12283
Ferrey, A. E., Frischen, A., & Fenske, M. J. (2012). Hot or not: Response inhibition reduces the 
hedonic value and motivational incentive of sexual stimuli. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 575. 
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00575
Folk, C. L., Remington, R. W., & Johnston, J. C. (1992). Involuntary covert orienting is contingent on 
attentional control settings. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 18(4), 1030–1044. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.18.4.1030
Folstein, J. R., & Van Petten, C. (2008). Influence of cognitive control and mismatch on the N2 
component of the ERP: A review. Psychophysiology, 45(1), 152–170. doi:10.1111/
j.1469-8986.2007.00602.x
Forrest, C. L. D., Monsell, S., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2014). Is performance in task-cuing experiments 
mediated by task set selection or associative compound retrieval? Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 40(4), 1002–1024. doi:10.1037/a0035981
Frank, M. J. (2006). Hold your horses: A dynamic computational role for the subthalamic nucleus in 
decision making. Neural Networks, 19(8), 1120–1136. doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.03.006
Friedman, D., Cycowicz, Y. M., & Gaeta, H. (2001). The novelty P3: An event-related brain potential 
(ERP) sign of the brain’s evaluation of novelty. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 
25(4), 355–373. doi:10.1016/S0149-7634(01)00019-7
Frings, C., & Moeller, B. (2012). The horserace between distractors and targets: Retrieval-based probe 
responding depends on distractor–target asynchrony. Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 24(5), 
582–590. doi:10.1080/20445911.2012.666852
Gajewski, P. D., & Falkenstein, M. (2013). Effects of task complexity on ERP components in Go/
Nogo tasks. International Journal of Psychophysiology : Official Journal of the International 
Organization of Psychophysiology, 87(3), 273–278. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2012.08.007
Garavan, H., & Stout, J. C. (2005). Neurocognitive insights into substance abuse. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 9(4), 195–201. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.02.008
Gaschler, R., & Nattkemper, D. (2012). Instructed task demands and utilization of action effect 
anticipation. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 578. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00578
REFERENCES
305
Gebauer, G. F., & Mackintosh, N. J. (2007). Psychometric intelligence dissociates implicit and explicit 
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 33(1), 34–
54. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.33.1.34
Giesen, C., & Rothermund, K. (2014). You better stop! Binding “stop” tags to irrelevant stimulus 
features. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology (2006), 67(4), 809–832. doi:
10.1080/17470218.2013.834372
Gollwitzer, P. M. (1999). Implementation intentions. American Psychologist, 54(7), 493–503. doi:
10.1177/0146167207311201
Golomb, J., & Turk-Browne, N. B. (2010). A taxonomy of external and internal attention. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 62(1), 73–101. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100427
Gomez, P., Ratcliff, R., & Perea, M. (2007). A model of the go/no-go task. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: General, 136(3), 389–413. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.3.389
Gratton, G., Coles, M.G.H., Sirevaag, E.J., Eriksen, C.W., Donchin, E., 1988. Pre- and poststimulus 
activation of response channels: a psychophysiological analysis. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception & Performance, 14(3), 331–344.
Graybiel, A. M. (2005). The basal ganglia: Learning new tricks and loving it. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 15(6), 638–644. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2005.10.006
Guerrieri, R., Nederkoorn, C., & Jansen, A. (2012). Disinhibition is easier learned than inhibition. The 
effects of (dis)inhibition training on food intake. Appetite, 59(1), 96–99. doi:10.1016/
j.appet.2012.04.006
Hall, G. (2002). Associative structures in Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning. In C. R. Gallistel 
(Ed.), Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology (3rd ed., pp. 1–45). New York: John 
Wiley & Sons.
Hampshire, A., Chamberlain, S. R., Monti, M. M., Duncan, J., & Owen, A. M. (2010). The role of the 
right inferior frontal gyrus: inhibition and attentional control. NeuroImage, 50(3), 1313–1319. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.12.109
Hanes, D. P., Patterson, W. F., & Schall, J. D. (1998). Role of frontal eye fields in countermanding 
saccades: visual, movement, and fixation activity. Journal of Neurophysiology, 79(2), 817–
834. doi:10.1007/s00221-008-1455-0
Hartmann, L., Sallard, E., & Spierer, L. (2015). Enhancing frontal top-down inhibitory control with 
Go/NoGo training. Brain Structure and Function, 1131–1137. doi:10.1007/s00429-015-1131-7
REFERENCES
306
Henson, R. N., Eckstein, D., Waszak, F., Frings, C., & Horner, A. J. (2014). Stimulus-response 
bindings in priming. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 376–384. doi:10.1016/
j.tics.2014.03.004
Hogarth, L., Dickinson, A., Austin, A., Brown, C., & Duka, T. (2008). Attention and expectation in 
human predictive learning: the role of uncertainty. Quarterly Journal of Experimental 
Psychology (2006), 61(11), 1658–1668. doi:10.1080/17470210701643439
Hommel, B. (1998). Event Files: Evidence for automatic integration of stimulus-response episodes. 
Visual Cognition, 5(1-2), 183–216. doi:10.1080/713756773
Hommel, B. (2004). Event files: feature binding in and across perception and action. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 8(11), 494–500. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.08.007
Horner, A. J., & Henson, R. N. (2011). Stimulus-response bindings code both abstract and specific 
representations of stimuli: evidence from a classification priming design that reverses multiple 
levels of response representation. Memory & Cognition, 39(8), 1457–1471. doi:10.3758/
s13421-011-0118-8
Horner, A. J., & Henson, R. N. (2009). Bindings between stimuli and multiple response codes 
dominate long-lag repetition priming in speeded classification tasks. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35(3), 757–779. doi:10.1037/a0015262
Houben, K. (2011). Overcoming the urge to splurge: influencing eating behavior by manipulating 
inhibitory control. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 42(3), 384–388. 
doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2011.02.008
Houben, K., Havermans, R. C., Nederkoorn, C., & Jansen, A. (2012). Beer à no-go: learning to stop 
responding to alcohol cues reduces alcohol intake via reduced affective associations rather than 
increased response inhibition. Addiction (Abingdon, England), 107(7), 1280–1287. doi:
10.1111/j.1360-0443.2012.03827.x
Houben, K., & Jansen, A. (2011). Training inhibitory control. A recipe for resisting sweet temptations. 
Appetite, 56(2), 345–349. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2010.12.017
Houben, K., Nederkoorn, C., Wiers, R. W., & Jansen, A. (2011). Resisting temptation: decreasing 
alcohol-related affect and drinking behavior by training response inhibition. Drug and Alcohol 
Dependence, 116(1-3), 132–136. doi:10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2010.12.011
Hughes, G., Velmans, M., & De Fockert, J. (2009). Unconscious priming of a no-go response. 
Psychophysiology, 46(6), 1258–1269. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2009.00873.x
REFERENCES
307
Huster, R. J., Enriquez-Geppert, S., Lavallee, C. F., Falkenstein, M., & Herrmann, C. S. (2013). 
Electroencephalography of response inhibition tasks: Functional networks and cognitive 
contributions. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 87(3), 217–233. doi:10.1016/
j.ijpsycho.2012.08.001
Jahanshahi, M., Obeso, I., Rothwell, J. C., & Obeso, J. A. (2015). A fronto-striato-subthalamic-pallidal 
network for goal-directed and habitual inhibition. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience, 16(12), 719–
732. doi:10.1038/nrn4038
Jahfari, S., Stinear, C. M., Claffey, M., Verbruggen, F., & Aron, A. R. (2010). Responding with 
restraint: What are the neurocognitive mechanisms? Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(7), 
1479–1492. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21307
Jahfari, S., Verbruggen, F., Frank, M. J., Waldorp, L. J., Colzato, L., Ridderinkhof, K. R., & 
Forstmann, B. U. (2012). How preparation changes the need for top-down control of the basal 
ganglia when inhibiting premature actions. Journal of Neuroscience, 32(32), 10870–10878. 
doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0902-12.2012
Jasinska, A. J. (2013). Automatic inhibition and habitual control: Alternative views in neuroscience 
research on response inhibition and inhibitory control. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 
7, 1–4. doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00025
Jodo, E., & Inoue, K. (1990). Effects of practice on the P300 in a Go/NoGo task. 
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 76(3), 249–257. doi:
10.1016/0013-4694(90)90019-G
Jodo, E., & Kayama, Y. (1992). Relation of a negative ERP component to response inhibition in a Go/
No-go task. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 82(6), 477–482. doi:
10.1016/0013-4694(92)90054-L
Jones, A., Di Lemma, L. C. G., Robinson, E., Christiansen, P., Nolan, S., Tudur-Smith, C., & Field, M. 
(2016). Inhibitory control training for appetitive behaviour change: A meta-analytic 
investigation of mechanisms of action and moderators of effectiveness. Appetite, 97, 16-28. 
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2015.11.013
Jones, A., & Field, M. (2013). The effects of cue-specific inhibition training on alcohol consumption 
in heavy social drinkers. Experimental and Clinical Psychopharmacology, 21(1), 8–16. doi:
10.1037/a0030683
Kasten, R., & Navon, D. (2008). Is location cueing inherently superior to color cueing? Not if color is 
presented early enough. Acta Psychologica, 127(1), 89–102. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.02.002
Kastner, S., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2000). Mechanisms of visual attention in the human cortex, Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 23, 315–341. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.23.1.315
REFERENCES
308
Kato, Y., Endo, H., & Kizuka, T. (2009). Mental fatigue and impaired response processes: Event-
related brain potentials in a Go/NoGo task. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 72(2), 
204–211. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2008.12.008
Kiefer, M., Marzinzik, F., Weisbrod, M., Scherg, M., & Spitzer, M. (1998). The time course of brain 
activations during response inhibition: evidence from event-related potentials in a go/no go 
task. Neuroreport, 9(4), 765–770. 
Kiesel, A., Miller, J., Jolicoeur, P., & Brisson, B. (2008). Measurement of ERP latency differences: A 
comparison of single-participant and jackknife-based scoring methods. Psychophysiology, 
45(2), 250–274. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2007.00618.x
Koch, I., & Allport, A. (2006). Cue-based preparation and stimulus-based priming of tasks in task 
switching. Memory & Cognition, 34(2), 433–444. doi:10.3758/BF03193420
Kok, A., Ramautar, J. R., De Ruiter, M. B., Band, G. P. H., & Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2004). ERP 
components associated with successful and unsuccessful stopping in a stop-signal task. 
Psychophysiology, 41(1), 9–20. doi:10.1046/j.1469-8986.2003.00127.x
Konorski, J. (1967). Integrative activity of the brain: An interdisciplinary approach. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
Kruschke, J. K. (2003). Attention in learning. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12(5), 
171–175. doi:10.1111/1467-8721.01254
Lakens, D. (2013). Calculating and reporting effect sizes to facilitate cumulative science: A practical 
primer for t-tests and ANOVAs. Frontiers in Psychology, 4(NOV), 1–12. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2013.00863
Langford, Z. D., Krebs, R. M., Talsma, D., Woldorff, M., & Boehler, C. N. (2016). Strategic down-
regulation of attentional resources as a mechanism of proactive response inhibition. European 
Journal of Neuroscience, 44(4), 2095-2103. doi:10.1111/ejn.13303
Lavric, A., Pizzagalli, D. A., & Forstmeier, S. (2004). When “go” and “nogo” are equally frequent: 
ERP components and cortical tomography. European Journal of Neuroscience, 20(9), 2483–
2488. doi:10.1111/j.1460-9568.2004.03683.x
Lawrence, N. S., O’Sullivan, J., Parslow, D., Javaid, M., Adams, R. C., Chambers, C. D., Kos, K., & 
Verbruggen, F. (2015a). Training response inhibition to food is associated with weight loss and 
reduced energy intake. Appetite, 95, 17–28. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2015.06.009
Lawrence, N. S., Verbruggen, F., Morrison, S., Adams, R. C., & Chambers, C. D. (2015b). Stopping to 
food can reduce intake. Effects of stimulus-specificity and individual differences in dietary 
restraint. Appetite, 85C, 91–103. doi:10.1016/j.appet.2014.11.006
REFERENCES
309
Lawrence, N. S., Hinton, E. C., Parkinson, J. A., & Lawrence, A. D. (2012). Nucleus accumbens 
response to food cues predicts subsequent snack consumption in women and increased body 
mass index in those with reduced self-control. NeuroImage, 63(1), 415–422. doi:10.1016/
j.neuroimage.2012.06.070
Le Pelley, M. E., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2003). Learned associability and associative change in human 
causal learning. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. B, Comparative and 
Physiological Psychology, 56(1), 68–79. doi:10.1080/02724990244000179
Le Pelley, M. E., Suret, M. B., & Beesley, T. (2009). Learned predictiveness effects in humans: a 
function of learning, performance, or both? Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal 
Behavior Processes, 35(3), 312–327. doi:10.1037/a0014315
Le Pelley, M. E., Mitchell, C. J., & Johnson, A. M. (2013). Outcome value influences attentional 
biases in human associative learning: Dissociable effects of training and instruction. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 39(1), 39–55. doi:10.1037/a0031230
Le Pelley, M. E., Pearson, D., Griffiths, O., & Beesley, T. (2014). When goals conflict with values: 
Counterproductive attentional and oculomotor capture by reward-related stimuli. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: General, 144(1), 158–171. doi:10.1037/xge0000037
Le Pelley, M. E., Vadillo, M., & Luque, D. (2013). Learned predictiveness influences rapid attentional 
capture: evidence from the dot probe task. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 39(6), 1888–1900. doi:10.1037/a0033700
Lenartowicz, A., & Verbruggen, F. (2011). Inhibition-related activation in the right inferior frontal 
gyrus in the absence of inhibitory cues. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11), 3388–
3399. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00031
Leocani, L., Cohen, L., & Wassermann, E. (2000). Human corticospinal excitability evaluated with 
transcranial magnetic stimulation during different reaction time paradigms. Brain, 123, 1161–
1173. doi:10.1093/brain/ 123.6.1161
Levy, B. J., & Wagner, A. D. (2011). Cognitive control and right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex: 
Reflexive reorienting, motor inhibition, and action updating. Annals of the New York Academy 
of Sciences, 1224(1), 40–62. doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.05958.x
Liefooghe, B., Degryse, J., & Theeuwes, M. (2016). Automatic effects of No-Go instructions. 
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology. doi:10.1037/cep0000080
Lin, Z., & Murray, S. O. (2015). Automaticity of unconscious response inhibition: comment on Chiu 
and Aron (2014). Journal of Experimental Psychology. General, 144(1), 244–54. doi:10.1037/
xge0000042
REFERENCES
310
Livesey, E. J., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2007). Elemental associability changes in human discrimination 
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 33(2), 148–159. 
doi:10.1037/0097-7403.33.2.148
Logan, G. D. (1981). Attention, automaticity, and the ability to stop a speeded choice response. In J. 
Long, & A. D. Baddeley (Eds.), Attention and performance IX. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Logan, G. (1983). On the ability to inhibit simple thoughts and actions: I. Stop-signal studies of 
decision and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
9(4), 585–606. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.9.4.585
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of automatization. Psychological Review, 95(4), 492–
527. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.95.4 .492
Logan, G. (1990). Repetition Priming and Automaticity: Common underlying mechanisms? Cognitive 
Psychology, 35, 1–35. doi:10.1016/0010-0285(90)90002-L
Logan, G. D. (1992). Shapes of reaction-time distributions and shapes of learning curves: a test of the 
instance theory of automaticity. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 18(5), 883–914. doi:10.1037//0278-7393.18.5.883
Logan, G. D., & Bundesen, C. (2003). Clever homunculus: Is there an endogenous act of control in 
the explicit task-cuing procedure? Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and 
Performance, 29(3), 575–599. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.29.3.575
Logan, G. D., & Etherton, J. L. (1994). What is learned during automatization ? The Role of Attention 
in Constructing an Instance. Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and 
Cognition, 20(5), 1022–1050.
Logan, G. D., & Gordon, R. D. (2001). Executive control of attention in dual-task situations. 
Psychological Review, 108(2), 393-434. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.108.2.393
Logan, G. D., Yamaguchi, M., Schall, J. D., & Palmeri, T. J. (2015). Inhibitory control in mind and 
brain 2.0: Blocked-input models of saccadic countermanding. Psychological Review, 122(2), 
115–147. doi:10.1037/a0038893
Logan, G. D., & Burkell, J. (1986). Dependence and independence in responding to double 
stimulation: A comparison of stop, change, and dual-task paradigms. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 12(4), 549–563. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.12.4.549
Logan, G. D., & Cowan, W. B. (1984). On the ability to inhibit thought and action: A theory of an act 
of control. Psychological Review, 91(3), 295–327. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.91.3.295
REFERENCES
311
Logan, G. D., Van Zandt, T., Verbruggen, F., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2014). On the ability to inhibit 
thought and action: General and special theories of an act of control. Psychological Review, 
121(1), 66–95. doi:10.1037/a0035230
Longman, C. S., Lavric, A., & Monsell, S. (2013). More attention to attention? An eye-tracking 
investigation of selection of perceptual attributes during a task switch. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 39(4), 1142–1151. doi:10.1037/a0030409
Longman, C. S., Lavric, A., Munteanu, C., & Monsell, S. (2014). Attentional inertia and delayed 
orienting of spatial attention in task-switching. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human 
Perception and Performance, 40(4), 1580–1602. doi:10.1037/a0036552
Longman, C. S., Milton, F., Wills, A. J., & Verbruggen, F. (under review). Category-response 
associations enhance the early stages of instructed learning and rapidly generalize to novel 
stimuli.
Luck, S. J. (2005). An introduction to the event-related potential technique. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Luck, S. J. (2009). The spatiotemporal dynamics of visual-spatial attention. In F. Aboitiz, & D. 
Cosmelli (Eds.), From attention to goal-directed behavior. Springer-Verlag: Berlin. 
Luft, C. D. B., Takase, E., & Bhattacharya, J. (2014). Processing Graded Feedback: 
Electrophysiological correlated of learning from small and large errors. Journal of Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 26(5), 1180–1193. doi:10.1162/jocn_a_00543
Mackintosh, N. (1975). A theory of attention: Variations in the associability of stimuli with 
reinforcement. Psychological Review, 82(4), 276–298. doi:10.1037/h0076778
MacLeod, C. M., Dodd, M. D., Sheard, E. D., Wilson, D. E., & Bibi, U. (2003). In opposition to 
inhibition. In B. H. Ross (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 163–
168). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
MacLeod, C. (1991). Half a Century of Research on the Stroop Effect: An Integrative Review. 
Psychological Bulletin, 109(2), 163–203. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.109.2.163
Maizey (2016). (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Cardiff University, UK. 
Manuel, A. L., Grivel, J., Bernasconi, F., Murray, M. M., & Spierer, L. (2010). Brain Dynamics 
Underlying Training-Induced Improvement in Suppressing Inappropriate Action. Journal of 
Neuroscience, 30(41), 13670–13678. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2064-10.2010
Manuel, A. L., Bernasconi, F., & Spierer, L. (2013). Plastic modifications within inhibitory control 
networks induced by practicing a stop-signal task: An electrical neuroimaging study. Cortex, 
49(4), 1141–1147. doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2012.12.009
REFERENCES
312
Mars, R. B., Piekema, C., Coles, M. G. H., Hulstijn, W., & Toni, I. (2007). On the programming and 
reprogramming of actions. Cerebral Cortex, 17(12), 2972–2979. doi:10.1093/cercor/bhm022
McAndrew, A., Jones, F. W., McLaren, R. P., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2012). Dissociating expectancy of 
shock and changes in skin conductance: an investigation of the Perruchet effect using an 
electrodermal paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Animal Behavior Processes, 
38(2), 203–208. doi:10.1037/a0026718
McAndrew, A., Yeates, F., Verbruggen, F., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2013). Modeling a reaction time 
variant of the Perruchet effect in humans. In M. Knauff, M. Pauen, N. Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth 
(Eds.), Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 
3014– 3019). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
McLaren, I. P. L., Forrest, C. L. D., McLaren, R. P., Jones, F. W., Aitken, M. R. F., & Mackintosh, N. 
J. (2014). Associations and propositions: the case for a dual-process account of learning in 
humans. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory, 108, 185–195. doi:10.1016/
j.nlm.2013.09.014
McLaren, I. P. L., Wills, A. J., & Graham, S. (2010). Attention and perceptual learning. In C. Mitchell 
& M. Le Pelley (Eds.), Attention and associative learning: From brain to behaviour (pp. 131–
158). Oxford: Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaren, I. P. L., Green, R. E. A., & Mackintosh, N. J. (1994). Animal learning and the implicit/
explicit distinction. In N. C. Ellis (Ed.), Implicit and Explicit Learning of Languages. 
Academic Press.
McLaren, I. P. L., & Verbruggen, F. (2015). Associations, inhibition, and action. In R. A. Murphy & R. 
C. Honey (Eds.), The Wiley Handbook on the Cognitive Neuroscience of Learning. Chichester, 
West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons.
Meyer, D. E., & Kieras, D. E. (1997). A computational theory of executive cognitive processes and 
multiple-task performance: Part 2. Accounts of psychological refractory-period phenomena. 
Psychological Review, 104(4), 749–791. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.104.4.749
Miller, E. K., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annual 
Review of Neuroscience, 24, 167–202. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.24.1.167
Miller, J., Patterson, T., & Ulrich, R. (1998). Jackknife-based method for measuring LRP onset latency 
differences. Psychophysiology, 35(1), 99–115. doi:10.1111/1469-8986.3510099
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009). The propositional nature of human 
associative learning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32(2), 183–198. doi:10.1017/
S0140525X09000855
REFERENCES
313
Mitchell, C. J., & Le Pelley, M. E. (2010). Attention and associative learning: From brain to 
behaviour. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, a H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D. (2000). The 
unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex “Frontal Lobe” 
tasks: a latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 41(1), 49–100. doi:10.1006/
cogp.1999.0734
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(3), 134–140. doi:10.1016/
S1364-6613(03)00028-7
Monsell, S., & Driver, J. (2000). Banishing the control homunculus. In S. Monsell & J. Driver (Eds.), 
Control of cognitive processes: Attention and performance XVIII (pp. 3–32). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press.
Monsell, S., & Mizon, G. A. (2006). Can the task-cuing paradigm measure an endogenous task-set 
reconfiguration process? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 32(3), 493–516. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.32.3.493
Moreau, D., Kirk, I. J., & Waldie, K. E. (2016). Seven pervasive statistical flaws in cognitive training 
interventions. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 10(153), 1–17. doi:10.3389/
fnhum.2016.00153
Morey, R. D., Rouder, J. N., & Jamil, T. (2015). BayesFactor: Computation of Bayes factors for 
common designs (Version 0.9.11-1). Retrieved from https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/
BayesFactor/
Morgan, K. K., Luu, P., & Tucker, D. M. (2016). Changes in P3b latency and amplitude reflect 
expertise acquisition in a football visuomotor learning task. PLoS ONE, 11(4), e0154021. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0154021
Mostofsky, S. H., & Simmonds, D. J. (2008). Response inhibition and response selection: Two sides 
of the same coin. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20(5), 751–761. doi:10.1162/
jocn.2008.20500
Muller, H. J., Reimann, B., & Krummenacher, J. (2003). Visual search for singleton feature targets 
across dimensions: Stimulus- and expectancy-driven effects in dimensional weighting. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 29(5), 1021–1035. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.29.5.1021
Näätänen, R., & Picton, T. (1987). The N1 wave of the human electric and magnetic response to 
sound: a review and an analysis of the component structure. Psychophysiology, 24(4), 375–
425. doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.1987.tb00311.x
REFERENCES
314
Nambu, A., Tokuno, H., & Takada, M. (2002). Functional significance of the cortico-subthalamo-
pallidal “hyperdirect” pathway. Neuroscience Research, 43(2), 111–117. doi:10.1016/
S0168-0102(02)00027-5
Neill, W., & Valdes, L. (1992). Persistence of negative priming: Steady state or decay? Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(3), 565–576. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.18.3.565
Neill, W., Valdes, L., Terry, K., & Gorfein, D. (1992). Persistence of negative priming: II. Evidence for 
episodic trace retrieval. Journal of Experimental Psychology Learning Memory and Cognition, 
18(5), 993–1000. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.18.5.993
Newell, B. R., & Shanks, D. R. (2014). Unconscious influences on decision making: A critical review. 
The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37(1), 1–19. doi:10.1017/S0140525X12003214
Nieuwenhuis, S., Aston-Jones, G., & Cohen, J. D. (2005). Decision making, the P3, and the locus 
coeruleus-norepinephrine system. Psychological Bulletin, 131(4), 510–532. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.131.4.510
Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). Stimulus modality, perceptual overlap, and the 
go/no-go N2. Psychophysiology, 41(1), 157–160. doi:10.1046/j.1469-8986.2003.00128.x
Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., van den Wildenberg, W., & Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2003). 
Electrophysiological correlates of anterior cingulate function in a go/no-go task: Effects of 
response conflict and trial type frequency. Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Neuroscience, 
3(1), 17–26. doi:10.3758/CABN.3.1.17
Nigg, J. (2001). Is ADHD a disinhibitory disorder? Psychological Bulletin, 127(5), 571–598. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.127.5.571
Noël, X., Brevers, D., & Bechara, A. (2013). A neurocognitive approach to understanding the 
neurobiology of addiction. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 23, 1–7. doi:10.1016/
j.conb.2013.01.018
Noël, X., Brevers, D., Hanak, C., Kornreich, C., Verbanck, P., & Verbruggen, F. (2016). On the 
automaticity of response inhibition in individuals with alcoholism. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 51, 84–91. doi:10.1016/j.jbtep.2016.01.003
Norman, D. A., & Shallice, T. (1986). Attention to action: Willed and automatic control of behavior. 
Advances in Research: Vol. IV. Consciousness and Self-Regulation, 99(99), 1–18. doi:
10.1007/978-1-4757-0629-1
O’Shea, J., & Walsh, V. (2007). Transcranial magnetic stimulation. Current Biology, 17(6), R196–9. 
doi:S0960-9822(07)00868-8 [pii]\r10.1016/j.cub.2007.01.030
REFERENCES
315
Oldenburg, J. F. E., Roger, C., Assecondi, S., Verbruggen, F., & Fias, W. (2012). Repetition priming in 
the stop signal task: The electrophysiology of sequential effects of stopping. 
Neuropsychologia, 50(12), 2860–2868. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.08.014
Olivers, C. N. L., & Eimer, M. (2011). On the difference between working memory and attentional 
set. Neuropsychologia, 49(6), 1553–1558. doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.11.033
Papies, E. K., & Aarts, H. (2016). Automatic self-regulation: From habit to goal pursuit. In Handbook 
of self regulation: Research, theory, and applications (3rd ed). New York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Passingham, R. E., & Toni, I. (2001). Contrasting the dorsal and ventral visual systems: Guidance of 
movement versus decision making. NeuroImage, 14, S125–S131. doi:10.1006/nimg.2001.0836
Pearce, J., & Hall, G. (1980). A model for Pavlovian learning: variations in the effectiveness of 
conditioned but not of unconditioned stimuli. Psychological Review, 87(6), 532–552. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.87.6.532
Pearce, J., & Mackintosh, N. (2010). Two theories of attention: a review and a possible integration. In 
C. Mitchell & M. E. Le Pelley (Eds.), Attention and Associative Learning: From Brain to 
Behaviour (pp. 11–39). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perruchet, P. (2015). Dissociating conscious expectancies from automatic link formation in associative 
learning: A review on the so-called Perruchet effect. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Animal Learning and Cognition, 41(2), 105–127. doi:10.1037/xan0000060
Perruchet, P., Cleeremans, A., & Destrebecqz, A. (2006). Dissociating the effects of automatic 
activation and explicit expectancy on reaction times in a simple associative learning task. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32(5), 955–965. doi:
10.1037/0278-7393.32.5.955
Pfefferbaum, A., Ford, J. M., Weller, B. J., & Kopell, B. S. (1985). ERPs to response production and 
inhibition. Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology, 60(5), 423–434. doi:
10.1016/0013-4694(85)91017-X
Pineda, J. A., Westerfield, M., Kronenberg, B. M., & Kubrin, J. (1997). Human and monkey P3-like 
responses in a mixed modality paradigm: Effects of context and context-dependent 
noradrenergic influences. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 27, 223–240. doi:
10.1016/S0167-8760(97)00061-5
Polich, J. (2003). Overview of the P3a and P3b. In J. Polich (Ed.), Detection of change: event-related 
potential and fMRI findings. (pp. 83–98). Boston, MA: Kluwer.
Polich, J. (2007). Updating P300: An integrative theory of P3a and P3b. Clinical Neurophysiology, 
118(10), 2128–2148. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.04.019
REFERENCES
316
Polich, J., & Kok, A. (1995). Cognitive and biological determinants of P300: an integrative review. 
Biological Psychology, 41(2), 103–146. doi:10.1016/0301-0511(95)05130-9
Posner, M. A. (1980). Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 32(1), 3–
25. doi:10.1080/00335558008248231
Posner, M. I., & Cohen, Y. (1984). Components of visual orienting. In H. Bouma & D. G. Bouwhuis 
(Eds.), Attention and performance, vol. 10 (pp. 531–556). Hilldale, N.J: Erlbaum.
Posner, M. I., & Snyder, C. R. (1975). Attention and cognitive control. In R. L. Solso (Ed.), 
Information processing and cognition (pp. 55–85). Hilldale, N.J: Erlbaum.
R Development Core Team. (2014). R: A language and environment for statistical computing. Vienna, 
Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing. Retrieved from http://www.R-project.org/
Race, E. A., Shanker, S., & Wagner, A. D. (2008). Neural Priming in Human Frontal Cortex : Multiple 
Forms of Learning Reduce Demands on the Prefrontal Executive System, 1766–1781. doi:
10.1162/jocn.2009.21132
Rae, C. L., Hughes, L. E., Weaver, C., Anderson, M. C., & Rowe, J. B. (2014). Selection and stopping 
in voluntary action: A meta-analysis and combined fMRI study. NeuroImage, 86, 381–391. doi:
10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.10.012
Ramautar, J. R., Kok, A., & Ridderinkhof, K. R. (2004). Effects of stop-signal probability in the stop-
signal paradigm: The N2/P3 complex further validated. Brain and Cognition, 56(2 SPEC. 
ISS.), 234–252. doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2004.07.002
Ratcliff, R. (1978). A theory of memory retrieval. Psychological Review, 85(2), 59–108. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.85.2.59
Ratcliff, R., & Smith, P. L. (2004). A comparison of sequential sampling models for two-choice 
reaction time, 111(2), 333–367. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.111.2.333
Ratcliff, R., Smith, P. L., Brown, S. D., & McKoon, G. (2016). Diffusion decision model: Current 
issues and history. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 20(4), 260–281.
Ravden, D., & Polich, J. (1998). Habituation of P300 from visual stimuli. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 30(3), 359–365. doi:10.1016/S0167-8760(98)00039-7
Rehder, B., & Hoffman, A. B. (2005). Eyetracking and selective attention in category learning. 
Cognitive Psychology, 51(1), 1–41. doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.11.001
Ridderinkhof, K. R., Ullsperger, M., & Crone, E. A. (2004). The role of the medial frontal cortex in 
cognitive control. Science, 306(5695), 443–447. doi:10.1126/science.1100301
REFERENCES
317
Rieger, M., & Gauggel, S. (1999). Inhibitory after-effects in the stop signal paradigm. British Journal 
of Psychology, 90, 509–518.
Rietdijk, W. J. R., Franken, I. H. A., & Thurik, A. R. (2014). Internal consistency of event-related 
potentials associated with cognitive control: N2/P3 and ERN/Pe. PLoS ONE, 9(7), 3–9. doi:
10.1371/journal.pone.0102672
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between simple cognitive tasks. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124(2), 207–231.
Rouder, J. N., Morey, R. D., Speckman, P. L., & Province, J. M. (2012). Default Bayes factors for 
ANOVA designs. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 56(5), 356–374. doi:10.1016/
j.jmp.2012.08.001
Rubia, K., Taylor, E., Smith, A. B., Oksannen, H., Overmeyer, S., & Newman, S. (2001). 
Neuropsychological analyses of impulsiveness in childhood hyperactivity. British Journal of 
Psychiatry, 179, 138–143.
Rushworth, M. F. S., Passingham, R. E., & Nobre, A. C. (2002). Components of switching intentional 
set. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(8), 1139–1150. doi:10.1162/089892902760807159
Saenz, M., Buracas, G. T., & Boynton, G. M. (2002). Global effects of feature-based attention in 
human visual cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 5(7), 631–2. doi:10.1038/nn876
Salinas, E., & Stanford, T. R. (2013). The countermanding task revisited: Fast stimulus detection is a 
key determinant of psychophysical performance. The Journal of Neuroscience : The Official 
Journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 33(13), 5668–5685. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.3977-12.2013
Schall, J. D. (2001). Neural basis of deciding, choosing and acting. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 
2(1), 33–42. doi:10.1038/35049054
Schapkin, S., Falkenstein, M., Marks, A., & Griefahn, B. (2007). Practice-related effects in a go-nogo 
task. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 105, 1275–1288. doi:10.2466/PMS.105.4.1275-1288
Schneider, D. W. (2015). Attentional Control of Response Selection in Task Switching. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 41(5), 1315–1324. doi:
10.1037/xhp0000091
Schneider, D. W., & Logan, G. D. (2005). Modeling task switching without switching tasks: a short-
term priming account of explicitly cued performance. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
General, 134(3), 343–367. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.134.3.343
REFERENCES
318
Schneider, W., & Shiffrin, R. M. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: I. 
Detection, search, and attention. Psychological Review, 84(1), 1–66. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.84.1.1
Shanks, D. R., & John, M. F. S. (1994). Characteristics of dissociable learning systems. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 17, 367–395. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00035032
Shanks, D. R. (2010). Learning: From association to cognition. Annual Review of Psychology, 61, 
273–301. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100519
Shiffrin, R., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. 
Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. Psychological Review, 84(2), 
127–190. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.84.2.127
Simmonds, D. J., Pekar, J. J., & Mostofsky, S. H. (2008). Meta-analysis of Go/No-go tasks 
demonstrating that fMRI activation associated with response inhibition is task-dependent. 
Neuropsychologia, 46(1), 224–232. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2007.07.015
Simon, J. R., & Rudell, A. P. (1967). Auditory S-R compatibility: The effect of an irrelevant cue on 
information processing. Journal of Applied Psychology, 51(3), 300–304. doi:10.1037/
h0020586
Smith, J. L., Johnstone, S. J., & Barry, R. J. (2008). Movement-related potentials in the Go/NoGo 
task: The P3 reflects both cognitive and motor inhibition. Clinical Neurophysiology, 119(3), 
704–714. doi:10.1016/j.clinph.2007.11.042
Smith, J. L., Smith, E. A., Provost, A. L., & Heathcote, A. (2010). Sequence effects support the 
conflict theory of N2 and P3 in the Go/NoGo task. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 
75(3), 217–226. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2009.11.002
Smith, J. L., & Douglas, K. M. (2011). On the use of event-related potentials to auditory stimuli in the 
Go/NoGo task. Psychiatry Research, 193(3), 177–81. doi:10.1016/j.pscychresns.2011.03.002
Smith, P. L., & Ratcliff, R. (2004). Psychology and neurobiology of simple decisions. Trends in 
Neurosciences, 27(3), 161–168. doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.01.006
Snyder, K. M., Ashitaka, Y., Shimada, H., Ulrich, J. E., & Logan, G. D. (2014). What skilled typists 
don’t know about the QWERTY keyboard. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 76(1), 162–
71. doi:10.3758/s13414-013-0548-4
Song, Y., Ding, Y. L., Fan, S. L., & Chen, L. (2002). An event-related potential study on visual 
perceptual learning under short-term and long-term training conditions. Neuroreport, 13(16), 
2053–2057. doi:10.1097/00001756-200211150-00013
REFERENCES
319
Spierer, L., Chavan, C. F., & Manuel, A. L. (2013). Training-induced behavioral and brain plasticity in 
inhibitory control. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 427. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00427
Stothart, C. R., Simons, D. J., Boot, W. R., & Kramer, A. F. (2014). Is the effect of aerobic exercise on 
cognition a placebo effect? PloS One, 9(10), e109557. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0109557
Strayer, D. L., & Kramer, A. F. (1994). Strategies and automaticity: II. Dynamic aspects of strategy 
adjustment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 20(2), 
342–365. doi:10.1037/0278-7393.20.2.342
Sudevan, P., & Taylor, D. A. (1987). The cuing and priming of cognitive operations. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 13(1), 89–103. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.13.1.89
Suret, M., & McLaren, I. (2005). Elemental representation and associability: An integrated model. In 
A. J. Wills (Ed.), New directions in human associative learning (pp. 155–188). Mahwah, NJ: 
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Sutherland, N., & Mackintosh, N. (1971). Mechanisms of animal discrimination learning. New York: 
Academic Press.
Theeuwes, J., & Van der Burg, E. (2011). On the limits of top-down control of visual selection. 
Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 73(7), 2092–103. doi:10.3758/s13414-011-0176-9
Tipper, S. P. (1985). The negative priming effect. Inhibitory priming by ignored objects. The Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 37(A), 571-590. doi:10.1080/14640748508400920
Tukey, J. W. (1977). Exploratory Data Analysis. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Tzelgov, J. (1997). Specifying the relations between automaticity and consciousness: A theoretical 
note. Consciousness and Cognition, 6, 441–451.
Ulrich, R., Mattes, S., & Miller, J. (1999). Donders’s assumption of pure insertion: an evaluation on 
the basis of response dynamics. Acta Psychologica, 102(1), 43–76. doi:10.1016/
S0001-6918(99)00019-0
Ulrich, R., & Miller, J. (2001). Using the jackknife-based scoring method for measuring LRP onset 
effects in factorial designs. Psychophysiology, 38(5), 816–827. doi:10.1017/
S0048577201000610
Valls-Solé, J., Pascual-Leone, A., Wassermann, E. M., & Hallett, M. (1992). Human motor evoked 
responses to paired transcranial magnetic stimuli. Electroencephalography and Clinical 
Neurophysiology/Evoked Potentials Section, 85(6), 355–364. doi:
10.1016/0168-5597(92)90048-G
REFERENCES
320
Van Boxtel, G. J. M., Van der Molen, M. W., Jennings, J. R., & Brunia, C. H. M. (2001). A 
psychophysiological analysis of inhibitory motor control in the stop-signal paradigm. 
Biological Psychology, 58(3), 229–262. doi:10.1016/S0301-0511(01)00117-X
van Gaal, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Fahrenfort, J. J., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. A. F. (2008). Frontal 
cortex mediates unconsciously triggered inhibitory control. Journal of Neuroscience, 28(32), 
8053–8062. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1278-08.2008
van Gaal, S. Van, Lamme, V., & Fahrenfort, J. (2011). Dissociable brain mechanisms underlying the 
conscious and unconscious control of behavior. Journal of Cognitive, 1–15. doi:10.1162/
jocn.2010.21431
van Gaal, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., Scholte, H. S., & Lamme, V. a F. (2010). Unconscious activation of 
the prefrontal no-go network. The Journal of Neuroscience, 30(11), 4143–4150. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.2992-09.2010
van Gaal, S., Ridderinkhof, K. R., van den Wildenberg, W. P. M., & Lamme, V. a F. (2009). 
Dissociating consciousness from inhibitory control: Evidence for unconsciously triggered 
response inhibition in the stop-signal task. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human 
Perception and Performance, 35(4), 1129–1139. doi:10.1037/a0013551
Van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Veling, H., Stroebe, W., & Aarts, H. (2014). Comparing two 
psychological interventions in reducing impulsive processes of eating behaviour: Effects on 
self-selected portion size. British Journal of Health Psychology, 19(4), 767–782. doi:10.1111/
bjhp.12075
Veling, H., & Aarts, H. (2009). Putting behavior on hold decreases reward value of need-instrumental 
objects outside of awareness. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 45(4), 1020–1023. 
doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.04.020
Veling, H., Aarts, H., & Papies, E. K. (2011). Using stop signals to inhibit chronic dieters’ responses 
toward palatable foods. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(11), 771–780. doi:10.1016/
j.brat.2011.08.005
Veling, H., Aarts, H., & Stroebe, W. (2013a). Using stop signals to reduce impulsive choices for 
palatable unhealthy foods. British Journal of Health Psychology, 18(2), 354–368. doi:10.1111/
j.2044-8287.2012.02092.x
Veling, H., Aarts, H., & Stroebe, W. (2013b). Stop signals decrease choices for palatable foods 
through decreased food evaluation. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 875. doi:10.3389/
fpsyg.2013.00875
Veling, H., Holland, R. W., & van Knippenberg, A. (2008). When approach motivation and behavioral 
inhibition collide: Behavior regulation through stimulus devaluation. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 44(4), 1013–1019. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2008.03.004
REFERENCES
321
Veling, H., van Koningsbruggen, G. M., Aarts, H., & Stroebe, W. (2014). Targeting impulsive 
processes of eating behavior via the internet. Effects on body weight. Appetite, 78, 102–109. 
doi:10.1016/j.appet.2014.03.014
Verbruggen, F., Adams, R. C., van ’t Wout, F., Stevens, T., McLaren, I. P. L., & Chambers, C. D. 
(2013). Are the Effects of Response Inhibition on Gambling Long-Lasting? PLoS ONE, 8(7), 
e70155. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0070155
Verbruggen, F., Adams, R., & Chambers, C. D. (2012). Proactive motor control reduces monetary risk 
taking in gambling. Psychological Science, 23(7), 805–815. doi:10.1177/0956797611434538
Verbruggen, F., Aron, A. R., Stevens, M. A., & Chambers, C. D. (2010). Theta burst stimulation 
dissociates attention and action updating in human inferior frontal cortex. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 107(31), 13966–13971. doi:
10.1073/pnas.1001957107
Verbruggen, F., Best, M., Bowditch, W., Stevens, T., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2014). The inhibitory 
control reflex. Neuropsychologia, 65, 263–278. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.08.014.
Verbruggen, F., Chambers, C. D., & Logan, G. D. (2013). Fictitious inhibitory differences: How 
skewness and slowing distort the estimation of stopping latencies. Psychological Science, 24, 
352–362. doi:10.1177/0956797612457390
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008a). Automatic and controlled response inhibition: associative 
learning in the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms. Journal of Experimental Psychology. 
General, 137(4), 649–672. doi:10.1037/a0013170
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008b). Response inhibition in the stop-signal paradigm. Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, 12(11), 418–424. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.005
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2008c). Long-term aftereffects of response inhibition: Memory 
retrieval, task goals, and cognitive control. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human 
Perception and Performance, 34(5), 1229–1235. doi:10.1037/0096-1523.34.5.1229
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009a). Proactive adjustments of response strategies in the stop-
signal paradigm. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 
35(3), 835–854. doi:10.1037/a0012726
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009b). Models of response inhibition in the stop-signal and stop-
change paradigms. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(5), 647–661. doi:10.1016/
j.neubiorev.2008.08.014
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2009c). Automaticity of cognitive control: Goal priming in response-
inhibition paradigms. Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning Memory and Cognition, 
35(5), 1381–1388. doi:10.1037/a0016645.
REFERENCES
322
Verbruggen, F., & Logan, G. D. (2015). Evidence for capacity sharing when stopping. Cognition, 142, 
81–95. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.014
Verbruggen, F., Logan, G. D., Liefooghe, B., & Vandierendonck, A. (2008). Short-term aftereffects of 
response inhibition: repetition priming or between-trial control adjustments? Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 34(2), 413–426. doi:
10.1037/0096-1523.34.2.413
Verbruggen, F., McAndrew, A., Weidemann, G., Stevens, T., & McLaren, I. P. L. (2016). Limits of 
executive control: Sequential effects in predictable environments. Psychological Science, 
27(5), 748–757. doi:10.1177/0956797616631990
Verbruggen, F., McLaren, I. P. L., & Chambers, C. D. (2014). Banishing the control homunculi in 
studies of action control and behaviour change. Perspectives on Psychological Science., 9(5), 
497–524. doi:10.1177/1745691614526414
Verbruggen, F., Stevens, T., & Chambers, C. (2014). Proactive and reactive stopping when distracted : 
An attentional account. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 40(4), 1295–1300. doi:10.1037/ a003654.
Verleger, R., Jaskowski, P., & Wascher, E. (2005). Evidence for an integrative role of P3b in linking 
reaction to perception. Journal of Psychophysiology, 19(3), 165-181. doi:
10.1027/0269-8803.19.3.165
Verleger, R., Schroll, H., & Hamker, F. H. (2013). The unstable bridge from stimulus processing to 
correct responding in Parkinson’s disease. Neuropsychologia, 51(13), 2512–2525. doi:10.1016/
j.neuropsychologia.2013.09.017
Vidal, F., Burle, B., Grapperon, J., & Hasbroucq, T. (2011). An ERP study of cognitive architecture 
and the insertion of mental processes: Donders revisited. Psychophysiology, 48(9), 1242–1251. 
doi:10.1111/j.1469-8986.2011.01186.x
Waldron, E. M., & Ashby, F. G. (2001). The effects of concurrent task interference on category 
learning: evidence for multiple category learning systems. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
8(1), 168–176. doi:10.3758/BF03196154
Wallis, J. D., Dias, R., Robbins, T. W., & Roberts, A. C. (2001). Dissociable contributions of the 
orbitofrontal and lateral prefrontal cortex of the marmoset to performance on a detour reaching 
task. European Journal of Neuroscience, 13(9), 1797–1808. doi:10.1046/
j.0953-816x.2001.01546.x
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2004). Semantic generalization of stimulus-task bindings. 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 11(6), 1027–1033. doi:10.3758/BF03196732
REFERENCES
323
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2005). Interaction of task readiness and automatic retrieval in 
task switching: Negative priming and competitor priming. Memory & Cognition, 33(4), 595–
610. doi:10.3758/BF03195327
Waszak, F., Hommel, B., & Allport, A. (2003). Task-switching and long-term priming: Role of 
episodic stimulus–task bindings in task-shift costs. Cognitive Psychology, 46(4), 361–413. doi:
10.1016/S0010-0285(02)00520-0
Waszak, F., Pfister, R., & Kiesel, A. (2013). Top-down versus bottom-up: When instructions overcome 
automatic retrieval. Psychological Research, 77(5), 611–617. doi:10.1007/s00426-012-0459-3
Webb, T. L., & Sheeran, P. (2006). Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior change? A 
meta-analysis of the experimental evidence. Psychological Bulletin, 132(2), 249–268. doi:
10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.249
Wendt, M., & Kiesel, A. (2008). The impact of stimulus-specific practice and task instructions on 
response congruency effects between tasks. Psychological Research, 72(4), 425–432. doi:
10.1007/s00426-007-0117-3
Wenke, D., De Houwer, J., De Winne, J., & Liefooghe, B. (2014). Learning through instructions vs. 
learning through practice: flanker congruency effects from instructed and applied S-R 
mappings. Psychological Research, 79(6), 899–912. doi:10.1007/s00426-014-0621-1
Wessel, J. R., Danielmeier, C., Morton, J. B., & Ullsperger, M. (2012). Surprise and Error: Common 
Neuronal Architecture for the Processing of Errors and Novelty. Journal of Neuroscience, 
32(22), 7528–7537. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.6352-11.2012
Wiecki, T. V., & Frank, M. J. (2013). A computational model of inhibitory control in frontal cortex and 
basal ganglia. Psychol Rev, 120(2), 329–355. doi:10.1037/a0031542
Woodman, G. F. (2013). Viewing the dynamics and control of visual attention through the lens of 
electrophysiology. Vision Research, 80, 7–18. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2013.01.003
Woodman, G. F. (2010). A brief introduction to the use of event-related potentials in studies of 
perception and attention. Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 72(8), 2031–2046. doi:
10.3758/APP.72.8.2031
Woodman, G. F., & Luck, S. J. (2003). Serial deployment of attention during visual search. Journal of 
Experimental Psychology. Human Perception and Performance, 29(1), 121–138. doi:
10.1167/1.3.103
Woolard, A. A., Kose, S., Woodward, N. D., Verbruggen, F., Logan, G. D., & Heckers, S. (2010). 
Intact Associative Learning in Patients with Schizophrenia: Evidence from a Go/NoGo 
Paradigm. Schizophrenia Research, 122(1-3), 131–135. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2010.02.1057
REFERENCES
324
Wylie, G., & Allport, A. (2000). Task switching and the measurement of “switch costs”. Psychological 
Research, 63, 212–233. doi:10.1007/s004269900003
Yang, J., & Li, P. (2012). Brain networks of explicit and implicit learning. PLoS ONE, 7(8), e42993. 
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0042993
Yeung, N., Botvinick, M. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural basis of error detection: conflict 
monitoring and the error-related negativity. Psychological Review, 111(4), 931–959. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.111.4.939
Zandbelt, B. B., Bloemendaal, M., Neggers, S. F. W., Kahn, R. S., & Vink, M. (2012). Expectations 
and violations: Delineating the neural network of proactive inhibitory control. Human Brain 
Mapping, 34(9), 2015–2024. doi:10.1002/hbm.22047
Zandbelt, B. B., & Vink, M. (2010). On the role of the striatum in response inhibition. PLoS ONE, 
5(11), e13848. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0013848
